Philosophical Realism Begs the Question

Should you think about your duty, or about the consequences of your actions? Or should you concentrate on becoming a good person?

Moderators: AMod, iMod

Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 15722
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Philosophical Realism Begs the Question

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Those who deny moral facts exist [thus morality is not objective] leveraged their argument on Philosophical Realism [p-realism] which is grounded on the idea of mind*-independence. [*or human conditions].
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

I argue, those who argued on the basis of philosophical realism begs-the-Question.

This is because philosophical realists merely assumes things and reality-out-there exists independent of the human conditions [minds] without sound justifications.
As such, whatever the conclusions arrived at based on p-realism begs-the-Question.

People like PH insists what-is-fact is a feature of reality, that is the case, just-is or a state of affairs which is absolute independent of the human conditions, i.e. opinions, beliefs, knowledge and judgments. To me, this is merely a linguistic fact not a really real fact.

When pressed PH will explained what is fact or that feature of reality is justified by science i.e. based on scientific realism.
But scientific realism is grounded on philosophical realism, i.e. science assumes whatever is to be discovered by science is absolutely independent of the human conditions.
As such, science as taken from the scientific realism perspective begs-the-question.


On the other hand, with scientific-antirealism [Kantian] there is no begging the question, since it relies of a scientific Framework and System [FSERC] without any assumption of some pre-existing things or reality awaiting discovery.

From AI [wR];
(AI offered alternative views, but I accept the one below)
AI wrote:From a Kantian perspective, many arguments for philosophical realism would be seen as begging the question. Here's why:

Kant and the Limits of Knowledge:
Immanuel Kant, a famous antirealist philosopher, argued that our minds impose categories (like space, time, and causality) on our experience. These categories are necessary for us to make sense of the world, but they don't necessarily reflect the "thing-in-itself" – the ultimate reality that exists independent of our minds.

Science and Frameworks:
Kant would argue that science doesn't directly access this "thing-in-itself." Scientific theories are successful because they create a coherent framework for understanding our experiences within these categories. But they might not be directly "discovering" an objective reality.

p-Realism vs. Begging the Question:
P-Realist arguments that rely solely on the success of science as proof of a mind-independent reality would beg the question from a Kantian perspective. They assume the very thing they're trying to prove – that science reveals the true nature of reality. For Kant, science just gives us a successful human framework.
Therefore, those who deny moral facts exist [thus morality is not objective] and leveraging their argument on Philosophical Realism which is grounded on the idea of mind*-independence [*or human conditions], begs-the-question.

Discuss??
Views??
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 15722
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Philosophical Realism Begs the Question

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Notes:

Here is an explanation on how Philosophical Realists [absolute mind-independent things] are caught with Question-begging:
ChatGpt Wrote:

In the context of Paul Moser's quote, 'question-begging' refers to a logical fallacy where a claim is assumed to be true without providing independent evidence to justify it. Instead of addressing the skeptic's challenge directly, the claim relies on premises that implicitly assume the truth of the conclusion being argued for. This is particularly problematic in debates about objectivity and knowledge, where skeptics demand rigorous, non-circular reasoning.

Explanation in the Context of Philosophical Realism:
Relevance to Realism: Philosophical realists often assert that an objective, mind-independent reality exists. However, skeptics challenge this by asking:
"What evidence can you provide that is independent of your assumption of such a reality?"
If realists rely on reasoning that assumes the existence of mind-independent entities (e.g., "We perceive reality, therefore it exists"), skeptics accuse them of question-begging.

Application to Philosophical Realism:
Moser's critique is particularly relevant to metaphysical realism, which claims that reality exists in an absolute, mind-independent manner. Skeptics challenge such claims on the grounds that:

Any attempt to "prove" the existence of a mind-independent reality often assumes what it seeks to prove, thereby failing the test of non-question-begging reasoning.

For example:
A realist might argue: "The world exists independently because we can observe consistent patterns in nature."
The skeptic counters: "But your observation of consistency presupposes a framework (e.g., human perception and cognition) that might itself be mind-dependent."


