Theism and Moral Realism are separate concepts

[FlashDangerpants]

In other words, nothing's behind it. People just "use" the word, and you don't know why, or what it refers to?

You seem to be weilding an extremely unorthodox theory of how words come to have meanings.

Again, quite orthodox. People form their meanings out of the ancient past...especially their most fundamental concepts. But from where did their ancient forbears get those concepts? From the belief in God. It wasn't from a belief in "gods," as Socrates pointed out to Euthyphro.

From where did the Atheists get theirs? Same place. Except that as Atheists, they are now believing in a thing that cannot, for them, exist. There can be no actual, real or objective "good," they have to realize, because there's no basis of good. It's a totally gratuitious judgment.

So I would say you're weilding an unorthodox theory of the good. It certainly doesn't reflect any way that concept can have emerged from history.

But maybe you have a better explanation...I'll wait.

I was talking about theory of language and meaning. The stuff that covers how words have meanings and how more than one person can mean the same thing by their words. The sort of thing in other words that would be the relevant theory to take into account when somebody is saying that basic words understood by all users of the language (words such as 'good' for instance) somehow don't hold the same content for all users of that language.

So there's an Augustinian account of that, and Locke's version where words are signs which point at little pictures in your mind, Frege with all that composability stuff, Wittgenstein with tool theory of language, Grice with all that implicature he bangs on about.... that sort of stuff. Not whatever you are on about with something about the ancient past.

So if the word "good" is a different word when an atheist uses it than it is when a christian uses it... that's not an orthodox theory of how words come to have meanings, not even close.

[Immanuel Can]

You seem to be weilding an extremely unorthodox theory of how words come to have meanings.

Again, quite orthodox. People form their meanings out of the ancient past...especially their most fundamental concepts. But from where did their ancient forbears get those concepts? From the belief in God. It wasn't from a belief in "gods," as Socrates pointed out to Euthyphro.

From where did the Atheists get theirs? Same place. Except that as Atheists, they are now believing in a thing that cannot, for them, exist. There can be no actual, real or objective "good," they have to realize, because there's no basis of good. It's a totally gratuitious judgment.

So I would say you're weilding an unorthodox theory of the good. It certainly doesn't reflect any way that concept can have emerged from history.

But maybe you have a better explanation...I'll wait.

...basic words understood by all users of the language (words such as 'good' for instance) somehow don't hold the same content for all users of that language.

That can be because some people simply have it wrong. That's what it usually is.

We can't deduce concept from mere common usage, because common usage commonly is loose. We can look at a more precise analysis of what the concept requires, though, and that's what I'm advocating here. I'm asking not "who uses the word 'good,'" but "what is assumed by ANY using of the word 'good' regardless of the specific items the speaker is hoping to assign it to. That transcends common usage, and it delimits the range of coherent usage.

So if the word "good" is a different word when an atheist uses it than it is when a christian uses it...

I don't think it is. I think that when Atheists try to use it, they are trying to say something similar to what the Theist is saying. All human beings have a conscience, and some instictive sense that "good" is real. They may be confused about what objects or actions to assign it to, but they're basically trying to assign a similar value to whatever things they are choosing. One says, "Charity is good," and the other says, "Abortion is good." They disagree on the proper referent of "good," but they don't really disagree on the quality that is being predicated of that referent.

But here's the difference: whereas the Theistic concept can give an account of its own grounding, acceptable to the Atheist or not, the Atheist account cannot explain what natural property "good" refers to at all. He can know some things are "good"; but he can't say why, or HOW he knows it, or that anybody should agree with him. So he's voided the word "good" of any substantive content, because he has assumptively cut himself off from the worldview that can make sense of the concept. He's using a word that his own worldview tells him has to be sheer smoke-and-mirrors, and nothing more beyond that.

[Harbal]

It's not a threat. I have no power to enact any such thing, and don't pretend to. But I also don't have to convince you. You'll think and be convinced now, or you'll be convinced later. My job? I just have to tell you.

Job done.

We are here to argue about morality, not to make predictions about the future.

