What could make morality objective?

[Sculptor]

Kant's Ding an sich is a concept designed for us to reflect upon the fact that it is highly unlikely to give us the whole picture.
It asks us to consider that reality is limited by our perceptions and anticipations of our perceptions.
It allows us to consider that when we apprehend an object we understand it within the limits or our internally created worlds.

The Ding an sich could be something beyond our perception or a thing we perceive incompletely.
The implication is that whatever we percieve, we can never have a full and complete understanding of it and there will always remain elements that are forever obscured to us.

An example would be our neighbouring galaxy M31, in Andromeda. We can see it in plain sight but we are seeing it as it was 100 million years ago, we know it is composed of stars and nubulae and black holes, but we do not know how many, nor how many planets or what the civilisations look like, if indeed there are any. But we see it with a category "Galaxy" which makes many asusmptions.

But it does not stop there. A simple cup has an element of Ding an sich. We know what a cup is, so knowing that we see the cup and associate the cup with its cupness. Consider a person never having seen a cup or used a cup. They would see a different object, even though physically the thing is the same. But peception is not passive in the way you might think it is.
Above all this there are things about an object we might call a cup that are beyond our ordinary perception.

Ding an sich is a critique of naive epistemology.
I am surpise to see VA bring it up since it utterly denies any claim about "objective morality"

[Veritas Aequitas]

Kant didn't recognise things-in-themselves. He invented them, in order to define them out of existence. And you've been suckered by this trick.

OK, the term "recognize" used wrongly here.

What Kant did was, he labelled what [the thing] the p-realists claimed ideologically as absolutely independent of the human condition, the thing-in-itself.
He then proved the thing-in-itself when claimed as real is actually an illusion.

Further, this thing-in-itself [absolutely independent thing] is claimed by theists as an entity with agency, i.e. an independent God.

I have argued, what you claimed as an independent things is a thing-in-itself.
Do you have a counter for this.
PH's (et. al.) Thing is a Thing-in-Itself
viewtopic.php?t=42433

Prove to me the thing you claim as existing absolutely independent of the human conditions is not what Kant termed as a thing-in-itself.
A thing-in-itself is literally the same as your definition, i.e. a thing existing absolutely independent of the human conditions; it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not.

1 Explain exactly what a thing-in-itself actually is.
2 Prove that things-in-themselves don't exist.

1 Explain exactly what a thing-in-itself actually is.
I have explained the thing-in-itself aka noumenon many times and have even raised specific threads on it, but you cannot grasp nor understand [not agree with] the concept.

Here again,
In the preface and elsewhere Kant has listed and explained there are loads of problem when philosophers of his past ASSUMED there is something that exists as real beyond the empirical.

Substance theory, or substance–attribute theory, is an ontological theory positing that objects are constituted each by a substance and properties borne by the substance but distinct from it. In this role, a substance can be referred to as a substratum or a thing-in-itself.[1][2]
Substances are particulars that are ontologically independent: they are able to exist all by themselves.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_theory

See Criticism to the above;
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance ... #Criticism

The above is ideologized as philosophical realism or metaphysical realism:

Philosophical realism – ...– is the view that a certain kind of thing (ranging widely from abstract objects like numbers to moral statements to the physical world itself) has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

The "thing" within philosophical realism is the literally the thing-in-itself which is the thing or object within Substance Theory.

In your case, while the terms may be different, the above thing-in-itself is the same as you what is object, thing or fact, i.e.
a fact is a feature of reality which is the case, a state of affairs, just-is that is absolutely independent of the human conditions' of opinions, beliefs, and judgment, i.e. it exists absolutely regardless of whether there are humans or not.
So your claim of what is fact or thing of reality is literally a thing-in-itself as coined by Kant.

2 Prove that things-in-themselves don't exist.
Protocol wise, the onus is on you to prove a positive claim that the thing-in-itself [fact, thing, object] exists as real.

