You're a Case of Supervenience

[Peter Holmes]

With reference to Moral Facts Supervene on Natural Facts.

You as an alive person with self consciousness is a case and example of Supervenience at work.
Here is AI[wR]'s views:

... the emergence of consciousness from a physical body can be regarded as a case of supervenience. In philosophy, supervenience refers to a relationship between two sets of properties such that if there is a change in the supervenient properties, there must be a corresponding change in the subvenient properties. Applied to the mind-body problem, this means that mental states (consciousness) supervene on physical states (the brain and body).

In this context:

Subvenient properties are the physical properties of the brain and nervous system, including neurons, synapses, and their complex interactions.
Supervenient properties are the mental states and conscious experiences that emerge from these physical properties.

The principle of supervenience implies that any change in mental states must be accompanied by a change in the physical states of the brain.

However, it does not necessarily mean that the relationship between the two is causal or reducible. It allows for the possibility that mental states are dependent on but not fully explainable by physical states, aligning with certain non-reductive physicalist or emergentist perspectives in philosophy of mind.

Discuss??
Views??

I would say that changes in body states are also accompanied by changes in brain states. So, which is "supervenient" and which is not? Are either of them.

I think the idea is that the relationship is between physical and mental states or events, rather than brain states or events, which are physical.

But I agree with your point about sub- and supervenience. If there's complete simultaneity, then why give them different labels, which suggests a hierarchy or at least one-way relationship of some kind? And then, as you say, we happily talk about the mind affecting the body.

I reckon it's because the idea is to account for 'mental' things, which are supposed to be of a different kind from physical things. So it's the old mind-body or mind-matter 'problem' in a different guise.

But, as ever, it's only a problem - needing a solution - if we keep taking mentalist talk - about minds containing mental things and event - seriously, despite its obviously metaphorical nature. Using the rules of one language game inappropriately in another.

And I think the related argument between compatibilists and incompatibilists is also stuck - in that case with an old faculty psychology where the nature of 'the will' supposedly needs explanation.

[Gary Childress]

With reference to Moral Facts Supervene on Natural Facts.

You as an alive person with self consciousness is a case and example of Supervenience at work.
Here is AI[wR]'s views:



Discuss??
Views??

I would say that changes in body states are also accompanied by changes in brain states. So, which is "supervenient" and which is not? Are either of them.

I think the idea is that the relationship is between physical and mental states or events, rather than brain states or events, which are physical.

Yes, I should have said states of mind. Sloppy wording on my part.

[Veritas Aequitas]

You asserted based on Kant for a long time that noumena did not exist. This is a false interpretation of Kant which you seemed to have accepted recently, but now have returned to the false interpretation of Kant that Kant asserted noumena were false and did not exist. He never asserted that God, freedom, moral law, etc. were false and did not exist.

There are nuances to the above.

I presented the whole chapter on Phenomena vs Noumena here;
viewtopic.php?t=39987
I suggest you read the whole chapter at least 10 times.
Even it is not easy to grasp because it is only a part of the whole argument.

6. If by 'Noumenon' we mean a Thing so far as it is not an Object of our Sensible Objectifying-Faculty, and so abstract from our Mode of Sensing it, {then} this is a Noumenon in the negative sense of the term.

7. But if we understand by it [the thing] an Object of a non-Sensible Objectifying-Faculty,
we thereby presuppose a special Mode of Objectifying-Faculty, namely, the intellectual, which is not that which we possess, and of which we cannot comprehend even the Possibility. This would be 'Noumenon' in the positive sense of the term.

8. The Doctrine of Sensibility is likewise the Doctrine of the Noumenon in the negative sense, that is, of Things which the Intellect must think without this reference to our Mode of Objectifying-Faculty, therefore not merely as Appearances but as Things-in-Themselves.
B307

What is real is the Sensible Objectifying-Faculty.
According to the above [6], if the noumena is NOT taken in the above sense, then it is in the negative sense, i.e. it cannot be real relative to the Sensible Objectifying-Faculty
If one insist it is real in Sensible Objectifying-Faculty, then they are chasing an illusion because the noumena in this sense is 'false' i.e. an illusion.