Don't think the two aren't inextricably involved.

Too late, I've already thought it.

A basket full of apples can contain both good and bad fruit, but the fruit can only be good or bad in relation to a subjective standard by which it is evaluated. In this instance the evaluation would be based on how edible and palatable the apples were. It cannot be good or bad in an objective sense. To a human being, rotten apples would be bad, but to a fruit fly, they would be the good ones.

This is a very frivolous response. When we say that something edible is "good" or "bad" in this way, we don't mean any moral implication at all. As you say, but don't notice the implication of it, it's only based on edibility, not moral worth.

The word, "good", in not exclusive to morality. It is a qualitative term, and can apply to anything.

Moral good and bad is good or bad in the same way.

Category error. Moral judgments and edibility judgments are nothing alike.

The word, "good", simply means to match up to what we want. "Good", on it's own, tells us nothing, but we usually know what it refers to by its context. Apples and morality may not come under the same category, but when we use the word, "good", in relation to either, we are using it in the same way. Apples can taste good, and conduct can be morally good. In both cases they are good in the sense that they conform to what we ideally expect of them.

A morally good act is one that satisfies the moral standards of whoever judges it. That doesn’t make it morally good in an objective sense, just morally good by a particular set of standards, and it could well be morally bad when measured against an alternative set, held by someone else.

Again, you're swallowing a camel and choking on a gnat here. The "gnat" is the realization that "good" is objective. The "camel" is that you're prepared to sacrifice all moral judment to the subjective: so that Stalin, Hitler, Pol Pot and the Devil Himself become "good" for you, because they have a set of subjective, totally arbitrary standards for themselves.

Not much of a moral view. This is why I'm worried about that compass...

Deliberately misinterpreting me is neither making you look good, nor getting us closer to the truth.

[FlashDangerpants]

Again, quite orthodox. People form their meanings out of the ancient past...especially their most fundamental concepts. But from where did their ancient forbears get those concepts? From the belief in God. It wasn't from a belief in "gods," as Socrates pointed out to Euthyphro.

From where did the Atheists get theirs? Same place. Except that as Atheists, they are now believing in a thing that cannot, for them, exist. There can be no actual, real or objective "good," they have to realize, because there's no basis of good. It's a totally gratuitious judgment.

So I would say you're weilding an unorthodox theory of the good. It certainly doesn't reflect any way that concept can have emerged from history.

But maybe you have a better explanation...I'll wait.

...basic words understood by all users of the language (words such as 'good' for instance) somehow don't hold the same content for all users of that language.

That can be because some people simply have it wrong. That's what it usually is.

We can't deduce concept from mere common usage, because common usage commonly is loose. We can look at a more precise analysis of what the concept requires, though, and that's what I'm advocating here. I'm asking not "who uses the word 'good,'" but "what is assumed by ANY using of the word 'good' regardless of the specific items the speaker is hoping to assign it to. That transcends common usage, and it delimits the range of coherent usage.

What on Earth do you mean by "deduce the concept"?

So if the word "good" is a different word when an atheist uses it than it is when a christian uses it...

I don't think it is. I think that when Atheists try to use it, they are trying to say something similar to what the Theist is saying. All human beings have a conscience, and some instictive sense that "good" is real. They may be confused about what objects or actions to assign it to, but they're basically trying to assign a similar value to whatever things they are choosing. One says, "Charity is good," and the other says, "Abortion is good." They disagree on the proper referent of "good," but they don't really disagree on the quality that is being predicated of that referent.

Oh that's nice. Well we all mean and understand the same predicate so we all mean the same thing with the same words. Back to the topic then, what is the quality that is being predicated when God says that something is good? Does God discover via reason that X is good, or does his opinion that X is good undergird the application of the predicate in the instance?

[promethean75]

^^^

[Immanuel Can]

The word, "good", in not exclusive to morality. It is a qualitative term, and can apply to anything.

