What could make morality objective?

[Iwannaplato]

Also, what is it that experiences phenomena? It must itself be phenomenal, because there are no noumena. So the transcendental ego can't be a thing-in-itself. But then, how do we experience it through the senses and mental categories?

I thnk this is a useful direction. I think his approach should lead him to be skeptical of other minds. He cannot directly experience them and can only infer them. Do other people stop existing when he is not looking at them?

Whatever argument he uses to justify the existence of other minds, must - I would guess - parallel arguments in favor of the existence of unobservables. But those are taboo as they are realist arguments, for example from indirect realism.

There's also something 'funny' about a purist anti-realist like VA saying there are no things in themselves. This is a conclusion about what he has not experienced.

[FlashDangerpants]

Also, what is it that experiences phenomena? It must itself be phenomenal, because there are no noumena. So the transcendental ego can't be a thing-in-itself. But then, how do we experience it through the senses and mental categories?

I thnk this is a useful direction. I think his approach should lead him to be skeptical of other minds. He cannot directly experience them and can only infer them. Do other people stop existing when he is not looking at them?

He has no use for other minds anyway. He already assumes that the only reason anybody could have for not agreeing with him over some trivial shit is that they are terrified of the monsters under their beds or some other existential panic nonsense. He has no coherent sense that we have inner lives at all.

[Veritas Aequitas]

None. But that's because they're defined as non-existent, so they're not things that could exist but happen not to. The mind-warp is the point.

So what does he think is the cause of the phenomena that we experience if there is absolutely nothing outside of it? I'm sorry to be asking you these questions, but he won't talk to me; I'm not worth bothering with.

Calling VA. What causes the phenomena we experience?

Whatever are phenomena, they are observable and can be verified and justified via the scientific FSERC as the gold standard of credibility and objectivity.
Whatever the causes, they are explained therein by the scientific FSERC.

Also, what is it that experiences phenomena? It must itself be phenomenal, because there are no noumena. So the transcendental ego can't be a thing-in-itself. But then, how do we experience it through the senses and mental categories?

In modern philosophical use, the term phenomena means things as they are experienced through the senses and processed by the mind as distinct from things in and of themselves (noumena).

According to Kant, there is the empirical-self and transcendental-ego [apperception].
Re Descartes, Kant asserted there is only the "I-THINK' there is no the "I-AM" which is claimed to survive physical death. So there is no real existing noumenal self but one can think of it as a thought.

According to Kant as with Hume, the transcendental-ego [apperception] is merely an emergent from a bundle of activities [a priori and a posteriori] and when a person dies, there is no more such self because there is no more activities.

The transcendental-ego [apperception] (I-that-Think) experiences the empirical self i.e. from first-person experience or from the collective [psychology and science]. The empirical self can be regarded as the "phenomenal" self to one's transcendental ego or to the collective.

Analogy:
Say there is a symphonic orchestra comprising of 100 instrumental player.
When everyone is playing his instrument, the symphonic-orchestra emerged as an entity with consciousness and it aware of its own self and the parts of it plus being aware of it external environment.
When the orchestra stop playing and everyone keep their instruments leave their position, this entity with consciousness just vanish.

That is how the transcendental ego emerged out of 13.7 billion years of history.

Why philosophical realists want to cling to an absolutely independent noumenal self, noumenon or thing-in-itself is due to the inherent desperate psychology.
As I had challenged, there is no loss if we give up this belief and ideology. Why philosophical realists insist on clinging to it as an ideology is a psychological issue grounded on TERROR!

[Peter Holmes]

So what does he think is the cause of the phenomena that we experience if there is absolutely nothing outside of it? I'm sorry to be asking you these questions, but he won't talk to me; I'm not worth bothering with.

Calling VA. What causes the phenomena we experience?

Whatever are phenomena, they are observable and can be verified and justified via the scientific FSERC as the gold standard of credibility and objectivity.
Whatever the causes, they are explained therein by the scientific FSERC.

Also, what is it that experiences phenomena? It must itself be phenomenal, because there are no noumena. So the transcendental ego can't be a thing-in-itself. But then, how do we experience it through the senses and mental categories?

In modern philosophical use, the term phenomena means things as they are experienced through the senses and processed by the mind as distinct from things in and of themselves (noumena).

According to Kant, there is the empirical-self and transcendental-ego [apperception].
Re Descartes, Kant asserted there is only the "I-THINK' there is no the "I-AM" which is claimed to survive physical death. So there is no real existing noumenal self but one can think of it as a thought.

