What could make morality objective?

[Age]

Strawman as usual.

What is reality is that which
1. -emerged with the human conditions upon a 13.7 b years of history.

False. There were no humans for most of the universe's history. And anyway, you claim that it's not humans but life forms. Stop referring only to humans.

2. -is realized as real

This is meaningless rubbish. And the passive voice, which suppresses agency, reinforces that.

3. -then perceived
4. -then cognized
5. -subsequently described.

This supposedly significant sequence is banal. Something has to exist before it can be perceived, known and described. So what?

Despite my explaining the above a '1000' times, you deliberately ignore 1&2 to present your dishonest narrow argument.

You don't explain anything. You merely go through your mantra over and over again, as though it amounts to an argument. It doesn't. And when I set out your actual argument, you can't address it, but monotonously repeat 'straw man'. Here it is.

P Reality depends on life forms.
C Therefore, if there were no life forms, there would be no reality.

You call this the product of 'higher' reasoning that sets it and you above the rest of us. It doesn't. It comes from some fundamental conceptual mistakes that Kant repackaged with his invention of the noumenon - a fiction, a ghost that doesn't exist but can't be exorcised.

What is reality to you is assumed [based on faith] to pre-exists awaiting discovery by humans.
Your presumption without proof for reality is circular.

Reality - the universe - existed long before life forms appeared. And there's massive and overwhelming proof that it did. So this is not even up for debate. Your premise - reality depends on life forms - is patently false.

As I had stated I have not problem agreeing with you on the default understanding of reality as independent of the human conditions, but I do not accept is as an ideology of absoluteness without compromise.

The condition of absoluteness is your imposition. But yes, the universe existed absolutely, completely, definitively, unarguably, etc before life forms appeared. So that universe - our reality - was utterly independent from life forms.

Our 'default understanding of reality' - and especially its existence independent from life forms - is rational and massively evidenced. But your stupid anti-realism is irrational, has no supporting evidence whatsoever, and is the poison fruit from a twisted philosophical tree.

If you are doing serious philosophy, any claim based on absoluteness is not tenable, so as fallible humans we need to be humble to acknowledge the relative state of reality.

Word salad. 'Reality depends on life forms. Therefore, no life forms = no reality.'

And you condemn absoluteness? It's a joke.

You overlooked my response above and kept on with your strawman
viewtopic.php?p=720263#p720263

If there were no life forms, there would be no reality - no universe that is absolutely independent of the human conditions.

Can you really 'not see' how you twist and distort words around here? Or, are you doing 'this' on purpose?

Obviously, if there were none of you human beings, then there would be no 'concepts' of 'Reality' and 'Universe', which are, of course, dependent upon the 'conditions' of you human beings. But, just as obvious is the Fact that 'Reality' and 'Universe, themselves, would exist if there were no 'life forms' like you human beings.

If there were no life forms, there is reality - universe, but this conclusion is not absolutely independent of the human conditions, instead is relative to the human conditions.

Again, OF COURSE, human being 'conclusions' could never ever, ever, be absolutely independent of you human beings, nor independent of so-called 'human conditions', OBVIOUSLY.

And, once again, has absolutely even tried to dispute this with you?

[Peter Holmes]

Elsewhere, VA wrote this:

'Antirealists [Kant] do not believe all of reality [all there is] is an illusion.
It only when philosophical realists claim there is something beyond the empirical, the experienced and possible-to-be-experienced, that antirealists charge the p-realists as chasing an illusion.'

Good to get that clear. And here's my conclusion.

1 I think most philosophical realists don't claim 'there is something beyond the empirical, the experienced and possible-to-be-experienced'. And I certainly don't. That 'something beyond' is indeed a fiction or illusion.

2 When we (rightly) abandon our anthropocentrism, or human-exceptionalism, we are left with just life forms that experience the reality of which we're all a part - a reality that is not an illusion, just as we life forms are not an illusion.

3 When we (rightly) abandon the myth of the mind as a separate, non-physical substance, we also (rightly) abandon the 'realm of the intelligible', and with it the mystical distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge - a distinction that assumes the non-physical mind and the realm of the intelligible exist.

And this is to leave behind Kant and the whole religious legacy that has always plagued philosophy, since at least Plato. Hoo-rah.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Elsewhere, VA wrote this:

'Antirealists [Kant] do not believe all of reality [all there is] is an illusion.
It only when philosophical realists claim there is something beyond the empirical, the experienced and possible-to-be-experienced, that antirealists charge the p-realists as chasing an illusion.'

Good to get that clear. And here's my conclusion.

1 I think most philosophical realists don't claim 'there is something beyond the empirical, the experienced and possible-to-be-experienced'. And I certainly don't. That 'something beyond' is indeed a fiction or illusion.

2 When we (rightly) abandon our anthropocentrism, or human-exceptionalism, we are left with just life forms that experience the reality of which we're all a part - a reality that is not an illusion, just as we life forms are not an illusion.

3 When we (rightly) abandon the myth of the mind as a separate, non-physical substance, we also (rightly) abandon the 'realm of the intelligible', and with it the mystical distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge - a distinction that assumes the non-physical mind and the realm of the intelligible exist.

And this is to leave behind Kant and the whole religious legacy that has always plagued philosophy, since at least Plato. Hoo-rah.

You deny but you are ignorant you are engaging in chasing something as real beyond the empirical.

You claimed what is fact is a feature of reality that is the case, state of affairs, just is, which in absolutely independent of the human conditions, opinions, beliefs and judgment, i.e. it exist regardless of whether there are human or not.