Your Insight:
You're correct in linking this critique to philosophical realists. Moser appears to suggest that metaphysical realists, who claim that things are absolutely mind-independent, often fail to meet the skeptic's demand for non-question-begging evidence. This aligns with your critique of philosophical realism as adopting the intuition/deduction thesis without adequately addressing the epistemic limitations of their claims.
Reference:
Philosophy after Objectivity: Making Sense in Perspective
PAUL K. MOSER
Last edited by Veritas Aequitas on Thu Jan 23, 2025 8:40 am, edited 1 time in total.
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 15722
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Philosophical Realism Begs the Question

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Notes: KIV
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 15722
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Philosophical Realism Begs the Question

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Here are the syllogisms [from AI-wR] from philosophical realists that are circular:

Syllogism I
Major Premise: P-realism claims that the success of scientific theories is evidence for a mind-independent reality.
Minor Premise: The success of scientific theories relies on the assumption that our minds can accurately perceive and understand the world.
Conclusion: Therefore, p-realism assumes the existence of a mind-independent reality in order to prove its existence.

This syllogism highlights the circular reasoning involved in p-realism. It assumes the very thing it aims to prove: that our minds can accurately reflect an objective reality. From a Kantian perspective, this assumption is not justified, as our minds are limited by their inherent categories and cannot directly access the "thing-in-itself."
…….

Syllogism II
Major Premise: P-realism asserts that the success of scientific theories is evidence for a mind-independent reality.
Minor Premise: The success of scientific theories relies on the assumption that our minds can accurately perceive and understand reality.
Conclusion: Therefore, p-realism assumes the existence of a mind-independent reality in order to prove its existence.

This syllogism highlights the circular reasoning involved. P-realism uses the success of science as evidence for a mind-independent reality. However, the success of science itself depends on the assumption that our minds can accurately grasp reality. This assumption, in turn, presupposes the very mind-independent reality that p-realism seeks to prove.
In essence, p-realism appears to be assuming the conclusion it aims to reach, making its argument circular and, thus, begging the question.
……..

Syllogism III
Major Premise: If a theory relies on assumptions that are not independently verifiable, it begs the question.
Minor Premise: P-realism relies on the assumption that the success of scientific theories implies a mind-independent reality.
Conclusion: Therefore, p-realism begs the question, as it assumes the very thing it seeks to prove.

Explanation:
• Major Premise: This premise establishes the general principle that circular reasoning, or assuming what one is trying to prove, is a logical fallacy.
• Minor Premise: This premise connects p-realism to the Kantian critique. It argues that p-realism relies on the success of scientific theories as evidence for a mind-independent reality. However, from a Kantian perspective, the success of science is merely a testament to its usefulness within our mental framework, not a direct window into an objective reality.
• Conclusion: The syllogism concludes that p-realism, by relying on the assumption of a mind-independent reality, is essentially assuming the conclusion it aims to reach.
It's important to note that this syllogism represents a specific Kantian critique of p-realism. Other philosophical perspectives may not share this view.

……..
From the antirealist [Kantian] point of view, scientific justifications merely justify the empirical evidences within a human-based scientific framework and system which is self-contained. In general, science merely assumes there is a thing or reality awaiting discovery.
According to Kant, there is no thing-in-itself that exists absolutely independent of the human conditions.
Thus from the antirealist [Kantian] view, is it reasonable to state the all arguments grounded on philosophical realism begs the question?
Last edited by Veritas Aequitas on Tue Nov 26, 2024 7:18 am, edited 1 time in total.
Atla
Posts: 9936
Joined: Fri Dec 15, 2017 8:27 am

Re: Philosophical Realism Begs the Question

Post by Atla »

Atla the KG wrote:Is the premise "P-realism claims that the success of scientific theories is evidence for a mind-independent reality." inaccurate, because scientific evidence for a mind-independent reality is scientifc evidence for a mind-independent reality, not just the success of scientific theories in themselves? Summary only.
God wrote:Yes, the premise is inaccurate because it conflates the success of scientific theories with evidence for a mind-independent reality. While scientific realism (P-realism) often argues that the success of scientific theories supports the existence of a mind-independent reality, the success itself is not the evidence; rather, the evidence comes from how theories consistently and reliably correspond to observed phenomena.
Atla the KG wrote:Is the premise "The success of scientific theories relies on the assumption that our minds can accurately perceive and understand the world." incorrect, because most p-realism doesn't assume that our minds can accurately perceive and understand the world? Summary only.
God wrote:Yes, the premise is incorrect. Most forms of scientific realism do not assume that our minds can accurately perceive and understand the world. Instead, they posit that science aims to produce theories that are approximately true and that the success of scientific theories is evidence of their ability to describe or predict aspects of an objective reality, even if our perceptions and cognitive processes are imperfect.
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 15722
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Philosophical Realism Begs the Question