That is precisely the point. "Morally good" is not at all the same as "functionally good," or "comestibly good," or "aesthetically good," or "musically good," or any number of other kinds of "good." But since we're talking about moral realism (see above) we're not talking about function or eating or art or music or any of the other irrelevant "goods."

The word, "good", simply means to match up to what we want.

If that were true, then Hitler's 'Final Solution' would be a "good." It matched up to what he wanted. Xi and Kim's brutality against citizens of China and Korea would be "good," because they match up to what those two homicidal manics want. Epstein island would be "good," because it matched up with what Epstein wanted. Racism would be "good," because it matches up with what racists want. And rape...

But you don't want to say any of that, I'm certain. But your definition would require you to do so, if you were to apply it consistently. But you won't because you can't...not without approving things which, as a moral person, you would and should loathe.

So your definition doesn't work. It includes many things that any sane person would recognize as evil. If your definition doesn't even allow evil to be recognized at all (and, of course, it doesn't, if it includes them as "good"), then how "good" can it be?

[Immanuel Can]

That can be because some people simply have it wrong. That's what it usually is.

We can't deduce concept from mere common usage, because common usage commonly is loose. We can look at a more precise analysis of what the concept requires, though, and that's what I'm advocating here. I'm asking not "who uses the word 'good,'" but "what is assumed by ANY using of the word 'good' regardless of the specific items the speaker is hoping to assign it to. That transcends common usage, and it delimits the range of coherent usage.

What on Earth do you mean by "deduce the concept"?

I mean you're trying to analyze how a certain group of people use the word, as if they were bound to be using it intelligently and accurately, and to use that to conclude what the word can and should mean. That doesn't work.

Back to the topic then, what is the quality that is being predicated when God says that something is good?

Consonance with his nature, will and character.

[FlashDangerpants]

it may be noncognitive or at least different from the way moral language is actually spoken.

It is different from the way that people who speak about God as unknown to them speak about "good." That much is true. But then, such also use the word "God" differently from how Theists use it, too. For when they use it, they use it to refer to an entity they take to be merely imaginary. Theists do not use it that way, obviously, by definition. So when an unbeliever uses the phrase "God is good," it has no meaning the Theist finds adequate: it only means, "The mythical entity has an imputed property I think I understand from analogy with other created things." But a person who said such a thing would manifestly be no Theist. And he would not be expressing a correct understanding of Christian philosophy, either.

Please clarify whether you are still asserting, in line with the above, that non-Christians and Christians hold concepts of "good" and of "God" with different semantic content?

[Harbal]

The word, "good", in not exclusive to morality. It is a qualitative term, and can apply to anything.

That is precisely the point. "Morally good" is not at all the same as "functionally good," or "comestibly good," or "aesthetically good," or "musically good," or any number of other kinds of "good." But since we're talking about moral realism (see above) we're not talking about function or eating or art or music or any of the other irrelevant "goods."

The word, "good", simply means to match up to what we want.

If that were true, then Hitler's 'Final Solution' would be a "good." It matched up to what he wanted. Xi and Kim's brutality against citizens of China and Korea would be "good," because they match up to what those two homicidal manics want. Epstein island would be "good," because it matched up with what Epstein wanted. Racism would be "good," because it matches up with what racists want. And rape...

But you don't want to say any of that, I'm certain. But your definition would require you to do so, if you were to apply it consistently. But you won't because you can't...not without approving things which, as a moral person, you would and should loathe.

So your definition doesn't work. It includes many things that any sane person would recognize as evil. If your definition doesn't even allow evil to be recognized at all (and, of course, it doesn't, if it includes them as "good"), then how "good" can it be?

I'm just telling you what the word, "good", means. You know what you are like for inventing your own definitions for words when left to your own devices.

[Immanuel Can]

it may be noncognitive or at least different from the way moral language is actually spoken.

It is different from the way that people who speak about God as unknown to them speak about "good." That much is true. But then, such also use the word "God" differently from how Theists use it, too. For when they use it, they use it to refer to an entity they take to be merely imaginary. Theists do not use it that way, obviously, by definition. So when an unbeliever uses the phrase "God is good," it has no meaning the Theist finds adequate: it only means, "The mythical entity has an imputed property I think I understand from analogy with other created things." But a person who said such a thing would manifestly be no Theist. And he would not be expressing a correct understanding of Christian philosophy, either.

