Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Thu Jul 11, 2024 3:59 am
My FSERC is a human-based framework and system of emergence and realization of reality [things] [FSER], which is subsequently perceived, cognized and described [FSC or FSK].
The noumena which is 'false' and not real [illusory] has nothing to do with my FSERC [real] at all.
Your FSERC may well be real, but the 'things' it is drawing conclusions about are noumena, which in your system means they are illusory.
The 'objects' that are posited, in this case moral law or in other threads 'freedom' - are not real.
If you are a kind of agnostic antirealist (I don't mean this in relation to belief in God, but as a general we don't know position, here in relation to noumena) then the 'things' that are not observed are considered useful fictions.
The conclusions are useful, but that kind of anti-realist takes no stand in relation to the truth of noumena or the reality of noumena.
But your antirealism has been characterized by a strong postion that noumena are false/not real.
That means that the unobservable objects 'things' 'processes' are not real.
If you can show that morality proper, the one morality that is true and real is observable, the please do that. If you can show that freedom is observable - Kant specifically said it was not - please do that.
If not, then these terms are about noumena. And thus according to you, not Kant, they are unreal and false, as the title of one of your threads says about noumena.
The above points are messy.
I agree with Kant, freedom is noumenal [thing-in-itself].
Then it is, according to you, false and not real. There is a thread title with that exact assertion about noumena.
For Kant, freedom as thing-in-itself is necessary for his morality.
I did not claim freedom is observable.
My morality-proper do not focus on 'noumenal freedom'.
Lovely. So, you do not agree with Kant on what is necessary for morality. He sees freedom as noumenal, which you acknowledge above, and you consider the noumenal false and unreal. So, this is a core difference from Kant.
Rather, my Morality-proper-FSERC is based on empirical evidence 'supervened' upon the scientific FSERC.
As I had claimed there is an inherent moral function within the brain that is supported by its physical neurons in process and actions.
The existence of mirror neurons is one clue to that.
Though there is nothing so far discovered by science that entails that it is moral. It affects behavior and attitudes. You are calling it moral. Further you focus on the one part of the neuronal patterns that support your morality. You do not focus on the other parts of the brain. Current brains have patterns or neuronal firing (and actually glial and endocrine involvement, heck even postural and other involvement). These are associate with current behaviors and attitudes. If you think brains should be different, which you have asserted, then science is not leading to this conclusion. Currently brain physiology and neuronal patterns is not leading to this conclusion. Something outside of science is leading to this conclusion.
Physics is the natural science of matter, involving the study of matter, its fundamental constituents, its motion and behavior through space and time, and the related entities of energy and force. WIKI
Within scientific realism [philosophical realism],
Physics recognized whatever it study and justify is physical and as such exists as real regardless it is observable or not.
and so they would be necessarily wrong in that conclusion, which is a realist one, if the metaphysical anti realists are correct.
Yes, the philosophical realists relying on scientific realism are wrong in chasing for something that is absolute and beyond the empirical world.
Then 1) so was Kant for thinking that morality was possible, given that he thought freedom, which he considered noumenal and which you also think, was necessary for morality. 2) Other minds, which are not empirical, but deduced and inferred, and unreal. We cannot direcly experience (iow they are not empirical) other minds. 3)
morality proper is not empirical. If it is, please tell me where to look/listen/feel to experience it.
Thus the scientific realism of philosophical realism [mind-independent reality] includes all that are not directly observable [gravity, quarks] but justified within Physics.
These indirectly observable are facts i.e. facts of Physics.
But now you are calling Physics realism, while at the same time you have threads arguing that really physics is starting to realize it should be antirealist.
I am merely describing [not agreeing] the philosophical realist version of what they claim to be Physics.
As an antirealist I do not agree with that.
OK, but then we cannot assume that things physics says are real, are real.
Moral facts as objective as contingent within a moral framework and system [FS-ERC] with inputs of scientific facts from the scientific FSERC.
And if that FSERC is scientific realist then if must, according to your own arguments be false, because it treats noumena as real and true.
FSERC is scientific realist is an oxymoron.
FSERC by definition cannot be scientific realist
OK, I have not kept up with your terminology. I thought it was simply a new version of FSK. So, physics is not an FSERC, unless it is the physics practiced and thought of by an antirealist physicist.
Must respect and tolerate the morality of others - which by the way is very common in both sociology and anthropology - is an objectivist moral stance. Some people who think they are moral relativists don't notice that problem. Despite that they are moral realists. In fact they are deontologists: it's a rule with provisos to consequences.
?? Moral Relativism is Moral Realism or Moral Objectivism???
No, not all moral relativisms, but you gave a moral relativism with a deontologicaI rule that one must respect other moralities. And there are moral relativists or people who call themselves that without realizing they are contradicting themselves.
For example, it leads to a paradox. You must respect other moralities even those that do not respect other moraIities. Which many moral realists, obviously, do not do.
Moral Relativism by definition leads to 'to each their own' either they are indifferent or they respect/tolerate the differences.
If a Hitler insist it is within his morality to commit genocide on race-X, the moral relativist would either be indifferent or will respect/tolerate it.
Nope, that's a false conclusion. It's also not quite relevant to what I quoted. A moral relativist can hate what Hitler does and join the resistance or sign up for the army. They simply need not think of their hatred of his goals as an objective morality. One can have, for example, empathy regardless of one's metaethical position.
A Moral Realist by definition imply all moral elements are universal thus applicable to all humans [without exception] as inherent in their human nature.
It's a metaethical position.
Analogy: All humans are embedded or hardwired with the inherent oughtness-to-breathe without exceptions.
Similarly, moral realists believe for example all humans are embedded or hardwired with the inherent oughtnot-ness to kill humans, and will take steps to strive toward this moral standard with the best of their abilities.
No, it depends on what moral realism they believe in. There are all sorts of attitudes and behavioral tendencies in brains and humans. You don't get to cherry pick.
If you think moral realists can't condone killing on moral grounds, you need to study history. Most humans have been killed, when killed intentionally by other humans, on moral realist grounds. The overwhelming majority of human killing of other humans has been justified on moral realist grounds.
And the brains that did this had structures and patterns. If we can look at brains and decide what is morality proper, then what they had in their brains MUST have led to morality proper and shown itself in their behavior.
If we don't like their behavior, then the structure of their brains had a problem with something outside the fields of brain science has decide on non-scientific grounds.