moral relativism

[iambiguous]

Our Morality: A Defense of Moral Objectivism
After our recent ‘Death of Morality’ issue, Mitchell Silver replies to the amoralists.

Metaethics and Moral Disagreement

Although it brings all possible actions under a single standard, a permissibility rule can be complex, and its application sensitive to circumstances. A permissibility rule may require that the time, place, effects, and the nature of the people involved be considered when evaluating an action. It may even take into account the acceptance of different permissibility rules by other people.

For those who basically agree with the points being made here by the author, please take a stab at describing how, in your view, permissibility rules as encompassed above are a manifestation of objective morality.

This might make sense [to me] if there was in fact an objective morality and different people were able to grasp different parts of it. And then they were, in turn, able to come together and combine their insights into an actual deontological assessment of human interactions.

And with any luck [for us] they are willing to come down out of the theoretical clouds and, context by context, offer us what at least philosophically encompassed the One True Path to enlightenment.

Information about other peoples’ rules should shape a moral perspective, but it doesn’t undermine its validity. For instance, I know that there are people who categorically accept the rule that one should never mistreat their holy scriptures. I accept no such rule, but my awareness of others’ acceptance of the rule, combined with a rule I do accept, that everyone should show respect for others’ feelings, results in me not mistreating others’ holy scriptures.

See how it works? Hypothetically. Now, let's take this advice to the folks fighting the abortion wars here in America, or actual wars in Gaza and Ukraine. See if they might be willing to exchange rules of behavior with those on the other side. If the rules are said to sustain, what, the best of all possible moral interactions?

I do not respect the ‘holy scripture rule’ in itself; but I respect the holders of that rule, and in doing so I must often respect their rule. But this derivative respect for their permissibility rules does not mean I accept their rules to make my moral judgments.

Okay, but wouldn't we have to first know what their own permissibility rules actually allow...or don't allow.

Let's start with, say, the permissibility rules of those communities that practice female genital mutilation.

[iambiguous]

However, even granting the relativist/ nihilist assessment of the empirical effects of all and any objectivism, without a permissibility principle requiring avoidance of those effects, the relativist/nihilist has provided no grounds for rejecting objectivism. Railing against objectivism for the harms it causes is like protesting that the Constitution is unconstitutional.

Well, this moral relativist/moral nihilist is still completely baffled regarding how permissibility rules themselves reflect an objective morality.

Permissability rules are parts, generally, of objective morality. Unless they are considered mere conventions, agreed upon social guidelines. Any proposed-to-be-objective morality will have permissibility rules. It's a part. I don't think many would argue they demonstrate the morality is objective. So, I suppose any answer depends on what 'reflect' means here.

Okay, let someone here note what they construe to be reasonable permissibility rules in regard to, say, the buying and selling of guns. After all, the great Libertarian henry quirk would actually permit the buying and selling of weapons of mass destruction! And as close as I can come to grasping how he rationalizes this is that his God installed in him -- at birth? -- the need to "follow the dictates of Reason and Nature".

But this question is not a response to what is quoted. Essentially here, Mitchell Silver - in the quote - is arguing that to argue that objectivisms or a specific objectivism because it does harm, is a problematic argument for the nihilist/moral relativist since the attack comes from permissibility rules that are being considered, in that argument, objective - which is off-limits to the nihilist/moral relativist.

Again, in regard to the example above, how would this be factored in by citizens in any particular community? If those like henry are absolutely adamant that they and only they grasp the true "God-given" parameters of "life, liberty and property", you either agree with him or it's another Ruby Ridge.

Henry has no interest in democracy and the rule of law. His ends justify his means. He just has his own rendition of "or else" if others don't embrace his own One True Path to enlightenment.

And over and again I flat-out acknowledge that any number of moral nihilists and moral relativists might embrace permissibility rules that revolve solely around "me, myself and I" or "show me the money". Then the sociopaths and thugs like Putin, Xi, and Trump.

[Iwannaplato]

Okay, let someone here note what they construe to be reasonable permissibility rules in regard to, say, the buying and selling of guns. After all, the great Libertarian henry quirk would actually permit the buying and selling of weapons of mass destruction! And as close as I can come to grasping how he rationalizes this is that his God installed in him -- at birth? -- the need to "follow the dictates of Reason and Nature".

1) My point was that permissibility rules do not justify objective morals, they are simple a part of them. But I don't know what you meant by 'reflect' in your previous post, so I went with what it would generally mean.
2) Given your skepticism that there are moral objectivities, why the implied argument of incredulity? What would make Henry Quirks objective moral stance stranger/wilder than any other moral objectivity on guns. Incredulity is based on a sense that you can judge and we all will with you the ridiculousness of HQ's particular morals. That implies some solid ground to compare objective moralities.

