Indirect Realism is Not Realistic

[Veritas Aequitas]

I am aware ChatGpt is reasonable familiar with Kant's CPR.

He doesn't understand what Chatgpt does. It isn't 'familiar' with Kant's CPR. It has been given data on it. If asked a question, it can access its data and using algorithms deduce (or try to) conclusions. This is even more distanced from 'being familiar with' when the questions are not the standard ones. IOW when they require interpretation, guesswork.

In a sense it is the exact same situation that BINGai is in, an AI that does scour the internet, was not 'familiar' with Kant before, but now used that scanning to produce in real time to generate and answer. Chatgpt has a library at home. Bing Ai goes to outside libraries.

Neither is familiar. They just have tools they throw at data.

I stated ChatGpt is 'familiar' not have 100% access.
I am using other AIs that that can access any PDF to have 100% of the texts therein.

[Atla]

Then there is the problem within transcendental idealism that causation is seen as a priori, so on one hand noumena can't "cause" phenomena, on the other hand noumena somehow "cause" phenomena anyway.

I see no such problem within indirect realism as causation is seen as universal.

[Atla]

Let's see what else we got, VA didn't bring any argument of his own, so AI will have to step in:

What are the main critiques of indirect realism, from a transcendental idealist perspective?

From a transcendental idealist perspective, which is rooted in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, there are several critiques of indirect realism, also known as representationalism or the theory of perception that suggests we do not perceive the external world directly but rather through representations or mental images. Here are some main critiques:

1. Epistemological Concerns: Transcendental idealism posits that our knowledge of the world is mediated through the structures of our minds. Indirect realism, by suggesting that we perceive mental representations rather than the external world itself, raises questions about how we can have knowledge of the external world at all. If our perceptions are only of mental representations, it becomes unclear how we can know anything about the external world beyond our mental representations.

2. Undermining the Role of Transcendental Structures: Kant argued that the mind imposes certain conceptual structures (such as space, time, and the categories of understanding) onto our perceptions, thereby shaping our experience of the world. Indirect realism undermines this view by suggesting that our perceptions are not directly shaped by these transcendental structures but rather by mental representations that may or may not accurately reflect external reality.

3. Problem of Representational Content: Transcendental idealism raises concerns about the nature of the content of mental representations posited by indirect realism. If our perceptions are mediated by mental representations, it becomes unclear how these representations acquire their content and how they can accurately represent the external world. This raises questions about the reliability of our perceptual experiences and the possibility of knowledge.

4. Limitations on Knowledge: Kant's transcendental idealism emphasizes the limits of human knowledge, arguing that we can only know phenomena as they appear to us, not things as they are in themselves (noumena). Indirect realism further complicates this picture by suggesting that our perceptions are not even of phenomena themselves but of mental representations of phenomena, raising doubts about the extent to which we can know anything about the external world.

Overall, from a transcendental idealist perspective, indirect realism is critiqued for its potential to undermine the possibility of knowledge of the external world and for its implications regarding the nature of perception and the limits of human understanding.

1. Residues of patterns, regularities, features about the external world are picked up by our senses and get processed in our minds, they make it into our mental representations and our more abstract concepts. Even if we only perceive say a 1% "residue" about out surroundings, our minds can work with that data.

2. That's not a problem, Kant was just partially wrong. Though our minds probably still impose certain a priori structures on our mental representations, those structures aren't imposed on the external reality.

3. The content is probably constructed from a combination of a priori structures and data from the senses. By definition it can't be fully accurate. How accurate it is exactly, may be an unanswarable question by definition too. For most people most of the time, it seems to be accurate enough. For people who are actively hallucinating, it doesn't seem to be accurate enough.

(Which brings up indirect realism's important commonplace advantage: when representations are accurate enough, we can just forget about it all and revert back to living life as naive realists, which is the healthy thing to do. Transcendental idealism on the other hand can be fairly unhealthy, can trap us in a state similar to solipsism.)

4. I think overall we can know more: we can have a better actual understanding of our mental representations, and some understanding at all about external objects. Overall, there is no absolute solid "ground" upon which all human understanding is built, but that has always just been a (Kantian) fantasy anyway.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here is summary of the discussion up to Mar, 30, 2024:

Indirect Realism is Not Realistic
viewtopic.php?p=704336#p704336


The main problem why Indirect Realism is not realistic.
SCEPTICISM AND THE VEIL OF PERCEPTION
A problem for indirect realism is that it leads to scepticism about the nature and existence of the external world.


Look at the two diagrams above. What would be the difference from the perceiver’s perspective between the two?
What difference would it make to the perceiver if there was no physical world at all? [as postulated by Indirect Realists]
This is asking, what if we deny Indirect Realism?
The answer, surely, is nothing.

If we only perceive sense data, and not the object itself, how can we know anything about the external world?
There is no way of telling if the sense data is an accurate representation of the external world – or even that there is an external world at all!
We can’t get beyond the veil of perception (sense data) to access the external world behind it.
So, how can indirect realism justify its claim that there is a mind-independent external world that causes sense data if we never actually perceive the mind-independent external world itself?