In the CPR Kant wrote [mine]:

[1.] If Intuition [of Objects] must conform to the constitution of the Objects [as Things-in-themselves], I do not see how we could know anything of the latter [the Objects as Things-in-Themselves] a priori
[2.] but if the Object (as Object of the Senses) must conform to the constitution of our Faculty of Intuition, I have no difficulty in conceiving such a possibility. [as Object of the Senses].
Bxvii

In the above [1] [when a thing is assumed to be a thing-in-itself] Kant stated we cannot know the object if it is constituted as a thing-in-itself, i.e. absolutely independent of the human conditions [intuition].

Note "our faculty of intuition" [2]
What humans can know is only via its intuition[sensible] and realized via empirical evidence.
As such, what is known as real is contingent upon the human conditions.
What is real is with reference to human-based science as the most credible and objective.

The concept of 'know' is extended from emergence and realization of reality as implied in the whole context of the CPR.

Now it is your turn;
prove your thing-in-itself [what is fact] exists as real and is absolutely independent of the human conditions?
Btw, if you refer to science, it is human-based and science only generate polished conjectures [hypothesis] and do not confirm things exist as thing-in-itself beyond its scope.
In addition, at best science merely assumes thing-in-themselves exist as a guide but never taken as really real.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Kant's Ding an sich is a concept designed for us to reflect upon the fact that it is highly unlikely to give us the whole picture.
.........
Above all this there are things about an object we might call a cup that are beyond our ordinary perception.

Ding an sich is a critique of naive epistemology.
I am surprise to see VA bring it up since it utterly denies any claim about "objective morality"

I explained in the above post what is a thing-in-itself [plural things-in-themselves].

I am not relying on Kant's Ding an Sich to claim that Morality is Objective.
I am relying on Kant's Ding an sich only to refute PH's claim that Morality Cannot be Objective.

PH et. al. claimed there are things-in-themselves, i.e. they exist absolutely independent of the human conditions, i.e. they exist regardless whether there are humans or not. In this sense things-in-themselves are objective.

To PH et. al. moral objects [elements, right or wrong beliefs] are not things-in-themselves, i.e. exist independent of the human conditions.
Moral objects [as opinions, beliefs and judgments] are contingent upon the subjects, thus are subjective and cannot be objective.
Therefore, to PH et. al morality can never be objective.

But Kant has proven there are no real things-in-themselves, they can be thought of but they are essentially illusory.

Because PH relies on the existence of things-in-themselves to refute Morality is objective, but Kant had proven, things-in-themselves are illusions,
PH do not have real solid grounds to refute morality is objective.
In other words, PH cannot rely on illusions to refute morality is objective.

So, I am using the idea of thing-in-itself to squash PH's claim 'Morality cannot be objective'.
It is not tenable for PH to claim "Morality cannot be objective" when his argument is based on the illusory thing-in-itself.


My claim that Morality is Objective is based on philosophical antirealism, i.e. there are only conditioned things contingent upon a specific collective human-based framework and system [FS] (thus objective) of which the scientific FS is the gold standard.
I am relying on an objective collective-human-based MORAL framework and system [FS] which is objective in grounding my claim that morality is objective.

• P1 Whatever is grounded on a specific collective human-based framework and system [FS] is objective.
  
  P2 Morality is grounded on a specific collective human-based Moral framework and system [FS].
  
  C Therefore, Morality is Objective.

[Sculptor]

Kant's Ding an sich is a concept designed for us to reflect upon the fact that it is highly unlikely to give us the whole picture.
.........
Above all this there are things about an object we might call a cup that are beyond our ordinary perception.

Ding an sich is a critique of naive epistemology.
I am surprise to see VA bring it up since it utterly denies any claim about "objective morality"

I explained in the above post what is a thing-in-itself [plural things-in-themselves].

I am not relying on Kant's Ding an Sich to claim that Morality is Objective.
I am relying on Kant's Ding an sich only to refute PH's claim that Morality Cannot be Objective.