Please clarify whether you are still asserting, in line with the above, that non-Christians and Christians hold concepts of "good" and of "God" with different semantic content?

The quality "good" is analogous; the objects and actions toward which the term is being directed, in particular cases, is often radically different, or even opposite. Atheists often call "good" that which Theists call "not good" -- disbelief in God, for example. But they mean to apply roughly the same value-judgment, or withdraw the same value, in each case.

The term "God" in Atheist-speak necessarily means "delusion" or "myth." Therefore, by definition, it is not the same in Theistic speaking. However, the Entity whose existence the Atheist means to deny could be roughly the same as the entity the Theist means to affirm...but only roughly, since the Atheist, by definition, does not include in his conception of God things like existence or goodness. The Theist does.

That's as plainly as it is possible to state the case.

[Immanuel Can]

The word, "good", in not exclusive to morality. It is a qualitative term, and can apply to anything.

That is precisely the point. "Morally good" is not at all the same as "functionally good," or "comestibly good," or "aesthetically good," or "musically good," or any number of other kinds of "good." But since we're talking about moral realism (see above) we're not talking about function or eating or art or music or any of the other irrelevant "goods."

The word, "good", simply means to match up to what we want.

If that were true, then Hitler's 'Final Solution' would be a "good." It matched up to what he wanted. Xi and Kim's brutality against citizens of China and Korea would be "good," because they match up to what those two homicidal manics want. Epstein island would be "good," because it matched up with what Epstein wanted. Racism would be "good," because it matches up with what racists want. And rape...

But you don't want to say any of that, I'm certain. But your definition would require you to do so, if you were to apply it consistently. But you won't because you can't...not without approving things which, as a moral person, you would and should loathe.

So your definition doesn't work. It includes many things that any sane person would recognize as evil. If your definition doesn't even allow evil to be recognized at all (and, of course, it doesn't, if it includes them as "good"), then how "good" can it be?

I'm just telling you what the word, "good", means.

Well, no...not unless you are approving of the listed acts and persons. And most people, it seems do not hold that moral assessment. So you're not saying what the term actually means, either analytically or by popular assumption. And you're not even saying what you, yourself believe, if you don't also approve those listed acts. Rather, you're floating a very poor attempt at definition.

[FlashDangerpants]

It is different from the way that people who speak about God as unknown to them speak about "good." That much is true. But then, such also use the word "God" differently from how Theists use it, too. For when they use it, they use it to refer to an entity they take to be merely imaginary. Theists do not use it that way, obviously, by definition. So when an unbeliever uses the phrase "God is good," it has no meaning the Theist finds adequate: it only means, "The mythical entity has an imputed property I think I understand from analogy with other created things." But a person who said such a thing would manifestly be no Theist. And he would not be expressing a correct understanding of Christian philosophy, either.

Please clarify whether you are still asserting, in line with the above, that non-Christians and Christians hold concepts of "good" and of "God" with different semantic content?

The quality "good" is analogous; the objects and actions toward which the term is being directed, in particular cases, is often radically different, or even opposite. Atheists often call "good" that which Theists call "not good" -- disbelief in God, for example. But they mean to apply roughly the same value-judgment, or withdraw the same value, in each case.

The term "God" in Atheist-speak necessarily means "delusion" or "myth." Therefore, by definition, it is not the same in Theistic speaking. However, the Entity whose existence the Atheist means to deny could be roughly the same as the entity the Theist means to affirm...but only roughly, since the Atheist, by definition, does not include in his conception of God things like existence or goodness. The Theist does.

That's as plainly as it is possible to state the case.

Are you familiar with philosophy of language at all, and do you understand what a Theory of Meaning is?

As things stand you are implying that words such as "good" can somehow hold dissimilar mental content (sense) if people might apply them to different things in the world (reference). This is probably unwise, and I rcommend reconsidering that strategy. The history of the philosophy of langauge is a story of various peope looking for ways to avoid that trap.

