You're a Case of Supervenience

[Veritas Aequitas]

With reference to Moral Facts Supervene on Natural Facts.

You as an alive person with self consciousness is a case and example of Supervenience at work.
Here is AI[wR]'s views:

... the emergence of consciousness from a physical body can be regarded as a case of supervenience. In philosophy, supervenience refers to a relationship between two sets of properties such that if there is a change in the supervenient properties, there must be a corresponding change in the subvenient properties. Applied to the mind-body problem, this means that mental states (consciousness) supervene on physical states (the brain and body).

In this context:

Subvenient properties are the physical properties of the brain and nervous system, including neurons, synapses, and their complex interactions.
Supervenient properties are the mental states and conscious experiences that emerge from these physical properties.

The principle of supervenience implies that any change in mental states must be accompanied by a change in the physical states of the brain.

However, it does not necessarily mean that the relationship between the two is causal or reducible. It allows for the possibility that mental states are dependent on but not fully explainable by physical states, aligning with certain non-reductive physicalist or emergentist perspectives in philosophy of mind.

Discuss??
Views??

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

[Iwannaplato]

I think the terms body, brain states and mind are all useful fictions, but let's keep them for the sake of argument here, and Iet's accept the supervenience of mind and brain states aIso for the sae of argument here.

And then....Let's look at supervenience and moraI diversity for a moment. Given the supervenience relationship, different moral facts can emerge for different individuals. For exampIe, we're going to find and do find individual variations:

Steve's Moral Judgments supervene on Steve's unique brain states, experiences, and cultural context.
Nagazi's MoraI Judgments judgments supervene on Nagazi's different brain states, experiences, and cultural context.
Steve and Nagazi do have and will have have different morals/judgments and moral facts due to the differences in their underlying neural and experiential foundations.

The idea that "moral facts supervene on natural facts" implies that moral judgments depend on underlying brain states and other natural factors. Because neural patterns and brain states vary widely among individuals, different individuals do/will have different moral judgments, leading to different moral facts across a spectrum of individuals and also between groups of people, groups where the individuas invoIved have overlapping brain states or perhaps better put, commonaIities between their brain states, though this might incIude, given in incredibIe compIexist of brain states and neuronaI patterns

different, even very different neuronaI patterns in two individuaIs Ieading to very simiIar moraI judgments in certain or many situations.

This can all justify a more relativistic or subjectivist view of morality, where what is considered morally right or wrong can differ based on individual and group differences in brain states, experiences, and cultural backgrounds.

So.......ta da......recognizing that moral judgments supervene on neural and natural facts helps explain the diversity of moral beliefs across individuals and cultures, suggesting that moral facts are not universally fixed but can vary based on the underlying natural differences.

This was a thought experiment founded on the acceptance, for the sake of argument, of certain terms and filtering them through the idea of supervience then introducing morals into the mix.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I think the terms body, brain states and mind are all useful fictions,

This is very narrow, shallow and negative thinking.

Body, brain states and mind are only useful fictions and illusions, if one insists they exist absolutely independent of the human conditions, i.e. noumenal and things-in-themselves.

There is no issue with an antirealist [Kantian] claim of what is body, brain states and mind, i.e. they are contingent [relative] upon a human-based FSERC, e.g. science, biology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and the like.

but let's keep them for the sake of argument here, and Iet's accept the supervenience of mind and brain states aIso for the sae of argument here.

And then....Let's look at supervenience and moraI diversity for a moment. Given the supervenience relationship, different moral facts can emerge for different individuals. For exampIe, we're going to find and do find individual variations:

Steve's Moral Judgments supervene on Steve's unique brain states, experiences, and cultural context.
Nagazi's MoraI Judgments judgments supervene on Nagazi's different brain states, experiences, and cultural context.
Steve and Nagazi do have and will have have different morals/judgments and moral facts due to the differences in their underlying neural and experiential foundations.