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Atla wrote: Tue Nov 26, 2024 6:14 am
Atla the KG wrote:Is the premise "P-realism claims that the success of scientific theories is evidence for a mind-independent reality." inaccurate, because scientific evidence for a mind-independent reality is scientifc evidence for a mind-independent reality, not just the success of scientific theories in themselves? Summary only.
God wrote:Yes, the premise is inaccurate because it conflates the success of scientific theories with evidence for a mind-independent reality. While scientific realism (P-realism) often argues that the success of scientific theories supports the existence of a mind-independent reality, the success itself is not the evidence; rather, the evidence comes from how theories consistently and reliably correspond to observed phenomena.
Atla the KG wrote:Is the premise "The success of scientific theories relies on the assumption that our minds can accurately perceive and understand the world." incorrect, because most p-realism doesn't assume that our minds can accurately perceive and understand the world? Summary only.
God wrote:Yes, the premise is incorrect. Most forms of scientific realism do not assume that our minds can accurately perceive and understand the world. Instead, they posit that science aims to produce theories that are approximately true and that the success of scientific theories is evidence of their ability to describe or predict aspects of an objective reality, even if our perceptions and cognitive processes are imperfect.
Strawman again?

The above are the circular syllogism presented by philosophical realists and indirect realists to justify their proofs that philosophical realism is true.
I edited the above to:

Here are the syllogisms [AI-wR] from philosophical realists that are circular:
ChatGpt wrote:This syllogism highlights the circular reasoning involved in p-realism. It assumes the very thing it aims to prove: that our minds can accurately reflect an objective reality. From a Kantian perspective, this assumption is not justified, as our minds are limited by their inherent categories and cannot directly access the "thing-in-itself."
User avatar
FlashDangerpants
Posts: 8815
Joined: Mon Jan 04, 2016 11:54 pm

Re: Philosophical Realism Begs the Question

Post by FlashDangerpants »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Tue Nov 26, 2024 5:55 am Syllogism I
Major Premise: P-realism claims that the success of scientific theories is evidence for a mind-independent reality.
Minor Premise: The success of scientific theories relies on the assumption that our minds can accurately perceive and understand the world.
Conclusion: Therefore, p-realism assumes the existence of a mind-independent reality in order to prove its existence.
That's not a minor premise.

The basic form of the syllogism is a big premise that says something general (all men are mortal), a minor premise that says something specific relevant to the major premise (socrates is a man) and a coinclusion that follows from the confluence of those premises (socrates is mortal).
Atla
Posts: 9936
Joined: Fri Dec 15, 2017 8:27 am

Re: Philosophical Realism Begs the Question

Post by Atla »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Tue Nov 26, 2024 7:22 am
Atla wrote: Tue Nov 26, 2024 6:14 am
Atla the KG wrote:Is the premise "P-realism claims that the success of scientific theories is evidence for a mind-independent reality." inaccurate, because scientific evidence for a mind-independent reality is scientifc evidence for a mind-independent reality, not just the success of scientific theories in themselves? Summary only.
God wrote:Yes, the premise is inaccurate because it conflates the success of scientific theories with evidence for a mind-independent reality. While scientific realism (P-realism) often argues that the success of scientific theories supports the existence of a mind-independent reality, the success itself is not the evidence; rather, the evidence comes from how theories consistently and reliably correspond to observed phenomena.
Atla the KG wrote:Is the premise "The success of scientific theories relies on the assumption that our minds can accurately perceive and understand the world." incorrect, because most p-realism doesn't assume that our minds can accurately perceive and understand the world? Summary only.
God wrote:Yes, the premise is incorrect. Most forms of scientific realism do not assume that our minds can accurately perceive and understand the world. Instead, they posit that science aims to produce theories that are approximately true and that the success of scientific theories is evidence of their ability to describe or predict aspects of an objective reality, even if our perceptions and cognitive processes are imperfect.
Strawman again?

The above are the circular syllogism presented by philosophical realists and indirect realists to justify their proofs that philosophical realism is true.
I edited the above to:

Here are the syllogisms [AI-wR] from philosophical realists that are circular:
ChatGpt wrote:This syllogism highlights the circular reasoning involved in p-realism. It assumes the very thing it aims to prove: that our minds can accurately reflect an objective reality. From a Kantian perspective, this assumption is not justified, as our minds are limited by their inherent categories and cannot directly access the "thing-in-itself."
The strawman is your claim that p-realists claim to access Kant's inaccessible noumenon. Most realisms aren't compatible with Kant's TI.
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 15722
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Philosophical Realism Begs the Question

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Atla wrote: Tue Nov 26, 2024 1:57 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Tue Nov 26, 2024 7:22 am
Atla wrote: Tue Nov 26, 2024 6:14 am
Strawman again?