You are a laugh a minute.

[Ansiktsburk]

It seems to me this question - which has emerged from discussion of my post 'Is morality objective or subjective?' - is the crux in the disagreement between objectivists and subjectivists.

An objection to moral subjectivism is that, if moral values and judgements are matters of opinion, we can't know if they're correct. For example, we can't know if slavery is right or wrong, and can't therefore morally condemn those who think slavery is justifiable. That's just their opinion, and we can't say which opinion is correct or true.

But this assumes that there is indeed something to be known: an object of some kind that verifies the assertion slavery is wrong and falsifies the assertion slavery is right - or, perhaps, vice versa. But what is the object that makes moral judgements objective - matters of fact - and therefore true or false?

It can't be slavery itself, because that would also be the object of the assertion slavery is right - so we're back to square one. And it can't be the wrongness of slavery. To say the assertion slavery is wrong is justified (shown to be true) by the objective wrongness of slavery is circular, and so no justification at all.

So what is it that moral objectivists claim about moral judgements that makes them objective - matters of fact, falsifiable and independent from judgement, belief or opinion?

Does any moral objectivist here have an answer that doesn't beg the question?

(The claim that objective moral values and judgements come from a god's commands or a god's nature begs the question: what makes a god's commands or a god's nature objectively morally good?)

Morals are pretty intersubjective, right? Not all that objective or subjective? Even one’s own little morals are pretty hard to make up oneself independently, aren’t they?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Kant's Ding an sich is a concept designed for us to reflect upon the fact that it is highly unlikely to give us the whole picture.
.........
Above all this there are things about an object we might call a cup that are beyond our ordinary perception.

Ding an sich is a critique of naive epistemology.
I am surprise to see VA bring it up since it utterly denies any claim about "objective morality"

I explained in the above post what is a thing-in-itself [plural things-in-themselves].

I am not relying on Kant's Ding an Sich to claim that Morality is Objective.
I am relying on Kant's Ding an sich only to refute PH's claim that Morality Cannot be Objective.

You are a laugh a minute.

Your usual immature response when you have nothing to counter my arguments.

[Iwannaplato]

• P1 Whatever is grounded on a specific collective human-based framework and system [FS] is objective.
  
  P2 Morality is grounded on a specific collective human-based Moral framework and system [FS].
  
  C Therefore, Morality is Objective.

But we have no Morality. We have many moralities.
It seems in another thread you universalize an act, a bit like Kant does, to decide if it can be moral.
Abortion is wrong because if everyone got abortions, humans would die out.

So, does this mean you hold with Kant's ideas about lying?
Would you tell the Nazis where the Jews are hiding if they asked you?

Do you think we should tell the truth regardless of the consequences?
And if, so please justify this.
If not, then explain how you and Kant can arrive at two different yet both objective moralities

Example:
Chemotherapy can cause harm to children.
Some children are in danger, so it is moral to give chemotherapy, in the right cases, to children with cancer.
We could argue that chemotherapy might prevent cancers in other children, but we do a risk assessment and decide that the risks outweigh the benefits for most children.
To make a universal law either way would be immoral: both never give chemo to children and always give chemo to children would be immoral.

We decide that it is case sensitive.

Same thing with lying. There are exceptional situations when lying is appropriate.

Note: the core intention of this is not particularly to debate whether Kant's objective morals are correct, but rather to focus on how different objective morals can arise if they are objective.

[Sculptor]

I explained in the above post what is a thing-in-itself [plural things-in-themselves].

I am not relying on Kant's Ding an Sich to claim that Morality is Objective.
I am relying on Kant's Ding an sich only to refute PH's claim that Morality Cannot be Objective.

You are a laugh a minute.

Your usual immature response when you have nothing to counter my arguments.

Adn, as usual, looking for an argument in your text is like looking the meat in a word salad.

