Transcendental, Philosophical, Scientific, Naive, Indirect Realism -fundamentally SAME

[Veritas Aequitas]

Kants' Transcendental Realism, Philosophical Realism, Scientific Realism, Naive Realism, Indirect Realism are fundamentally the SAME whilst their forms and descriptions are obviously different.

The above realism are a subset of Philosophical Realism:

Philosophical realism – is the view that a certain kind of thing (ranging widely from abstract objects like numbers to moral statements to the physical world itself) has mind-independent existence,
i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

To be more specific, Philosophical realism claims that reality and things exist absolute independent of the human conditions [mind, beliefs, opinion, etc.]; i.e. they exists regardless of whether humans exists or not.

Philosophical Realism [PR] is an evolutionary default [i.e. it is basis and primitive] and clung upon as a dogmatic ideology; upon serious reflections on the many negative baggage of PR, many philosophers since philosophy emerged do not accept PR as absolute but insist realism can only be relative.

One of the official opposition of philosophical realism as a dogmatic ideology was Kant who first introduced the term 'realism'; Kant named his antirealism 'Transcendental Realism" for the purposes of his Critique of Pure Reason.

The ideology of absolute philosophical realism later has many subsets, i.e. direct [naive] and indirect realism, scientific realism and others.

There are those who argued ignorantly, Kant's Transcendental Realism is different from Philosophical Realism.

Try to make an argument that makes sense in English.
Philosophical realism isn't transcendental realism.
For example [from ChatGpt]:

Conclusion
Forms of realism such as scientific realism, critical realism, internal realism, phenomenal realism, and epistemological realism, differ from Kant's transcendental realism in various ways. They often either reject the direct identification of phenomena with noumena or recognize the role of cognitive and social factors in shaping our understanding of reality. These distinctions place them outside the scope of what Kant criticizes as transcendental realism.

Obviously if one ignorantly [based on strawman] ask AI from one's biasness, ChatGPT will simply give answers from that ignorant perspective.

My argument that Transcendental Realism is the same as Philosophical Realism is based on the fundamental substance and principles not on their forms.

Here is ChatGpt answer to the specific and related matter;

The above poster relied on ChatGpt but he himself is too narrow and shallow minded in his interaction with ChatGpt.

There are many forms of realism and we need to be very specific when dealing with each form of realism.
While Kant rejected Transcendent Realism, he accept Empirical Realism.
So cannot simply conflate the various forms of realism as one general view but need to consider the nuances.

My intended point as presented by ChatGpt [wR]:

Yes, when considering the basic principle of mind-independent existence alone, it is reasonable to claim that philosophical realism, Kant's transcendental realism, scientific realism, and naive realism share this foundational idea. This principle asserts that external things exist independently of human perception or cognition.
.........
.........
By focusing solely on the principle of mind-independent existence, it is clear that all these forms of realism share the view that external things exist regardless of human presence or perception. This commonality highlights their agreement on the fundamental nature of reality being independent of the human mind, despite their differences in other philosophical aspects.

The forms are secondary, the critical [primary] element here is the claim that whether, it is transcendental, philosophical scientific, direct [naive], indirect realism, their targeted reality and things exist absolutely [unconditionally] independent of the human conditions [mind-independent] to the extent that they exist regardless of whether there are human or not.

Thus my point:
Kants' Transcendental Realism, Philosophical Realism, Scientific Realism, Naive Realism, Indirect Realism are fundamentally the SAME whilst their forms and descriptions are obviously different.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

[Veritas Aequitas]

As stated above, philosophical realism [absolute mind-independence] is a dogmatic ideology adopted from an evolutionary default of a sense of external_ness to facilitate basic survival.
"Philosophy" [to know, learn, wisdom] is a also an evolutionary default, albeit being activated VERY slowly.
Ever since the beginning of philosophy with the emergence of opposition of philosophical realism, all philosophical issues and contentions up to the present are reducible to the case of philosophical realism [as an ideology] versus philosophical antirealism.
Even with the agnostics, there is still the opposing element to philosophical realism.

The main criteria of the ideology philosophical realism is
reality and/or things exist regardless of whether there are humans or not in the absolute sense.

[Atla]

Kants' Transcendental Realism, Philosophical Realism, Scientific Realism, Naive Realism, Indirect Realism are fundamentally the SAME whilst their forms and descriptions are obviously different.

The above realism are a subset of Philosophical Realism:

Philosophical realism – is the view that a certain kind of thing (ranging widely from abstract objects like numbers to moral statements to the physical world itself) has mind-independent existence,
i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

To be more specific, Philosophical realism claims that reality and things exist absolute independent of the human conditions [mind, beliefs, opinion, etc.]; i.e. they exists regardless of whether humans exists or not.

Philosophical Realism [PR] is an evolutionary default [i.e. it is basis and primitive] and clung upon as a dogmatic ideology; upon serious reflections on the many negative baggage of PR, many philosophers since philosophy emerged do not accept PR as absolute but insist realism can only be relative.