But this question is not a response to what is quoted. Essentially here, Mitchell Silver - in the quote - is arguing that to argue that objectivisms or a specific objectivism because it does harm, is a problematic argument for the nihilist/moral relativist since the attack comes from permissibility rules that are being considered, in that argument, objective - which is off-limits to the nihilist/moral relativist.

Again, in regard to the example above, how would this be factored in by citizens in any particular community? If those like henry are absolutely adamant that they and only they grasp the true "God-given" parameters of "life, liberty and property", you either agree with him or it's another Ruby Ridge.

Again missing the point. You said earlier that you also have argument against particular moral objectivities based on harm. Silver is pointing out that this makes no sense since that argument relies on there being an objective morality on which you base your criticism. Likewise the implicit incredulity.

Henry has no interest in democracy and the rule of law. His ends justify his means. He just has his own rendition of "or else" if others don't embrace his own One True Path to enlightenment.

See, none of this matters in the context of moral relativism. Here you're taking AT THE SAME TIME a critical stance about the idea of objective morality
and
an objective stance about HQ's morality.

And over and again I flat-out acknowledge that any number of moral nihilists and moral relativists might embrace permissibility rules that revolve solely around "me, myself and I" or "show me the money". Then the sociopaths and thugs like Putin, Xi, and Trump.

Which continues to same contradiction. What you are saying here is that nihilts and moral relativisists can cause harm also.

The whole thing is suffused with your objective morality: we must reduce harm. Things that cause harm are bad.

I know, at this point you'll say that you have said over and over that your own moral preferences are created by dasein and you acknowledge this. What I have never managed to get you to acknowledge is that we can say X in one instance and contradict it in others. We can also have incorrect self-assessments. In other words we are both complicated enough to act out of contradictory beliefs we hold and even go against what we think we believe and do that most of the time. And also we may think we believe X, but actually our actions and attitudes show we do not.

The moral skeptic/nihilist has no grounds for incredulity over any particular version of objective morality. There are all equally absurd and not justified. The moment you have an enduring criterion that makes one more (dangerously) ridiculous and you expect your readers to nod in agreement, you are a moral objectivist. Sure, you might take breaks from this when waxing at a meta-moral level.

The anti-racist person can also with regularity treat afro-americans in demeaning ways.
The person who believes in free will (officially) can constantly make excuses about why they HAD to do X.

In part this is a suggestion around rhetoric. If you want to argue that the moral objectivists haven't demonstrated the objectivity of their morals, the strongest approach is to use your own morality as the example. This eliminates implicit and explicit appeals to incredulity and harm which both imply objectivity. (and yes, I am aware that you have acknowledged and asserted that moralities that fit your preferences are also, as yet, not adequately justified as THE TRUTH. But this does not mean you are not coming from an objective moral stance at other times, such as in the above).

In part it is me pointing out that Silver is correct. Nihilist criticisms of objective moralities based on the harm they do are self-contradictory.

[iambiguous]

Our Morality: A Defense of Moral Objectivism
After our recent ‘Death of Morality’ issue, Mitchell Silver replies to the amoralists.

Your metaethics depends on whether you genuinely accept a permissibility rule.

"Metaethics is a branch of analytic philosophy that explores the status, foundations, and scope of moral values, properties, and words. Whereas the fields of applied ethics and normative theory focus on what is moral, metaethics focuses on what morality itself is." IEP

So, my own "metaethics" revolves around the assumption that given the gap, Rummy's Rule and the Benjamin Button Syndrome there may well be no capacity on our part to grasp what morality itself is. Maybe it goes back to God, maybe it revolves around the Übermensch, maybe it revolves around dasein, maybe it goes back to Buddha.

In any event, what happens when the behaviors that you deem to be permissible are deemed to be taboo by others. Back to "might makes right", "right makes might" or "democracy and the rule of law". In other words, as we all well know, the rest is history.

If you have genuinely accepted specific permissibility rules, in accordance with that acceptance, then you must judge that there are rules which categorize any action’s permissibility, ie, its morality, and you are a moral objectivist.

All I can suggest here is that someone who agrees with this might want to note how they connect the dots themselves between permissibility rules, objective morality and their own interactions with others that involved conflicting value judgments. Rules of behaviors exist because they must exist. There are moral narratives [and political agendas] that clash given any number of circumstances. Those on both sides of the moral spectrum are able to make reasonable arguments. Just peruse examples of this here: https://www.procon.org/

If in addition you accept the same permissibility rules as I do, we agree about the essential substance of morality. Nonetheless, we may yet disagree about the correct classification of a particular action, or kind of action.

