Kant: Phenomena [real] - Noumena [FALSE -Illusory]

[Veritas Aequitas]

PH et. al. claimed there are no absolutely independent moral facts [objective], thus morality cannot be objective.
Kant claimed PH sort of facts are actually real 'Noumena' which are false or illusory.-, i.e.
1. Phenomena [real] - Noumena [real]
but Kant countered the actual situation with this;
2. Phenomena [real]-Noumena [FALSE -Illusory]

PH is thus using an illusion to refute the thesis moral cannot be objective; but using an illusion in an argument lead to invalid illusory false conclusions.

Here is the detailed argument support the OP

If there are no noumena, then of what are phenomena phenomena?

There are no real noumena that exist to be known.
What is phenomena is the reality or fact that is contingent upon a human-based FSERC of which the scientific FSERC is the most credible and objective.

Ah-ha! So here's the point of noumena: without them, there's no reason to say that things can only be things-as-they-appear-to-us - i.e. phenomena. Think about it. If we abolish one pole of a dichotomy, it's no longer a dichotomy. The distinction vanishes - and Kant's argument collapses.

It is based on your illusory philosophical realism that you reason there must be a real noumena that is represented by the real phenomena.

What??
re Principle of Cause and Effect, all causes must lead to a first cause, i.e. God.
if we abolish the theists idea that God as one pole of the God-Creation dichotomy, their argument may collapse, but the creations or phenomena do not vanish.
For Kant the Phenomena-Noumena is just like the Creations-God dichotomy.
Without the 'noumena' as real and 'God as real' in both, the phenomena and Creation still exist as real which can be justified by a human based FSERC.

For Kant, he saw the realist's claim as this;
1. Phenomena [real]-Noumena [real]
to predicate the noumena as real is false.
to Kant it is
2. Phenomena [real]-Noumena [FALSE -Illusory]

Since it is in the middle of his long argument, and the realists are adamant, Kant temporary accept the realists'
1. Phenomena [real]-Noumena [real]
but ultimately he will prove
2. Phenomena [real]-Noumena [FALSE -Illusory]
in his final conclusion, i.e. noumena aka thing-in-itself is illusory.

Note the above VERY important point and Kant's chess strategy and move.

Because of an evolutionary default, the majority will speculate there is something beyond the phenomena. Because it such a natural propensity to speculate the beyond, Kant agreed one can think of it but cannot take it as a real existence.
If the noumena is used, it can only be used in the negative sense but not as something real positively.

This is nonsense. The majority do not 'speculate [that] there is something beyond the phenomena'. We don't need to, because we don't think of reality as phenomenal. Only philosophers lumbered by Platonic and Kantian (repackaged) delusions do that.

You cannot be that ignorant of this.
The majority [>80%] of people are theists who are also philosophical realists.
The secular non-theists who philosophical realists could be <5% and antirealists 10% [Buddhists, etc.].

You are in denial, but your definition of what is fact as a feature of reality, that is the case, just-so is something that is beyond the phenomena.
Can you counter this?

As explained, Kant did not do that.
see my above point;
To Kant merely accept the phenomena-noumena dichotomy
in this sense:
2. Phenomena [real]-Noumena [FALSE -Illusory]
NOT this of the realists';
1. Phenomena [real]-Noumena [real]

If there are no things-in-themselves, then appearances are not appearances of things-in-themselves.

Kant has a unique definition for 'appearance' which is different from the typical definition.
Whatever are appearances, they can be verified and justified by a human-based FSERC [science most credible]. There is no need for things-in-themselves when considering what is real and possible to be experience.

So an appearance is not an appearance. It's the thing-itself. But, oops. There are no things-themselves. (What a silly conceptual mess!)

This is why you are ignorant of the nuances in Kant's argument.

Kant's view is this;
2. Phenomena & appearances [real] - Noumena & things-in-themselves [FALSE -Illusory]

So, there are real phenomena & appearances but there are no real things-in-themselves.
The critical term here is 'real'.
What is real is contingent upon a human-based FSERC.

My point:
Kant accepted phenomena - noumena dichotomy as a convenience in the middle of his long argument.
The nuance to the above is while Kant accepted the phenomena and appearances as real [possible to be experienced and observed] he regarded the noumenal as false and illusory.
While Kant did state, the noumenal is unknowable,
Kant never agreed the noumenal exist-as-real or can be known-as-real at all.


Discuss??
Views??