If the noumena is taken in the positive sense [not within Mode of Sensible Objectifying-Faculty], then it a thing-in-itself which is a useful illusion. [8]

Elsewhere Kant used the term constitutive and regulative.
When the noumena is view in the constitutive basis, it cannot be taken a positive real as an ontological substance of some sort.

Again, I suggest you read the chapter 10 times or more if necessary.

This is why, the best one can do with such belief is to admit and recognize it is only a useful illusion or fiction.

Which is exactly what intrumentalists do and do in relation to things like brain states, for example. And this 'oughtness not to kill' and other oughtnesses would be considered fictions, possibly useful, by instrumentalists.

Anyone accepting Kant's noumena vs. phenomena schema would consider many of the terms you use to be noumena. If they were your kind of antirealist, as noumean they are false and unreal.

The intrumentalists [Kant and others] can rely on the thing-in-itself [noumena] for their moral theory.

However, the 'oughtness not to kill' can be verified, tested and justified empirically, so it cannot be a noumena from an instrumentalist [antirealist] POV.
If Kant had access to the current knowledge of the neuroscience and other advance knowledge, Kant may have considered this without the noumena in this case. This is an empirical moral fact within the moral FSERC.

The other necessary aspect of the instrumentalists moral theory is the idea target of a state of ZERO humans killed by humans or ZERO abortion.
This is an expected ideal objective [impossible to achieve in practice] and thus could be regarded as a noumena in the negative sense [6].

[Iwannaplato]

What is real is the Sensible Objectifying-Faculty.
According to the above [6], if the noumena is NOT taken in the above sense, then it is in the negative sense, i.e. it cannot be real relative to the Sensible Objectifying-Faculty
If one insist it is real in Sensible Objectifying-Faculty, then they are chasing an illusion because the noumena in this sense is 'false' i.e. an illusion.

If the noumena is taken in the positive sense [not within Mode of Sensible Objectifying-Faculty], then it a thing-in-itself which is a useful illusion. [8]

Elsewhere Kant used the term constitutive and regulative.
When the noumena is view in the constitutive basis, it cannot be taken a positive real as an ontological substance of some sort.

Again, I suggest you read the chapter 10 times or more if necessary.

Implicit ad hom.

I suggest you actually integrate the above with, for example, oughtness.

The intrumentalists [Kant and others] can rely on the thing-in-itself [noumena] for their moral theory.

But you have argued that noumena are faIse and unreaI. Thus, Kant's moral theory depends on something faIse and unreaI.

However, the 'oughtness not to kill' can be verified, tested and justified empirically, so it cannot be a noumena from an instrumentalist [antirealist] POV.

Nope. We can verify and test behaviors. If we open a brain up we can directIy see neurons. But the oughtness aspect is deduced and added to structures that are sensory - and deduced and inferrred in the way you do by very few people, if any. This oughtness aspect is outside of the empiricaI. It is outside the sensory. It is a noumenon. Please provide images of the 'oughtness'. A persistant moon is vastIy less speculative. At least the object in question can be sensed on some occasions with the eye.

You've created a huge exception, just because it is necessary. If a realist produced an example as abstract and requiring the levels of inference and deduction required by 'oughtness' you'd dismiss it.

If Kant had access to the current knowledge of the neuroscience and other advance knowledge, Kant may have considered this without the noumena in this case. This is an empirical moral fact within the moral FSERC.

The other necessary aspect of the instrumentalists moral theory is the idea target of a state of ZERO humans killed by humans or ZERO abortion.

SEriously this is delusion.

The instumentalists moral theory. There are many intrumentalist approaches to moral theory. You are just making something up here. Of course you can have a moral theory with a specific injunction against abortion. You can call this something you arrived at within your particular, specific instrumentalist approach.