Empirical evidence for a proposition is evidence, i.e. what supports or counters this proposition, that is constituted by or accessible to sense experience or experimental procedure. Empirical evidence is of central importance to the sciences and plays a role in various other fields, like epistemology and law.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empirical_evidence

The Empirical world is basically anthropomorphic, i.e. dependent on the human conditions, i.e. sense experiences [mainly observations] and human measurements.

Therefore when you claim,
"it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not"
it implies it exists as real beyond the empirical,
since science is fundamentally empirical,
your thing that "exists regardless of whether there are human or not"
is beyond what science can directly verify and justify.

You can give all sorts of excuses above,
PH: 2 When we (rightly) abandon our anthropocentrism, or human-exceptionalism, we are left with just life forms that experience the reality of which we're all a part - a reality that is not an illusion, just as we life forms are not an illusion.
This ridiculous.
Are you claiming non-living things has establish their respective scientific framework to determine what is reality?
Other life forms do not have self-awareness to reflect on what exists as real, except human beings.

Besides, you are using anthropocentrism wrongly:
"Anthropocentrism is the belief that human beings are the central or most important entity on the planet."
I have not claimed that.
Rather, you are the one who is onto to anthropocentrism, i.e. insisting your human view is the only way in an ideological manner.

your real thing is that which is beyond the empirical and exists as a thing-by-itself or thing-in-itself, it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not,
like the absolute independent moon that existed before there were humans and will exists even if humans are extinct.

What I have been claiming is based on humility as fallible human beings, i.e. what is real is contingent grounded on as far as our limited empirical evidences can support our claim.

[Peter Holmes]

Elsewhere, VA wrote this:

'Antirealists [Kant] do not believe all of reality [all there is] is an illusion.
It only when philosophical realists claim there is something beyond the empirical, the experienced and possible-to-be-experienced, that antirealists charge the p-realists as chasing an illusion.'

Good to get that clear. And here's my conclusion.

1 I think most philosophical realists don't claim 'there is something beyond the empirical, the experienced and possible-to-be-experienced'. And I certainly don't. That 'something beyond' is indeed a fiction or illusion.

2 When we (rightly) abandon our anthropocentrism, or human-exceptionalism, we are left with just life forms that experience the reality of which we're all a part - a reality that is not an illusion, just as we life forms are not an illusion.

3 When we (rightly) abandon the myth of the mind as a separate, non-physical substance, we also (rightly) abandon the 'realm of the intelligible', and with it the mystical distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge - a distinction that assumes the non-physical mind and the realm of the intelligible exist.

And this is to leave behind Kant and the whole religious legacy that has always plagued philosophy, since at least Plato. Hoo-rah.

You deny but you are ignorant you are engaging in chasing something as real beyond the empirical.

You claimed what is fact is a feature of reality that is the case, state of affairs, just is, which in absolutely independent of the human conditions, opinions, beliefs and judgment, i.e. it exist regardless of whether there are human or not.

Empirical evidence for a proposition is evidence, i.e. what supports or counters this proposition, that is constituted by or accessible to sense experience or experimental procedure. Empirical evidence is of central importance to the sciences and plays a role in various other fields, like epistemology and law.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Empirical_evidence

The Empirical world is basically anthropomorphic, i.e. dependent on the human conditions, i.e. sense experiences [mainly observations] and human measurements.

False. Look at the definition above. There's no mention of humans. And you agree that we're talking about life forms, not just humans. Reality is simply 'that which can be accessible to sense experience'. It's not 'only that which is accessible to human sense experience'. So your main premise is false.

Therefore when you claim,
"it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not"
it implies it exists as real beyond the empirical,
since science is fundamentally empirical,
your thing that "exists regardless of whether there are human or not"
is beyond what science can directly verify and justify.

Things which can be accessible to the sense experience of life forms may well not be or have been actually experienced by life forms. And the whole history of the universe before life forms evolved demonstrates that. Reality does not depend on life forms. Your main premise is false.

You can give all sorts of excuses above,
PH: 2 When we (rightly) abandon our anthropocentrism, or human-exceptionalism, we are left with just life forms that experience the reality of which we're all a part - a reality that is not an illusion, just as we life forms are not an illusion.
This ridiculous.
Are you claiming non-living things has establish their respective scientific framework to determine what is reality?
Other life forms do not have self-awareness to reflect on what exists as real, except human beings.

So what? We're talking about reality, not the self-aware reflection on reality by humans. Always the same idiotic conflation.

Besides, you are using anthropocentrism wrongly:
"Anthropocentrism is the belief that human beings are the central or most important entity on the planet."
I have not claimed that.

Your whole argument rests on that delusion. 'Reality can't be absolutely independent from humans.'

Rather, you are the one who is onto to anthropocentrism, i.e. insisting your human view is the only way in an ideological manner.

your real thing is that which is beyond the empirical and exists as a thing-by-itself or thing-in-itself, it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not,

That which is accessible to sense experience exists whether or not there are any life forms, such as humans, to experience it. It doesn't suddenly exist only when it is experienced. Wake up.

[Veritas Aequitas]

The Empirical world is basically anthropomorphic, i.e. dependent on the human conditions, i.e. sense experiences [mainly observations] and human measurements.

False. Look at the definition above. There's no mention of humans. And you agree that we're talking about life forms, not just humans. Reality is simply 'that which can be accessible to sense experience'. It's not 'only that which is accessible to human sense experience'. So your main premise is false.

Strawman as usual.
I did not state categorically,
I have not stated the following:
"Reality is simply 'that which can be accessible to sense experience'"

What I have always asserted [a 'million' times] is this;
What is real and reality is contingent upon a human-based FSERC - the scientific FSERC the gold standard. So it is not merely sense experience but cover whatever is the whole human being.
This is opposing the philosophical realists' claim that reality and things are absolutely independent of the human conditions.