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:
Kant stated theoretically, the noumenon can only be known via an intellectual intuition.
Humans by nature cannot have an intellectual intuition.
Therefore it is non-starter to even consider the noumenon can be known as real by humans.
As such, the noumenon can only be thought as an idea or a thought but never something existing a real [FSERC].

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes: KIV

[Impenitent]

there are sensory impressions

that's it

-Imp

[Iwannaplato]

Here's a problem with Kant for you, VA, in particular.
Kant believed that to be moral one had to be free to make choices.
Kant believed that freedom was noumenal.
Kant believed with can be moral.
If we can be moral, then this noumenal freedom must be real. That is a serious chunk of realism.

And it also means that his sense of morality requires that something noumenal, freedom, is real.

There is no reality without this noumenal ontological whatever it is being real.

"For the law must indeed be necessary for all rational beings and hence also valid for all rational beings. And because freedom is necessary for rational beings as beings who are capable of action, it follows that freedom must be presupposed in all rational beings as the condition of the possibility of morality."

Kant:"But although we cannot comprehend the practical unconditional necessity of the moral imperative, we yet comprehend its incomprehensibility, which is all that can be fairly demanded of a philosophy which in its principles strives to the very boundary of human reason. Besides, how duty should bring with it an interest which should be a determining ground of the will, and how this is possible, cannot be made comprehensible by any human reason, but is an ultimate fact of the practical reason, which, as such, we can very well indicate and authenticate, though we can never comprehend it. We can only comprehend so much of it as is necessary to reveal the practical rule of the relation of reason to the will which it determines, viz., the principle of the autonomy of the will, which, instead of the heteronomy of natural causes, makes the will a law to itself. Therefore, it is of the greatest importance in practical questions to beware of that equivocation which inserts into the word 'necessity' the notion of natural necessity, and takes freedom in the practical sense to be the same as the freedom of the will in the sense of indifference, which freedom of the will we must contemplate only in a transcendent manner, and can never present to ourselves or explain through any analogy."

The above passages show Kant's position that freedom is a necessary presupposition for morality and situates this freedom within the noumenal realm, transcending empirical and deterministic constraints.

Transcendence of Freedom:

"We must contemplate [freedom of the will] only in a transcendent manner": Here, Kant asserts that the concept of freedom of the will is something that transcends empirical understanding. It is not something that can be fully grasped or explained within the bounds of empirical, scientific knowledge.
"We can never present to ourselves or explain through any analogy": This emphasizes that freedom is beyond empirical comprehension and cannot be understood through analogies to the physical world.
Non-Physical Nature:

"The autonomy of the will, which, instead of the heteronomy of natural causes, makes the will a law to itself": Kant contrasts autonomy with heteronomy (being subject to external laws or forces). This autonomy is a form of self-legislation that is not governed by natural (physical) laws, indicating a non-physical aspect of freedom.
"It is of the greatest importance in practical questions to beware of that equivocation which inserts into the word 'necessity' the notion of natural necessity": Here, Kant warns against confusing moral necessity (the necessity of following moral law) with natural necessity (deterministic causation in the physical world). This distinction underscores that moral freedom operates outside the realm of natural, physical laws.
Summary:
In these passages, Kant is saying that:

Freedom is transcendent: It exists beyond the empirical, phenomenal realm that we can observe and understand through science and sensory experience.
Freedom is not subject to physical laws: It operates in the noumenal realm, where the will is autonomous and not determined by natural, causal laws.

So, if the noumean are false/illusory, then according to Kant this eliminates freedom, which is non-empirical, and precludes the possibility then of moral behavior.

[Veritas Aequitas]

"We must contemplate [freedom of the will] only in a transcendent manner": Here, Kant asserts that the concept of freedom of the will is something that transcends empirical understanding. It is not something that can be fully grasped or explained within the bounds of empirical, scientific knowledge.
"We can never present to ourselves or explain through any analogy": This emphasizes that freedom is beyond empirical comprehension and cannot be understood through analogies to the physical world.

To Kant what is real is confined to the empirical and what is possible empirically, i.e. "something that can be fully grasped or explained within the bounds of empirical, scientific knowledge."

As such the noumenal [transcends empirical and experience] cannot be "real" in the Kantian sense.

In dealing with morality, Kant assumed the noumenal or thing-in-itself in the positive sense as if it exists but in no way it is be treated as if it is existing as real in "the empirical and what is possible empirically" sense.