Without thoroughly understanding and grasping the criticism of the OP, Atla seek out ChatGpt [which has limitations]

viewtopic.php?p=704485&sid=780c9f4dc85c ... ea#p704485

Atla the KG wrote:
Which explanation is more likely to be correct according to empirical observation?

ChatGpt responded to Atla based on his narrow view.
The point is, ChatGpt will respond accordingly to one's levels of intelligence. If one approach from low intelligence level, ChatGpt will respond accordingly. ChatGpt [even though capable] will not provide PhD level, if the one who question is asking a kindi-level question.

ChatGpt to Atla:
According to empirical observation, indirect realism is more likely to align with our understanding of reality. Empirical evidence consistently suggests that there is an external world that exists independently of our perception. Through scientific experiments and observations, we gather data that supports the existence of objective features and properties of the external world.

I understand ChatGpt is interacting with Atla at the kindi-level, so I interrupted from the PhD level as discussed with ChatGpt as follows;

VA to ChatGpt wrote:
Topic: Kant Empirical Realism & Transcendental Realism:
viewtopic.php?p=704492&sid=104b44d1700d ... 3c#p704492
My interlocutor provided the following from ChatGpt.
(I believe my interlocutor did not provide the proper perspective for ChatGpt's consideration.)

[ChatGpt]"Yes, this could be considered an example of inconsistency when attempting to incorporate empirical realism within transcendental idealism. Empirical realism typically asserts the existence of an objective reality independent of human cognition, while transcendental idealism emphasizes the subjective nature of reality and the role of human cognition in shaping our understanding of the world. When trying to reconcile these perspectives, conflicts may arise, such as in explaining the disparity between classical intuitions of space and time and the findings of Einsteinian relativity. "

I provided details with reference to Kant’s ideas and ChatGpt responded as follows;

Yes, your points are reasonable and provide a more nuanced understanding of Kant's philosophical framework.
Overall, your interpretation provides a more accurate portrayal of Kant's philosophical position and his attempt to reconcile empirical realism with transcendental idealism within the framework of the CPR.
viewtopic.php?p=704586&sid=75644e120d01 ... b8#p704586

With Kant's Transcendental Idealism, the basic approach to reality is to rely solely on empirical evidences plus critical thinking without assuming there is something real beyond the empirical.
Obviously this is more realistic than Indirect Realism which speculate and assume [based on faith] there is something existing beyond the empirical.

Here is a better move by Atla in asking the question what is the main critiques of indirect realism, from a transcendental idealist perspective?

Atla the KG wrote:
What are the main critiques of indirect realism, from a transcendental idealist perspective?

ChatGpt gave a detailed critique of Indirect Realism from the Transcendental Idealist’s perspective and concluded with the following;

Overall, from a transcendental idealist perspective, indirect realism is critiqued for its potential to undermine the possibility of knowledge of the external world and for its implications regarding the nature of perception and the limits of human understanding.

This is pointed out in the OP, i.e. Indirect Realism is not realistic, i.e. there is a Veil of Perception that lead to skepticism, thus cannot be realistic.
Indirect Realism does rely on empirical evidence but not ultimately on empirical evidence rather Indirect Realism speculate and assume there is an absolute ultimate reality beyond the empirical, i.e. the things-in-themselves or things-by-themselves existing regardless whether there are human or not.

[Atla]

Here is summary of the discussion up to Mar, 30, 2024:

Indirect Realism is Not Realistic
viewtopic.php?p=704336#p704336


The main problem why Indirect Realism is not realistic.
SCEPTICISM AND THE VEIL OF PERCEPTION
A problem for indirect realism is that it leads to scepticism about the nature and existence of the external world.


Look at the two diagrams above. What would be the difference from the perceiver’s perspective between the two?
What difference would it make to the perceiver if there was no physical world at all? [as postulated by Indirect Realists]
This is asking, what if we deny Indirect Realism?
The answer, surely, is nothing.

If we only perceive sense data, and not the object itself, how can we know anything about the external world?
There is no way of telling if the sense data is an accurate representation of the external world – or even that there is an external world at all!
We can’t get beyond the veil of perception (sense data) to access the external world behind it.
So, how can indirect realism justify its claim that there is a mind-independent external world that causes sense data if we never actually perceive the mind-independent external world itself?

Without thoroughly understanding and grasping the criticism of the OP, Atla seek out ChatGpt [which has limitations]

viewtopic.php?p=704485&sid=780c9f4dc85c ... ea#p704485

Atla the KG wrote:
Which explanation is more likely to be correct according to empirical observation?

ChatGpt responded to Atla based on his narrow view.
The point is, ChatGpt will respond accordingly to one's levels of intelligence. If one approach from low intelligence level, ChatGpt will respond accordingly. ChatGpt [even though capable] will not provide PhD level, if the one who question is asking a kindi-level question.