The above are the circular syllogism presented by philosophical realists and indirect realists to justify their proofs that philosophical realism is true.
I edited the above to:

Here are the syllogisms [AI-wR] from philosophical realists that are circular:
ChatGpt wrote:This syllogism highlights the circular reasoning involved in p-realism. It assumes the very thing it aims to prove: that our minds can accurately reflect an objective reality. From a Kantian perspective, this assumption is not justified, as our minds are limited by their inherent categories and cannot directly access the "thing-in-itself."
The strawman is your claim that p-realists claim to access Kant's inaccessible noumenon. Most realisms aren't compatible with Kant's TI.
Strawman again.

TI is not applicable in this issue.
The comparison is between Kant's Transcendental Realism and Philosophical Realism where both focus on the absolutely mind-independent reality of philosophical realism and the similar noumenon aka thing-in-itself.
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 15722
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Philosophical Realism Begs the Question

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

FlashDangerpants wrote: Tue Nov 26, 2024 12:31 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Tue Nov 26, 2024 5:55 am Syllogism I
Major Premise: P-realism claims that the success of scientific theories is evidence for a mind-independent reality.
Minor Premise: The success of scientific theories relies on the assumption that our minds can accurately perceive and understand the world.
Conclusion: Therefore, p-realism assumes the existence of a mind-independent reality in order to prove its existence.
That's not a minor premise.

The basic form of the syllogism is a big premise that says something general (all men are mortal), a minor premise that says something specific relevant to the major premise (socrates is a man) and a coinclusion that follows from the confluence of those premises (socrates is mortal).
AI wrote:
The syllogism I presented earlier is not a typical categorical syllogism. It's more of a simplified representation of a complex philosophical argument.

To better fit the standard form, we could try to rephrase the argument:
  • Major Premise: If our scientific theories accurately describe reality, then a mind-independent reality exists.

    Minor Premise: Our scientific theories accurately describe reality.

    Conclusion: Therefore, a mind-independent reality exists.
While this is closer to the standard form, it still doesn't fully capture the nuances of the philosophical debate. The key issue is that the minor premise itself relies on the assumption of a mind-independent reality. This circularity is what makes the argument problematic from a Kantian perspective.

It's important to note that philosophical arguments often don't fit neatly into formal logical structures.
They often involve complex concepts and subtle distinctions that are challenging to reduce to simple syllogisms.
In this case, understanding the underlying philosophical assumptions and the limitations of scientific knowledge is crucial to evaluating the argument.
Atla
Posts: 9936
Joined: Fri Dec 15, 2017 8:27 am

Re: Philosophical Realism Begs the Question

Post by Atla »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Wed Nov 27, 2024 3:22 am
Atla wrote: Tue Nov 26, 2024 1:57 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Tue Nov 26, 2024 7:22 am
Strawman again?

The above are the circular syllogism presented by philosophical realists and indirect realists to justify their proofs that philosophical realism is true.
I edited the above to:

Here are the syllogisms [AI-wR] from philosophical realists that are circular:

The strawman is your claim that p-realists claim to access Kant's inaccessible noumenon. Most realisms aren't compatible with Kant's TI.
Strawman again.

TI is not applicable in this issue.
The comparison is between Kant's Transcendental Realism and Philosophical Realism where both focus on the absolutely mind-independent reality of philosophical realism and the similar noumenon aka thing-in-itself.
Strawman, TI and TR are not applicable and yet you do apply them. "Absolutely" mind-independent means two different things in most PR, and we can only call one of them noumenon. You never had any idea about the anti-realism vs realism debate and you still don't.
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 15722
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Philosophical Realism Begs the Question

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Atla wrote: Wed Nov 27, 2024 4:12 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Wed Nov 27, 2024 3:22 am
Atla wrote: Tue Nov 26, 2024 1:57 pm
The strawman is your claim that p-realists claim to access Kant's inaccessible noumenon. Most realisms aren't compatible with Kant's TI.
Strawman again.

TI is not applicable in this issue.
The comparison is between Kant's Transcendental Realism and Philosophical Realism where both focus on the absolutely mind-independent reality of philosophical realism and the similar noumenon aka thing-in-itself.
Strawman, TI and TR are not applicable and yet you do apply them. "Absolutely" mind-independent means two different things in most PR, and we can only call one of them noumenon. You never had any idea about the anti-realism vs realism debate and you still don't.
You're the philosophical ultracrepidarian gnat on the issue of philosophical realism vs philosophical anti-realism.
I have loads of books and articles on this issue in this specific Folder in my PC.