Therefore when you claim,
"it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not"
it implies it exists as real beyond the empirical,
since science is fundamentally empirical,
your thing that "exists regardless of whether there are human or not"
is beyond what science can directly verify and justify.

Things which can be accessible to the sense experience of life forms may well not be or have been actually experienced by life forms. And the whole history of the universe before life forms evolved demonstrates that. Reality does not depend on life forms. Your main premise is false.

Strawman again.
I stated many times, the term 'depend' does not fit in with my opposition to your positive claim of an absolutely independent reality.
Reality cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions, i.e.

1. Reality is all-there-is.
2. All-there-is inevitably include human-beings [& human conditions].
3. So, human-beings are part and parcel of reality.
4. As such, reality cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions.

In the Ultimate Sense [philosophically]
Being part and parcel of reality [all-there-is] whatever is of reality cannot be exclude the human elements, therefore reality cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions.

In the Common and Conventional Sense
I agree, within the common and conventional sense, reality and things are independent of the human conditions, but that is only relatively but not absolutely.
Example, the oncoming train on the same rail tract I am standing on is real and independent of my human self but that is only relatively not absolutely. As such, I will jump off the track to avoid being smashed.

Your problem is your inability to differentiate between the relative and absolute sense; rather you insisted there is only the absolute sense ideologically and dogmatically.

The point is the Ultimate [of higher] Sense [philosophically] which is above the common and conventional sense enable greater utilities to humanity.
Note, the contrasting utilities potential to humanity in the case of conventional classical Newtonian [realism] to the higher Einsteinian [mixed realism and anti-realism] and QM [antirealism].

As I had stated else, your dogmatic philosophical realism will hinder humanity's progress toward greater well-being for the individual[s] and humanity in the direction of perpetual peace.

Besides, you are using anthropocentrism wrongly:
"Anthropocentrism is the belief that human beings are the central or most important entity on the planet."
I have not claimed that.

Your whole argument rests on that delusion. 'Reality can't be absolutely independent from humans.'

Actually what is going on is, I am opposing your philosophical realist [mind-independence claim].
You are unable to prove [up to the ultimate sense] reality is absolutely independent from the human conditions.
You are just relying on common sense and speculating that a thing-by-itself existing regardless of whether there are humans or not.

My argument is:
Whatever exists must be contingent upon a human-based FSERC.
This so glaringly obvious.
I given you the example of scientific reality which is contingent within the human-based scientific FSERC.

Rather, you are the one who is onto to anthropocentrism, i.e. insisting your human view is the only way in an ideological manner.

your real thing is that which is beyond the empirical and exists as a thing-by-itself or thing-in-itself, it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not,

That which is accessible to sense experience exists whether or not there are any life forms, such as humans, to experience it. It doesn't suddenly exist only when it is experienced. Wake up.

Strawman again.
I have argue,
before a thing is accessible to sense experiences, it has to emerge and realized as real within the human conditions.
Take dreams, pains, emotions, and the like, these states happened and emerged within the brain before they are sensed by the sense organs.

There are tons of research from psychology, cognitive sciences and the neurosciences
justifying the above, yet you are merely relying on your common sense.

[Age]

The Empirical world is basically anthropomorphic, i.e. dependent on the human conditions, i.e. sense experiences [mainly observations] and human measurements.

False. Look at the definition above. There's no mention of humans. And you agree that we're talking about life forms, not just humans. Reality is simply 'that which can be accessible to sense experience'. It's not 'only that which is accessible to human sense experience'. So your main premise is false.

Strawman as usual.
I did not state categorically,
I have not stated the following:
"Reality is simply 'that which can be accessible to sense experience'"

What I have always asserted [a 'million' times] is this;
What is real and reality is contingent upon a human-based FSERC - the scientific FSERC the gold standard. So it is not merely sense experience but cover whatever is the whole human being.
This is opposing the philosophical realists' claim that reality and things are absolutely independent of the human conditions.

Therefore when you claim,
"it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not"
it implies it exists as real beyond the empirical,
since science is fundamentally empirical,
your thing that "exists regardless of whether there are human or not"
is beyond what science can directly verify and justify.

Things which can be accessible to the sense experience of life forms may well not be or have been actually experienced by life forms. And the whole history of the universe before life forms evolved demonstrates that. Reality does not depend on life forms. Your main premise is false.

Strawman again.
I stated many times, the term 'depend' does not fit in with my opposition to your positive claim of an absolutely independent reality.
Reality cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions, i.e.

1. Reality is all-there-is.
2. All-there-is inevitably include human-beings [& human conditions].
3. So, human-beings are part and parcel of reality.
4. As such, reality cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions.

In the Ultimate Sense [philosophically]
Being part and parcel of reality [all-there-is] whatever is of reality cannot be exclude the human elements, therefore reality cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions.

In the Common and Conventional Sense
I agree, within the common and conventional sense, reality and things are independent of the human conditions, but that is only relatively but not absolutely.
Example, the oncoming train on the same rail tract I am standing on is real and independent of my human self but that is only relatively not absolutely. As such, I will jump off the track to avoid being smashed.

Your problem is your inability to differentiate between the relative and absolute sense; rather you insisted there is only the absolute sense ideologically and dogmatically.

The point is the Ultimate [of higher] Sense [philosophically] which is above the common and conventional sense enable greater utilities to humanity.
Note, the contrasting utilities potential to humanity in the case of conventional classical Newtonian [realism] to the higher Einsteinian [mixed realism and anti-realism] and QM [antirealism].

As I had stated else, your dogmatic philosophical realism will hinder humanity's progress toward greater well-being for the individual[s] and humanity in the direction of perpetual peace.

Besides, you are using anthropocentrism wrongly:
"Anthropocentrism is the belief that human beings are the central or most important entity on the planet."
I have not claimed that.

