I'm just curious: who told you that Paradise Lost was an authoritative treatise on theology, rather than a epic fiction? Since NO theologians refer to Paradise Lost as an authoritative text, why are you attempting to use it as if it were one?Alexiev wrote: ↑Fri Jun 14, 2024 11:39 pmIn my post above about "Paradise Lost" I purport that Milton questions whether God's moral authority is de facto or de jure.henry quirk wrote: ↑Fri Jun 14, 2024 11:12 pm
*God exists and created all that is.
*Man is more than just meat (he has, or is, a free will; is morally discerning and therefore is capable of, and subject to, moral judgement; is ensouled).
*Morality is fact, not opinion, and pertains to what is and is not permissible between and among men.
I reckon Mannie and me are far closer than you or I, or you and him. He and I are largely on the page while you and me, or you and him, aren't even in the same book.
Isn't it a bit like using Shakespeare as a medical text?
This really isn't anything but the old, failed "Euthyprho Dilemma," which we've already showed, by quoting directly from it, depends on polytheism, and makes the false-dichotomy error of severing who God is from what God desires for us. But the Supreme Being, by virtue of being supreme, never finds it necessary to do or to approve anything that is not precisely consonant with His own nature. We humans do, precisely because we are not good, do not always have good desires, and lack the power and wisdom to make our intentions real. But God is perfectly able to allign His character and intentions into the fabric of what we rightly recognize (when we recognize it, and whether we want to or not) as the right.If we say, "God us beneficent and just", we must mean something more than, "God is God." Otherwise the statement is meaningless. So if these moral terms describe God and his rule there are several possibilities:
1) God rules and is all powerful. Therefore his will is law. (De facto)
2) We can derive moral principles apart from God, and we find that He is perfect in His compliance with them. (De jure).
There may be other possibilities. If so, what are they?
So there's no sense in saying, "Is it good because God wants it, or does God want it because it's good." The answer is, "God wants X because that's who God is, and He is good." So the de-jure/de-facto distinction is meaningless in reference to God. It posits an absurdity: either a Supreme Being who is not good, or a good that "floats free" of the Supreme Being and exists prior to His judgment.
Neither one makes any sense: the former supposes we, contingent, created, limited and immoral beings, can somehow pass judgment morally on the Entity that created the very concept of morality, on the basis of that same morality; and the other actually implies that a thing called "morality" exists prior to the Supreme Being, and thus has to be "the supremer supreme reality."
That's just how off-point the whole question is. It's clearly absurd, and reflects a failure to identify the word "God" with anything.