The sematic properties of the concept "God" are not different for an atheist than they are for a theist. It is just that the atheist sees sense without referent and the theist posits sense and referent both.

To go down the road of asserting that different beliefs about the referent of the concept imply holding different concepts suggests that you think of words and concepts as nothing but names for mental entities such as images or sensations (Locke/Augustine style). That is a very badly dated theory of meaning, one that nobody modern holds so far as i can tell.

[Harbal]

That is precisely the point. "Morally good" is not at all the same as "functionally good," or "comestibly good," or "aesthetically good," or "musically good," or any number of other kinds of "good." But since we're talking about moral realism (see above) we're not talking about function or eating or art or music or any of the other irrelevant "goods."

If that were true, then Hitler's 'Final Solution' would be a "good." It matched up to what he wanted. Xi and Kim's brutality against citizens of China and Korea would be "good," because they match up to what those two homicidal manics want. Epstein island would be "good," because it matched up with what Epstein wanted. Racism would be "good," because it matches up with what racists want. And rape...

But you don't want to say any of that, I'm certain. But your definition would require you to do so, if you were to apply it consistently. But you won't because you can't...not without approving things which, as a moral person, you would and should loathe.

So your definition doesn't work. It includes many things that any sane person would recognize as evil. If your definition doesn't even allow evil to be recognized at all (and, of course, it doesn't, if it includes them as "good"), then how "good" can it be?

I'm just telling you what the word, "good", means.

Well, no...not unless you are approving of the listed acts and persons. And most people, it seems do not hold that moral assessment. So you're not saying what the term actually means, either analytically or by popular assumption. And you're not even saying what you, yourself believe, if you don't also approve those listed acts. Rather, you're floating a very poor attempt at definition.

So when you talk about God's being good, you are not talking about moral good, but some other kind of good? In the context of morality, the terms "good" and "bad" just mean morally good or bad to me, but they seem to mean something different to you, and I can't work out what it is.

[Immanuel Can]

As things stand you are implying that words such as "good" can somehow hold dissimilar mental content (sense) if people might apply them to different things in the world (reference).

No, I'm just being suitably cautious about what other people "mean." I can only say what they appear to me to mean. I cannot be sure that it is exactly what they mean...even were they to try to tell me.

But I'm pointing to the same distinction you're trying to point to here. Even if they do use the word similarly (and I'm granting that maybe they might), it does not mean they apply the value-judgment to the same objects and situations. And that's obviously true, so I think I don't need to make that argument, do I?

The sematic properties of the concept "God" are not different for an atheist than they are for a theist.

In my experience, I would have to disagree.

Consider it this way. Suppose I ask somebody, "Do you know Flash?"

And they say, "Sure: Flash is a middle-aged woman from Idaho. She has three cats and a hobby farm."

And I say, "Well, that's not who Flash is, to me. Flash is an eighty-year-old man from Dallas, with no cats, who lives in an apartment."

What is the most obvious conclusion? That we're using the same name, "Flash," but referring to completely different people. That's just common sense.

So if you've got a Theist and an Atheist. And the Atheist says the word "God," and means "a mythical figure," and a Theist uses the word and means, the "I AM" God of Judaism, you can be quite sure that they have different conceptions in mind, even if they use the identical word. That, too, is the most sensible realization, and common enough.

[Immanuel Can]

I'm just telling you what the word, "good", means.

Well, no...not unless you are approving of the listed acts and persons. And most people, it seems do not hold that moral assessment. So you're not saying what the term actually means, either analytically or by popular assumption. And you're not even saying what you, yourself believe, if you don't also approve those listed acts. Rather, you're floating a very poor attempt at definition.

So when you talk about God's being good, you are not talking about moral good, but some other kind of good?

No...no...don't walk away from the issue. Do you approve of that list of malefactors and malefactions I listed in my earlier message, or do you recognize your proposed definition as seriously flawed?

Yes? No?