Then the part where one side or the other is actually able to legislate and then enforce their own rendition of that. Or both sides come to a moral consensus or both sides agree to sustain a political process that involves moderation, negotiation and compromise.

These disagreements can stem from disputes about concepts (how shall we define ‘pain’?), facts (does an eighteen-week-old fetus feel pain?), or logic (does ‘we ought not perform abortions’ follow from ‘we ought never inflict pain unnecessarily’?). Common acceptance of specific permissibility rules leaves room for differences of particular judgments.

Again, I'm still confused. The author is convinced that his own rendition of permissibility rules is compatible with objective morality.

But how "for all practical purposes" would that actually be demonstrated? Either pain here is defined in the optimal or the only rational manner, it is determined how much pain [if any] an 18-week-old fetus does feel when aborted and we can in fact finally determine whether a particular abortion is objectively moral or immoral, or things stay the way they are now...both sides assuming that their own assumptions reflect the objective truth.

[iambiguous]

Our Morality: A Defense of Moral Objectivism
After our recent ‘Death of Morality’ issue, Mitchell Silver replies to the amoralists.

Your specific permissibility rules constitute what you take to be morality, but they are likely to permit inconsistent courses of action: permission is not the same as direction.

Over and again...

Gather advocates from any number of folks...

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_r ... traditions
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_p ... ideologies
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_s ... philosophy

...on their own One True Paths. What of instances where permissions are not granted because morally and politically, you're accused of heading in the wrong direction? What of objective morality then?

For example, a rule that implies you should not eat animals allows that the daily consumption of carrots is moral and that the refusal to ever eat carrots is also moral. Indeed that rule permits you to starve yourself to death. You remain a moral objectivist even if the permissibility rule(s) you accept allow you to do almost anything.

Does this make sense to you? Who gets to decide what is permissible in any particular community? Now, if the community embraces a God, the God, they can fall back on Scripture. Or if the community embraces one or another ideological or deontological assessment of human interactions, they can refer back to that. But how is that the equivalent of objective morality? And how are the arguments that I make rooting morality in dasein rebutted?

This part...

Some permissibility rules allow an infinite number of morally permissible acts. The only requirement for your moral objectivist status is that the rules you accept classify some actions as morally out-of-bounds.

A little help here please. Note how, given interactions with others in which conflicting goods abound -- in Gaza for example or at an abortion clinic -- this would be explained to everyone.

And objectivism is not totalitarianism: even if you believe there are some things that no one ought to do, you can believe that there are many ways to lead an overall good life, and many situations that permit different courses of action.

On the other hand, for any number of moral objectivists, that is precisely how they construe their own One True Path: totally in sync with rational and virtuous behavior. Then the part where some communities practice "or else" with a vengeance. There are even objectivists among us who insist there are very different permissibility rules for those of the wrong color or gender or sexual orientation or religion.

Hence a moral objectivist can be an ethical pluralist.

Same thing. Does this make sense to you? If so, please note experiences you have had as both a moral objectivist and an ethical pluralist.

[Iwannaplato]

If you have genuinely accepted specific permissibility rules, in accordance with that acceptance, then you must judge that there are rules which categorize any action’s permissibility, ie, its morality, and you are a moral objectivist.

All I can suggest here is that someone who agrees with this might want to note how they connect the dots themselves between permissibility rules, objective morality and their own interactions with others that involved conflicting value judgments. Rules of behaviors exist because they must exist. There are moral narratives [and political agendas] that clash given any number of circumstances.

What you quoted is saying basically if you have objective morals, you are a moral objectivist. He is putting it in terms of permissability rules, as a way of getting people to check if they are in fact objectivists.

He further asserts that having permissability rules is a natural process.

Then he says

As long as a set of permissibility rules does not require impossible actions (cure cancer, fly to Mars, eat your cake and have it, never die), or posit non-existing entities (the tooth fairy, the Devil, the eternal incorporeal commander), there are no epistemic or practical reasons for rejecting or it, just as there are none for accepting it. Hume famously, and correctly, said that you cannot derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’. It is equally important to note that you cannot derive ‘ought not to accept oughts’ from ‘is’. The rejection of all permissibility rules has no more justification than the acceptance of a specific permissibility rule. The consequences of accepting or rejecting permissibility rules are another matter entirely; but whatever they are, by themselves consequences cannot constitute a justification.

So, his argument comes down to there is no justification for have permissability rules, but at the same time there is no justification for not having them.

You're treating his essay as arguing that really this or that objective set of morals is correct.

But that is not the position he is taking.

Again, I'm still confused. The author is convinced that his own rendition of permissibility rules is compatible with objective morality.

He's saying that if you have permissability rules, you are a moral objectivist.

[Iwannaplato]

On the other hand, for any number of moral objectivists, that is precisely how they construe their own One True Path:

Which doesn't contradict what he is saying.