Your whole argument rests on that delusion. 'Reality can't be absolutely independent from humans.'

Actually what is going on is, I am opposing your philosophical realist [mind-independence claim].
You are unable to prove [up to the ultimate sense] reality is absolutely independent from the human conditions.
You are just relying on common sense and speculating that a thing-by-itself existing regardless of whether there are humans or not.

My argument is:
Whatever exists must be contingent upon a human-based FSERC.
This so glaringly obvious.
I given you the example of scientific reality which is contingent within the human-based scientific FSERC.

Rather, you are the one who is onto to anthropocentrism, i.e. insisting your human view is the only way in an ideological manner.

your real thing is that which is beyond the empirical and exists as a thing-by-itself or thing-in-itself, it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not,

That which is accessible to sense experience exists whether or not there are any life forms, such as humans, to experience it. It doesn't suddenly exist only when it is experienced. Wake up.

Strawman again.
I have argue,
before a thing is accessible to sense experiences, it has to emerge and realized as real within the human conditions.

What even are the so-called 'human conditions', exactly?

Take dreams, pains, emotions, and the like, these states happened and emerged within the brain before they are sensed by the sense organs.

This is not necessarily true at all.

There are tons of research from psychology, cognitive sciences and the neurosciences
justifying the above, yet you are merely relying on your common sense.

But, there is research, and results, which show the exact opposite of what you just claimed here.

[Age]

What makes 'morality' objective is the exact same thing that makes other things objective as well.

[Peter Holmes]

Here's an assertion from something quoted elsewhere.

'The most common view in the literature is that the Supervenience of the ethical [on the natural] is a conceptual truth.'

But there's no such thing as a conceptual truth. Concepts have no truth-value. Only factual assertions - typically linguistic expressions - have truth-value. So the above assertion is, well, incompetent or ignorant. And it's shocking that this kind of crap can be passed off as in any way respectable.

Of course, if 'the literature' does endorse ethical or moral supervenience on the natural, then the people who write it are completely wrong.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here's an assertion from something quoted elsewhere.

'The most common view in the literature is that the Supervenience of the ethical [on the natural] is a conceptual truth.'

But there's no such thing as a conceptual truth. Concepts have no truth-value. Only factual assertions - typically linguistic expressions - have truth-value. So the above assertion is, well, incompetent or ignorant. And it's shocking that this kind of crap can be passed off as in any way respectable.

Of course, if 'the literature' does endorse ethical or moral supervenience on the natural, then the people who write it are completely wrong.

As usual you are expressing from a one-track narrow thinking, which is grounded on an illusion inferred from philosophical realism.

Here are the wiser comments to the above from AI-wR in contrast to your immature thinking:
(note 'conceptual framework' which is equivalent to my FSERC)

Critique:
Concepts and Truth: The statement claims concepts lack truth-value entirely. This is too strong. Concepts themselves aren't necessarily true or false, but they can be used to build statements that can be true or false. For example, "bachelor" is a concept, not a truth statement. However, "All bachelors are unmarried men" is a true statement based on the concept of "bachelor."

Conceptual Frameworks: Many areas, like mathematics and logic, rely on conceptual frameworks. Within these frameworks, certain statements hold true based on the definitions and rules. For instance, "all triangles have three sides" is true within Euclidean geometry.

Balanced View:
There are two main kinds of truths:

Conceptual truths (analytic truths): These are true by definition based on the meaning of the words involved. They are typically a priori, meaning we know them to be true independent of experience. The example of "all bachelors are unmarried men" falls under this category.

Empirical truths (synthetic truths): These truths are based on observation and experience. They are a posteriori, meaning we learn them through the world. For instance, "the sky is blue today" is an empirical truth.

Not all conceptual truths are trivial: While some conceptual truths may seem obvious, others can be complex and have significant philosophical implications.

The Importance of Context: Whether something is a conceptual truth depends on the context and the specific concepts involved. Disagreements on the meaning of terms can lead to disagreements about what is a conceptual truth. For example, "justice is blind" might be considered a conceptual truth depending on how one defines "justice."

Conclusion:
Conceptual truths are a valuable tool in understanding the world and creating logical frameworks. While they may not be based on experience, they still hold a significant place in building knowledge. The key is to recognize the distinction between conceptual and empirical truths and to consider the context when evaluating statements about concepts.

[Peter Holmes]

Elsewhere, VA quotes more AI blather. 'Rubbish In, Rubbish Out' applies to AI as to any other type of programming, as the following claptrap demonstrates.

Critique:
Concepts and Truth: The statement claims concepts lack truth-value entirely. This is too strong. Concepts themselves aren't necessarily true or false, but they can be used to build statements that can be true or false. For example, "bachelor" is a concept, not a truth statement. However, "All bachelors are unmarried men" is a true statement based on the concept of "bachelor."

1 'Bachelor' is a word, not a concept.
2 There's no evidence for the existence of any concept that the word 'bachelor' names, or to which it corresponds. There's no evidence for the existence of concepts, full stop. They are mentalist fictions designed to pad out the myth of the mind.
3 A description of the supposed concept of bachelor is nothing more than a description of the ways we use the word 'bachelor' in different contexts. There is no residue left over after such a description.

Here are some definitions of the word 'concept'.

'A an abstract idea'

(So what is a concrete idea? Is the concept of bachelor concrete or abstract? What's the difference between an idea and a concept? What is an abstract thing? The nonsense ramifies and proliferates.)

'B philosophy
an idea or mental image which corresponds to some distinct entity or class of entities, or to its essential features, or determines the application of a term (especially a predicate), and thus plays a part in the use of reason or language.'