ChatGpt to Atla:
According to empirical observation, indirect realism is more likely to align with our understanding of reality. Empirical evidence consistently suggests that there is an external world that exists independently of our perception. Through scientific experiments and observations, we gather data that supports the existence of objective features and properties of the external world.

I understand ChatGpt is interacting with Atla at the kindi-level, so I interrupted from the PhD level as discussed with ChatGpt as follows;

VA to ChatGpt wrote:
Topic: Kant Empirical Realism & Transcendental Realism:
viewtopic.php?p=704492&sid=104b44d1700d ... 3c#p704492
My interlocutor provided the following from ChatGpt.
(I believe my interlocutor did not provide the proper perspective for ChatGpt's consideration.)

[ChatGpt]"Yes, this could be considered an example of inconsistency when attempting to incorporate empirical realism within transcendental idealism. Empirical realism typically asserts the existence of an objective reality independent of human cognition, while transcendental idealism emphasizes the subjective nature of reality and the role of human cognition in shaping our understanding of the world. When trying to reconcile these perspectives, conflicts may arise, such as in explaining the disparity between classical intuitions of space and time and the findings of Einsteinian relativity. "

I provided details with reference to Kant’s ideas and ChatGpt responded as follows;

Yes, your points are reasonable and provide a more nuanced understanding of Kant's philosophical framework.
Overall, your interpretation provides a more accurate portrayal of Kant's philosophical position and his attempt to reconcile empirical realism with transcendental idealism within the framework of the CPR.
viewtopic.php?p=704586&sid=75644e120d01 ... b8#p704586

With Kant's Transcendental Idealism, the basic approach to reality is to rely solely on empirical evidences plus critical thinking without assuming there is something real beyond the empirical.
Obviously this is more realistic than Indirect Realism which speculate and assume [based on faith] there is something existing beyond the empirical.

Here is a better move by Atla in asking the question what is the main critiques of indirect realism, from a transcendental idealist perspective?

Atla the KG wrote:
What are the main critiques of indirect realism, from a transcendental idealist perspective?

ChatGpt gave a detailed critique of Indirect Realism from the Transcendental Idealist’s perspective and concluded with the following;

Overall, from a transcendental idealist perspective, indirect realism is critiqued for its potential to undermine the possibility of knowledge of the external world and for its implications regarding the nature of perception and the limits of human understanding.

This is pointed out in the OP, i.e. Indirect Realism is not realistic, i.e. there is a Veil of Perception that lead to skepticism, thus cannot be realistic.
Indirect Realism does rely on empirical evidence but not ultimately on empirical evidence rather Indirect Realism speculate and assume there is an absolute ultimate reality beyond the empirical, i.e. the things-in-themselves or things-by-themselves existing regardless whether there are human or not.

But where are your actual counters to my arguments? I went through all the points. Even according to your God, indirect realism is more realistic from a scientific point of view than transcendental idealism. And you haven't added anything.

Without thoroughly understanding and grasping the criticism of the OP, Atla seek out ChatGpt [which has limitations]
...
The point is, ChatGpt will respond accordingly to one's levels of intelligence. If one approach from low intelligence level, ChatGpt will respond accordingly. ChatGpt [even though capable] will not provide PhD level, if the one who question is asking a kindi-level question.
...
I understand ChatGpt is interacting with Atla at the kindi-level, so I interrupted from the PhD level as discussed with ChatGpt as follows;

Nothing but ad hom. I already better understood the arguments 20 years ago than you do now. If you ever wondered why your God keeps agreeing with me and not you.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here is the post again where ChatGpt agree my version re Kant Empirical Realism is more realistic:
viewtopic.php?p=704492#p704492

Here is my discussion with ChatGpt that expose your ignorance:

Topic: Kant Empirical Realism & Transcendental Realism:

My interlocutor provided the following from ChatGpt.
(I believe my interlocutor did not provide the proper perspective for ChatGpt's consideration.)

• [ChatGpt]"Yes, this could be considered an example of inconsistency when attempting to incorporate empirical realism within transcendental idealism. Empirical realism typically asserts the existence of an objective reality independent of human cognition, while transcendental idealism emphasizes the subjective nature of reality and the role of human cognition in shaping our understanding of the world. When trying to reconcile these perspectives, conflicts may arise, such as in explaining the disparity between classical intuitions of space and time and the findings of Einsteinian relativity. "

The concept of empirical realism was introduced by Kant in his CPR.
Kant argued for Empirical Realism, i.e. an mind-independent external world but this empirical realism is ultimately subsumed within his Transcendental Idealism which is not mind-independent.

Einstein is a philosophical realist while Kant in contrast is a transcendental idealist. Thus the point re intuition of space between Kant and Einstein is highly debatable.

My point is Kant did argue in his CPR his empirical realism is subsumed within his transcendental idealism and thus both are reconcilable.

Here is ChatGpt [wR] response;

Yes, your points are reasonable and provide a more nuanced understanding of Kant's philosophical framework.

