Moral Facts Supervene on Natural Facts

[Veritas Aequitas]

I have not finished David Brink's book yet [75%]; however I note the supervenience point as in the OP do struck a chord with my moral thesis.
This is why I asked AI to explain and give a simple example, and open it for discussion.

To go more into details, I am now reading SEP's
Supervenience in Ethics
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supe ... ce-ethics/

I have not finished reading it, here are the notable points which favor my position:

It is common for philosophers to endorse ethical Supervenience without much argument (an important exception is Smith 2004; for critical discussion of a variety of the arguments that have been offered, see Roberts 2018, 10–18).

Part of the reason for this is that ethical Supervenience is taken to be both obvious and uncontroversial.
(Rosen 2020 calls it “The least controversial thesis in metaethics”.)

Further, ethical Supervenience is often claimed or assumed to be an obvious conceptual truth, doubts about which are supposed to reveal conceptual incompetence.

The most common view in the literature is that the Supervenience of the ethical is a conceptual truth.

The discussion just completed, however, suggests reason to worry about this assumption: there is not one ethical Supervenience thesis but instead a complex variety of such theses.

The above is the general view of moral supervenience by many moral philosophers, i.e. both obvious and uncontroversial.
There will be those who argued against it but their counter views only deal with the nuanced and more complex issue, but do not refute the general principles of moral supervenience, i.e. moral facts supervene on natural facts.

Thus it is very immature to brush off moral supervenience based on whims and reading some oppositions against it.

I will do further research and reading to strengthen my thesis on moral supervenience.

[Flannel Jesus]

To go more into details, I am now reading SEP's
Supervenience in Ethics
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supe ... ce-ethics/

That article seems to me to suggest an entirely different type of moral supervenience to what you offered in the op. It's just basically saying "morality is situational".

So for example, generally it's not moral to kill another person, but if you find yourself in a situation where someone is trying to kill you, suddenly you killing another person becomes a moral option.

It's not about moral facts compared to natural facts at large, it's about situational ethics.

So when I asked you to describe a situation where changing a natural fact could change a moral fact, and you got all pissy with me instead of just doing it.... Well, I've just shown you how to do it without getting pissy. Hopefully you learn how to express yourself properly for next time sometime asks you.

And the idea is much more unambiguously communicated without the word supervenience at all, it seems. Just say "your moral options can change when your situation changes".

[Veritas Aequitas]

To go more into details, I am now reading SEP's
Supervenience in Ethics
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supe ... ce-ethics/

That article seems to me to suggest an entirely different type of moral supervenience to what you offered in the op. It's just basically saying "morality is situational".

So for example, generally it's not moral to kill another person, but if you find yourself in a situation where someone is trying to kill you, suddenly you killing another person becomes a moral option.

It's not about moral facts compared to natural facts at large, it's about situational ethics.

So when I asked you to describe a situation where changing a natural fact could change a moral fact, and you got all pissy with me instead of just doing it.... Well, I've just shown you how to do it without getting pissy. Hopefully you learn how to express yourself properly for next time sometime asks you.

And the idea is much more unambiguously communicated without the word supervenience at all, it seems. Just say "your moral options can change when your situation changes".

From AI[wR];

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supe ... ce-ethics/
Yes, the article discusses the idea of ethical supervenience, which is the idea that ethical properties supervene on natural properties.
This means that there cannot be a difference in ethical properties without a difference in natural properties.

[Iwannaplato]

That article seems to me to suggest an entirely different type of moral supervenience to what you offered in the op. It's just basically saying "morality is situational".

There are moral realist who use supervenience to support their moral realism. But it can just as easily support moral antirealism.

[Flannel Jesus]

I truly enjoy when you quote me just to not reply to anything I said. It's something iwannaplato points out in your behaviour frequently. What a treat for us all.

[Flannel Jesus]

That article seems to me to suggest an entirely different type of moral supervenience to what you offered in the op. It's just basically saying "morality is situational".

There are moral realist who use supervenience to support their moral realism. But it can just as easily support moral antirealism.

Don't you think "moral options are situational" is a rather simple point to make, that doesn't need to be wrapped in so much opaque jargon?

Most people already agree that, if there is such a thing as morality, violence for violence sake is not moral, but violence for self defense is moral.

If "moral supervenience" is supposed to be just a fancy way of saying "sometimes some situations allow for the mortality of violence", then... let's just speak plainly lmao. Sure, if there's such a thing as morality, moral options change situationally.