But this was ridiculous. One couId be a proabortion or antiabortion instrumentalist. It's a metaethical approach, not a specific set of moraIs. It all depends on what the goaIs are and how you evaulate those goaIs.

This is an expected ideal objective [impossible to achieve in practice] and thus could be regarded as a noumena in the negative sense [6].
[/quote]

[Flannel Jesus]

The instumentalists moral theory. There are many intrumentalist approaches to moral theory. You are just making something up here. Of course you can have a moral theory with a specific injunction against abortion. You can call this something you arrived at within your particular, specific instrumentalist approach.

But this was ridiculous. One couId be a proabortion or antiabortion instrumentalist. It's a metaethical approach, not a specific set of moraIs. It all depends on what the goaIs are and how you evaulate those goaIs.

Fully agreed on all counts. VAs farts must smell good cause he keeps going back to his own ass for more.

Do you have an instrumentalist morality?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Morality is the management [prevent & eliminate] of evil to enable its related goods.
We need to define evil, i.e. that which is net negative to the well-being and flourishing of the individual[s] and humanity.
In this case, we need to have an exhaustive list of what is considered evil in relation to morality.

Now you are coming at the issue in an entirely different way and also an unrelated way. You are not addressing the epistemology of these brain states, the existence of oughtness. IOW the points I raised.

So far, I have not venture to deliberate on an exhaustive list of what is considered evil of a certain degree of evilness.

So far, I included in the list of what is evil, i.e.
1. humans killing of human
2. rape
3. slavery -chattel
6. torture with serious harm
7. etc.

Every item of evil must be justified to be universal and immoral. I have done that with 'humans killing humans' and justified it has a physical neural base, so it is a biological and thence a moral fact via the moral FSERC.

In the above case 1-5, your X is accused to be immoral without justifying why his act is evil.
You cannot state X is immoral and expect me to accept it.

I'm not asking you to accept that X is evil. I never used the word evil. I was talking about any behavior that anyone thinks of as immoral. And the fact that the brain states are not the same even in those who agree. It doesn't matter what the act is.

So your thought experiment is pointless.
You need to be precise with what do you mean by 'immoral'.

No, not in this situation. I am demonstrating that any judgment that an act is immoral with have different neuronal patterns and brain states even in those who agree that the act is immoral.

.................

If you are wearing an instrumentalist hat, you are an ANTI-philosophical realists, i.e. you oppose and reject philosophical realism which is after something ontologically.

I am demonstrating that intrumentalists disagree with many things you say.

I say it is a strawman.
Your presentation do not represent my moral arguments in an instrumentalist perspective.


Suppose 8 billion people exercise what is recognized as empathy related to morality.
It we analyzed all the brains, it will be demonstrated that the same main neural roots, trunk and branches [analogically a tree] will are activated within the mirror neurons system.
Whatever differences are in the leaves of the tree.

Analogy:
With nutrition, the diversified food are processed within a universal digestive system that produced the same sugar, proteins, fats and mineral in all humans.
It is the same with morality where are universals elements involved.

First you have to define what is morality [anti specific evil acts] and establishing a moral FSERC with its constitution, principles, methodology, conditions and processes.
Whatever behavior is covered within morality, it must be specifically identified as related to morality.

Virtues and vices are not within the ambit of what is recognized as morality.

[Veritas Aequitas]

What is real is the Sensible Objectifying-Faculty.
According to the above [6], if the noumena is NOT taken in the above sense, then it is in the negative sense, i.e. it cannot be real relative to the Sensible Objectifying-Faculty
If one insist it is real in Sensible Objectifying-Faculty, then they are chasing an illusion because the noumena in this sense is 'false' i.e. an illusion.

If the noumena is taken in the positive sense [not within Mode of Sensible Objectifying-Faculty], then it a thing-in-itself which is a useful illusion. [8]

Elsewhere Kant used the term constitutive and regulative.
When the noumena is view in the constitutive basis, it cannot be taken a positive real as an ontological substance of some sort.

