Nurana Rajabova is determined to sort it out.
That's more or less me "here and now". Then the part, however, where I flat-out acknowledge how the odds that my take on all of this is the correct one is almost certainly very, very, very remote. All someone need do is to bring back the fact that I haven't a clue regarding how the human species fits into the existence of existence itself. And, of course, neither does anyone else here.Morally speaking, determinists are mainly divided into two camps, namely compatibilists and incompatibilists. The incompatibilists argue that determinism completely negates the possibility of agent causation, and therefore moral responsibility.
What I wouldn't give for someone to actually explain this to me in such a way my own frame of mind here begins to crumble. I begin to see what I keep missing in the arguments of others. I begin to see the likelihood of moral responsibility "somehow" being applicable to human interactions.On the other hand, compatibilists claim that moral responsibility is still applicable under determinism. They are both contrasted to libertarians, who defend moral responsibility through believing in free will, dismissing determinism.
On the other hand, back to this...
I come here one day arguing that I finally do grasp how one can be compelled to behave as they do but still be responsible. Only how do I know for sure whether in doing so this isn't just another inherent manifestation of a wholly determined universe?
In the interim...
I know that I wonder about this all the time. Again, however, I wonder if all that I profess to know, I was never able not to profess to know.What’s interesting about the compatibilists’ position, is that they adhere to the idea that everything that happens is predetermined to happen, yet still argue for moral responsibility. One wonders, what is it that compatibilists are able to see that allows them to reconcile these two apparently contradictory theories?