One of the official opposition of philosophical realism as a dogmatic ideology was Kant who first introduced the term 'realism'; Kant named his antirealism 'Transcendental Realism" for the purposes of his Critique of Pure Reason.

The ideology of absolute philosophical realism later has many subsets, i.e. direct [naive] and indirect realism, scientific realism and others.

There are those who argued ignorantly, Kant's Transcendental Realism is different from Philosophical Realism.

Try to make an argument that makes sense in English.
Philosophical realism isn't transcendental realism.
For example [from ChatGpt]:

Conclusion
Forms of realism such as scientific realism, critical realism, internal realism, phenomenal realism, and epistemological realism, differ from Kant's transcendental realism in various ways. They often either reject the direct identification of phenomena with noumena or recognize the role of cognitive and social factors in shaping our understanding of reality. These distinctions place them outside the scope of what Kant criticizes as transcendental realism.

Obviously if one ignorantly [based on strawman] ask AI from one's biasness, ChatGPT will simply give answers from that ignorant perspective.

My argument that Transcendental Realism is the same as Philosophical Realism is based on the fundamental substance and principles not on their forms.

Here is ChatGpt answer to the specific and related matter;

The above poster relied on ChatGpt but he himself is too narrow and shallow minded in his interaction with ChatGpt.

There are many forms of realism and we need to be very specific when dealing with each form of realism.
While Kant rejected Transcendent Realism, he accept Empirical Realism.
So cannot simply conflate the various forms of realism as one general view but need to consider the nuances.

My intended point as presented by ChatGpt [wR]:

Yes, when considering the basic principle of mind-independent existence alone, it is reasonable to claim that philosophical realism, Kant's transcendental realism, scientific realism, and naive realism share this foundational idea. This principle asserts that external things exist independently of human perception or cognition.
.........
.........
By focusing solely on the principle of mind-independent existence, it is clear that all these forms of realism share the view that external things exist regardless of human presence or perception. This commonality highlights their agreement on the fundamental nature of reality being independent of the human mind, despite their differences in other philosophical aspects.

The forms are secondary, the critical [primary] element here is the claim that whether, it is transcendental, philosophical scientific, direct [naive], indirect realism, their targeted reality and things exist absolutely [unconditionally] independent of the human conditions [mind-independent] to the extent that they exist regardless of whether there are human or not.

Thus my point:
Kants' Transcendental Realism, Philosophical Realism, Scientific Realism, Naive Realism, Indirect Realism are fundamentally the SAME whilst their forms and descriptions are obviously different.

Yes they all share mind-independence, therefore they are the same. Just like how both the Earth and Mars are more or less round, therefore they are the same planet. VA takes self-parody to the next level.

Of course they all share mind-independence ffs, that's why they have 'realism' in their names. That's what realism means. But Kant specifically critiqued transcendental realism, his arguments don't work against mind-independence in general. VA thought they did, and based his entire rampage againt philosophical realism on this.

[Atla]

When in doubt, why don't you just ask God [wR]? For example:

"In summary, Kant’s critique is not sufficient to refute the mind-independence aspect of indirect realism. Indirect realism can still maintain that external objects exist independently of our perception, even if our access to them is always mediated and shaped by our cognitive faculties."

Kant's critique of transcendental realism in the "Critique of Pure Reason" (CPR) primarily targets a specific philosophical stance that he believes misconstrues the relationship between the human mind and the world. To determine if this critique is also sufficient to refute the mind-independence claim of indirect realism, we need to carefully analyze both Kant's arguments and the nature of indirect realism.

Transcendental Realism and Kant’s Critique
Transcendental realism, according to Kant, is the view that the objects of our perception exist as they appear to us, independent of our cognitive faculties. This means it posits that the properties of objects (such as space, time, and causality) are inherent to the objects themselves, regardless of the perceiver’s mind.

Kant's primary arguments against transcendental realism include:

The Distinction Between Phenomena and Noumena: Kant argues that what we perceive (phenomena) is shaped by our cognitive faculties, particularly the forms of intuition (space and time) and the categories of the understanding (like causality). According to Kant, these forms and categories do not apply to things as they are in themselves (noumena). Therefore, our knowledge is limited to phenomena, and we cannot claim to know objects as they exist independently of our perception.

The Impossibility of Knowing Noumena: Since our knowledge is conditioned by the structures of our mind, any claim to know things as they are in themselves (noumena) is untenable. We can only know how things appear to us under the conditions set by our cognitive faculties.

The Role of Synthetic A Priori Judgments: Kant argues that our understanding of experience relies on synthetic a priori judgments, which are necessary and universally valid but are also dependent on the structure of our cognition. These judgments are not about the world in itself but about the world as it is structured by our cognitive faculties.