I have explained the difference between Absolute and Relative Mind Independent here:
viewtopic.php?t=40600

1. The basic principle of PR [including IR] is reality/things are absolutely mind-independence in the sense that it exist regardless of whether there are humans or not. In this sense, the mind independence of PR is absolute.

2. On the other hand, empirical realism also accept mind-independence but only as relative mind independence, because if there are no humans there is no human-mind-independence.

The difference between 1 and 2 is the underlying issue between philosophical realism vs philosophical anti-realism [or preferably anti-philosophical_realism].
Atla
Posts: 9936
Joined: Fri Dec 15, 2017 8:27 am

Re: Philosophical Realism Begs the Question

Post by Atla »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Wed Nov 27, 2024 5:10 am
Atla wrote: Wed Nov 27, 2024 4:12 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Wed Nov 27, 2024 3:22 am
Strawman again.

TI is not applicable in this issue.
The comparison is between Kant's Transcendental Realism and Philosophical Realism where both focus on the absolutely mind-independent reality of philosophical realism and the similar noumenon aka thing-in-itself.
Strawman, TI and TR are not applicable and yet you do apply them. "Absolutely" mind-independent means two different things in most PR, and we can only call one of them noumenon. You never had any idea about the anti-realism vs realism debate and you still don't.
You're the philosophical ultracrepidarian gnat on the issue of philosophical realism vs philosophical anti-realism.
I have loads of books and articles on this issue in this specific Folder in my PC.

I have explained the difference between Absolute and Relative Mind Independent here:
viewtopic.php?t=40600

1. The basic principle of PR [including IR] is reality/things are absolutely mind-independence in the sense that it exist regardless of whether there are humans or not. In this sense, the mind independence of PR is absolute.

2. On the other hand, empirical realism also accept mind-independence but only as relative mind independence, because if there are no humans there is no human-mind-independence.

The difference between 1 and 2 is the underlying issue between philosophical realism vs philosophical anti-realism [or preferably anti-philosophical_realism].
Strawman, TI and TR are not applicable and yet you do apply them. "Absolutely" mind-independent means two different things in most PR, and we can only call one of them noumenon. You never had any idea about the anti-realism vs realism debate and you still don't.

You haven't read any books and articles on the issue. You speed-read them without paying attention to what they were saying.
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 15722
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Philosophical Realism Begs the Question

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Atla wrote: Wed Nov 27, 2024 5:29 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Wed Nov 27, 2024 5:10 am
Atla wrote: Wed Nov 27, 2024 4:12 am
Strawman, TI and TR are not applicable and yet you do apply them. "Absolutely" mind-independent means two different things in most PR, and we can only call one of them noumenon. You never had any idea about the anti-realism vs realism debate and you still don't.
You're the philosophical ultracrepidarian gnat on the issue of philosophical realism vs philosophical anti-realism.
I have loads of books and articles on this issue in this specific Folder in my PC.

I have explained the difference between Absolute and Relative Mind Independent here:
viewtopic.php?t=40600

1. The basic principle of PR [including IR] is reality/things are absolutely mind-independence in the sense that it exist regardless of whether there are humans or not. In this sense, the mind independence of PR is absolute.

2. On the other hand, empirical realism also accept mind-independence but only as relative mind independence, because if there are no humans there is no human-mind-independence.

The difference between 1 and 2 is the underlying issue between philosophical realism vs philosophical anti-realism [or preferably anti-philosophical_realism].
Strawman, TI and TR are not applicable and yet you do apply them. "Absolutely" mind-independent means two different things in most PR, and we can only call one of them noumenon. You never had any idea about the anti-realism vs realism debate and you still don't.

You haven't read any books and articles on the issue. You speed-read them without paying attention to what they were saying.
Are you an omnipresent God who know whether I have read or the way I have read them?

Atla:"Absolutely" mind-independent means two different things in most PR, and we can only call one of them noumenon.
Explain the above with references. [WIKI or otherwise]
You cannot do it with the noumenon because you are not thoroughly familiar with Kant's CPR.
User avatar
FlashDangerpants
Posts: 8815
Joined: Mon Jan 04, 2016 11:54 pm

Re: Philosophical Realism Begs the Question

Post by FlashDangerpants »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Wed Nov 27, 2024 5:45 am Are you an omnipresent God who know whether I have read or the way I have read them?
We've all seen you making special excuses for why you are the one who doesn't really need to read things. And we've all seen how badly you misread things, even things you've read over and over again. He's obviously right.
Post Reply