According to Kant as with Hume, the transcendental-ego [apperception] is merely an emergent from a bundle of activities [a priori and a posteriori] and when a person dies, there is no more such self because there is no more activities.

The transcendental-ego [apperception] (I-that-Think) experiences the empirical self i.e. from first-person experience or from the collective [psychology and science]. The empirical self can be regarded as the "phenomenal" self to one's transcendental ego or to the collective.

Analogy:
Say there is a symphonic orchestra comprising of 100 instrumental player.
When everyone is playing his instrument, the symphonic-orchestra emerged as an entity with consciousness and it aware of its own self and the parts of it plus being aware of it external environment.
When the orchestra stop playing and everyone keep their instruments leave their position, this entity with consciousness just vanish.

That is how the transcendental ego emerged out of 13.7 billion years of history.

Why philosophical realists want to cling to an absolutely independent noumenal self, noumenon or thing-in-itself is due to the inherent desperate psychology.
As I had challenged, there is no loss if we give up this belief and ideology. Why philosophical realists insist on clinging to it as an ideology is a psychological issue grounded on TERROR!

Reality (the object) is not noumenal. The expression 'thing-in-itself' has no coherent meaning. It's Kantians who cling to 'things-in-themselves', because they're the crutch needed to sustain the silly idea that reality isn't independent from humans.

[FlashDangerpants]

Reality (the object) is not noumenal. The expression 'thing-in-itself' has no coherent meaning.

Like, when I make a cup of tea the water (some stuff) gets boiled (a process) in the kettle (a thing) and that's all there is to the matter. Talk of water-in-itself getting boiled-as-itself in a kettle-of-itself is just a gloss of ghost in the machine mysticism for faux dualists.

[Skepdick]

Like, when I make a cup of tea the water (some stuff) gets boiled (a process) in the kettle (a thing) and that's all there is to the matter. Talk of water-in-itself getting boiled-as-itself in a kettle-of-itself is just a gloss of ghost in the machine mysticism for faux dualists.

Talk of ghost in the machine is just nonsense for faux non-dualists.

Everything's a process. Reality is a process. Living is a process. Dying is a process. Learning is a process. Making a cup of tea is a process. What's a process? What does a process DO?

There needs not be any "ghost in the machine" in any worldly process when you are dealing with Kantian wholes.

Your heart needs not be anthropomorphised as an agent with intent/autonomy (let alone any "ghosts") to insist that it has a function and a purpose.

Your kind of dumb-dubmb is the usual anti-mysticism bias. The "in it self" is the part where you contextualize the object of inquiry in relation to the implicit Kantian whole under consideration.

It's systems thinking. Quit being dumb.

[Skepdick]

Reality (the object) is not noumenal.

Said the noumenon refered to as Peter Holmes.

It's Kantians who cling to 'things-in-themselves', because they're the crutch needed to sustain the silly idea that reality isn't independent from humans.

Contradiction. Suppose reality is independent from humans (as you claim).

Therefore you (Peter Holmes) are independent from the Kantial whole known as "reality".
But you also reject humans independent from reality.
So you reject yourself?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Calling VA. What causes the phenomena we experience?

Whatever are phenomena, they are observable and can be verified and justified via the scientific FSERC as the gold standard of credibility and objectivity.
Whatever the causes, they are explained therein by the scientific FSERC.

Also, what is it that experiences phenomena? It must itself be phenomenal, because there are no noumena. So the transcendental ego can't be a thing-in-itself. But then, how do we experience it through the senses and mental categories?

In modern philosophical use, the term phenomena means things as they are experienced through the senses and processed by the mind as distinct from things in and of themselves (noumena).

According to Kant, there is the empirical-self and transcendental-ego [apperception].
Re Descartes, Kant asserted there is only the "I-THINK' there is no the "I-AM" which is claimed to survive physical death. So there is no real existing noumenal self but one can think of it as a thought.

According to Kant as with Hume, the transcendental-ego [apperception] is merely an emergent from a bundle of activities [a priori and a posteriori] and when a person dies, there is no more such self because there is no more activities.

The transcendental-ego [apperception] (I-that-Think) experiences the empirical self i.e. from first-person experience or from the collective [psychology and science]. The empirical self can be regarded as the "phenomenal" self to one's transcendental ego or to the collective.