('Corresponds'? How? 'Some distinct entity or class of entities'? Whence the identity or classification of distinctness? What 'essential features'? And wtf is a 'mental image? This crap has passed muster for so long that even AI can't smell the bs. And why should it?)

To repeat. Only factual assertions - typically linguistic expressions - have truth-value, given the ways we use the words or other signs in context. If the assertion 'bachelors are unmarried men' is true, that's simply because we use the expressions 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' in the same way. And this has nothing to do with concepts. And anyway, it can be false, because a bachelor (of arts?) can be a married woman.

And the (Fregean?) claim that a concept 'determines the application of a term (especially a predicate)' is so far down the rabbit hole that it would take a very determined critical thinking badger to ferret it out.

And what's more. Quine demolished analyticity, and therefore the dogmatic distinction between analytic and synthetic assertions - though sadly he didn't sweep away the rubble, in my opinion. But VA's AI merely trundled out the old Kantian crap.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Elsewhere, VA quotes more AI blather. 'Rubbish In, Rubbish Out' applies to AI as to any other type of programming, as the following claptrap demonstrates.

Critique:
Concepts and Truth: The statement claims concepts lack truth-value entirely. This is too strong. Concepts themselves aren't necessarily true or false, but they can be used to build statements that can be true or false. For example, "bachelor" is a concept, not a truth statement. However, "All bachelors are unmarried men" is a true statement based on the concept of "bachelor."

1 'Bachelor' is a word, not a concept.
2 There's no evidence for the existence of any concept that the word 'bachelor' names, or to which it corresponds. There's no evidence for the existence of concepts, full stop. They are mentalist fictions designed to pad out the myth of the mind.
3 A description of the supposed concept of bachelor is nothing more than a description of the ways we use the word 'bachelor' in different contexts. There is no residue left over after such a description.

Here are some definitions of the word 'concept'.

'A an abstract idea'

(So what is a concrete idea? Is the concept of bachelor concrete or abstract? What's the difference between an idea and a concept? What is an abstract thing? The nonsense ramifies and proliferates.)

'B philosophy
an idea or mental image which corresponds to some distinct entity or class of entities, or to its essential features, or determines the application of a term (especially a predicate), and thus plays a part in the use of reason or language.'

('Corresponds'? How? 'Some distinct entity or class of entities'? Whence the identity or classification of distinctness? What 'essential features'? And wtf is a 'mental image? This crap has passed muster for so long that even AI can't smell the bs. And why should it?)

To repeat. Only factual assertions - typically linguistic expressions - have truth-value, given the ways we use the words or other signs in context. If the assertion 'bachelors are unmarried men' is true, that's simply because we use the expressions 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' in the same way. And this has nothing to do with concepts. And anyway, it can be false, because a bachelor (of arts?) can be a married woman.

And the (Fregean?) claim that a concept 'determines the application of a term (especially a predicate)' is so far down the rabbit hole that it would take a very determined critical thinking badger to ferret it out.

Your views are outdated.

Concepts vs. Words: While "bachelor" is a word, it represents a concept in our minds. A concept is a mental category that groups together similar things based on shared characteristics. "Bachelor" represents the concept of an unmarried adult male.

Evidence for Concepts:
Shared Understanding: We all understand "bachelor" without needing detailed explanations. This suggests a shared mental category, a concept.
Learning and Categorization: We learn new words by relating them to existing concepts. For example, if you know "male" and "unmarried," you can understand "bachelor" by combining these concepts.
Hypothetical Thought: Humans can think about things that don't exist physically, like unicorns. This ability relies on concepts. We can imagine a bachelor without encountering one in reality.
Concepts vs. Word Usage: Your interlocutor argues descriptions of concepts are just word usage. While it's true we use words to describe concepts, the concept itself is more than just the different ways we use the word.

Multiple Words for One Concept: Different languages may have different words for the same concept (e.g., "soltero" in Spanish). This shows the concept exists independently of any specific word.
Synonyms and Different Usages: "Bachelor" can have slightly different connotations depending on context (e.g., a young bachelor vs. a confirmed bachelor). Yet, it still refers to the same core concept of an unmarried adult male.
Remember: Concepts are abstract mental categories. We can't directly observe them, but evidence from shared understanding, learning, and thought experiments supports their existence.

"Bachelor" is just word??

If a single beautiful girl were to receive a message from an agent,
that the rich prince want to meet her for a date and that she was told the prince is a 'bachelor' that word 'bachelor' would be very meaningful which would trigger a lot of thoughts and emotional reactions in that girl.
That is because the term 'bachelor' is a concept of an unmarried man that has meaning.

[Peter Holmes]

Elsewhere, VA quotes more AI blather. 'Rubbish In, Rubbish Out' applies to AI as to any other type of programming, as the following claptrap demonstrates.

1 'Bachelor' is a word, not a concept.
2 There's no evidence for the existence of any concept that the word 'bachelor' names, or to which it corresponds. There's no evidence for the existence of concepts, full stop. They are mentalist fictions designed to pad out the myth of the mind.
3 A description of the supposed concept of bachelor is nothing more than a description of the ways we use the word 'bachelor' in different contexts. There is no residue left over after such a description.

Here are some definitions of the word 'concept'.

'A an abstract idea'

(So what is a concrete idea? Is the concept of bachelor concrete or abstract? What's the difference between an idea and a concept? What is an abstract thing? The nonsense ramifies and proliferates.)

'B philosophy
an idea or mental image which corresponds to some distinct entity or class of entities, or to its essential features, or determines the application of a term (especially a predicate), and thus plays a part in the use of reason or language.'

('Corresponds'? How? 'Some distinct entity or class of entities'? Whence the identity or classification of distinctness? What 'essential features'? And wtf is a 'mental image? This crap has passed muster for so long that even AI can't smell the bs. And why should it?)