The idea that "moral facts supervene on natural facts" implies that moral judgments depend on underlying brain states and other natural factors. Because neural patterns and brain states vary widely among individuals, different individuals do/will have different moral judgments, leading to different moral facts across a spectrum of individuals and also between groups of people, groups where the individuas invoIved have overlapping brain states or perhaps better put, commonaIities between their brain states, though this might incIude, given in incredibIe compIexist of brain states and neuronaI patterns

different, even very different neuronaI patterns in two individuaIs Ieading to very simiIar moraI judgments in certain or many situations.

This can all justify a more relativistic or subjectivist view of morality, where what is considered morally right or wrong can differ based on individual and group differences in brain states, experiences, and cultural backgrounds.

So.......ta da......recognizing that moral judgments supervene on neural and natural facts helps explain the diversity of moral beliefs across individuals and cultures, suggesting that moral facts are not universally fixed but can vary based on the underlying natural differences.

This was a thought experiment founded on the acceptance, for the sake of argument, of certain terms and filtering them through the idea of supervience then introducing morals into the mix.

The above is very narrow.

'That all humans must breathe or else die' as driven by the 'ought to breathe' neural algorithm is a biological fact supervene on natural facts [physics, chemistry, facts of nature etc.].
This biological fact is universal in ALL humans.

Similarly there is the universal 'oughtnotness to torture and kill babies for pleasure' neural algorithm which is a moral fact contingent upon a moral FSERC.
The physical existence of the above biological and moral fact is universal in all humans.
Who want to deny the above?

If some extreme perverted human were to 'torture and kill babies for pleasure' that is due to the damage to the mechanisms of the said algorithm, it does not obviate the physical existence of that biological moral fact.

In principle, the whole of the living human being and human-nature supervene upon natural facts.
Moral facts are part of the human nature fact, the whole human being.
Therefore moral facts supervene on natural facts.

[Age]

With reference to Moral Facts Supervene on Natural Facts.

You as an alive person with self consciousness is a case and example of Supervenience at work.

But, to have 'self consciousness' one would have to have already known who and what they are, exactly. Otherwise you are not 'self conscious', nor conscious of 'the self', but rather you are just conscious that there is a 'self'. And, who and what 'that self' is, exactly, you are, still, not yet sure of.

So, do 'you', the so-called 'alive person' here known as "veritas aequitas" know who and what 'you' are, exactly?

Until then you are only conscious that there is 'a self', somewhere.

Here is AI[wR]'s views:

... the emergence of consciousness from a physical body can be regarded as a case of supervenience. In philosophy, supervenience refers to a relationship between two sets of properties such that if there is a change in the supervenient properties, there must be a corresponding change in the subvenient properties. Applied to the mind-body problem, this means that mental states (consciousness) supervene on physical states (the brain and body).

In this context:

Subvenient properties are the physical properties of the brain and nervous system, including neurons, synapses, and their complex interactions.
Supervenient properties are the mental states and conscious experiences that emerge from these physical properties.

The principle of supervenience implies that any change in mental states must be accompanied by a change in the physical states of the brain.

However, it does not necessarily mean that the relationship between the two is causal or reducible. It allows for the possibility that mental states are dependent on but not fully explainable by physical states, aligning with certain non-reductive physicalist or emergentist perspectives in philosophy of mind.

Discuss??
Views??

Do you also try to sound 'smart' by using words, in particular ways, but when read and listened to, properly, you are actually saying absolutely nothing at all, outside of this forum as well? Or, do you only do this within this and/or other forums?

[Iwannaplato]

I think the terms body, brain states and mind are all useful fictions,

This is very narrow, shallow and negative thinking.

Some peopIe have that reaction to insturmentalist views of theories, modes and the use of terms. Intrumentalists may well view such reactions as not understanding that they vaIue utiIity over metaphysics.

Body, brain states and mind are only useful fictions and illusions, if one insists they exist absolutely independent of the human conditions, i.e. noumenal and things-in-themselves.

To an instrumentaiist there is simply no need to get into all that metaphysical talk, regardless of how one comes down on the topic.