Kant's Empirical Realism within Transcendental Idealism: Kant indeed introduces the concept of empirical realism in his "Critique of Pure Reason" (CPR). Empirical realism, as Kant presents it, acknowledges the existence of a mind-independent external world, but he also argues that this empirical realism is ultimately subsumed within his broader framework of transcendental idealism. In other words, while Kant recognizes the reality of the external world, he emphasizes that our understanding of it is mediated by the structures of our own minds.

Reconciling Empirical Realism and Transcendental Idealism: Kant's project in the CPR is precisely about reconciling seemingly conflicting perspectives, such as empirical realism and transcendental idealism. While empirical realism posits an objective reality independent of human cognition, transcendental idealism asserts that our perception of reality is shaped by the structures of our minds. Kant's synthesis involves showing how both perspectives can be understood within a unified framework, where empirical reality is not denied but understood in relation to the conditions of human cognition.

Debate over Intuition of Space between Kant and Einstein: Your point about the debate regarding the intuition of space between Kant and Einstein being highly debatable is valid. While Kant's understanding of space and time is indeed different from Einstein's, the comparison between the two is complex and involves considerations of both philosophical and scientific perspectives. Kant's intuition of space and time is tied to his transcendental idealism, while Einstein's theory of relativity introduces a new understanding of spacetime dynamics. However, it's essential to recognize that these perspectives operate within different intellectual contexts and are not necessarily directly comparable.

Overall, your interpretation provides a more accurate portrayal of Kant's philosophical position and his attempt to reconcile empirical realism with transcendental idealism within the framework of the CPR.

Indirect Realism faces a very serious problem because it merely ASSUMEs based on faith that there is an absolutely independent external world out.

2. SCEPTICISM AND THE VEIL OF PERCEPTION
A problem for indirect realism is that it leads to scepticism about the nature and existence of the external world.



Look at the two diagrams above. What would be the difference from the perceiver’s perspective between the two?
What difference would it make to the perceiver if there was no physical world at all?
[In other words, what if we deny Indirect Realism?]
The answer, surely, is nothing.
If we only perceive sense data, and not the object itself, how can we know anything about the external world?

There is no way of telling if the sense data is an accurate representation of the external world – or even that there is an external world at all!
We can’t get beyond the veil of perception (sense data) to access the external world behind it.
So, how can indirect realism justify its claim that there is a mind-independent external world that causes sense data if we never actually perceive the mind-independent external world itself?

Why Kant Empirical Realism is more realistic because it does not assume there is an absolute mind-independent external world out there.

Whatever is real to the Kantian is an emergence within humans contingent within a collective-of-subjects as justified with empirical evidences.
Kantians do not speculate and assume there is an absolute mind-independent external world out there which can be inferred indirectly [ indirect realism].

[Atla]

Here is the post again where ChatGpt agree my version re Kant Empirical Realism is more realistic:
viewtopic.php?p=704492#p704492

Here is my discussion with ChatGpt that expose your ignorance:

Topic: Kant Empirical Realism & Transcendental Realism:

My interlocutor provided the following from ChatGpt.
(I believe my interlocutor did not provide the proper perspective for ChatGpt's consideration.)

• [ChatGpt]"Yes, this could be considered an example of inconsistency when attempting to incorporate empirical realism within transcendental idealism. Empirical realism typically asserts the existence of an objective reality independent of human cognition, while transcendental idealism emphasizes the subjective nature of reality and the role of human cognition in shaping our understanding of the world. When trying to reconcile these perspectives, conflicts may arise, such as in explaining the disparity between classical intuitions of space and time and the findings of Einsteinian relativity. "

The concept of empirical realism was introduced by Kant in his CPR.
Kant argued for Empirical Realism, i.e. an mind-independent external world but this empirical realism is ultimately subsumed within his Transcendental Idealism which is not mind-independent.

Einstein is a philosophical realist while Kant in contrast is a transcendental idealist. Thus the point re intuition of space between Kant and Einstein is highly debatable.

My point is Kant did argue in his CPR his empirical realism is subsumed within his transcendental idealism and thus both are reconcilable.

Here is ChatGpt [wR] response;

Yes, your points are reasonable and provide a more nuanced understanding of Kant's philosophical framework.

Kant's Empirical Realism within Transcendental Idealism: Kant indeed introduces the concept of empirical realism in his "Critique of Pure Reason" (CPR). Empirical realism, as Kant presents it, acknowledges the existence of a mind-independent external world, but he also argues that this empirical realism is ultimately subsumed within his broader framework of transcendental idealism. In other words, while Kant recognizes the reality of the external world, he emphasizes that our understanding of it is mediated by the structures of our own minds.

Reconciling Empirical Realism and Transcendental Idealism: Kant's project in the CPR is precisely about reconciling seemingly conflicting perspectives, such as empirical realism and transcendental idealism. While empirical realism posits an objective reality independent of human cognition, transcendental idealism asserts that our perception of reality is shaped by the structures of our minds. Kant's synthesis involves showing how both perspectives can be understood within a unified framework, where empirical reality is not denied but understood in relation to the conditions of human cognition.