Hence a moral objectivist can be an ethical pluralist.

Same thing. Does this make sense to you? If so, please note experiences you have had as both a moral objectivist and an ethical pluralist.

Are you saying that only people who are both these things should respond? He talked about one being able to be both, not that all moral objectivists are both.

[iambiguous]

If you have genuinely accepted specific permissibility rules, in accordance with that acceptance, then you must judge that there are rules which categorize any action’s permissibility, ie, its morality, and you are a moral objectivist.

All I can suggest here is that someone who agrees with this might want to note how they connect the dots themselves between permissibility rules, objective morality and their own interactions with others that involved conflicting value judgments. Rules of behaviors exist because they must exist. There are moral narratives [and political agendas] that clash given any number of circumstances.

What you quoted is saying basically if you have objective morals, you are a moral objectivist. He is putting it in terms of permissability rules, as a way of getting people to check if they are in fact objectivists.

Again: huh?

We live on a planet where down through the centuries countless communities have concocted "rules of behavior" in order to reward [permit] some behaviors and punish [prohibit] others.

So, they can still call themselves moral objectivists as long as they believe that what they permit or do not permit is accepted by those in the community?

A moral consensus equals moral objectivism? For them?

Okay, how would such an assessment be applicable in regard to abortion, gun control, homosexuality and the like?

He further asserts that having permissability rules is a natural process.

Natural becasue we choose to live in a community with others. Natural because by and large we as a species are among the "social animals". And while all are burdened with biological needs there are many, many conflicting assessments regarding how to attain and then sustain them.

Permisobilty rules for capitalists? Permissibility rules for socialists?

As for the things we want...?

Then he says

As long as a set of permissibility rules does not require impossible actions (cure cancer, fly to Mars, eat your cake and have it, never die), or posit non-existing entities (the tooth fairy, the Devil, the eternal incorporeal commander), there are no epistemic or practical reasons for rejecting or it, just as there are none for accepting it. Hume famously, and correctly, said that you cannot derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’. It is equally important to note that you cannot derive ‘ought not to accept oughts’ from ‘is’. The rejection of all permissibility rules has no more justification than the acceptance of a specific permissibility rule. The consequences of accepting or rejecting permissibility rules are another matter entirely; but whatever they are, by themselves consequences cannot constitute a justification.

If within any particular community citizens agree to permit some things and to prohibit other things, sure, they might convince themselves that they are moral objectivists.

But: that is not at all the manner in which I construe the meaning of moral objectivism.

And the author doesn't focus much at all on how we come to acquire our value judgments: existentially. In other words, out in a particular world understood in a particular manner given a particular life.

But how should the world around us be understood? Understood such that no matter what community is visited, mere mortals in a No God world can always come up with, what, the optimal behaviors?

Also, given his assumptions, would not the best of all possible worlds be one that revolved around democracy and the rule of law? Whereas from my frame of mind, moral objectivism is far more likely to revolve around "right makes might". Then the "or else" part.

So, his argument comes down to there is no justification for have permissability rules, but at the same time there is no justification for not having them.

Again, it's not a question of justification in my view. It's merely a reflection of the fact that one way or another each and every community must have rules of behavior. Thus, historically, given various combinations of might makes right, right makes might or moderation, negotiation and compromise, the political agenda can go in any number of conflicting directions.

You're treating his essay as arguing that really this or that objective set of morals is correct.

But that is not the position he is taking.

The article is "a defense of moral objectivism". All I can do is to react to that given my own understanding of it.

Again, I'm still confused. The author is convinced that his own rendition of permissibility rules is compatible with objective morality.

He's saying that if you have permissability rules, you are a moral objectivist.

A little help here please. Note how, given interactions with others in which conflicting goods abound -- in Gaza for example or at an abortion clinic -- this would be explained to everyone.

There.

[iambiguous]

On the other hand, for any number of moral objectivists, that is precisely how they construe their own One True Path:

Which doesn't contradict what he is saying.

At least until we get to the "or else" part? Again, for me, moral objectivism revolves around two basic assumptions [and assumptions are all they are]:

1] that we can discover an intrinsic or intuitive self. The Real Me.
2] that given the right path, the Real Me can in fact come to grasp [philosophically or otherwise] The Right Thing To Do.

The main distinction that some make here is whether their own rules of behavior are objective given a particular set of circumstances or are in fact universally applicable to everyone.

Hence a moral objectivist can be an ethical pluralist.

Same thing. Does this make sense to you? If so, please note experiences you have had as both a moral objectivist and an ethical pluralist.

Are you saying that only people who are both these things should respond? He talked about one being able to be both, not that all moral objectivists are both.

