Theism and Moral Realism are separate concepts

[FlashDangerpants]

The sematic properties of the concept "God" are not different for an atheist than they are for a theist.

In my experience, I would have to disagree.

Consider it this way. Suppose I ask somebody, "Do you know Flash?"

And they say, "Sure: Flash is a middle-aged woman from Idaho. She has three cats and a hobby farm."

And I say, "Well, that's not who Flash is, to me. Flash is an eighty-year-old man from Dallas, with no cats, who lives in an apartment."

What is the most obvious conclusion? That we're using the same name, "Flash," but referring to completely different people. That's just common sense.

So if you've got a Theist and an Atheist. And the Atheist says the word "God," and means "a mythical figure," and a Theist uses the word and means, the "I AM" God of Judaism, you can be quite sure that they have different conceptions in mind, even if they use the identical word. That, too, is the most sensible realization, and common enough.

Erm. OK. So let's go with that and see how you make the next step. God is just the name for a particular object and thus if two people have a different proper noun in mind when they utter the word, then the semantic content attaches to that object. So how does this work for "good", which isn't a proper noun?

[Immanuel Can]

The sematic properties of the concept "God" are not different for an atheist than they are for a theist.

In my experience, I would have to disagree.

Consider it this way. Suppose I ask somebody, "Do you know Flash?"

And they say, "Sure: Flash is a middle-aged woman from Idaho. She has three cats and a hobby farm."

And I say, "Well, that's not who Flash is, to me. Flash is an eighty-year-old man from Dallas, with no cats, who lives in an apartment."

What is the most obvious conclusion? That we're using the same name, "Flash," but referring to completely different people. That's just common sense.

So if you've got a Theist and an Atheist. And the Atheist says the word "God," and means "a mythical figure," and a Theist uses the word and means, the "I AM" God of Judaism, you can be quite sure that they have different conceptions in mind, even if they use the identical word. That, too, is the most sensible realization, and common enough.

Erm.

"Erm?"

What I've said is dead obvious, I would say. Can you explain things any other way?

[FlashDangerpants]

The sematic properties of the concept "God" are not different for an atheist than they are for a theist.

In my experience, I would have to disagree.

Consider it this way. Suppose I ask somebody, "Do you know Flash?"

And they say, "Sure: Flash is a middle-aged woman from Idaho. She has three cats and a hobby farm."

And I say, "Well, that's not who Flash is, to me. Flash is an eighty-year-old man from Dallas, with no cats, who lives in an apartment."

What is the most obvious conclusion? That we're using the same name, "Flash," but referring to completely different people. That's just common sense.

So if you've got a Theist and an Atheist. And the Atheist says the word "God," and means "a mythical figure," and a Theist uses the word and means, the "I AM" God of Judaism, you can be quite sure that they have different conceptions in mind, even if they use the identical word. That, too, is the most sensible realization, and common enough.

So let's go with that and see how you make the next step. God is just the name for a particular object and thus if two people have a different proper noun in mind when they utter the word, then the semantic content attaches to that object. So how does this work for "good", which isn't a proper noun?

[Immanuel Can]

The sematic properties of the concept "God" are not different for an atheist than they are for a theist.

In my experience, I would have to disagree.

Consider it this way. Suppose I ask somebody, "Do you know Flash?"

And they say, "Sure: Flash is a middle-aged woman from Idaho. She has three cats and a hobby farm."

And I say, "Well, that's not who Flash is, to me. Flash is an eighty-year-old man from Dallas, with no cats, who lives in an apartment."

What is the most obvious conclusion? That we're using the same name, "Flash," but referring to completely different people. That's just common sense.

So if you've got a Theist and an Atheist. And the Atheist says the word "God," and means "a mythical figure," and a Theist uses the word and means, the "I AM" God of Judaism, you can be quite sure that they have different conceptions in mind, even if they use the identical word. That, too, is the most sensible realization, and common enough.

So let's go with that and see how you make the next step.

Let's not.

If you have any doubt at all about that, let's hear it now, so we have a good, firm foundation of mutual agreement underneath us both. Otherwise, it's clearly not sufficient for us to go on to any "next step."

So I ask again: if you have any contrary opinion about that, let's mutually inspect your grounds for it now.