[Iwannaplato]

Don't you think "moral options are situational" is a rather simple point to make, that doesn't need to be wrapped in so much opaque jargon?

I haven't read the Stanford article, so I don't know if that's the main point. But sure that's pretty simple. I'd say that the moral realists are trying to use supervenience to jump the is/ought gap. Well, there's these molecules and other is stuff. So morals are made up of matter and are just as real as matter is. (that's not a fair summation of their position, but I'm going for shorthand). So far, so good. Yes, what we refer to as moral supervenes on matter, real stuff. But this does not give us any tools to decide which of the many patterns of matter is the one that is correct universally, let alone objectively.

Most people already agree that, if there is such a thing as morality, violence for violence sake is not moral, but violence for self defense is moral.

Except for pacifists - I know you know this - and so their arrangements of molecules with their morality is supervened on is just as objective as any other.

[Flannel Jesus]

Don't you think "moral options are situational" is a rather simple point to make, that doesn't need to be wrapped in so much opaque jargon?

I haven't read the Stanford article, so I don't know if that's the main point. But sure that's pretty simple. I'd say that the moral realists are trying to use supervenience to jump the is/ought gap. Well, there's these molecules and other is stuff. So morals are made up of matter and are just as real as matter is. (that's not a fair summation of their position, but I'm going for shorthand). So far, so good. Yes, what we refer to as moral supervenes on matter, real stuff. But this does not give us any tools to decide which of the many patterns of matter is the one that is correct universally, let alone objectively.

Most people already agree that, if there is such a thing as morality, violence for violence sake is not moral, but violence for self defense is moral.

Except for pacifists - I know you know this - and so their arrangements of molecules with their morality is supervened on is just as objective as any other.

Moral supervenience seems to have multiple meanings, so anybody claiming to believe in moral supervenience should probably just say what they really think.

Are they saying morally acceptable options change circumstantially?

Are they saying our DNA defines our morality, so a change in DNA could produce a change in morality?

Are they saying something entirely different?

Seems like there's always a better way to say what they think than to say "supervenience".

[Veritas Aequitas]

[Question]Topic Morality and Supervenience.
If is said that mirror neurons contribute the impulse of empathy in humans.
Empathy also contributes to restraining humans from killing humans in some way.
The humans killing of humans is a moral issue within a moral framework and system.
In the above, is there moral facts or properties supervening on natural facts?
………..

Yes, in the scenario you described, there is a case of moral facts or properties supervening on natural facts.

Here's the breakdown:
• Natural Fact: The existence and function of mirror neurons in the human brain. These neurons fire both when we perform an action and when we observe someone else perform a similar action.

• Natural Fact: Empathy, the ability to understand and share the feelings of another person. This is believed to be influenced by mirror neurons.

• Moral Property: The idea that killing another human is wrong. This falls within a larger moral framework and system.

Supervenience Argument:
• Mirror neurons (natural fact) contribute to our capacity for empathy (another natural fact).
• Empathy (natural fact) can motivate us to avoid harming others (linked to the moral property of not killing).
Here, the moral property ("killing is wrong") supervenes on the natural facts of mirror neurons and empathy. While empathy doesn't directly dictate morality, it creates a natural tendency that can be integrated into a moral framework.

It's important to consider some nuances:
• Not all humans with mirror neurons experience empathy to the same degree. Other factors contribute to moral reasoning.
• Moral frameworks are also shaped by social and cultural factors, not just biological ones.

Overall, the scenario suggests that moral properties can be influenced by, and perhaps even depend on, underlying natural properties. This is how supervenience plays a role in the relationship between biology and morality.

[Peter Holmes]

You have not explained why 'Moral Facts Supervene on Natural Facts' is not possible.

If there are no moral facts, then there can be no supervenience of moral facts upon natural facts.

And in that case, talk of moral supervenience is incoherent.

In other words, first you have to establish the existence of moral facts - which you've failed to do. Supervenience can't produce moral facts from natural facts.

And, as it happens, I think the idea of supervenience - especially without entailment - is a con designed to smuggle in a supposedly necessary connection. At least, that's my impression from all the examples of supervenience I've seen so far. Happy to be disabused, of course.

Example. It can never be a fact that an object, which has XYZ physical properties, is beautiful. So the putative aesthetic fact that an object is beautiful can never 'supervene upon' the fact of its physical properties.

And whether the fact of other physical properties 'supervene upon' the fact of its physical properties opens the can of worms to do with properties and identity - which, as always, is really about language games.

Are you familiar [not necessary agree] with Coherentism.