Let's look at the example he used:

For example, a rule that implies you should not eat animals allows that the daily consumption of carrots is moral and that the refusal to ever eat carrots is also moral. Indeed that rule permits you to starve yourself to death. You remain a moral objectivist even if the permissibility rule(s) you accept allow you to do almost anything.

Does this make sense to you? Who gets to decide what is permissible in any particular community? Now, if the community embraces a God, the God, they can fall back on Scripture. Or if the community embraces one or another ideological or deontological assessment of human interactions, they can refer back to that. But how is that the equivalent of objective morality? And how are the arguments that I make rooting morality in dasein rebutted?

Run this by Peta. Instead, what we find is that when it comes to what is permissible in regard to animals, it just another example of conflicting goods: https://vegetarian.procon.org/

Both sides are able to make arguments that the other side seem unable to wholly refute. Then what?

[Iwannaplato]

Again: huh?

We live on a planet where down through the centuries countless communities have concocted "rules of behavior" in order to reward [permit] some behaviors and punish [prohibit] others.

Sure.

So, they can still call themselves moral objectivists as long as they believe that what they permit or do not permit is accepted by those in the community?

Actually, they don't even need a community's support to be considered moral objectivists. Would you call people who think that X should be permitted and is fine or good and Y should not be permitted and is bad a moral objectivist. All he's doing is using rules of permission as a way to look at objectivism.

A moral consensus equals moral objectivism? For them?

No, again, they don't need moral consensus to be moral objectivists. The could be lone wolfs who have permissability RULES and be if they have these they are moral objectivists. That part of his argument is NOT saying that if they have permissability rules, their morals are correct. He is saying that if you have permissability rules you are a moral objectivist. IOW you believe that certain things are objective morals.

Okay, how would such an assessment be applicable in regard to abortion, gun control, homosexuality and the like?

The people who think abortion should be permitted and have this as a rule are objectivists. The people who think it is wrong and should not be permitted are objectivists.

This part of his argument is does not disagree with your assessments. He is putting the issue of who is a moral objectivism in terms of permissability rules. One reason he does this is to make it easier for people to see if in fact they are moral objectivists.

Then he says

As long as a set of permissibility rules does not require impossible actions (cure cancer, fly to Mars, eat your cake and have it, never die), or posit non-existing entities (the tooth fairy, the Devil, the eternal incorporeal commander), there are no epistemic or practical reasons for rejecting or it, just as there are none for accepting it. Hume famously, and correctly, said that you cannot derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’. It is equally important to note that you cannot derive ‘ought not to accept oughts’ from ‘is’. The rejection of all permissibility rules has no more justification than the acceptance of a specific permissibility rule. The consequences of accepting or rejecting permissibility rules are another matter entirely; but whatever they are, by themselves consequences cannot constitute a justification.

If within any particular community citizens agree to permit some things and to prohibit other things, sure, they might convince themselves that they are moral objectivists.

It does depend on how they think of the rules. If they think there are merely agreements, then no. But if they think they are permissability rules as he defines them, then they are objectivists.

But: that is not at all the manner in which I construe the meaning of moral objectivism.

If someone thinks that X should be permitted and it is wrong to not permit it, they are a moral objectivist. As with the opposite in something should not permitted.

And the author doesn't focus much at all on how we come to acquire our value judgments: existentially. In other words, out in a particular world understood in a particular manner given a particular life.

No, he doesn't.

But how should the world around us be understood? Understood such that no matter what community is visited, mere mortals in a No God world can always come up with, what, the optimal behaviors?

Also, given his assumptions, would not the best of all possible worlds be one that revolved around democracy and the rule of law? Whereas from my frame of mind, moral objectivism is far more likely to revolve around "right makes might". Then the "or else" part.

He does address that issue. And I do think democracy likely fits with his particular moral objectivism.
And again you are moving into the argument that moral objectivism causes harm argument which he rebutted.

However, even granting the relativist/ nihilist assessment of the empirical effects of all and any objectivism, without a permissibility principle requiring avoidance of those effects, the relativist/nihilist has provided no grounds for rejecting objectivism. Railing against objectivism for the harms it causes is like protesting that the Constitution is unconstitutional.

Again, it's not a question of justification in my view. It's merely a reflection of the fact that one way or another each and every community must have rules of behavior. Thus, historically, given various combinations of might makes right, right makes might or moderation, negotiation and compromise, the political agenda can go in any number of conflicting directions.

That's not really respoding to his points.

The article is "a defense of moral objectivism".

Yes, the part of the article you were responding to about permissability rules, the parts in your quotes is not arguing that. He does come up with a defense of moral objectivism. I haven't seen you quote those parts of respond to them.

