Often you define your 'what is fact' as "a feature of reality".Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Thu Oct 12, 2023 12:23 pm Outside language, reality is not linguistic - and features of reality aren't obliged to conform to our ways of talking about them. And I think that's one of the most profound consequences of Wittgenstein's profound insight - that meaning is use.
From the above, there are two elements to reality, i.e.
1. reality as the-fact [the described]
2. the linguistic description of the fact [the descriptions],
As such, "reality as the-fact [the described]" aren't obliged to conform to our ways of talking [description of] about them
Agree?
In the above, there are two elements to reality, i.e.Peter Holmes wrote: ↑Sat Jun 08, 2024 9:52 am My point is that so-called philosophical problems are linguistic in nature. So questions about reality, knowledge and truth - for example - are really about the ways we do or could use those words, their cognates and related words. There is no ' ultimate true nature of things and reality' for philosophy to examine. There's no noumenon - or perhaps you've forgotten that.
1. reality as the-fact [the described]
2. the linguistic description of the fact [the descriptions],
if there is 1. reality as the-fact [the described], wouldn't it has an ultimate true nature? or some sort of realistic nature?
But in the above you stated,
"There is no ' ultimate true nature of things and reality' for philosophy to examine."
Can you explain the contradictory statements?