To repeat. Only factual assertions - typically linguistic expressions - have truth-value, given the ways we use the words or other signs in context. If the assertion 'bachelors are unmarried men' is true, that's simply because we use the expressions 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' in the same way. And this has nothing to do with concepts. And anyway, it can be false, because a bachelor (of arts?) can be a married woman.

And the (Fregean?) claim that a concept 'determines the application of a term (especially a predicate)' is so far down the rabbit hole that it would take a very determined critical thinking badger to ferret it out.

Your views are outdated.

Concepts vs. Words: While "bachelor" is a word, it represents a concept in our minds. A concept is a mental category that groups together similar things based on shared characteristics. "Bachelor" represents the concept of an unmarried adult male.

Evidence for Concepts:
Shared Understanding: We all understand "bachelor" without needing detailed explanations. This suggests a shared mental category, a concept.
Learning and Categorization: We learn new words by relating them to existing concepts. For example, if you know "male" and "unmarried," you can understand "bachelor" by combining these concepts.
Hypothetical Thought: Humans can think about things that don't exist physically, like unicorns. This ability relies on concepts. We can imagine a bachelor without encountering one in reality.
Concepts vs. Word Usage: Your interlocutor argues descriptions of concepts are just word usage. While it's true we use words to describe concepts, the concept itself is more than just the different ways we use the word.

Multiple Words for One Concept: Different languages may have different words for the same concept (e.g., "soltero" in Spanish). This shows the concept exists independently of any specific word.
Synonyms and Different Usages: "Bachelor" can have slightly different connotations depending on context (e.g., a young bachelor vs. a confirmed bachelor). Yet, it still refers to the same core concept of an unmarried adult male.
Remember: Concepts are abstract mental categories. We can't directly observe them, but evidence from shared understanding, learning, and thought experiments supports their existence.

"Bachelor" is just word??

If a single beautiful girl were to receive a message from an agent,
that the rich prince want to meet her for a date and that she was told the prince is a 'bachelor' that word 'bachelor' would be very meaningful which would trigger a lot of thoughts and emotional reactions in that girl.
That is because the term 'bachelor' is a concept of an unmarried man that has meaning.

Identity, abstraction and concepts

Peter Holmes
2024

(from 'Filos O'Fickle Papers' - available from Amazon)

Identity

We talk about identity – what a thing is and, therefore, why it is the same as or different from other things. But – as usual – in philosophy, such talk is problematic.

People excepted, features of reality do not identify, name or describe themselves. Rather, we do that when we talk about them. And this fact has some important implications.

First, we need to distinguish between features of reality and what we say about them. (And, in my opinion, mistaking what we say for the way things are is the beginning of philosophical confusion.)

Second, things we call the same by one criterion we can also call different by another criterion. In other words, we can always categorise things differently.

Third, features of reality are not obliged to conform to our ways of identifying, naming and describing them.

And fourth, the rules of classical logic seem insecure. If A can equal both A and not-A, then what price the so-called law of identity?

These considerations can lead to the excitingly subversive conclusion that, outside language, there are no identities – no sameness and differences – in reality.

But this is to mistake what we say about things for the way things are. For example, the things we call cats, dogs and trees are what they are, how ever we identify and name them, and whether we say they are the same as or different from each other.

In other words, it is as mistaken to deny identity in reality as it is to insist on linguistic identity outside language. Both mistakes demonstrate the dazzling power of language.

And a logic does not deal with the reality outside language. Other discourses do that – such as the natural sciences. Instead, a logic deals with language – what can be said consistently, without contradiction – which is ‘speaking against’.

So the so-called laws of classical logic – A equals A (identity) and cannot equal not-A (non-contradiction), and there’s no other possibility (excluded middle) – are simply rules, like those of a game.

There is no necessary or inherent connection between those rules and the reality outside language. Logical identity is a purely linguistic matter.

In real life, there are many real problems to do with identity – among them gender, tribal, national, religious and political identity. But the philosophical so-called problem of identity is not among them, which is why civilians ignore it, along with other invented difficulties.

But we are philosophers, so for us it has been interesting to ask questions such as: what is the nature of identity? And I suggest this question arises – at least partly – from a misunderstanding about what we call abstraction.

Abstraction

It has been argued that language works by means of abstraction, as in the following example.

We use the common noun dog to talk about the many different individual things we call dogs. So the word seems to name something that those individual things have in common, something general – in other words, an abstraction from the real things.

But what is an abstraction or an abstract thing? Here are two representative dictionary definitions:

Abstraction: ‘the quality of dealing with ideas rather than events’.

Abstract: ‘existing in thought or as an idea but not having a physical or concrete existence’.

So, though dogs are real things, the noun dog is supposedly the name of an unreal or abstract thing: dogginess, dog-essence, dog-nature, fundamental-dog, or – and here is my point – dog-identity.

I suggest that the so-called problem of identity arises from the delusion that common nouns are names of the abstractions we call identities.

But wait, there’s more.

We call the word dog a concrete noun, to contrast it with what we call an abstract noun, such as truth, knowledge, being, meaning, beauty, justice, goodness, identity, and so on. (Behold: the stuff of philosophy!)

But the expression abstract noun is a misattribution, because a word is not an abstract thing. It is a real, physical thing. So in the phrase abstract noun, the adjective abstract does not refer to the word noun, but rather to the supposed thing that the abstract noun supposedly names.

And the story goes like this. We use nouns to name things. So what we call abstract nouns name abstract things, which exist in thought or as ideas, presumably in the mind – another abstract thing, which, therefore, also exists in thought or as an idea in the mind – and so on, spiralling down the rabbit hole where philosophers furkle. Uselessly.