In Kantian morality, whatever the resultant from the basis of the noumenal [e.g. freedom and the categorical imperatives] they are merely theoretical things which are to be taken as guides only.
I have stated many times, the noumena aka thing-in-itself are at best useful illusions
-as moral ideals [freedom] to drive real moral progress,
-as an illusory soul that can go to heaven and avoid hell, or
-as an illusory God as a real security-blanket.

So,
"Kant: Phenomena [real] - Noumena [FALSE -Illusory]" remains.

[Iwannaplato]

"We must contemplate [freedom of the will] only in a transcendent manner": Here, Kant asserts that the concept of freedom of the will is something that transcends empirical understanding. It is not something that can be fully grasped or explained within the bounds of empirical, scientific knowledge.
"We can never present to ourselves or explain through any analogy": This emphasizes that freedom is beyond empirical comprehension and cannot be understood through analogies to the physical world.

To Kant what is real is confined to the empirical and what is possible empirically, i.e. "something that can be fully grasped or explained within the bounds of empirical, scientific knowledge."

As such the noumenal [transcends empirical and experience] cannot be "real" in the Kantian sense.

In dealing with morality, Kant assumed the noumenal or thing-in-itself in the positive sense as if it exists but in no way it is be treated as if it is existing as real in "the empirical and what is possible empirically" sense.

In Kantian morality, whatever the resultant from the basis of the noumenal [e.g. freedom and the categorical imperatives] they are merely theoretical things which are to be taken as guides only.
I have stated many times, the noumena aka thing-in-itself are at best useful illusions
-as moral ideals [freedom] to drive real moral progress,
-as an illusory soul that can go to heaven and avoid hell, or
-as an illusory God as a real security-blanket.

So,
"Kant: Phenomena [real] - Noumena [FALSE -Illusory]" remains.

Notice how VA avoids dealing with the problem. Let say that VA is correct in what he does say above and in the OP.
This means that freedom is false and illusory.
This entails that morality is impossible according to Kant because Kant considers freedom necessary for morality.
Morality is, according to Kant, impossible, without freedom.

Not 'freedom is impossible without the illusion of freedom' but impossible without freedom.
Humans had to be able to be free to develop their morality free from external factors. That is the kind of freedom Kant asserted had to be present for morality. He also asserted that such freedom is non-empirical.

Immanuel Kant believed that freedom was necessary for morality, not merely the illusion of freedom. His moral philosophy hinges on the concept of autonomy, which is the capacity of rational agents to legislate moral laws for themselves, independent of external influences. Here are key points regarding Kant's views on freedom and morality:

1. **Autonomy and Moral Law**:
- Kant's notion of autonomy is crucial for his moral philosophy. He argues that for an action to be morally worthy, it must be done out of respect for the moral law, which rational beings give to themselves. This self-legislation is only possible if agents are free.

2. **Practical Reason**:
- Kant posits that practical reason requires the idea of freedom. In his "Critique of Practical Reason," he states that the moral law presupposes freedom because if we were not free, we could not be held morally accountable for our actions.

3. **Freedom as a Postulate**:
- In his works, particularly the "Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals" and the "Critique of Practical Reason," Kant introduces the idea of freedom as a necessary postulate of practical reason. This means that although we cannot theoretically prove freedom (in the way we prove empirical facts), we must assume it for moral reasoning and responsibility to make sense.

4. **Moral Responsibility**:
- Kant asserts that the concept of moral responsibility is meaningful only if individuals are free. Without freedom, the notion of duty and moral obligation would collapse because individuals could not be held accountable for their actions if they were not capable of choosing otherwise.

To summarize, Kant did not think that merely the illusion of freedom was necessary for morality; rather, he believed that true freedom is an indispensable condition for moral responsibility and ethical behavior.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I did not use the term 'false' without qualification; I do not prefer to use this term 'false' because without proper qualification and context it can be misleading.

To Kant:
The idea of freedom is illusory in contrast to what is real empirically.
Kant never used the term real [empirically] with reference to the idea of freedom.
Where Kant used the term 'true freedom' it is qualified to pure reason.

Thus, to Kant;
true freedom [illusory idea] is necessary [imperative] for pure morality [theoretical].

Kant differentiated between pure morality [ideal] and applied morality [ethics].
Kant's deliberately focus 90% on pure morality [ideal] and hardly on applied morality [ethics].
Kant believed if we get pure morality right, the applied will follow accordingly and effectively.