Again, I suggest you read the chapter 10 times or more if necessary.

Implicit ad hom.

This is a serious call.
I was thinking 20 times because I have read it more than 50 times.

I suggest you actually integrate the above with, for example, oughtness.

I have already done with the "oughtnotness to kill humans."

The intrumentalists [Kant and others] can rely on the thing-in-itself [noumena] for their moral theory.

But you have argued that noumena are faIse and unreaI. Thus, Kant's moral theory depends on something faIse and unreaI.

Yes, Kant relied on the thing-in-itself which is false, unreal and illusory, i.e. useful illusions. Kant said so many times in the CPR and his books on Morality.

If Kant had access to the current knowledge of the neuroscience and other advance knowledge, Kant may have considered this without the noumena in this case. This is an empirical moral fact within the moral FSERC.

The other necessary aspect of the instrumentalists moral theory is the idea target of a state of ZERO humans killed by humans or ZERO abortion.

SEriously this is delusion.

The instumentalists moral theory. There are many intrumentalist approaches to moral theory. You are just making something up here. Of course you can have a moral theory with a specific injunction against abortion. You can call this something you arrived at within your particular, specific instrumentalist approach.

But this was ridiculous. One couId be a proabortion or antiabortion instrumentalist. It's a metaethical approach, not a specific set of moraIs. It all depends on what the goaIs are and how you evaulate those goaIs.

This is an expected ideal objective [impossible to achieve in practice] and thus could be regarded as a noumena in the negative sense [6].

Maybe it was not clear.
I implied there are intrumentalists' moral theory not one general instrumentalist moral theory.

[Iwannaplato]

The instumentalists moral theory. There are many intrumentalist approaches to moral theory. You are just making something up here. Of course you can have a moral theory with a specific injunction against abortion. You can call this something you arrived at within your particular, specific instrumentalist approach.

But this was ridiculous. One couId be a proabortion or antiabortion instrumentalist. It's a metaethical approach, not a specific set of moraIs. It all depends on what the goaIs are and how you evaulate those goaIs.

Fully agreed on all counts. VAs farts must smell good cause he keeps going back to his own ass for more.

Do you have an instrumentalist morality?

Actually I am more interested in the whole fictions/useful fictions aspect of instrumentalism. I find that VA conflates all sorts of positions as if they support his position and he completely misunderstood my post here:
viewtopic.php?p=720613#p720613

To the degree that I'd just be interested in having a dialogue with someone else.

So, what do you think of the instrumentalist bypassing of the whole realist/antirealist divide - where the antirealists are saying there are no real things being referred to? We could look at any of the 'things' or things that instrumentalists refer to as useful fictions. Is it reasonable to consider 'mind' 'self' 'electrons' 'brain states' etc. The idea being that they really don't care about the ontological status of the noun involved, or if we can know something about the real nature of said 'thing' or even if said thing exists or not when we are not around. They black box all that, and just want to see if the model, the one that uses the noun, is effective in terms of some goal.

What do you think of their approach?

[Iwannaplato]

Fully agreed on all counts. VAs farts must smell good cause he keeps going back to his own ass for more.

Do you have an instrumentalist morality?

Actually I am more interested in the whole fictions/useful fictions aspect of instrumentalism. I find that VA conflates all sorts of positions as if they support his position and he completely misunderstood my post here:
viewtopic.php?p=720613#p720613 suggestion I need to prove that the moral X is evil. Sigh.

To the degree that I'd just be interested in having a dialogue with someone else.

So, what do you think of the instrumentalist bypassing of the whole realist/antirealist divide - where the antirealists are saying there are no real things being referred to? We could look at any of the 'things' or things that instrumentalists refer to as useful fictions. Is it reasonable to consider 'mind' 'self' 'electrons' 'brain states' etc. The idea being that they really don't care about the ontological status of the noun involved, or if we can know something about the real nature of said 'thing' or even if said thing exists or not when we are not around. They black box all that, and just want to see if the model, the one that uses the noun, is effective in terms of some goal.