Debate over Intuition of Space between Kant and Einstein: Your point about the debate regarding the intuition of space between Kant and Einstein being highly debatable is valid. While Kant's understanding of space and time is indeed different from Einstein's, the comparison between the two is complex and involves considerations of both philosophical and scientific perspectives. Kant's intuition of space and time is tied to his transcendental idealism, while Einstein's theory of relativity introduces a new understanding of spacetime dynamics. However, it's essential to recognize that these perspectives operate within different intellectual contexts and are not necessarily directly comparable.

Overall, your interpretation provides a more accurate portrayal of Kant's philosophical position and his attempt to reconcile empirical realism with transcendental idealism within the framework of the CPR.

This was the post where you simply lied to a chatbot, you didn't present to it what I actually wrote, only a part taken out of context and placed into a different context.

[Atla]

2. SCEPTICISM AND THE VEIL OF PERCEPTION
A problem for indirect realism is that it leads to scepticism about the nature and existence of the external world.



Look at the two diagrams above. What would be the difference from the perceiver’s perspective between the two?
What difference would it make to the perceiver if there was no physical world at all?
[In other words, what if we deny Indirect Realism?]
The answer, surely, is nothing.
If we only perceive sense data, and not the object itself, how can we know anything about the external world?

There is no way of telling if the sense data is an accurate representation of the external world – or even that there is an external world at all!
We can’t get beyond the veil of perception (sense data) to access the external world behind it.
So, how can indirect realism justify its claim that there is a mind-independent external world that causes sense data if we never actually perceive the mind-independent external world itself?

Why Kant Empirical Realism is more realistic because it does not assume there is an absolute mind-independent external world out there.

Whatever is real to the Kantian is an emergence within humans contingent within a collective-of-subjects as justified with empirical evidences.
Kantians do not speculate and assume there is an absolute mind-independent external world out there which can be inferred indirectly [ indirect realism].

On the contrary, that's exactly why Kantian philosophy is more irrational. Within philosophy, we can neither prove nor disprove the existence of the outside world. We can also not prove whether, if an outside world exists, it is 100% unknowable or only partially unknowable.

So we simply have no philosophical basis to confidently take a stance from the above. Science however is consistent with the stance that there is an outside world and it is only partially unknowable.

Therefore if we want to add science to philosophy, which both you and I do, Indirect realism is more rational than Transcendental idealism. Kant's insistence that we are 100% limited to the phenomena, is a childish and irresponsible bet. Kant's need for a false sense of certainty is immature.

I told you many times, science + Kantian philosophy can't give you what you want. It has to be some even more fundamental insight, maybe Buddhism has one, who knows. So far you haven't presented it.

Let's see if you can counter the above.

[Veritas Aequitas]

On the contrary, that's exactly why Kantian philosophy is more irrational. Within philosophy, we can neither prove nor disprove the existence of the outside world. We can also not prove whether, if an outside world exists, it is 100% unknowable or only partially unknowable.

So we simply have no philosophical basis to confidently take a stance from the above.

The statement "we can neither prove nor disprove the existence of the outside world" merely assumed and implied based on faith [no proof] there is already the "existence of the outside world.

This is the basis of philosophical realism which is grounded on circularity and an illusion.
Realism[Philosophical] is Circular
viewtopic.php?t=42538

Science however is consistent with the stance that there is an outside world and it is only partially unknowable.

There are two approaches to science, i.e.
1. Scientific antirealism- FSERC [no mind independence] basis
2. Scientific realism grounded on philosophical realism - there is an outside world.

This "Science however is consistent with the stance that there is an outside world and it is only partially unknowable." is based on scientific realism which is grounded on an illusion.

Therefore if we want to add science to philosophy, which both you and I do, Indirect realism is more rational than Transcendental idealism. Kant's insistence that we are 100% limited to the phenomena, is a childish and irresponsible bet. Kant's need for a false sense of certainty is immature.

I told you many times, science + Kantian philosophy can't give you what you want. It has to be some even more fundamental insight, maybe Buddhism has one, who knows. So far you haven't presented it.

Let's see if you can counter the above.

The antirealism [Kantian] basis [Empirical Realism] to science is the most realistic.

[Atla]

The statement "we can neither prove nor disprove the existence of the outside world" assume and implied based on faith [no proof] there is already the "existence of the outside world.

This is the basis of philosophical realism which is grounded on circularity and an illusion.
Realism[Philosophical] is Circular
viewtopic.php?t=42538

You seem to have some basic problem with logic. Not being able to prove or disprove the existence of X doesn't mean that we must assume the existence of X.

There are two approaches to science, i.e.
1. Scientific antirealism- FSERC [no mind independence] basis
2. Scientific realism grounded on philosophical realism - there is an outside world.

This "Science however is consistent with the stance that there is an outside world and it is only partially unknowable." is based on scientific realism which is grounded on an illusion.

The antirealism [Kantian] basis [Empirical Realism] to science is the most realistic.