[Harbal]

Well, no...not unless you are approving of the listed acts and persons. And most people, it seems do not hold that moral assessment. So you're not saying what the term actually means, either analytically or by popular assumption. And you're not even saying what you, yourself believe, if you don't also approve those listed acts. Rather, you're floating a very poor attempt at definition.

So when you talk about God's being good, you are not talking about moral good, but some other kind of good?

No...no...don't walk away from the issue. Do you approve of that list of malefactors and malefactions I listed in my earlier message, or do you recognize your proposed definition as seriously flawed?

Yes? No?

The final solution, for example, is something I consider to have been morally bad, so no, I do not approve of it. So where does that get us?

[Immanuel Can]

So when you talk about God's being good, you are not talking about moral good, but some other kind of good?

No...no...don't walk away from the issue. Do you approve of that list of malefactors and malefactions I listed in my earlier message, or do you recognize your proposed definition as seriously flawed?

Yes? No?

The final solution, for example, is something I consider to have been morally bad, so no, I do not approve of it. So where does that get us?

It burns your definition of "good" to nothing, because even you can't apply it. Got any better definition?

[FlashDangerpants]

In my experience, I would have to disagree.

Consider it this way. Suppose I ask somebody, "Do you know Flash?"

And they say, "Sure: Flash is a middle-aged woman from Idaho. She has three cats and a hobby farm."

And I say, "Well, that's not who Flash is, to me. Flash is an eighty-year-old man from Dallas, with no cats, who lives in an apartment."

What is the most obvious conclusion? That we're using the same name, "Flash," but referring to completely different people. That's just common sense.

So if you've got a Theist and an Atheist. And the Atheist says the word "God," and means "a mythical figure," and a Theist uses the word and means, the "I AM" God of Judaism, you can be quite sure that they have different conceptions in mind, even if they use the identical word. That, too, is the most sensible realization, and common enough.

So let's go with that and see how you make the next step.

Let's not.

If you have any doubt at all about that, let's hear it now, so we have a good, firm foundation of mutual agreement underneath us both. Otherwise, it's clearly not sufficient for us to go on to any "next step."

So I ask again: if you have any contrary opinion about that, let's mutually inspect your grounds for it now.

"God" as a concept is arguably more than just the name of an object. Your explanation doesn't really cover those aspects. I would have thought this is something you would asssent to rather easily as I imagine you are opposed to selling God short. So I am interested in knowing how your theory of meaning can account for concepts that are not proper nouns.

That would include the concept that Jehova is God, and "God is the only God" and stuff like that where the proper noun has additional qualities. But also "good", which isn't a proper noun whatsoever.

If "good" means something about the will and whatnot of God when you say it, like, if that's what the word means to you... it is something entirely distinct from that when Harbal says it, and me too. With this accounting of words as just names of mental objects we seem to be back in the realm of picture theories of language, and that might be problematic.

[Immanuel Can]

So I ask again: if you have any contrary opinion about that, let's mutually inspect your grounds for it now.

"God" as a concept is arguably more than just the name of an object. Your explanation doesn't really cover those aspects.

What do you have in mind? What are these "aspects" you think I'm missing out on?

Note: I'm not attempting to be derisive, here; I'm trying to figure out if you've discovered anything my explanation overlooked.

[Harbal]

No...no...don't walk away from the issue. Do you approve of that list of malefactors and malefactions I listed in my earlier message, or do you recognize your proposed definition as seriously flawed?

Yes? No?

The final solution, for example, is something I consider to have been morally bad, so no, I do not approve of it. So where does that get us?

It burns your definition of "good" to nothing, because even you can't apply it. Got any better definition?

Of course I can't apply the term, "good", to something I think is bad.

[Immanuel Can]

The final solution, for example, is something I consider to have been morally bad, so no, I do not approve of it. So where does that get us?

It burns your definition of "good" to nothing, because even you can't apply it. Got any better definition?

Of course I can't apply the term, "good", to something I think is bad.

Neither term has any objective reality, you say. So it doesn't matter. Nothing is objectively morally good, and nothing is morally bad. There is only what one wants and the instrumental connection between that and what you choose to do. You just said so. That's your definition.

Care to revise?

[FlashDangerpants]

So I ask again: if you have any contrary opinion about that, let's mutually inspect your grounds for it now.