Yes. Coherentism, either in theory of truth or epistemology, gets us nowhere near objectivity, including moral objectivity. Just another shiny thing that glisters but is not gold - like supervenience.

I'd say coherence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for truth - if that weren't philosophical babble.

PS, talking of babble. I propose to revive the term 'alethiology', as it sounds so much sexier and more technical than 'theory of truth'. And, by the way, the claim that alethiology is a branch of epistemology is a fine example of conflating what we say with what we know. They ain't the same, which is why the JTB truth condition for knowledge is misleading.

[Veritas Aequitas]

If there are no moral facts, then there can be no supervenience of moral facts upon natural facts.

And in that case, talk of moral supervenience is incoherent.

In other words, first you have to establish the existence of moral facts - which you've failed to do. Supervenience can't produce moral facts from natural facts.

And, as it happens, I think the idea of supervenience - especially without entailment - is a con designed to smuggle in a supposedly necessary connection. At least, that's my impression from all the examples of supervenience I've seen so far. Happy to be disabused, of course.

Example. It can never be a fact that an object, which has XYZ physical properties, is beautiful. So the putative aesthetic fact that an object is beautiful can never 'supervene upon' the fact of its physical properties.

And whether the fact of other physical properties 'supervene upon' the fact of its physical properties opens the can of worms to do with properties and identity - which, as always, is really about language games.

Are you familiar [not necessary agree] with Coherentism.

Yes. Coherentism, either in theory of truth or epistemology, gets us nowhere near objectivity, including moral objectivity. Just another shiny thing that glisters but is not gold - like supervenience.

I'd say coherence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for truth - if that weren't philosophical babble.

PS, talking of babble. I propose to revive the term 'alethiology', as it sounds so much sexier and more technical than 'theory of truth'. And, by the way, the claim that alethiology is a branch of epistemology is a fine example of conflating what we say with what we know. They ain't the same, which is why the JTB truth condition for knowledge is misleading.

I have presented;

There are Two Senses of Reality
viewtopic.php?t=40265

There are Two Senses of Truth
viewtopic.php?t=42081

i.e.
1. FSERC based reality and truth
2. Philosophical Realism human-independent reality and truth.

I have argued, your sense of reality and truth, i.e. 2 is grounded on an illusion.
The most you can claim to it is to rely on science.
But science is a human-based conjecture-polishing-machine, so cannot support your ontological claim of a non-human-based absolutely human-independent reality and truth.

What is truth is its alignment with reality.
The quest for truth is a human-dependent activity.
If your reality and things are absolutely independent of the human activity, then there is an inevitable Reality-Gap.
This why you will end up with a Correspondence Theory of Truth, i.e. corresponding your human activity with what is supposedly absolutely human independent.
Yours is not the typical correspondence re picture-theory but there is still some sort of correspondence to bridge the reality-gap between your human-based truth activities and the thing that is absolutely human independent existing out there.

What you think is the thing that is absolutely human independent existing out there is merely your speculation and assumption as inferred from your truth searching activities.

Btw, as I had argued, the philosophical realists can reject, eject and abandon there is an absolutely human independent things existing out there, there is no loss to reality at all.
What is lost is only the psychological security blanket that the philosohical realists are clinging onto ideologically and dogmatically.
Do you have a counter for this?

On the other hand coherentism, cohere the set of beliefs that is empirically possible and realistic, i.e. reality is that which emerged and realized as real, then subsequently perceived, known and described via a specific human-based FSERC.
As such, what is claimed to be true is always qualified to a human-based FSERC of which the scientific FSERC is the gold standard.

So, the model is;
P is true because the human-based X-FSERC said so.

The claim that 'P is true' without qualification to any human-based FSERC [as you always do] is pointing to an illusion.
The thing existing without reference to any FSERC is a thing-by-itself or thing-in-itself aka noumenon as Kant had expounded to expose the illusion that philosophical realists are clinging on to as a security blanket.

[Iwannaplato]

• Moral Property: The idea that killing another human is wrong. This falls within a larger moral framework and system.

Sure. We have the research over here in the lab and the conclusions in journals. And then we have a world with moral systems.
But the research in the lab on the structures in the brains and their effect on behavior doesn't justify any moral system.
It can give us information about why some people consider X moral. But it is not a justification, except for that these things exist. Then we have the cherry picking of one part of brain structures and patterns.

[Veritas Aequitas]

• Moral Property: The idea that killing another human is wrong. This falls within a larger moral framework and system.