There is no issue with an antirealist [Kantian] claim of what is body, brain states and mind, i.e. they are contingent [relative] upon a human-based FSERC, e.g. science, biology, cognitive science, neuroscience, and the like.

There is no issue for you, obviousIy, but the language structure 'there is no issue' universalizes your perspective as if it is the only one.

but let's keep them for the sake of argument here, and Iet's accept the supervenience of mind and brain states aIso for the sae of argument here.

And then....Let's look at supervenience and moraI diversity for a moment. Given the supervenience relationship, different moral facts can emerge for different individuals. For exampIe, we're going to find and do find individual variations:

Steve's Moral Judgments supervene on Steve's unique brain states, experiences, and cultural context.
Nagazi's MoraI Judgments judgments supervene on Nagazi's different brain states, experiences, and cultural context.
Steve and Nagazi do have and will have have different morals/judgments and moral facts due to the differences in their underlying neural and experiential foundations.

The idea that "moral facts supervene on natural facts" implies that moral judgments depend on underlying brain states and other natural factors. Because neural patterns and brain states vary widely among individuals, different individuals do/will have different moral judgments, leading to different moral facts across a spectrum of individuals and also between groups of people, groups where the individuas invoIved have overlapping brain states or perhaps better put, commonaIities between their brain states, though this might incIude, given in incredibIe compIexist of brain states and neuronaI patterns

different, even very different neuronaI patterns in two individuaIs Ieading to very simiIar moraI judgments in certain or many situations.

This can all justify a more relativistic or subjectivist view of morality, where what is considered morally right or wrong can differ based on individual and group differences in brain states, experiences, and cultural backgrounds.

So.......ta da......recognizing that moral judgments supervene on neural and natural facts helps explain the diversity of moral beliefs across individuals and cultures, suggesting that moral facts are not universally fixed but can vary based on the underlying natural differences.

This was a thought experiment founded on the acceptance, for the sake of argument, of certain terms and filtering them through the idea of supervience then introducing morals into the mix.

The above is very narrow.

'That all humans must breathe or else die' as driven by the 'ought to breathe' neural algorithm is a biological fact supervene on natural facts [physics, chemistry, facts of nature etc.].
This biological fact is universal in ALL humans.

Some things are invarient, some things vary widely.

Similarly there is the universal 'oughtnotness to torture and kill babies for pleasure' neural algorithm which is a moral fact contingent upon a moral FSERC.

This is clearly a use of a fiction, this 'oughtness' . It is definitely referring to something we cannot view. It is not even a reification and many metaphysical antirealists would consider it unreal. And any antirealist who views noumena as false and unreal must view this 'oughtness' as false and unreal.

This view however would not stop the antirealist from fighting tooth and nail against anyone who wants to do that.

The physical existence of the above biological and moral fact is universal in all humans.
Who want to deny the above?

If some extreme perverted human were to 'torture and kill babies for pleasure' that is due to the damage to the mechanisms of the said algorithm, it does not obviate the physical existence of that biological moral fact.

It is certainly an action that nearly every human in peace time does not allow and in war time does not allow as the specific goal of any individual's behavior. It is allowed as the byproduct of war behavior with other goals. It is accepted as an unfortunate and expected side effect of, for example, bombing cities and military bases, etc. There are also nations with nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction who have protocoIs in pIace that wouId necessariIy Iead to the torture and deaths of chiIdren but this is seen as a moraIIy justified coIIateraI effect of a justified response to attac, even though this might invoIve thousands or even miIIions of such instances.

In principle, the whole of the living human being and human-nature supervene upon natural facts.
Moral facts are part of the human nature fact, the whole human being.
Therefore moral facts supervene on natural facts.

Nothing here in this part disagrees with what I wrote.

CertainIy one can choose an emotionaIIy charged exampIe of something nearIy every human hates. We are empathetic regarding babies, in ways we are not about other aduIts. This does not, for an intrumentaIist justify the fiction of 'oughtnesses' inside humans somewhere. Though of course instrumentaIist wiII generaIIy fight tooth and nail to incarcerate or kill people in non-war situations from deciding that it's ok to have children tortured and killed - by radiation sickeness, say or horrible wounds from bombing etc.