[Iwannaplato]

The idea of freedom is illusory in contrast to what is real empirically.
Kant never used the term real [empirically] with reference to the idea of freedom.
Where Kant used the term 'true freedom' it is qualified to pure reason.

All this agrees with what I wrote.

Thus, to Kant;
true freedom [illusory idea] is necessary [imperative] for pure morality [theoretical].

It is necessary for practical morality. See above.

[Veritas Aequitas]

The idea of freedom is illusory in contrast to what is real empirically.
Kant never used the term real [empirically] with reference to the idea of freedom.
Where Kant used the term 'true freedom' it is qualified to pure reason.

All this agrees with what I wrote.

Thus, to Kant;
true freedom [illusory idea] is necessary [imperative] for pure morality [theoretical].

It is necessary for practical morality. See above.

On practical morality [ethics] the moral agent do not have true or absolute freedom since he is constraints by psychological, subjective, social, environmental and other conditions.

In pure morality is it a categorical imperative, but
in practical morality [ethics] that is only the hypothetical imperative.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_imperative
Hypothetical imperatives tell us how to act in order to achieve a specific goal and the commandment of reason applies only conditionally, e.g. "I must study to get a degree." To put it simply, a hypothetical imperative is the blueprint for the use of reason in the interest of achieving a goal.

[Iwannaplato]

On practical morality [ethics] the moral agent do not have true or absolute freedom since he is constraints by psychological, subjective, social, environmental and other conditions.

This contradicts Kant. See my earlier posts, given that VA won't deal with them.

In pure morality is it a categorical imperative, but
in practical morality [ethics] that is only the hypothetical imperative.

NOtice that VA continues, in general, to be unwilling or unable to integrate actual points made by other posts and relies on reasserting his position.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_imperative
Hypothetical imperatives tell us how to act in order to achieve a specific goal and the commandment of reason applies only conditionally, e.g. "I must study to get a degree." To put it simply, a hypothetical imperative is the blueprint for the use of reason in the interest of achieving a goal.

Not relevant.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I don't give too much attention to claims without any reference to Kant's work.

What I have posted is based on my understanding of reading Kant.
Of course I support my claims to Kant's CPR and his other critiques if I must.

What is pathetic is to be so arrogant based on ignorance and worst when one has not read and understood [not necessary agree with] Kant's work.

[Iwannaplato]

I don't give too much attention to claims without any reference to Kant's work.

Which I included in previous post in this thread.
And this is....

What is pathetic

about VA's general approach to responses.

[Will Bouwman]

My point:
Kant accepted phenomena - noumena dichotomy as a convenience in the middle of his long argument.
The nuance to the above is while Kant accepted the phenomena and appearances as real [possible to be experienced and observed] he regarded the noumenal as false and illusory.
While Kant did state, the noumenal is unknowable,
Kant never agreed the noumenal exist-as-real or can be known-as-real at all.


Discuss??
Views??

Well, ya gotta remember that Kant's project was in large part reconciliation of his Cartesianism with the empiricism of Hume that 'shook him from his dogmatic slumber'. As Descartes pointed out, the only thing we can be sure of is that there are phenomena, "I think, therefore I am" being the most famous phrase in all of western philosophy by a distance. There is a very good reason that less well known is his follow up that 'Ah, but I perceive a God who is so lovely and kind that it wouldn't deceive me if I have a clear and distinct idea of something'. The very good reason being that it is bollocks. Anyway, along comes Hume who pooh-poohs the idea of a god and insists that all we can know is phenomena. "Crikey," says Kant, "he's right. Still, something must be causing phenomena. I'll call them noumena."
Modern science is at best ambivalent about the noumenal. Take my favourite example, gravity. The phenomenon is that mass attracts mass, at least at less than intergalactic scales, and we can do all sorts of measurements and calculations of that phenomenon. We understand the phenomenon very well, but we don't know what the noumenon, the cause, is. There are theories, Einstein's warped spacetime being the most famous, but to some scientists, since such theories make no difference to the phenomenon, philosophy is useless or dead; Steven Weinberg and Stephen Hawking respectively.
As with any other phenomenon, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason has been interpreted in different ways, but nowhere, that I am aware of, does Kant say he "regarded the noumenal as false and illusory". If you could cite a passage where he does so, you will improve my understanding of Kant immeasurably.