So again: I say we can neither prove nor disprove the existence of the outside world. But you say it is an illusion (so it doesn't exist), so you should be able to prove that.

Either you have to prove that it's an illusion, or admit that Transcendental idealism is irrational. So you'll have to prove Kant's general argument: that we are 100% limited to phenomena.

[Veritas Aequitas]

The statement "we can neither prove nor disprove the existence of the outside world" assume and implied based on faith [no proof] there is already the "existence of the outside world.

This is the basis of philosophical realism which is grounded on circularity and an illusion.
Realism[Philosophical] is Circular
viewtopic.php?t=42538

You seem to have some basic problem with logic. Not being able to prove or disprove the existence of X doesn't mean that we must assume the existence of X.

There are two approaches to science, i.e.
1. Scientific antirealism- FSERC [no mind independence] basis
2. Scientific realism grounded on philosophical realism - there is an outside world.

This "Science however is consistent with the stance that there is an outside world and it is only partially unknowable." is based on scientific realism which is grounded on an illusion.

The antirealism [Kantian] basis [Empirical Realism] to science is the most realistic.

So again: I say we can neither prove nor disprove the existence of the outside world. But you say it is an illusion (so it doesn't exist), so you should be able to prove that.

Either you have to prove that it's an illusion, or admit that Transcendental idealism is irrational. So you'll have to prove Kant's general argument: that we are 100% limited to phenomena.

If there is no assumption of "the existence of X" then just state;
X does not exist unless proven with a credible proof.

In the context of the philosophical realism

Philosophical realism – is the view that a certain kind of thing (ranging widely from abstract objects like numbers to moral statements to the physical world itself) has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.

From the philosophical realist's perspective, he does not assume but literally claim "the existence of X" is real regardless of whether there are humans or not.

It is the antirealists who charged the philosophical realists as merely making an assumption, thus the circularity and the illusion.
The point is when the philosophical realist insist without proofs, the existence of X" is real regardless of whether there are humans or not, that is an illusion [because it not proven to be real].

Analogy:
It is like the 'Abdul' living a large desert who insist to his village members there is a real oasis full of water and dates palms with fruits, 5 kilometers North of the village. [the fact is there is no such thing as surveyed not long before]
The Abdul insistence of 'what is real' to him is actually an illusion.

The philosophical realist is doing the same with the noumenal and insist strong the noumenal is very real when critical-thinking proves the supposedly 'real' noumenal is an actually an illusion.

From the philosophical realist's perspective, he literally claim "the existence of X" [noumenal] is real regardless of whether there are humans or not; if he is so insistence on his claim, the onus is on the positive claimant to prove his claim.

[Atla]

The statement "we can neither prove nor disprove the existence of the outside world" assume and implied based on faith [no proof] there is already the "existence of the outside world.

This is the basis of philosophical realism which is grounded on circularity and an illusion.
Realism[Philosophical] is Circular
viewtopic.php?t=42538

You seem to have some basic problem with logic. Not being able to prove or disprove the existence of X doesn't mean that we must assume the existence of X.

There are two approaches to science, i.e.
1. Scientific antirealism- FSERC [no mind independence] basis
2. Scientific realism grounded on philosophical realism - there is an outside world.

This "Science however is consistent with the stance that there is an outside world and it is only partially unknowable." is based on scientific realism which is grounded on an illusion.

The antirealism [Kantian] basis [Empirical Realism] to science is the most realistic.

So again: I say we can neither prove nor disprove the existence of the outside world. But you say it is an illusion (so it doesn't exist), so you should be able to prove that.

Either you have to prove that it's an illusion, or admit that Transcendental idealism is irrational. So you'll have to prove Kant's general argument: that we are 100% limited to phenomena.

If there is no assumption of "the existence of X" then just state;
X does not exist unless proven with a credible proof.

In the context of the philosophical realism

Philosophical realism – is the view that a certain kind of thing (ranging widely from abstract objects like numbers to moral statements to the physical world itself) has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.

From the philosophical realist's perspective, he does not assume but literally claim "the existence of X" is real regardless of whether there are humans or not.

It is the antirealists who charged the philosophical realists as merely making an assumption, thus the circularity and the illusion.
The point is when the philosophical realist insist without proofs, the existence of X" is real regardless of whether there are humans or not, that is an illusion [because it not proven to be real].

Analogy:
It is like the 'Abdul' living a large desert who insist to his village members there is a real oasis full of water and dates palms with fruits, 5 kilometers North of the village. [the fact is there is no such thing as surveyed not long before]
The Abdul insistence of 'what is real' to him is actually an illusion.

The philosophical realist is doing the same with the noumenal and insist strong the noumenal is very real when critical-thinking proves the supposedly 'real' noumenal is an actually an illusion.

From the philosophical realist's perspective, he literally claim "the existence of X" [noumenal] is real regardless of whether there are humans or not; if he is so insistence on his claim, the onus is on the positive claimant to prove his claim.