However, let's say someone couId demonstrate that aII humans hate X. And we decide that is an objective moraI fact. This doesn't mean that there are other moraI facts.

If moraI supervenes on brain states and we decide that moraI facts can be determined based on this then it is absoIuteIy cIear and there can be absoIuteIy no doubt that opposing moraI positions both contain moraI facts.

Anti-abortionists and pro-abortionist wouId both have certain brain states that are present with their moraI judgments. Both moraI positions MUST, according to the Iogic presented in the OP, be considered moraI facts. Must be.

If moraI fact supervene on brain states, etc. Then today's moraI judgments, which their enormous diversity, are aII moraI facts. And one cannot say that moraI position X is not a moraI fact if any group of humans has that moraI position. Or reaIIy if any individuaI does.

[Iwannaplato]

I also like to question the language use in the titIe of thread, given that it might show a confusion about supervenience.

I consider it much better to say something like, "One can analyze or understand the relationship between your mental states and physical states in terms of supervenience." This formulation acknowledges that supervenience is a way of conceptualizing the relationship rather than defining what "you are" solely through supervenience. The title formulation sounds like we are talking about what someone is composed of, even with the qualifications in the OP, since they directly move on to morality.

Supervenience describes a specific aspect of the mind-body relationship—the dependency of mental states on physical states.

"In discussing how your mental states change with alterations in your brain's neural activity, we can use the concept of supervenience to understand that changes in your mental experiences always correspond to changes in your physical brain states."

By framing it as "one can look at the relationship in terms of supervenience," we maintain clarity that supervenience is a tool or perspective for understanding the mind-body relationship, rather than a definitive statement of what constitutes your entire being.

Pardon my fussiness when I have my instrumentaIist hat on. Best to try to prevent later needs for ontologicaI clean-up due to messes created by reification, conflation of perspective-taking with metaphysical commitment, and overIy extravagant application of terms.

[Veritas Aequitas]

'That all humans must breathe or else die' as driven by the 'ought to breathe' neural algorithm is a biological fact supervene on natural facts [physics, chemistry, facts of nature etc.].
This biological fact is universal in ALL humans.

Some things are invarient, some things vary widely.

Similarly there is the universal 'oughtnotness to torture and kill babies for pleasure' neural algorithm which is a moral fact contingent upon a moral FSERC.

This is clearly a use of a fiction, this 'oughtness' . It is definitely referring to something we cannot view. It is not even a reification and many metaphysical antirealists would consider it unreal. And any antirealist who views noumena as false and unreal must view this 'oughtness' as false and unreal.

This view however would not stop the antirealist from fighting tooth and nail against anyone who wants to do that.

It is not a useful fiction, it can be tested empirically.

This hypothesis "there is the universal oughtnotness to torture and kill babies for pleasure"
is abduced from the biological fact of the 'oughtness to breathe else die'.
If someone declared he does not want to breathe,
the immediate response from others, would be instantly be.
'you ought to breathe, else you will die'.

That "there is the universal oughtnotness to torture and kill babies for pleasure" is easily inferred from empirical evidence in the observation of human experience since there were babies.

This hypothesis can be potentially tested easily.
The intentional damage to the specific neural circuit will drive the patient to kill babies [immoral] regardless of the 'pleasure' element.

The physical existence of the above biological and moral fact is universal in all humans.
Who want to deny the above?

If some extreme perverted human were to 'torture and kill babies for pleasure' that is due to the damage to the mechanisms of the said algorithm, it does not obviate the physical existence of that biological moral fact.

It is certainly an action that nearly every human in peace time does not allow and in war time does not allow as the specific goal of any individual's behavior. It is allowed as the byproduct of war behavior with other goals. It is accepted as an unfortunate and expected side effect of, for example, bombing cities and military bases, etc. There are also nations with nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction who have protocoIs in pIace that wouId necessariIy Iead to the torture and deaths of chiIdren but this is seen as a moraIIy justified coIIateraI effect of a justified response to attac, even though this might invoIve thousands or even miIIions of such instances.