[Veritas Aequitas]

My point:
Kant accepted phenomena - noumena dichotomy as a convenience in the middle of his long argument.
The nuance to the above is while Kant accepted the phenomena and appearances as real [possible to be experienced and observed] he regarded the noumenal as false and illusory.
While Kant did state, the noumenal is unknowable,
Kant never agreed the noumenal exist-as-real or can be known-as-real at all.


Discuss??
Views??

Well, ya gotta remember that Kant's project was in large part reconciliation of his Cartesianism with the empiricism of Hume that 'shook him from his dogmatic slumber'. As Descartes pointed out, the only thing we can be sure of is that there are phenomena, "I think, therefore I am" being the most famous phrase in all of western philosophy by a distance. There is a very good reason that less well known is his follow up that 'Ah, but I perceive a God who is so lovely and kind that it wouldn't deceive me if I have a clear and distinct idea of something'. The very good reason being that it is bollocks. Anyway, along comes Hume who pooh-poohs the idea of a god and insists that all we can know is phenomena. "Crikey," says Kant, "he's right. Still, something must be causing phenomena. I'll call them noumena."

Kant was merely going along with the common thesis-antithesis dichotomy. i.e. for every p there is a non-p or for every appearance [phenomena] there must be something that appear [noumena].
However, note for every creation there must be a creator which is debunked when taken to the ultimate, there is merely an illusory God.
So it is the same with phenomena, when taken to the ultimate the noumena is illusory.

Modern science is at best ambivalent about the noumenal. Take my favourite example, gravity. The phenomenon is that mass attracts mass, at least at less than intergalactic scales, and we can do all sorts of measurements and calculations of that phenomenon. We understand the phenomenon very well, but we don't know what the noumenon, the cause, is. There are theories, Einstein's warped spacetime being the most famous, but to some scientists, since such theories make no difference to the phenomenon, philosophy is useless or dead; Steven Weinberg and Stephen Hawking respectively.
As with any other phenomenon, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason has been interpreted in different ways, but nowhere, that I am aware of, does Kant say he "regarded the noumenal as false and illusory". If you could cite a passage where he does so, you will improve my understanding of Kant immeasurably.

Modern science don't give a damm with regard the noumenal.
What modern science is more concern is the predictive power of its conclusion based on empirical evidence processed within a human-based scientific framework and system.

Kant did not label the noumena as false [my emphasis] but rather it is illusory when taken to the limit as something existing the positive real sense.

Here some indication that the noumena is illusory

1. If by 'Noumenon' we mean a Thing so far as it is not an Object of our Sensible Intuition, and so abstract from our Mode of intuiting it, [then] this is a Noumenon in the negative Sense of the term. B307

2. But if we understand by it an Object of a non-Sensible Intuition, we thereby presuppose a special Mode of Intuition, namely, the intellectual, which is not that which we possess, and of which we cannot comprehend even the Possibility. This would be 'Noumenon' in the positive Sense of the term.

If 1. we take the noumena in the empirical sense, then it can only be taken in the negative sense as a marker or an imaginary limit [e.g. not-p] and not as something real.

If 2. we take the noumena in the non-empirical sense, [e.g. freedom, soul, god] we can take it in the positive sense, but only as a positive illusion.

I have posted the whole section of the CPR on noumena here:
viewtopic.php?t=40170

A235 B294
WE have now not merely explored the territory of Pure Understanding, and carefully surveyed every part of it, but have also measured its extent, and assigned to everything in it its rightful place.
This domain {Pure Understanding} is an island, enclosed by Nature itself within unalterable Limits.
A236 B295
It [Pure Understanding] is the land of Truth -- enchanting name! - surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of Illusion, where many a fog bank and many a swiftly melting iceberg give the deceptive appearance of farther shores, deluding the adventurous seafarer ever anew with empty hopes, and engaging him in enterprises which he can never abandon and yet is unable to carry to completion.

In this introduction to the section on the noumenon, Kant is giving a clue how the noumenon is an illusion which we must be very careful with.
From here to the end of the CPR, Kant explained how the noumenon [illusory] is transposed into the thing-in-itself which subsequently is taken as the illusory, freedom, soul, the world and the ultimate illusory God.
The illusory freedom is necessary for his pure morality [not applied].

".. give the deceptive appearance of farther shores"
this is where the philosophical realists are deluded in jumping to conclusion there must be something beyond the empirical, and the theist a "real" God.
As I [not Kant] had argued, this delusion is an evolutionary default necessary in soothing an existential crisis.

Kant anticipated this evolutionary default and inevitable delusion;

Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them {the illusions}.
After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. CPR B397