[Iwannaplato]

For example, a rule that implies you should not eat animals allows that the daily consumption of carrots is moral and that the refusal to ever eat carrots is also moral. Indeed that rule permits you to starve yourself to death. You remain a moral objectivist even if the permissibility rule(s) you accept allow you to do almost anything.

Does this make sense to you? Who gets to decide what is permissible in any particular community? Now, if the community embraces a God, the God, they can fall back on Scripture. Or if the community embraces one or another ideological or deontological assessment of human interactions, they can refer back to that. But how is that the equivalent of objective morality? And how are the arguments that I make rooting morality in dasein rebutted?

Run this by Peta. Instead, what we find is that when it comes to what is permissible in regard to animals, it just another example of conflicting goods: https://vegetarian.procon.org/

Both sides are able to make arguments that the other side seem unable to wholly refute. Then what?

Yes, and both you and Silver would say that both sides are moral objectivists.

All I can say is that you haven't really taken on the part of the essay that argues that in general moral objectivism is a net plus, that arguing from the harm of moral objectivism is a kind of moral objectivism, that there is no justification for having permissability rules AND there is no justification for saying one ought not to have them.

You are focusing on the permissability rules as if he has solved the problem, in that part of the argument, for conflicting goods. But that is not what he is arguing there.

So far you haven't really aimed any critique at the points that you disagree with him on. Yes, you disagree with his conclusion. And we can see thousands of posts where you express your criticism of moral objectivism. But you haven't taken on his arguments for moral objectivism. And his framing the issue in terms of permissability rules in not where you would disagree actually. He's just using a specific terminology for what constitutes a moral objectivist, because he thinks this makes it easier to show what he means and what a moral objectivist means. I think you both would agree on if person X is a moral objectivist. Its where he goes after that where you guys disagree.

[iambiguous]

So, they can still call themselves moral objectivists as long as they believe that what they permit or do not permit is accepted by those in the community?

Actually, they don't even need a community's support to be considered moral objectivists. Would you call people who think that X should be permitted and is fine or good and Y should not be permitted and is bad a moral objectivist. All he's doing is using rules of permission as a way to look at objectivism.

So, each individual in the community can be a moral objectivist? Every time an individual bumps into someone new in situations that involve conflicting goods, they have to exchange permissibility rules in order to arrive at a set of behaviors that are the least objectionable to all parties?

Again, given the manner in which I have come to understand moral objectivists [existentially], it hardly ever works that way at all. Objectivism for them is more or less encompassed here: https://knowthyself.forumotion.net/f6-agora

A moral consensus equals moral objectivism? For them?

No, again, they don't need moral consensus to be moral objectivists. The could be lone wolfs who have permissability RULES and be if they have these they are moral objectivists. That part of his argument is NOT saying that if they have permissability rules, their morals are correct. He is saying that if you have permissability rules you are a moral objectivist. IOW you believe that certain things are objective morals.

Then we simply think about moral objectivism in very different ways. And then the part where permissibility rules fiercely clash -- gaza, ukraine, the abortion clinic, etc.

How would Silver go about explaining his point of view to the folks there? Some on both sides of these conflicts are even willing to kill those who do not accept their own rules.

Thus...

Okay, how would such an assessment be applicable in regard to abortion, gun control, homosexuality and the like?

The people who think abortion should be permitted and have this as a rule are objectivists. The people who think it is wrong and should not be permitted are objectivists.

Exactly! And then the "or else" part for many. And my own point that just as important as what you believe is how existentially you came to believe it: Your indoctrination as a child, your own personal experiences as an adult. The Benjamin Button Syndrome.

This part of his argument is does not disagree with your assessments. He is putting the issue of who is a moral objectivism in terms of permissability rules. One reason he does this is to make it easier for people to see if in fact they are moral objectivists.

Okay, and others ground their permissibility rules in God or in ideology or in deontology or in biological imperatives. For me, however, what matters is not what you profess should either be permitted or prohibited but how you go about demonstrating why others ought to embrace your rules as well. Otherwise, it's a "you're right from your side and I'm right from mine" world.

Which, again, in my view, is far more applicable to democracy and the rule of law than to right makes might.

Then he says

As long as a set of permissibility rules does not require impossible actions (cure cancer, fly to Mars, eat your cake and have it, never die), or posit non-existing entities (the tooth fairy, the Devil, the eternal incorporeal commander), there are no epistemic or practical reasons for rejecting or it, just as there are none for accepting it. Hume famously, and correctly, said that you cannot derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’. It is equally important to note that you cannot derive ‘ought not to accept oughts’ from ‘is’. The rejection of all permissibility rules has no more justification than the acceptance of a specific permissibility rule. The consequences of accepting or rejecting permissibility rules are another matter entirely; but whatever they are, by themselves consequences cannot constitute a justification.