Sure. We have the research over here in the lab and the conclusions in journals. And then we have a world with moral systems.
But the research in the lab on the structures in the brains and their effect on behavior doesn't justify any moral system.
It can give us information about why some people consider X moral. But it is not a justification, except for that these things exist. Then we have the cherry picking of one part of brain structures and patterns.

Does the tons of research on human nature since science began justify any nutrition system, health system, medical system, psychological system, etc.
The point here is for each of the above system to exists and works, they must be enabled [constructed] in some human ways, i.e. frame the system within a human-based specific Framework.
The specific Framework and System [FSERC] has its specific Constitution, principles, processes, assumptions, and so on.

Scientific research findings are inputted into the medical FSERC to general medical facts and justify medical actions and obligations.
If there is a tumor in the brain, medically, it ought to be removed.

So, scientific research findings are inputted into the moral FSERC to generate moral facts, i.e. to ensure the well being and flourishing of humanity, the moral potential, the natural inherent "oughtnot ness to kill humans" must be made active to increase its competencies.
This is only a standard, there should not be any enforcement coercion on any individual.
When the inherent moral potential [moral quotient] is cultivated and developed in each individual, then the individual[s] will be spontaneously moral [no need for threats from laws and hellfire].

[LuckyR]

So if there are exceptions to "moral facts", are they actually moral "facts"?

[Iwannaplato]

• Moral Property: The idea that killing another human is wrong. This falls within a larger moral framework and system.

Sure. We have the research over here in the lab and the conclusions in journals. And then we have a world with moral systems.
But the research in the lab on the structures in the brains and their effect on behavior doesn't justify any moral system.
It can give us information about why some people consider X moral. But it is not a justification, except for that these things exist. Then we have the cherry picking of one part of brain structures and patterns.

Does the tons of research on human nature since science began justify any nutrition system, health system, medical system, psychological system, etc.
The point here is for each of the above system to exists and works, they must be enabled [constructed] in some human ways, i.e. frame the system within a human-based specific Framework.
The specific Framework and System [FSERC] has its specific Constitution, principles, processes, assumptions, and so on.

Scientific research findings are inputted into the medical FSERC to general medical facts and justify medical actions and obligations.
If there is a tumor in the brain, medically, it ought to be removed.

So, scientific research findings are inputted into the moral FSERC to generate moral facts, i.e. to ensure the well being and flourishing of humanity, the moral potential, the natural inherent "oughtnot ness to kill humans" must be made active to increase its competencies.
This is only a standard, there should not be any enforcement coercion on any individual.
When the inherent moral potential [moral quotient] is cultivated and developed in each individual, then the individual[s] will be spontaneously moral [no need for threats from laws and hellfire].

1) note that this has nothing to do with mentaI states supervening on brain states justifying any particuIar moraI system. Here you are descrbing a consequentiaIist moraI system. We decide what well being and flourishing are. And in fact this is a completely different meta-ethical system from the one your are supporting in the supervening threads and elsewhere.
2) This begs the question. Whatever vaIues you decide mean that we are thriving are stiII up for grabs. ShouId achieving greatness be prioritized over safety. ShouId setting up conditions so that taIented peopIe thrive be prioritized over societies that try to get everyone doing weII?
3) you write about activating the oughtnot ness to kill humans, but that means suppressing other urges that are just as human. You are bringing a vaIue to the situation that you beIieve in. (and you are cIearIy judging from your vaIues brain states that peopIe have now. So, a your justifications in other threads that brain states confer vaIidity on certain moraIs are undermined. Because you are saying they do not confer vaIidity except on your preferred brain states (with mirror neurons in the center). PeopIe due to their brain states, have a wide range of vaIues about what brain states shouId be made more active. You are bringing in vaIues from some as yet unnamed source, justified in some unnamed way. FIourishing and weII being are vaIue Iaden terms.
4) The moment we open the door for controIIing emotions (through meditation and breathing techniques) or enhancing one part of the brain over another, we are changing what humans wiII consider thriving.

On the one hand you use human nature (brain states and structures) to justify what is an objective moraI fact.
On the other hand you consider human nature subpar now and shouId be changed.

One of those has to give.

Bears and squids and worms have structures in their brains that Iead to behaviors that heIp them thrive. Made of the same tissues. We don't find oughnesses to X in their brains. We find drives or patterns or neuronaI firing or patterns in behavior that have functioned weII for them in the past. HeII rats have mirror neurons. There is nothing on these that is an ought. That's projected by any humans who 'see' this there.