The silliness of this – what could be called – mentalist nonsense has not prevented its persistence over centuries, and even millennia. Abstract things are remarkably like supernatural things. Both are supposed to exist in some mysterious, non-physical but unexplained way.

And perhaps needless to say, the perennial argument between Platonists and nominalists over the existence of so-called universals has been just another manifestation of the myth of abstract things.

Concepts

As noted, an abstract thing is supposed to exist non-physically as a thought or an idea, presumably in the mind. But more recently – and much more impressively technical-sounding – such things have been called concepts.

There are supposed to be concrete concepts, such as the concept of a dog, which is an abstract thing ‘about’ a real thing. But there are also supposed to be abstract concepts, such as the concept of identity – an abstract thing ‘about’ an abstract thing. To maintain the fiction, we have had to double down on it.

To call identity a concept is to explain nothing at all. Asked then what the concept of identity is, all we can do is explain how we use the word identity, its cognates and related words, in different contexts.

And this is true of all the supposed abstract things that philosophers talk about. They are mysteries invented to explain mysteries of our own invention. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, we have been and are bewitched by a device of our language – that we use nouns to name things.

Peter Holmes
2024

[Veritas Aequitas]

Elsewhere, VA quotes more AI blather. 'Rubbish In, Rubbish Out' applies to AI as to any other type of programming, as the following claptrap demonstrates.

1 'Bachelor' is a word, not a concept.
2 There's no evidence for the existence of any concept that the word 'bachelor' names, or to which it corresponds. There's no evidence for the existence of concepts, full stop. They are mentalist fictions designed to pad out the myth of the mind.
3 A description of the supposed concept of bachelor is nothing more than a description of the ways we use the word 'bachelor' in different contexts. There is no residue left over after such a description.

Here are some definitions of the word 'concept'.

'A an abstract idea'

(So what is a concrete idea? Is the concept of bachelor concrete or abstract? What's the difference between an idea and a concept? What is an abstract thing? The nonsense ramifies and proliferates.)

'B philosophy
an idea or mental image which corresponds to some distinct entity or class of entities, or to its essential features, or determines the application of a term (especially a predicate), and thus plays a part in the use of reason or language.'

('Corresponds'? How? 'Some distinct entity or class of entities'? Whence the identity or classification of distinctness? What 'essential features'? And wtf is a 'mental image? This crap has passed muster for so long that even AI can't smell the bs. And why should it?)

To repeat. Only factual assertions - typically linguistic expressions - have truth-value, given the ways we use the words or other signs in context. If the assertion 'bachelors are unmarried men' is true, that's simply because we use the expressions 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' in the same way. And this has nothing to do with concepts. And anyway, it can be false, because a bachelor (of arts?) can be a married woman.

And the (Fregean?) claim that a concept 'determines the application of a term (especially a predicate)' is so far down the rabbit hole that it would take a very determined critical thinking badger to ferret it out.

Your views are outdated.

Concepts vs. Words: While "bachelor" is a word, it represents a concept in our minds. A concept is a mental category that groups together similar things based on shared characteristics. "Bachelor" represents the concept of an unmarried adult male.

Evidence for Concepts:
Shared Understanding: We all understand "bachelor" without needing detailed explanations. This suggests a shared mental category, a concept.
Learning and Categorization: We learn new words by relating them to existing concepts. For example, if you know "male" and "unmarried," you can understand "bachelor" by combining these concepts.
Hypothetical Thought: Humans can think about things that don't exist physically, like unicorns. This ability relies on concepts. We can imagine a bachelor without encountering one in reality.
Concepts vs. Word Usage: Your interlocutor argues descriptions of concepts are just word usage. While it's true we use words to describe concepts, the concept itself is more than just the different ways we use the word.

Multiple Words for One Concept: Different languages may have different words for the same concept (e.g., "soltero" in Spanish). This shows the concept exists independently of any specific word.
Synonyms and Different Usages: "Bachelor" can have slightly different connotations depending on context (e.g., a young bachelor vs. a confirmed bachelor). Yet, it still refers to the same core concept of an unmarried adult male.
Remember: Concepts are abstract mental categories. We can't directly observe them, but evidence from shared understanding, learning, and thought experiments supports their existence.

"Bachelor" is just word??

If a single beautiful girl were to receive a message from an agent,
that the rich prince want to meet her for a date and that she was told the prince is a 'bachelor' that word 'bachelor' would be very meaningful which would trigger a lot of thoughts and emotional reactions in that girl.
That is because the term 'bachelor' is a concept of an unmarried man that has meaning.

Identity, abstraction and concepts

Peter Holmes
2024

(from 'Filos O'Fickle Papers' - available from Amazon)

Identity

We talk about identity – what a thing is and, therefore, why it is the same as or different from other things. But – as usual – in philosophy, such talk is problematic.

People excepted, features of reality do not identify, name or describe themselves. Rather, we do that when we talk about them. And this fact has some important implications.

First, we need to distinguish between features of reality and what we say about them. (And, in my opinion, mistaking what we say for the way things are is the beginning of philosophical confusion.)

Second, things we call the same by one criterion we can also call different by another criterion. In other words, we can always categorise things differently.

Third, features of reality are not obliged to conform to our ways of identifying, naming and describing them.

And fourth, the rules of classical logic seem insecure. If A can equal both A and not-A, then what price the so-called law of identity?

These considerations can lead to the excitingly subversive conclusion that, outside language, there are no identities – no sameness and differences – in reality.

But this is to mistake what we say about things for the way things are. For example, the things we call cats, dogs and trees are what they are, how ever we identify and name them, and whether we say they are the same as or different from each other.

In other words, it is as mistaken to deny identity in reality as it is to insist on linguistic identity outside language. Both mistakes demonstrate the dazzling power of language.