[Peter Holmes]

In the CPR Kant wrote [mine]:

[1.] If Intuition [of Objects] must conform to the constitution of the Objects [as Things-in-themselves], I do not see how we could know anything of the latter [the Objects as Things-in-Themselves] a priori
[2.] but if the Object (as Object of the Senses) must conform to the constitution of our Faculty of Intuition, I have no difficulty in conceiving such a possibility. [as Object of the Senses].
Bxvii

In the above [1] [when a thing is assumed to be a thing-in-itself] Kant stated we cannot know the object if it is constituted as a thing-in-itself, i.e. absolutely independent of the human conditions [intuition].

With or without your square-bracket glosses, none of this is about reality - what actually is. It's all about what humans do or can know.

Notice this: '...I do not see how we could know anything of the latter [the Objects as Things-in-Themselves] a priori[.]' Kant is not saying there's no such thing as 'the constitution of the Objects [as Things-in-themselves]' - but only that we can't know what that is, a priori.

So - leaving aside the dodgy a priori/a posteriori distinction - this extract provides no evidence for your anti-realist reading of Kant.

[Veritas Aequitas]

In the CPR Kant wrote [mine]:

[1.] If Intuition [of Objects] must conform to the constitution of the Objects [as Things-in-themselves], I do not see how we could know anything of the latter [the Objects as Things-in-Themselves] a priori
[2.] but if the Object (as Object of the Senses) must conform to the constitution of our Faculty of Intuition, I have no difficulty in conceiving such a possibility. [as Object of the Senses].
Bxvii

In the above [1] [when a thing is assumed to be a thing-in-itself] Kant stated we cannot know the object if it is constituted as a thing-in-itself, i.e. absolutely independent of the human conditions [intuition].

With or without your square-bracket glosses, none of this is about reality - what actually is. It's all about what humans do or can know.

Notice this: '...I do not see how we could know anything of the latter [the Objects as Things-in-Themselves] a priori[.]' Kant is not saying there's no such thing as 'the constitution of the Objects [as Things-in-themselves]' - but only that we can't know what that is, a priori.

So - leaving aside the dodgy a priori/a posteriori distinction - this extract provides no evidence for your anti-realist reading of Kant.

I have quoted many times [raised a thread on it], in the CPR Kant claimed his philosophy is that of ANTIrealism i.e. Kant opposed and rejected philosophical realism.

Kant: a Transcendental Idealist & Empirical Realist
viewtopic.php?t=42073
I have a list of all the threads I have raised here.

Kant never agreed that reality and things pre-existed humans [exist as things-in-themselves] awaiting to be discovered by humans as presumed by the philosophical realists [e.g. you].
Kant is basically a constructivist; as such, reality is on an emergence basis.
I also have raised threads on constructivism.

In the above [1] [when a thing is assumed to be a thing-in-itself] Kant stated we cannot know the object if it is constituted as a thing-in-itself, i.e. absolutely independent of the human conditions [intuition].
In this case, there is nothing real to be known since there is no emergence of things to be realized and known.

Kant did mention the noumenon is unknowable as a convenience to avoid explaining all the related details [done somewhere in the CRP]; this does not imply there is something out there yet to be known.
What he meant is the thing-in-itself by definition is impossible to be known as real.

My point;
what you defined as fact, i.e. a feature of reality that is the case, state of affairs or just-is which is independent of the individuals' opinion, beliefs and judgments, i.e. exists regardless whether there are humans or not, is exactly what Kant defined as the noumenon aka thing-in-itself. This is basically the absolutely human[mind] independence of philosophy realism.

You et. al. and theists are both ideologically philosophical realists.
While you [atheist] limit your things-in-themselves to the human-independent 'physical' world, the theists stretch the idea [absolute mind-independent] of a human independent thing-in-itself, i.e. God.

It from here that Kant demonstrate it is impossible to prove God exists as real because it [stretched as a the father of thing-in-itself] is illusory to start with.