If within any particular community citizens agree to permit some things and to prohibit other things, sure, they might convince themselves that they are moral objectivists.

It does depend on how they think of the rules. If they think there are merely agreements, then no. But if they think they are permissability rules as he defines them, then they are objectivists.

Well, how others define moral objectivism in a philosophical argument is one thing, how they deal with those who define it differently given particular sets of circumstances that precipitate conflict another thing altogether. At least for me.

But: that is not at all the manner in which I construe the meaning of moral objectivism.

If someone thinks that X should be permitted and it is wrong to not permit it, they are a moral objectivist. As with the opposite in something should not permitted.

Joan thinks that abortions should be permitted and that it is wrong not to permit them.
Jean thinks that abortions should not be permitted and that it is wrong to permit them.

Now, I would call them moral objectivists only to the extent they insisted all others should think and feel as they do. Then those who insist that all others must think and feel as they do.

Or else.

But how should the world around us be understood? Understood such that no matter what community is visited, mere mortals in a No God world can always come up with, what, the optimal behaviors?

Also, given his assumptions, would not the best of all possible worlds be one that revolved around democracy and the rule of law? Whereas from my frame of mind, moral objectivism is far more likely to revolve around "right makes might". Then the "or else" part.

He does address that issue. And I do think democracy likely fits with his particular moral objectivism.

It definitely is more conducive to my own political philosophy. Only I am no less fractured and fragmented.

And again you are moving into the argument that moral objectivism causes harm argument which he rebutted.

His rendition [to me] seems to revolve more around the assumption that different people think up permissibility rules and call themselves objectivists, while others think up their own very much conflicting rules of behavior and call themselves objectivists.

Again, from my frame of mind, that might work to the extent they are willing to practice moderation, negotiation and compromise in a democratic political process. Or if they live in separate communities. But objectivists as I understand them invariably embrace "right makes might" and seem far more intent on sustaining their own One True Path. Often by heaping contempt on all the other objectivists on the wrong paths. Those who become "one of them". We see that all the time here.

In fact, I believe the reaction of the moral objectivists here as "I" understand them reflects this crucial distinction. They come here defending their own One True Path against those defending conflicting One True Paths. But what they both share in common is the conviction that there is but one and only one One True Path. And they're on it. Whereas I suggest that all of these "objective" assessments are derived from the manner in which I construe human interaction at the existential intersection of identity, dasein, value judgments, conflicting goods and political economy. As articulated in my signature threads.

However, even granting the relativist/ nihilist assessment of the empirical effects of all and any objectivism, without a permissibility principle requiring avoidance of those effects, the relativist/nihilist has provided no grounds for rejecting objectivism. Railing against objectivism for the harms it causes is like protesting that the Constitution is unconstitutional.

Again, it's not a question of justification in my view. It's merely a reflection of the fact that one way or another each and every community must have rules of behavior. Thus, historically, given various combinations of might makes right, right makes might or moderation, negotiation and compromise, the political agenda can go in any number of conflicting directions.

That's not really responding to his points.

So you say. I say that I am attempting to note the manner in which we construe objective morality differently. Thus I would be curious to know how Silver might respond to my own set of assumptions.

The article is "a defense of moral objectivism".

Yes, the part of the article you were responding to about permissability rules, the parts in your quotes is not arguing that. He does come up with a defense of moral objectivism. I haven't seen you quote those parts of respond to them.

Try again?

[iambiguous]

For example, a rule that implies you should not eat animals allows that the daily consumption of carrots is moral and that the refusal to ever eat carrots is also moral. Indeed that rule permits you to starve yourself to death. You remain a moral objectivist even if the permissibility rule(s) you accept allow you to do almost anything.

Does this make sense to you? Who gets to decide what is permissible in any particular community? Now, if the community embraces a God, the God, they can fall back on Scripture. Or if the community embraces one or another ideological or deontological assessment of human interactions, they can refer back to that. But how is that the equivalent of objective morality? And how are the arguments that I make rooting morality in dasein rebutted?

Run this by Peta. Instead, what we find is that when it comes to what is permissible in regard to animals, it just another example of conflicting goods: https://vegetarian.procon.org/

Both sides are able to make arguments that the other side seem unable to wholly refute. Then what?

Yes, and both you and Silver would say that both sides are moral objectivists.

All I can say is that you haven't really taken on the part of the essay that argues that in general moral objectivism is a net plus, that arguing from the harm of moral objectivism is a kind of moral objectivism, that there is no justification for having permissability rules AND there is no justification for saying one ought not to have them.

You are focusing on the permissability rules as if he has solved the problem, in that part of the argument, for conflicting goods. But that is not what he is arguing there.