"God" as a concept is arguably more than just the name of an object. Your explanation doesn't really cover those aspects.

What do you have in mind? What are these "aspects" you think I'm missing out on?

Philosophers of language will sometimes mention some guy called George Washington, and the descriptor "Our First President" which for an American would be ann interchangeable pairing but for a Frenchy not so much. One of the fun aspects of language is the feature called compositionality that allows us to make up brand new sentences using these concept thingies, and those concepts serve as more than just names for stuff. Translatability between GW and OFP is therefore important, as referentially they are coexistent, but semantically they are not the same thing and not all speakers will be aware that the two sentences are equivalent.

So in that same fashion, depending upon speaker "the creater of the universe" could be a reference to Jehova, or to Allah, or to 70 million milk maids churning up some non universe stuff to make a universe out of, or to Yahweh, Zeus's dad, A bloke who owns a computer in another universe and is just simulating us, and so on.... Similarly, "God" could be a reference to Allah because God isn't actually a name, it's the title for the supreme being that created everything and so on. If we are only talking about God as a name like "Dave", then you can have this idea of different people intending different things by that name. Try it with the interchangeables though and everything would get very weird on you.

Anyway, that was a fun diversion into the overly complex. But really right now, I am only asking something very simple. Your account of how God is semantically distinct for two speakers who also hold that it is referentially distinct is fine as is. But it depends upon God being a proper noun. So as this all began with you sayig that "good" is to some unclear extent not the same word if two people who are inclined to point at different things with it use it... given that "good" is not a proper noun, that would need its own explanation.

[Immanuel Can]

"God" as a concept is arguably more than just the name of an object. Your explanation doesn't really cover those aspects.

What do you have in mind? What are these "aspects" you think I'm missing out on?

...depending upon speaker "the creater of the universe" could be a reference to Jehova, or to Allah, or to 70 million milk maids...

If that's what you mean, then it's even more clear that Atheists don't mean "God" when they say "God."

They don't mean Allah, they don't mean milk maids, or the Pan spirit, or Zeus, or Odin, or... and they mean something different from the Judeo-Christian "I AM," too. All these conceptions of "god" have different characteristics, wills, origins, intentions, revelations, ethics...and so on. So now, it's even more clear than before, not less, that "God" can be used by different speakers to refer to different entities.

I'm at a loss to see how this observation in any way contradicts what I said. Instead, it seems to reinforce it greatly.

But maybe you can explain more clearly.

[Harbal]

It burns your definition of "good" to nothing, because even you can't apply it. Got any better definition?

Of course I can't apply the term, "good", to something I think is bad.

Neither term has any objective reality, you say. So it doesn't matter. Nothing is objectively morally good, and nothing is morally bad. There is only what one wants and the instrumental connection between that and what you choose to do. You just said so. That's your definition.

Care to revise?

When I say that something is morally good, it means I judge it to be morally good. What do you mean when you say that something is morally good? From what I can gather, you just mean that God approves of it, in which case you are not exercising any moral judgement yourself, you are merely referring to what you believe to be God's. You are like some sort of moral blank slate.

[Immanuel Can]

Of course I can't apply the term, "good", to something I think is bad.

Neither term has any objective reality, you say. So it doesn't matter. Nothing is objectively morally good, and nothing is morally bad. There is only what one wants and the instrumental connection between that and what you choose to do. You just said so. That's your definition.

Care to revise?

When I say that something is morally good, it means I judge it to be morally good.

That's circular. You can't define "good" by using the word "good."

[FlashDangerpants]

What do you have in mind? What are these "aspects" you think I'm missing out on?

...depending upon speaker "the creater of the universe" could be a reference to Jehova, or to Allah, or to 70 million milk maids...

If that's what you mean, then it's even more clear that Atheists don't mean "God" when they say "God."

They don't mean Allah, they don't mean milk maids, or the Pan spirit, or Zeus, or Odin, or... and they mean something different from the Judeo-Christian "I AM," too. All these conceptions of "god" have different characteristics, wills, origins, intentions, revelations, ethics...and so on. So now, it's even more clear than before, not less, that "God" can be used by different speakers to refer to different entities.

I'm at a loss to see how this observation in any way contradicts what I said. Instead, it seems to reinforce it greatly.

But maybe you can explain more clearly.

What is the problem with the full text of what I wrote?