You missed the critical point.
The universal Excel program is inherent and existing physically and as potential function in ALL human.
Yes, at present, there are humans killing humans for various reasons, but this is due to damage or the power of inhibition is weak.
This weakness of the mechanism does not obviate its physical existence, i.e. the biological-moral fact that exists in ALL humans.

Analogy:
If you install the Microsoft Excel program in your computer but it does not work for unknown or known reason, it does not mean the Excel program does not exists in your computer. It exists as real but it just that it is not working as expected.

Similarly, ALL humans are endowed with the "oughtnotness to kill humans" program in the brain as a feature of human nature, but if it does not work at all nor effectively [at present humans are killing for various reasons], it does not mean its does not exists as a moral fact in the brain of ALL humans.
There is no question of killing of humans is allowed, permitted or not.
The question is the program exists as real in the brain but is not working due to some reason.
Get it?

In principle, the whole of the living human being and human-nature supervene upon natural facts.
Moral facts are part of the human nature fact, the whole human being.
Therefore moral facts supervene on natural facts.

Nothing here in this part disagrees with what I wrote.

CertainIy one can choose an emotionaIIy charged exampIe of something nearIy every human hates. We are empathetic regarding babies, in ways we are not about other aduIts. This does not, for an intrumentaIist justify the fiction of 'oughtnesses' inside humans somewhere. Though of course instrumentaIist wiII generaIIy fight tooth and nail to incarcerate or kill people in non-war situations from deciding that it's ok to have children tortured and killed - by radiation sickeness, say or horrible wounds from bombing etc.

However, let's say someone couId demonstrate that aII humans hate X. And we decide that is an objective moraI fact. This doesn't mean that there are other moraI facts.

If moraI supervenes on brain states and we decide that moraI facts can be determined based on this then it is absoIuteIy cIear and there can be absoIuteIy no doubt that opposing moraI positions both contain moraI facts.

Anti-abortionists and pro-abortionist wouId both have certain brain states that are present with their moraI judgments. Both moraI positions MUST, according to the Iogic presented in the OP, be considered moraI facts. Must be.

If moraI fact supervene on brain states, etc. Then today's moraI judgments, which their enormous diversity, are aII moraI facts. And one cannot say that moraI position X is not a moraI fact if any group of humans has that moraI position. Or reaIIy if any individuaI does.

What is fact is contingent upon a human-based FSERC.
A moral fact is contingent upon a human-based moral FSERC.
The needed question is how credible and objective are the specific moral fact.

As I had argued, the 'oughtnotness to kill humans' can be easily verified, tested and justified empirically.

If another moral FSERC generate 'the oughtness to kill humans' as a moral fact, this is not tenable because it so evident humans do not go about killing humans arbitrary.
It does not have strong empirical evidences to justify the credibility and objectivity of its claim as a moral fact.
In addition, via reason and rationality, whatever moral must be universal in all humans.
If 'the oughtness to kill humans' is universal, then in theory the human species will go extinct or would not have survived for so long. This is not rational.

[Flannel Jesus]

I think the terms body, brain states and mind are all useful fictions,

This is very narrow, shallow and negative thinking.

How is it shallow and negative? It's model dependant realism if I ever heard it. Seems like the perfect thing for you to agree with!

Body, brain states and mind are only useful fictions and illusions, if one insists they exist absolutely independent of the human conditions, i.e. noumenal and things-in-themselves.

This is... exactly the direct opposite of the meaning of those words

[Veritas Aequitas]

I think the terms body, brain states and mind are all useful fictions,

This is very narrow, shallow and negative thinking.

How is it shallow and negative? It's model dependant realism if I ever heard it. Seems like the perfect thing for you to agree with!

"the terms body, brain states and mind are all useful fictions" is not a common view.
Show me evidence if you thing the above is the generally accepted view.