Can you address this critical argument of mine;
PH's "Morality is NOT Objective" is False.
viewtopic.php?t=42448

[Peter Holmes]

Kant's invention of things-in-themselves (noumena), which don't exist, has been turning philosopher's brains inside out for several centuries. Here's the silly 'argument'.

P1 Things that exist independent from humans are things-in-themselves (noumena).
P2 Things-in-themselves (noumena) don't exist.
C Therefore, nothing exists independent from humans. (There are only phenomena, which depend on humans.)

VA then extrapolates from this idiotic conclusion with the following non sequitur.

P Facts (phenomena) depend on humans.
C Therefore, there are moral facts (moral phenomena) - which depend on humans.

And to finish it off, VA defines away a god by calling it a thing-in-itself - which, of course, doesn't exist.

[Harbal]

Kant's invention of things-in-themselves (noumena), which don't exist, has been turning philosopher's brains inside out for several centuries. Here's the silly 'argument'.

P1 Things that exist independent from humans are things-in-themselves (noumena).
P2 Things-in-themselves (noumena) don't exist.
C Therefore, nothing exists independent from humans. (There are only phenomena, which depend on humans.)

VA then extrapolates from this idiotic conclusion with the following non sequitur.

P Facts (phenomena) depend on humans.
C Therefore, there are moral facts (moral phenomena) - which depend on humans.

And to finish it off, VA defines away a god by calling it a thing-in-itself - which, of course, doesn't exist.

I don't read much of what he says, because he's an idiot, but what evidence does he have that noumena don't exist?

[Peter Holmes]

Kant's invention of things-in-themselves (noumena), which don't exist, has been turning philosopher's brains inside out for several centuries. Here's the silly 'argument'.

P1 Things that exist independent from humans are things-in-themselves (noumena).
P2 Things-in-themselves (noumena) don't exist.
C Therefore, nothing exists independent from humans. (There are only phenomena, which depend on humans.)

VA then extrapolates from this idiotic conclusion with the following non sequitur.

P Facts (phenomena) depend on humans.
C Therefore, there are moral facts (moral phenomena) - which depend on humans.

And to finish it off, VA defines away a god by calling it a thing-in-itself - which, of course, doesn't exist.

I don't read much of what he says, because he's an idiot, but what evidence does he have that noumena don't exist?

None. But that's because they're defined as non-existent, so they're not things that could exist but happen not to. The mind-warp is the point.

[Harbal]

Kant's invention of things-in-themselves (noumena), which don't exist, has been turning philosopher's brains inside out for several centuries. Here's the silly 'argument'.

P1 Things that exist independent from humans are things-in-themselves (noumena).
P2 Things-in-themselves (noumena) don't exist.
C Therefore, nothing exists independent from humans. (There are only phenomena, which depend on humans.)

VA then extrapolates from this idiotic conclusion with the following non sequitur.

P Facts (phenomena) depend on humans.
C Therefore, there are moral facts (moral phenomena) - which depend on humans.

And to finish it off, VA defines away a god by calling it a thing-in-itself - which, of course, doesn't exist.

I don't read much of what he says, because he's an idiot, but what evidence does he have that noumena don't exist?

None. But that's because they're defined as non-existent, so they're not things that could exist but happen not to. The mind-warp is the point.

So what does he think is the cause of the phenomena that we experience if there is absolutely nothing outside of it? I'm sorry to be asking you these questions, but he won't talk to me; I'm not worth bothering with.

[Peter Holmes]

I don't read much of what he says, because he's an idiot, but what evidence does he have that noumena don't exist?

None. But that's because they're defined as non-existent, so they're not things that could exist but happen not to. The mind-warp is the point.

So what does he think is the cause of the phenomena that we experience if there is absolutely nothing outside of it? I'm sorry to be asking you these questions, but he won't talk to me; I'm not worth bothering with.

Calling VA. What causes the phenomena we experience?

Also, what is it that experiences phenomena? It must itself be phenomenal, because there are no noumena. So the transcendental ego can't be a thing-in-itself. But then, how do we experience it through the senses and mental categories?