Analogy:
Say there is a symphonic orchestra comprising of 100 instrumental player.
When everyone is playing his instrument, the symphonic-orchestra emerged as an entity with consciousness and it aware of its own self and the parts of it plus being aware of it external environment.
When the orchestra stop playing and everyone keep their instruments leave their position, this entity with consciousness just vanish.

That is how the transcendental ego emerged out of 13.7 billion years of history.

Why philosophical realists want to cling to an absolutely independent noumenal self, noumenon or thing-in-itself is due to the inherent desperate psychology.
As I had challenged, there is no loss if we give up this belief and ideology. Why philosophical realists insist on clinging to it as an ideology is a psychological issue grounded on TERROR!

Reality (the object) is not noumenal. The expression 'thing-in-itself' has no coherent meaning. It's Kantians who cling to 'things-in-themselves', because they're the crutch needed to sustain the silly idea that reality isn't independent from humans.

You [p-realist] insists facts, things [reality of external world] are absolutely independent of the human conditions, i.e. they exist regardless of whether there are humans or not.

Kant had labelled things [reality of external world] that are claimed [by p-realist] as absolutely independent of the human conditions as noumenal [aka thing-in-itself] i.e. they exists regardless of whether there are humans or not, .

What is a thing-in-itself is literally something that exists by itself unconditionally regardless of whether there are humans or not. This is exactly what you are claiming, as such it must mean something to you.

PH: "the silly idea that reality isn't independent from humans."
In the first place it is you [p-realist] who claim reality and things are absolutely independent of the human conditions.
It is not a silly idea to claim reality and things are relatively independent of the human conditions, BUT to claim
"reality and things are absolutely [unconditionally] independent of the human conditions" as an ideology is a illusory & silly idea out of the psychological desperation of an inherent TERROR.

I have asked, what have you to lose if you give up your ideological fundamentalistic belief of absolute unconditional independence of the human conditions?
The only thing that you will lose is your security blanket and psychological comfort in clinging to that ideology of absolute human independence.
But I don't expect you will let your dogmatic belief go.

[Peter Holmes]

See, there was this rock on the earth a million years ago. That's nearly a million years before human beings evolved.

So that rock was absolutely, completely and totally and utterly and irrefutably and undeniably independent from humans. It wasn't 'relatively' independent from humans - whatever that means.

And that rock wasn't a rock-in-itself. It was just a rock. And had human beings not evolved, it would have been just a rock, and it would have carried on being just a rock.

Unlike the rock, this isn't hard.

[Veritas Aequitas]

See, there was this rock on the earth a million years ago. That's nearly a million years before human beings evolved.

So that rock was absolutely, completely and totally and utterly and irrefutably and undeniably independent from humans. It wasn't 'relatively' independent from humans - whatever that means.

And that rock wasn't a rock-in-itself. It was just a rock. And had human beings not evolved, it would have been just a rock, and it would have carried on being just a rock.

Unlike the rock, this isn't hard.

The point is you are playing God and insisting "there was this rock on the earth a million years ago" in the absolute sense without any qualification of humility and insisted upon it as a dogmatic ideology.

What is really real and true is;
"there was this rock on the earth a million years ago"
as qualified to a human-based science cosmology framework and system of emergence & realization of reality, cognition, knowledge and description. [FSERC]
Because it is human-based, logically and deductive, whatever the resultant of the above cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions.

At the ultimate level where there is a need for rigor,
you are not a God, so you just cannot run away from the deductive logic entailed in the above.
Why you are unable to impute the necessary humility and qualification that somehow deductively the human conditions are inevitable is due to your [and other p-realists] inner desperate psychology.

[Peter Holmes]

Elsewhere, the silly idea that objectivity is intersubjectivity is being peddled. But here are two definitions.

'Objectivity: the quality of being based on facts and not influenced by personal beliefs or feelings.'

'Subjectivity: the quality of being based on or influenced by personal feelings, tastes, or opinions.'

1 Notice that the distinction rests on the existence of facts - that there are such things. No facts = no distinction - and then there's no point in talking about objectivity.

2 Intersubjectivity is just subjectivity accumulated. And an opinion held by everyone is still an opinion, whereas a fact acknowledged by no one is still a fact. The slogan 'objectivity is intersubjectivity' is the bandwagon fallacy made manifest. When no one thought the earth orbits the sun - it orbited the sun.