And a logic does not deal with the reality outside language. Other discourses do that – such as the natural sciences. Instead, a logic deals with language – what can be said consistently, without contradiction – which is ‘speaking against’.

So the so-called laws of classical logic – A equals A (identity) and cannot equal not-A (non-contradiction), and there’s no other possibility (excluded middle) – are simply rules, like those of a game.

There is no necessary or inherent connection between those rules and the reality outside language. Logical identity is a purely linguistic matter.

In real life, there are many real problems to do with identity – among them gender, tribal, national, religious and political identity. But the philosophical so-called problem of identity is not among them, which is why civilians ignore it, along with other invented difficulties.

But we are philosophers, so for us it has been interesting to ask questions such as: what is the nature of identity? And I suggest this question arises – at least partly – from a misunderstanding about what we call abstraction.

Abstraction

It has been argued that language works by means of abstraction, as in the following example.

We use the common noun dog to talk about the many different individual things we call dogs. So the word seems to name something that those individual things have in common, something general – in other words, an abstraction from the real things.

But what is an abstraction or an abstract thing? Here are two representative dictionary definitions:

Abstraction: ‘the quality of dealing with ideas rather than events’.

Abstract: ‘existing in thought or as an idea but not having a physical or concrete existence’.

So, though dogs are real things, the noun dog is supposedly the name of an unreal or abstract thing: dogginess, dog-essence, dog-nature, fundamental-dog, or – and here is my point – dog-identity.

I suggest that the so-called problem of identity arises from the delusion that common nouns are names of the abstractions we call identities.

But wait, there’s more.

We call the word dog a concrete noun, to contrast it with what we call an abstract noun, such as truth, knowledge, being, meaning, beauty, justice, goodness, identity, and so on. (Behold: the stuff of philosophy!)

But the expression abstract noun is a misattribution, because a word is not an abstract thing. It is a real, physical thing. So in the phrase abstract noun, the adjective abstract does not refer to the word noun, but rather to the supposed thing that the abstract noun supposedly names.

And the story goes like this. We use nouns to name things. So what we call abstract nouns name abstract things, which exist in thought or as ideas, presumably in the mind – another abstract thing, which, therefore, also exists in thought or as an idea in the mind – and so on, spiralling down the rabbit hole where philosophers furkle. Uselessly.

The silliness of this – what could be called – mentalist nonsense has not prevented its persistence over centuries, and even millennia. Abstract things are remarkably like supernatural things. Both are supposed to exist in some mysterious, non-physical but unexplained way.

And perhaps needless to say, the perennial argument between Platonists and nominalists over the existence of so-called universals has been just another manifestation of the myth of abstract things.

Concepts

As noted, an abstract thing is supposed to exist non-physically as a thought or an idea, presumably in the mind. But more recently – and much more impressively technical-sounding – such things have been called concepts.

There are supposed to be concrete concepts, such as the concept of a dog, which is an abstract thing ‘about’ a real thing. But there are also supposed to be abstract concepts, such as the concept of identity – an abstract thing ‘about’ an abstract thing. To maintain the fiction, we have had to double down on it.

To call identity a concept is to explain nothing at all. Asked then what the concept of identity is, all we can do is explain how we use the word identity, its cognates and related words, in different contexts.

And this is true of all the supposed abstract things that philosophers talk about. They are mysteries invented to explain mysteries of our own invention. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, we have been and are bewitched by a device of our language – that we use nouns to name things.

Peter Holmes
2024

Lazy to read the whole thing.
Point to me what is relevant as your counter argument why 'Bachelor' is not a concept and what are the consequences if we identify it as a concept.
Note Wittgenstein's Language Game which would accommodate the claim 'bachelor is a concept' as qualified according to the rules of the specific language game.

[Peter Holmes]

Lazy to read the whole thing.
Point to me what is relevant as your counter argument why 'Bachelor' is not a concept and what are the consequences if we identify it as a concept.
Note Wittgenstein's Language Game which would accommodate the claim 'bachelor is a concept' as qualified according to the rules of the specific language game.

1 You quote chunks of AI blather. So I'm giving you a different and better way of thinking about the tired old cliches that AI produces. But actually reading something carefully and critically probably isn't your thing.

2 That mentalist talk about minds and mental things such as concepts constitutes a variety of language games is true. And that's the whole point. 'To have a thought' or 'be in two minds' or 'understand the concept of identity' are expressions we use happily and perfectly clearly.

But then philosophers ask: 'Ah, but what is a mind, a thought, a concept, an identity? - as though those must be names of things of some kind, that exist somewhere, somehow. It's a very ancient, primitive delusion: nouns are names, so every noun is the name of some thing.

I challenge you to read and try to understand my paper. It's very short, and in plain English.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Lazy to read the whole thing.
Point to me what is relevant as your counter argument why 'Bachelor' is not a concept and what are the consequences if we identify it as a concept.
Note Wittgenstein's Language Game which would accommodate the claim 'bachelor is a concept' as qualified according to the rules of the specific language game.

1 You quote chunks of AI blather. So I'm giving you a different and better way of thinking about the tired old cliches that AI produces. But actually reading something carefully and critically probably isn't your thing.

2 That mentalist talk about minds and mental things such as concepts constitutes a variety of language games is true. And that's the whole point. 'To have a thought' or 'be in two minds' or 'understand the concept of identity' are expressions we use happily and perfectly clearly.

But then philosophers ask: 'Ah, but what is a mind, a thought, a concept, an identity? - as though those must be names of things of some kind, that exist somewhere, somehow. It's a very ancient, primitive delusion: nouns are names, so every noun is the name of some thing.

I challenge you to read and try to understand my paper. It's very short, and in plain English.

My Response here:
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