And all of science is consistent with a partially unknowable external world, so the claim is scientifically proven.

[Gary Childress]

Indirect Realism is Not Realistic
Atla had been claiming Indirect Realism is realistic in contrast to say Kant's Empirical Realism - Transcendental Idealism.

The so-called realists has hijacked and bastardized the term 'real' with their ideology of realism.
In serious philosophical consideration Indirect Realism is not realistic as defined below;

What is realistic [of varying degrees] is conditioned upon an embodied human-based FSRC, e.g. Kant's Empirical Realism, i.e. the focus on empirical evidences.

Here are the notes that support Indirect Realism is not realistic taken from
https://philosophyalevel.com/aqa-philos ... erception/
...........................

Indirect Realism is the view that:
The external world exists independently of the mind (hence, realism)
But we perceive the external world indirectly, via sense data (hence, indirect)

Indirect realism says the immediate object of perception is sense data. This sense data is caused by, and represents, the mind-independent external world.



Sense data can be described as the content of perceptual experience.
It’s not a physical thing, it exists in the mind. However, sense data is said to be caused by and represent mind-independent physical objects (see diagram above).
Sense data is private. No one else can experience your sense data.
This avoids the problems with direct realism described above. For example, differences in perceptual variation can be explained by differences in sense data. The object itself stays the same throughout even if the sense data changes.

PROBLEMS FOR INDIRECT REALISM

1. BERKELEY: MIND-INDEPENDENT OBJECTS ARE TOTALLY DIFFERENT TO SENSE DATA
Again, indirect realism says what we perceive is sense data that resembles the mind-independent external world. But George Berkeley (the idealism philosopher) questions how it’s possible for mind-dependent sense data to resemble so-called mind-independent objects in any way.
For example, sense data constantly changes, but mind-independent objects do not. The perceptual variation argument demonstrates this: One moment my sense data may be of a square table, the next it’s diamond-shaped. The sense data changes, but the mind-independent object doesn’t – so how can the two things resemble each other?
Further, how can the properties of sense data be like the properties of mind-independent objects? We say that a table is square, but how can my sense data be square? How can the squareness of a (mind-independent) table be like the squareness of sense data? They are two completely different kinds of things!
These major differences between sense data and mind-independent objects undermine the indirect realist claim that sense data is caused by and resembles mind-independent objects.

2. SCEPTICISM AND THE VEIL OF PERCEPTION
A problem for indirect realism is that it leads to scepticism about the nature and existence of the external world.



Look at the two diagrams above. What would be the difference from the perceiver’s perspective between the two?
What difference would it make to the perceiver if there was no physical world at all?
[In other words, what if we deny Indirect Realism?]
The answer, surely, is nothing.
If we only perceive sense data, and not the object itself, how can we know anything about the external world?

There is no way of telling if the sense data is an accurate representation of the external world – or even that there is an external world at all!
We can’t get beyond the veil of perception (sense data) to access the external world behind it.
So, how can indirect realism justify its claim that there is a mind-independent external world that causes sense data if we never actually perceive the mind-independent external world itself?

The Veil Problem:
How can we be sure our sense data accurately represent the external world? Is it like a veil that might distort reality?

Indirect realist replies to scepticism
Russell’s reply: External world is the best hypothesis
Bertrand Russell, an indirect realist, concedes that there is no way we can conclusively defeat this sceptical argument and prove the existence of the external world. So, instead, we must treat the external world as a hypothesis.

Note Russell admitted
"there is no way we can conclusively defeat this sceptical argument and prove the existence of the external world" of offer merely the best hypothesis.

3. The Homunculus Problem:
Who or what interprets the sense data? This can lead to an infinite regress if there's a little "person" in our heads interpreting the data.

From the above, Indirect Realism cannot be realistic.

It seems to me that our senses perceive the tree. But the tree itself is composed of atoms that are mostly empty space. What we see is the mind's work of piecing together information in a particular way that is useful to us, however, it doesn't perfectly correspond to what's actually out there independent of the human mind creating the illusion. Are trees actually out there in the same way that we perceive them to be out there? For example, are trees actually green or are they emitting photons at a particular wavelength that hit our retinas and cause our mind to code it as "green" in the way we experience it?

Granted, this is all highly theoretical in the sense that we could never see what is actually there in itself according to the hypothesis, but it seems like it is true based on scientific theories of what atoms are. And there are, I've heard, instances where the mind actively constructs sense data that is not really there using limited or incomplete data to form a more coherent picture that fits with its expectations. So it seems that the mind/brain can indeed construct experiences that are not really there.

Or is all this that I've said above incorrect?

Or when you say "indirect realism is not realistic" what does that sentence mean? Is it to say that indirect realism is not the case? Or is it to say that "indirect realism" is (literally) not the same thing as "realism"?