In such a case, one should present a variety and balanced view and provide argument to support one's view.

Body, brain states and mind are only useful fictions and illusions, if one insists they exist absolutely independent of the human conditions, i.e. noumenal and things-in-themselves.

This is... exactly the direct opposite of the meaning of those words

That is a sweeping statement, where is the justification.

As I had stated, your view is likely to be based on philosophical realism which arose from an evolutionary default, relative to antirealism [Kantian] it is very primordial and primitive.

[Flannel Jesus]

This is very narrow, shallow and negative thinking.

How is it shallow and negative? It's model dependant realism if I ever heard it. Seems like the perfect thing for you to agree with!

"the terms body, brain states and mind are all useful fictions" is not a common view.
Show me evidence if you thing the above is the generally accepted view.

I didn't say it was an accepted view, so I'm not going to show you that

Body, brain states and mind are only useful fictions and illusions, if one insists they exist absolutely independent of the human conditions, i.e. noumenal and things-in-themselves.

This is... exactly the direct opposite of the meaning of those words

That is a sweeping statement, where is the justification.

Well, look at the fucking words in english. "Fiction". "Illustion". When he says they're a fiction and an illusion, and you say "that means they exist absolutely", it's like you don't know what fiction, illusion, exist, or absolutely mean. If they're fictions, he's saying they DON'T exist. If you knew even the most basic English, you would be able to see that.

[Iwannaplato]

InstrumentaIist hat on again.

Let's consider 'brain states' as containing/being/having/including 'oughtness'. Or 'bodies' or 'minds' as containing/being/having/including this 'oughtness'.

We have three people, all of whom consider X to be immoral.
Person 1: considers X immoral, and upon examination we find this person is very conformist and wants to fit in. This is all reflected in this person's 'brain state' as shown in MRI sequences.
Person 2: considers X immoral, and upon examination we find this is based on disgust related to bodies. This is all reflected in this person's 'brain state' as shown in MRI sequences.
Person 3: considers X immoral, and upon examination we find this is based on an intuitive sense that if people X, certain problems will arise. This is all reflected in this person's 'brain state' as shown in MRI sequences.
Person 4: considers X immoral, and upon examination we find this is based on an analysis of consequences in carefully thought out cause and effect processes. This is all reflected in this person's 'brain state' as shown in MRI sequences.
Person 5: considers X immoral, and upon examination we find this is based on scriptural injunction. This is all reflected in this person's 'brain state' as shown in MRI sequences.

Even within each of these categories there will be wild variations in images and secondary feelings, hormonal levels, which parts of the brain are engaged, what neurons related to different linguistic aspects of their position, and so on and on.

There is no common oughtness. This oughtness is at best a useful fiction. It is certainly a noumenon, so, according to VA must be false and unreal. It cannot be sensed with devices or without them. All sorts of 'things' will be sensed by the devices. Unlike a 'tumor' say, where one finds 'it' in the image of MRIs. There it is. There will be just a myriad of brain states, all unique. And even granting that these device created images are 'sensory' or dealing with Kantian phenomena, we don't find the oughtness nor have we any scientific justification at all for calling anything in these images an oughtness. Within realist neuroscience we have justifications for calling things neurons and labels associated with certain brain states. But nowhere in the field of neuroscience do we find images of 'oughtnesses' in brains. Not that an instrumentalist would be beholden to such an interpretation/reification/fiction.

And we are not even including in this all the people who disagree and think that X is actually moral.

Once we include the diversity of humans, we will have a myriad of 'brain states' creating a myriad of 'moral facts'.

The point of this post is primarily----- even when the same opinion is held the brain states wiII vary wideIy and this 'oughtness' is an unfounded metaphysical, speculation wilder than those around electrons where there is vastly more consistant data. Though of course with my instrumentalist hat on, electrons are also fictions.

[Veritas Aequitas]

How is it shallow and negative? It's model dependant realism if I ever heard it. Seems like the perfect thing for you to agree with!