Indirect Realism and Mind-Independence
Indirect realism, or representationalism, posits that we do not perceive the external world directly. Instead, we perceive representations or sense-data that are caused by and represent external objects. The objects themselves exist independently of our perception, but we can only know them through these mediated representations.

Key aspects of indirect realism include:

Mind-Independence of Objects: Objects in the external world exist independently of our perceptions. Our knowledge of these objects is mediated by our sensory apparatus and mental representations.

Perceptual Mediation: Our access to the external world is indirect, through sense-data or perceptual representations. These representations are caused by external objects but are not the objects themselves.

Kant’s Critique Applied to Indirect Realism
To evaluate whether Kant's critique of transcendental realism also refutes the mind-independence claim of indirect realism, consider the following points:

Kant’s Rejection of Direct Access to Noumena: Kant’s arguments focus on the idea that our knowledge is constrained by the cognitive structures of our mind. Indirect realism, while agreeing that we do not perceive objects directly, still maintains that objects exist independently of our perception. Kant would argue that while we can posit the existence of noumena (things-in-themselves), we cannot have knowledge of them. This aligns with indirect realism's claim that our knowledge of the external world is mediated. However, it does not directly refute the idea that there could be a mind-independent reality causing our perceptions.

Phenomena and Representations: For Kant, phenomena are the appearances shaped by our cognitive faculties, while indirect realism refers to representations or sense-data that correspond to external objects. While both views accept that what we perceive is not the external world itself, Kant's critique is more radical in that it denies any knowledge of the noumenal realm, whereas indirect realism maintains that our representations are still caused by and correspond to mind-independent objects.

Mind-Dependence of Perceptual Conditions: Kant’s critique focuses on how the forms of intuition (space and time) and the categories of understanding (such as causality) are mind-dependent structures. For indirect realism, the existence of objects and their properties (as represented) is independent of the perceiver’s mind, even if our perception of these properties is mediated. Kant would argue that even the concepts we use to understand these representations are mind-dependent.

Conclusion
Kant’s critique of transcendental realism in the "Critique of Pure Reason" is thorough in demonstrating the limitations of our knowledge to phenomena and the dependence of perception on our cognitive faculties. However, his critique does not directly refute the mind-independence claim of indirect realism. While Kant shows that we cannot know the noumenal world directly, indirect realism is compatible with this position because it does not claim direct knowledge of objects themselves, only that our mediated representations are caused by mind-independent objects. Therefore, Kant’s arguments against transcendental realism do not necessarily undermine the core claim of indirect realism regarding the mind-independent existence of external objects.

In summary, Kant’s critique is not sufficient to refute the mind-independence aspect of indirect realism. Indirect realism can still maintain that external objects exist independently of our perception, even if our access to them is always mediated and shaped by our cognitive faculties.

[Iwannaplato]

But Atla, I don't think you have respected enough the magic of VA's pre- and post-emptive...

Obviously if one ignorantly [based on strawman] ask AI from one's biasness, ChatGPT will simply give answers from that ignorant perspective.

Let me tease out the core injunction:

Only I get to appeal to this authority.

[Atla]

But Atla, I don't think you have respected enough the magic of VA's pre- and post-emptive...

Obviously if one ignorantly [based on strawman] ask AI from one's biasness, ChatGPT will simply give answers from that ignorant perspective.

Let me tease out the core injunction:

Only I get to appeal to this authority.

And that doesn't even work because his quotes also support what I keep saying.

[Iwannaplato]

And that doesn't even work because his quotes also support what I keep saying.

We should have a training thread here:
How to effectively (if fallaciously) appeal to authority.

As a forum we are remiss in the apprentice process.

[Atla]

And that doesn't even work because his quotes also support what I keep saying.

We should have a training thread here:
How to effectively (if fallaciously) appeal to authority.

As a forum we are remiss in the apprentice process.

One mistery remains, why is the 'R' in [wR] uppercase?

Summary:
In most cases, particularly in running text, "reservations" will be lowercase. It’s only capitalized in specific contexts like titles, proper nouns, or at the beginning of a sentence.

[Iwannaplato]

One mistery remains, why is the 'R' in [wR] uppercase?

Summary:
In most cases, particularly in running text, "reservations" will be lowercase. It’s only capitalized in specific contexts like titles, proper nouns, or at the beginning of a sentence.

What you may not have realized is that finally Iambiguous, "age" and VA will merge into one superentity.
"age"

Because so-called "writers", or you 'human beings' if you like, are not worthy of capital letters, at the beginning of individual names, or labels.

you human beings have just done this, mostly unconsciously, because you consider "yourselves" above all other animals, creatures, and things. When obviously you are not.

Iambiguous

As for Heidegger, whether his own capital D Dasein is philosophical nonsense or not, my main interest is in how he would bring his intellectual premises out into the world of actual human interactions.

The part I root in dasein with a small "d".

We objectivists, possible realists, human beings at the time this is being written fail to understand the importance of what case letters are in.