3 How we may arrive at a conclusion - for example, by way of intersubjective consensus - does not determine the nature of the conclusion.

Here's the silly argument.

1 We humans have to perceive, know and describe reality - including what we call facts - in human ways.
2 A description, and therefore a truth-claim, and therefore a fact - is always contextual and conventional.
3 There's no such thing as a context-free and convention-free fact.
4 So what we call objectivity (or 'factuality'} is necessarily dependent on our (human) ways of perceiving, knowing and describing reality - including what we call facts.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Strawman as usual, see;
viewtopic.php?p=718187#p718187

[Peter Holmes]

Strawman as usual, see;
viewtopic.php?p=718187#p718187

Ignoring a refutation of your argument, as usual. Instead: repeat the refuted argument.

[Peter Holmes]

Elsewhere, VA offers the following AI-generated bland mush about 'the resurgent moral realism'.

'Moral Realism: There are objective moral truths independent of human opinion. (e.g., Torture is always wrong, regardless of culture or belief)
Moral Anti-Realism: Moral truths are subjective and depend on human beliefs or emotions. (e.g., Torture is wrong because most people find it repulsive)

The resurgence of moral realism has reignited the debate, and it's fair to ask if the classic arguments have lost their bite. Let's delve into each one:

Hume's Is-Ought Problem: This argument points out the gap between factual statements ("is") and moral statements ("ought"). Simply observing the world can't tell you what you morally should do. However, moral realists like David Brink argue that even though facts don't entail morals, they can still provide evidence for them. For example, facts about human well-being could support moral claims about actions that promote it.
The Cornell Realists might respond by arguing that moral facts supervene on natural facts, meaning they depend on them but aren't reducible to them.

Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy: This argument states you can't define "good" in terms of natural properties. Moore famously argued that saying pleasure is good is like saying yellow is good - you haven't really defined good, just added another property. Newer moral realists like Richard Boyd argue for a more nuanced view. They say properties like "pleasure-producing" can be evidence for something being good, even if they aren't identical.
The Cornell Realists might argue they aren't defining good, but rather uncovering its natural properties.

Open Question Argument: This argument highlights that even after learning all the facts, we can still ask "but is it morally right?" This seems to suggest morality isn't based on facts. However, realists like Peter Railton argue that this doesn't necessarily mean morals aren't objective. We might still be asking the question because we haven't considered all the relevant facts, or because we haven't fully grasped the moral principles at play.

Whether these classical arguments have lost their force depends on how convincing you find the realist responses.

The resurgence of moral realism presents a serious challenge to the classic arguments against it.

This is a complex topic, and there's no easy answer. But by understanding the arguments on both sides, you can form your own well-informed view.

Overall, the debate is lively. While classic arguments remain influential, the new wave of moral realism offers a fresh perspective on the relationship between facts and moral truths.'

What strikes me is how the 'new moral realists' don't seem to grasp the unarguable refutation of realist arguments. For example, facts just can't be 'evidence' for moral opinions. So the claim 'facts about human well-being could support moral claims about actions that promote it' ignores the fundamental point that lack of entailment makes the connection completely subjective.

This is simply philosophical, and even logical, incompetence. How can '"pleasure-producing" can be evidence for something being good'? For one thing, pleasure-producing could also be evidence for something being bad. I wonder how this kind of nonsense passes muster in philosophical circles.

This is not a complex topic. Moral rightness and wrongness are not and can never be matters of fact, independent from opinion. Whatever facts we deploy to try to justify a moral opinion, others can deploy the same facts differently, or different facts, to try to justify a different moral opinion.

That is our moral predicament. And the claim that, if this is true, we're condemned to deontological moral relativism, skepticism or nihilism is false. It's the other side of the counterfeit objectivist coin.

[Peter Holmes]

Elsewhere, the stupidity of VA's FSERC moral theory is laid bare, as follows.

'Within a human-based morality-proper framework and system [FSERC] the moral standard and maxim is,
Abortion is Not Permissible, Period!
However, this is merely a moral standard to be used as a guide for moral progress and with anything morality, moral maxims are not to be enforceable on any individual[s].'

Here's another assertion.

Within a human-based morality-proper framework and system [FSERC] the moral standard and maxim is,
Abortion is Permissible, Period!

Point is, VA has absolutely nothing to justify the 'objectivity' of the first claim, and deny the 'objectivity' of the second claim. It's brute subjective fiat. Grotesque!