"the terms body, brain states and mind are all useful fictions" is not a common view.
Show me evidence if you thing the above is the generally accepted view.

I didn't say it was an accepted view, so I'm not going to show you that

Body, brain states and mind are only useful fictions and illusions, if one insists they exist absolutely independent of the human conditions, i.e. noumenal and things-in-themselves.

This is... exactly the direct opposite of the meaning of those words

That is a sweeping statement, where is the justification.

Well, look at the fucking words in english. "Fiction". "Illustion". When he says they're a fiction and an illusion, and you say "that means they exist absolutely", it's like you don't know what fiction, illusion, exist, or absolutely mean. If they're fictions, he's saying they DON'T exist. If you knew even the most basic English, you would be able to see that.

Hey mf,
you are the one who is not getting the point because you are are stuck with primitive ideas.

When IWP stated
"the terms body, brain states and mind are all useful fictions"
I was equating to Kant stating 'God is a useful fiction'.
This is where theists insist their God is real absolutely..
But Kant proved God cannot exists as real, however, God can be a useful fiction or illusion because the belief in an illusory God soothe their existential pains.
So God in this case is a useful fiction.

It is the same with telling a 4 years old, Santa is a useful fiction, if he insist Santa is real.

It is the same with
1. "the terms body, brain states and mind are all useful fictions"
2. in this case X claims the body, brain states and mind are ABSOLUTELY real.
3. if X insists on 2 absolutely, then from an antirealist perspective,
body, brain states and mind are all useful fictions.
4. It is only in the above condition that one can state,
"the body, brain states and mind are all useful fictions."

Generally, in common parlance, no one will make the state,
"the body, brain states and mind are all useful fictions"
accept in the above conditions of 1-3.

[Flannel Jesus]

When IWP stated
"the terms body, brain states and mind are all useful fictions"
I was equating to Kant stating 'God is a useful fiction'.
This is where theists insist their God is real absolutely..
But Kant proved God cannot exists as real, however, God can be a useful fiction or illusion because the belief in an illusory God soothe their existential pains.
So God in this case is a useful fiction.

That's complete word salad. You've just said a bunch of nonsense crap. You don't know English. All of what you said is just straight nonsense, to ANYBODY who speaks English.

When someone claims something is a fiction, in English, that's NOT the same as saying it's "absolutely real", it's the exact opposite. If you spoke English well enough to participate in an English speaking philosophy forum, you'd know that.

[Iwannaplato]

When IWP stated
"the terms body, brain states and mind are all useful fictions"
I was equating to Kant stating 'God is a useful fiction'.
This is where theists insist their God is real absolutely..
But Kant proved God cannot exists as real, however, God can be a useful fiction or illusion because the belief in an illusory God soothe their existential pains.
So God in this case is a useful fiction.

That's complete word salad. You've just said a bunch of nonsense crap. You don't know English. All of what you said is just straight nonsense, to ANYBODY who speaks English.

When someone claims something is a fiction, in English, that's NOT the same as saying it's "absolutely real", it's the exact opposite. If you spoke English well enough to participate in an English speaking philosophy forum, you'd know that.

And he respeats old debunked claims in his word saIad.
Kant did not set out to prove God cannot or does not exist, and he certainly never did. And Kant never stated that God is a useful fiction. (which is analogically like saying he drove a Volvo)

In the CPR, Kant argued that human reason is limited to the realm of experience. He introduced the idea of the "phenomenal" world (the world as we experience it) and the "noumenal" world (the world as it is in itself, independent of our experience). According to Kant, while we can have knowledge of the phenomenal world, the noumenal world remains beyond our grasp.

As far as God, Kant critiqued traditional arguments for God's existence, such as the ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments. He found these arguments insufficient to prove God's existence through pure reason. But Kant did not conclude that God does not exist. Instead, he argued that God's existence is a matter of faith rather than knowledge.

VA is confused about Kant's position on noumena. VA and Kant do not share the same stance there, at all. Kant is much closer to me when I have my instrumentalist hat on. Hence his instrumentalist argument in favor of believing in God.