What do you think of their approach?

[Atla]

Actually I am more interested in the whole fictions/useful fictions aspect of instrumentalism.

Imo instrumentalism has no fictions/useful fictions aspect. To say that your tool is merely fictional is already sort of an ontological claim.

[Flannel Jesus]

The instumentalists moral theory. There are many intrumentalist approaches to moral theory. You are just making something up here. Of course you can have a moral theory with a specific injunction against abortion. You can call this something you arrived at within your particular, specific instrumentalist approach.

But this was ridiculous. One couId be a proabortion or antiabortion instrumentalist. It's a metaethical approach, not a specific set of moraIs. It all depends on what the goaIs are and how you evaulate those goaIs.

Fully agreed on all counts. VAs farts must smell good cause he keeps going back to his own ass for more.

Do you have an instrumentalist morality?

Actually I am more interested in the whole fictions/useful fictions aspect of instrumentalism. I find that VA conflates all sorts of positions as if they support his position and he completely misunderstood my post here:
viewtopic.php?p=720613#p720613

To the degree that I'd just be interested in having a dialogue with someone else.

So, what do you think of the instrumentalist bypassing of the whole realist/antirealist divide - where the antirealists are saying there are no real things being referred to? We could look at any of the 'things' or things that instrumentalists refer to as useful fictions. Is it reasonable to consider 'mind' 'self' 'electrons' 'brain states' etc. The idea being that they really don't care about the ontological status of the noun involved, or if we can know something about the real nature of said 'thing' or even if said thing exists or not when we are not around. They black box all that, and just want to see if the model, the one that uses the noun, is effective in terms of some goal.

What do you think of their approach?

I think the approach is basically rewordable as, find the most effective models for predicting things and use those, and don't worry too much about truth.

I think that's an important mentality to have, but I also think it's okay to still be deeply curious about real truth as well. Instrumentalists and realists both look at models and say "cool, this model looks like it works really well", but then realists go a step further and say "I wonder WHY this model works so well - what about reality maps so well into this model?"

And of course to some strong extent all answers to that question are perhaps doomed to be speculation, but I personally can't help but ask it anyway.

I'm thinking of all of this from a scientific instrumentalist position, not moral.

I'm not even sure what moral instrumentalism looks like at the moment.

[Iwannaplato]

I think the approach is basically rewordable as, find the most effective models for predicting things and use those, and don't worry too much about truth.

Yes. It's a kind of in motion epistemology. We often think of creating a static truth. This is what a black hole looks like. Here's a true assertion about mental states. You have reality on one side and a static map, assertion, whatever describing what reality is like. With instrumentalism those assertions become placeholders in a process. We're not interested in the static representation of reality, but rather does the model lead to X or not. (of course, we do try to determine the truthfulness of 'it is working' - more on that later).

I think that's an important mentality to have, but I also think it's okay to still be deeply curious about real truth as well. Instrumentalists and realists both look at models and say "cool, this model looks like it works really well", but then realists go a step further and say "I wonder WHY this model works so well - what about reality maps so well into this model?"

Which an instrumentalist could do also, in the hopes that it might leads to some modeling that is useful.

And of course to some strong extent all answers to that question are perhaps doomed to be speculation, but I personally can't help but ask it anyway.

Sure. And in a sense realism is useful. (and hard antirealism is useful also, though at this point, in science say, it seems to be useful in less contexts. On the other hand those contexts may be more fundamental. A bit like Newton vs. Einstein. In most situations, we are vastly better off using Newtonian ontology. Most people do not need to think in Einsteinian terms. It seems, from a realist perspective, that Einstein's ontology of space and time is more correct. But the instrumentalist could care less, he or she'd just wanna know in which context should we act as if space is absolute and in which should we act as if it is relativistic.)

I'm thinking of all of this from a scientific instrumentalist position, not moral.

I'm not even sure what moral instrumentalism looks like at the moment.