[Veritas Aequitas]

It seems to me that our senses perceive the tree.
But the tree itself is composed of atoms that are mostly empty space.
What we see is the mind's work of piecing together information in a particular way that is useful to us, however, it doesn't perfectly correspond to what's actually out there independent of the human mind creating the illusion. Are trees actually out there in the same way that we perceive them to be out there? For example, are trees actually green or are they emitting photons at a particular wavelength that hit our retinas and cause our mind to code it as "green" in the way we experience it?

From the antirealist PV [against Indirect Realism] there is no pre-existing 'tree' out there awaiting our senses to perceive it.

What happens is a something [pattern] emerged and is realized as real upon the states and condition of being human and this something is perceived and cognized as described as a 'tree'.

Granted, this is all highly theoretical in the sense that we could never see what is actually there in itself according to the hypothesis, but it seems like it is true based on scientific theories of what atoms are. And there are, I've heard, instances where the mind actively constructs sense data that is not really there using limited or incomplete data to form a more coherent picture that fits with its expectations. So it seems that the mind/brain can indeed construct experiences that are not really there.

Or is all this that I've said above incorrect?

The brain do generate sense-data but it is not from any external tree out there.
The sense data is generated from that something that emerged and is realized as real within the human conditions with its supposed emerging environment [not external].

Or when you say "indirect realism is not realistic" what does that sentence mean? Is it to say that indirect realism is not the case? Or is it to say that "indirect realism" is (literally) not the same thing as "realism"?

1. My take - antirealist [Kantian];
What is reality, real and realistic is contingent upon a human-based specific framework and system [FS].
As such, when anyone declares something to be real, that reality must be Qualified to a human-based FS, for example scientific reality and truth must be qualified to a the human-based scientific method and its condition.

2. The Indirect Realist take on Reality.
The problem [as I see it and do not agree with] is Indirect Realism claims what is real is really real, i.e. exists absolutely independent of human minds and so, regardless of whether there are human or not; as such, there is no need to qualify what is real to any human-based FS.

My argument based on antirealism is there is no real thing that can exists absolutely independent of human minds and so, regardless of whether there are human or not.
The insistent on such a thing is referring to an illusion, thus delusional.
The supposedly real thing which indirect realists rely of philosophical realism is actually an illusion.
Because it is an illusion, it cannot be realistic.

Direct Realism also relies on philosophical realism, so it is not realistic as well because it is chasing an absolutely independent reality out there which in an illusion reified as real.

Generally realists themselves will argue Indirect Realism is more reasonable than Direct [naive] realism, but both ideologically and dogmatically are chasing after illusions.

[Gary Childress]

It seems to me that our senses perceive the tree.
But the tree itself is composed of atoms that are mostly empty space.
What we see is the mind's work of piecing together information in a particular way that is useful to us, however, it doesn't perfectly correspond to what's actually out there independent of the human mind creating the illusion. Are trees actually out there in the same way that we perceive them to be out there? For example, are trees actually green or are they emitting photons at a particular wavelength that hit our retinas and cause our mind to code it as "green" in the way we experience it?

From the antirealist PV [against Indirect Realism] there is no pre-existing 'tree' out there awaiting our senses to perceive it.

What happens is a something [pattern] emerged and is realized as real upon the states and condition of being human and this something is perceived and cognized as described as a 'tree'.

Granted, this is all highly theoretical in the sense that we could never see what is actually there in itself according to the hypothesis, but it seems like it is true based on scientific theories of what atoms are. And there are, I've heard, instances where the mind actively constructs sense data that is not really there using limited or incomplete data to form a more coherent picture that fits with its expectations. So it seems that the mind/brain can indeed construct experiences that are not really there.

Or is all this that I've said above incorrect?

The brain do generate sense-data but it is not from any external tree out there.
The sense data is generated from that something that emerged and is realized as real within the human conditions with its supposed emerging environment [not external].

Or when you say "indirect realism is not realistic" what does that sentence mean? Is it to say that indirect realism is not the case? Or is it to say that "indirect realism" is (literally) not the same thing as "realism"?

1. My take - antirealist [Kantian];
What is reality, real and realistic is contingent upon a human-based specific framework and system [FS].
As such, when anyone declares something to be real, that reality must be Qualified to a human-based FS, for example scientific reality and truth must be qualified to a the human-based scientific method and its condition.

2. The Indirect Realist take on Reality.
The problem [as I see it and do not agree with] is Indirect Realism claims what is real is really real, i.e. exists absolutely independent of human minds and so, regardless of whether there are human or not; as such, there is no need to qualify what is real to any human-based FS.

My argument based on antirealism is there is no real thing that can exists absolutely independent of human minds and so, regardless of whether there are human or not.
The insistent on such a thing is referring to an illusion, thus delusional.
The supposedly real thing which indirect realists rely of philosophical realism is actually an illusion.
Because it is an illusion, it cannot be realistic.

Direct Realism also relies on philosophical realism, so it is not realistic as well because it is chasing an absolutely independent reality out there which in an illusion reified as real.

Generally realists themselves will argue Indirect Realism is more reasonable than Direct [naive] realism, but both ideologically and dogmatically are chasing after illusions.

All that seems to make sense to me.