So far you haven't really aimed any critique at the points that you disagree with him on. Yes, you disagree with his conclusion. And we can see thousands of posts where you express your criticism of moral objectivism. But you haven't taken on his arguments for moral objectivism. And his framing the issue in terms of permissability rules in not where you would disagree actually. He's just using a specific terminology for what constitutes a moral objectivist, because he thinks this makes it easier to show what he means and what a moral objectivist means. I think you both would agree on if person X is a moral objectivist. Its where he goes after that where you guys disagree.

Note others:

Anyone here share Silver's assessment of permissibility rules as fonts for moral objectivism?

If so, please note how this frame of mind was applicable in regard to your own interactions with others in which value judgments came into conflict.

For me, it's less a question of what people call themselves and more a question of how existentially they came to call themselves that and not something else. And then the extent to which they are more receptive politically to democracy and the rule of law then to "right makes right".

[Iwannaplato]

Note others:

Anyone here share Silver's assessment of permissibility rules as fonts for moral objectivism?

Why are you quoting me if you are asking people about Silver's use of permissability rules?

Did Silver use the term fonts? Do you mean this in the sense of source? He did n't argue that.

[Iwannaplato]

So, each individual in the community can be a moral objectivist? Every time an individual bumps into someone new in situations that involve conflicting goods, they have to exchange permissibility rules in order to arrive at a set of behaviors that are the least objectionable to all parties?

No, if someone believes that something is permissable, period, or something is impermissable period, they are a moral objectivist. It is a way of defining what a moral objectivist is.

Again, given the manner in which I have come to understand moral objectivists [existentially], it hardly ever works that way at all.

Well, you made it up. It's not what Silver's saying.

Then we simply think about moral objectivism in very different ways. And then the part where permissibility rules fiercely clash -- gaza, ukraine, the abortion clinic, etc.

So, if someone said to you abortion is not permissable, period, you wouldn't consider them a moral objectivist. And note they are not talking about the law, they are talking about morality. And if someone on the other side said abortions are permissable, period. Woman should be allowed to make that choice. You wouldn't consider them an objectivity.

This part of his argument is does not disagree with your assessments. He is putting the issue of who is a moral objectivism in terms of permissability rules. One reason he does this is to make it easier for people to see if in fact they are moral objectivists.

Okay, and others ground their permissibility rules in God or in ideology or in deontology or in biological imperatives. For me, however, what matters is not what you profess should either be permitted or prohibited but how you go about demonstrating why others ought to embrace your rules as well. Otherwise, it's a "you're right from your side and I'm right from mine" world.

So, you're not an objectivist if you go about trying to convince others in a nice way?

He's not talking about how one goes about trying to get others to accept one's permissability rules

Well, how others define moral objectivism in a philosophical argument is one thing, how they deal with those who define it differently given particular sets of circumstances that precipitate conflict another thing altogether. At least for me.

Sure, that's a valid issue. But you're reacting to Silver as if his idea of looking at objectivity as permissability rules is an argument about that topic. And you haven't responded to the parts of his article that actually you and he disagree on.

Joan thinks that abortions should be permitted and that it is wrong not to permit them.
Jean thinks that abortions should not be permitted and that it is wrong to permit them.

Both objectivists according to Silver.

Now, I would call them moral objectivists only to the extent they insisted all others should think and feel as they do. Then those who insist that all others must think and feel as they do.

I don't think you understand what the word 'should' means.

Or else.

OK, you're changed your position on objectivism over the years. Interesting.

So, if you are a moral realist and you use, say, democratic processes to affect the law so it reflects your morals, you aren't an objectist?

His rendition [to me] seems to revolve more around the assumption that different people think up permissibility rules and call themselves objectivists, while others think up their own very much conflicting rules of behavior and call themselves objectivists.

He doesn't say anything about what people call themselves. He doesn't weigh in on the source of the permissability rules. He doesn't assert that people, by themselves, all are just choosing a morality and permissability rules. He's neither denying nor confirming, for example, your sense of dasein's role in the formation of morality.

Again, from my frame of mind, that might work to the extent they are willing to practice moderation, negotiation and compromise in a democratic political process.

You're treating that part of the article as him ADVOCATING for people coming up with their own permissability rules. That's incorrect on two points. He's neither asserting they just make them up, nor is he advocating for people doing that. He is defining objectivism in terms of permissability rules. You can analyze any morality in terms of permissability rules, including what is not permitted. The 10 commandments, for example. But also consequentialist moralities where, for example, one should not be permitted to do things that lead to net harm of people or life forms or whatever.

You're reacting to him as if he is saying: people should just come up as individuals with their own permissability rules and tell each other them and that's make things better and that's how we do things.

He's not saying that.