I'd say it's on the extreme end of consequentialism. Consequentialists tend to have a best case goal. Happiness, say. And they then evaluate behaviors to see how well they lead to that goal. Morallity then comes out of this evaluation.
Instrumentalists allow for shifting goals. In a sense I would say that consequentialism has a deontological goal. The means are up for grabs, but we all know happiness (or whatever) is the goal. Instrumentalism just sees everything pragmantically, even the goal. Now I want X. X may have no intrinsic value, but that's my goal, let's start evaluating behaviors that lead to X. Then later. Now I want Y. Y may have no intrinsic value, but I want it, let's analyze behaviors.

[Iwannaplato]

Actually I am more interested in the whole fictions/useful fictions aspect of instrumentalism.

Imo instrumentalism has no fictions/useful fictions aspect. To say that your tool is merely fictional is already sort of an ontological claim.

Sure. I'm not arguing that one can or they do evade ontology. I suppose one might say their attitude is I'm gonna act as if. Fiction can also be accurate. We made it up. Maybe it's true, maybe it's not. Who knows, we don't care.

I think the main contradiction comes in later. We want truth, it seems to me, when we evaluate if it is working or not. I don't think this damns the attitude, but I agree it is very hard to not have an ontology. But I think there can be a significantly different attitude towards it.

[Atla]

Actually I am more interested in the whole fictions/useful fictions aspect of instrumentalism.

Imo instrumentalism has no fictions/useful fictions aspect. To say that your tool is merely fictional is already sort of an ontological claim.

Sure. I'm not arguing that one can or they do evade ontology. I suppose one might say their attitude is I'm gonna act as if. Fiction can also be accurate. We made it up. Maybe it's true, maybe it's not. Who knows, we don't care.

I think the main contradiction comes in later. We want truth, it seems to me, when we evaluate if it is working or not. I don't think this damns the attitude, but I agree it is very hard to not have an ontology. But I think there can be a significantly different attitude towards it.

Well I guess there is no contradiction as instrumentalism by definition isn't supposed to make sense.

[Flannel Jesus]

Was trying to do some entry-level reading on moral instrumentalism.

found this link:
https://www.philosophybasics.com/branch ... ntalism%20(or%20Instrumentalist%20Morality,are%20useful%20to%20that%20population.

Moral Instrumentalism (or Instrumentalist Morality) defines moral rules only as tools for moral good. Thus, the moral code arising from a given population is simply a collection of rules that are useful to that population.

Definition seems a bit circular, as there's no definition for moral good.

Moral instrumentalism means do whatever progresses the moral good. And moral good means whatever acts are morally instrumental...

I also found this link:

https://academic.oup.com/pq/article/69/276/555/5266881

I defend an instrumentalist account of moral responsibility and adopt Manuel Vargas’ idea that our responsibility practices are justified by their effects. However, whereas Vargas gives an independent account of morally responsible agency, on my account, responsible agency is defined as the susceptibility to developing and maintaining moral agency through being held responsible.

This makes sense I think, at least a little bit. "Responsible agency is defined as the susceptibility to developing and maintaining moral agency" - if you're not in some way succeptible to changing or altering your behaviour for moral reasons, then you don't have moral agency. So like... that's why rocks don't have moral agency, even ones that do very bad things like fall on peoples heads. Because they're not succeptible to developing agency or changing behaviors. And it's also why we don't hold people responsible for terrible accidents that happen to them - because a change in their behavioral patterns wouldn't necessarily have presented the accident, so it doesn't really make sense. They may be succeptible to moral change in general, but not succeptible in a way that would reasonably have prevented the terrible accident.

For example if you're a mom and you're a safe driver and you're driving your kid to work and you get T-boned by a drunk driver, we don't hold the mom responsible for her kids death. An ultra-naive moralist would say "well the action you took - driving around at that particular time - resulted in the kids death, so the death is your fault". We obviously have a strong intuition that that line of reasoning doesn't make sense, so any account of morality has to have a sensible way of dealing with that.