Is morality objective or subjective?

[promethean75]

That's right, Gary. In your philosophical travels one of the strangest things you'll ever encounter is a christian critiquing scientific theory and evidence. He'll go full retard on the theory of evolution and then be like 'nah bruh genesis isn't just allegory and metaphor; man literally was spontaneously generated from some dirt and then god took out one of his ribs and made homegirl from it. that's real science. Da fuck u talkin bout with this 'evolution' malarkey?'

[Will Bouwman]

...I think it's quite obvious that the most obvious conclusion is that there IS a God, not that there's not.

I think that's because you wish there to be a god. Without that bias, the most obvious conclusion is that there might be a god.

[Immanuel Can]

...I think it's quite obvious that the most obvious conclusion is that there IS a God, not that there's not.

I think that's because you wish there to be a god. Without that bias, the most obvious conclusion is that there might be a god.

The problem with that objection, Will, is that it's a gate that swings every way.

Maybe belief in God is just "wish fulfillment," it runs: people want there to be a God, so they imagine there is one.

But then, why not Atheism? Can it not just be "wish fulfillment" that no God would exist? Couldn't somebody be so viscerally opposed to the idea of God existing that they refuse to consider any contrary evidence? Sure. Why not?

And what about Agnosticism? Can it be nothing more than "wish fulfillment" that there would be no definite answer to the question of whether or not God exists? Couldn't somebody wish that nobody knew, so they could stop worrying about it? Sure. Why not? People wish all sorts of crazy things.

All of those things could be the case. So what does that objection really amount to? Not much. We still need to look at the evidence, in order to know which "wish" is more likely to be "fulfilled."

[Gary Childress]

...I think it's quite obvious that the most obvious conclusion is that there IS a God, not that there's not.

I think that's because you wish there to be a god. Without that bias, the most obvious conclusion is that there might be a god.

The problem with that objection, Will, is that it's a gate that swings every way.

Maybe belief in God is just "wish fulfillment," it runs: people want there to be a God, so they imagine there is one.

But then, why not Atheism? Can it not just be "wish fulfillment" that no God would exist? Couldn't somebody be so viscerally opposed to the idea of God existing that they refuse to consider any contrary evidence? Sure. Why not?

And what about Agnosticism? Can it be nothing more than "wish fulfillment" that there would be no definite answer to the question of whether or not God exists? Couldn't somebody wish that nobody knew, so they could stop worrying about it? Sure. Why not? People wish all sorts of crazy things.

All of those things could be the case. So what does that objection really amount to? Not much. We still need to look at the evidence, in order to know which "wish" is more likely to be "fulfilled."

I agree that evidence is the final arbiter on matters of any kind of knowledge being transmitted from one person to another. I also agree that absence of evidence may not necessarily equate to evidence of absence. However, agnosticism makes the most sense to me. And Pascal's Wager seems like a dubious way to base belief. I mean, maybe there could be a competition between religions to see whose hell is the worst or whose heaven is the best and then based on that we ought to place our "wager" on the religion that is the most best, or most worst, or whatever.

[Immanuel Can]

However, agnosticism makes the most sense to me.

You mean, emotionally? Or do you have reasons?

And Pascal's Wager seems like a dubious way to base belief.

It's a prudential argument -- which means it tells a person what is prudent to believe, not necessarily what is true to believe. That much, any fair assessor must admit. However, being a prudential argument doesn't mean that what it asks you to believe is not also ultimately right.

So the real question is not,"What do I find winsome to believe?" nor "What ought I to believe in order to be prudent?" but "What will the truth be?"

[Gary Childress]

However, agnosticism makes the most sense to me.

You mean, emotionally? Or do you have reasons?

I have sound rational reasons.

[Immanuel Can]

However, agnosticism makes the most sense to me.

You mean, emotionally? Or do you have reasons?

I have sound rational reasons.

Which would be...what?

[Gary Childress]

You mean, emotionally? Or do you have reasons?

I have sound rational reasons.

Which would be...what?

That I don't know if there's a God or not, or if there is, which God or account of God is the most accurate (if any of the present accounts are). If I said I did, I'd be lying.

[Immanuel Can]

I have sound rational reasons.

Which would be...what?

That I don't know if there's a God or not, or if there is, which God or account of God is the most accurate (if any of the present accounts are). If I said I did, I'd be lying.

Well, fair enough. It's honest, if not very compelling.

However, that's not a "reason," per se. It's not attached to any evidence or proof of something, or even to a pattern of logic. That's just a personal confession of not knowing at the present moment, plausibly due to simply not having had particular experiences or knowing particular things.

"Sound" is usually a word we assign, especially in philosophy, to a syllogism or formal pattern of having reasoned a thing out, rather than to a confession of personal lack-of-knowledge. And "rational" implies some such pattern that other "rational" persons are logically able to follow. But a lack of experience is merely one's own situation.

So "sound rational reasons"? Maybe not. Maybe just a personal feeling or preference, or at most, an admission of limited knowledge on the subject, right?

[Harbal]

Which would be...what?

That I don't know if there's a God or not, or if there is, which God or account of God is the most accurate (if any of the present accounts are). If I said I did, I'd be lying.

Well, fair enough. It's honest, if not very compelling.

However, that's not a "reason," per se. It's not attached to any evidence or proof of something, or even to a pattern of logic. That's just a personal confession of not knowing at the present moment, plausibly due to simply not having had particular experiences or knowing particular things.

"Sound" is usually a word we assign, especially in philosophy, to a syllogism or formal pattern of having reasoned a thing out, rather than to a confession of personal lack-of-knowledge. And "rational" implies some such pattern that other "rational" persons are logically able to follow. But a lack of experience is merely one's own situation.

So "sound rational reasons"? Maybe not. Maybe just a personal feeling or preference, or at most, an admission of limited knowledge on the subject, right?

I know we've talked about this before, but there really isn't any evidence of God's existence. There might be things that suggest it to you, but that isn't evidence.

[Immanuel Can]

I know we've talked about this before, but there really isn't any evidence of God's existence. There might be things that suggest it to you, but that isn't evidence.

All "evidence" is something that "suggests" the truth. When a murder has been committed, perhaps there are no witnesses. The disposition of the body is "suggestive" of a murder, not a suicide, perhaps. The blunt instrument on the floor is "suggestive" of being the murder weapon. The DNA traces are "suggestive" of the identity of the murderer -- but never quite conclusive, since he might have been present for other reasons. But taken together, these things may well "suggest" that there is no other possible "reasonable" conclusion than that X murdered Y.

"Suggestions" come in various intensities, ranging from low-percentage to high-percentage. "Low" might be 50-50. "High" might be 99.999%. But in all cases,"evidence" is never more than suggestive.

However, when you say "there really isn't any evidence," then you're making a categorical claim about all that exists, here, there or anywhere. It's not a modest claim: it proposes that the speaker has been everywhere that "evidence" could exist, and seen it all, and excluded all possibilities that anywhere, anytime, there is or has been any evidence.

In other words, it really amounts to a claim that there actually IS a God, and his identity is the maker of the claim; for who else could have such comprehensive knowledge of everything?

Is that your claim? I doubt it. I doubt you expect anybody to take such a claim seriously, at all. So maybe you want to clarify that very categorical declaration of yours, so that somebody else can find it remotely plausible, maybe?

[Gary Childress]

Which would be...what?

That I don't know if there's a God or not, or if there is, which God or account of God is the most accurate (if any of the present accounts are). If I said I did, I'd be lying.

Well, fair enough. It's honest, if not very compelling.

However, that's not a "reason," per se. It's not attached to any evidence or proof of something, or even to a pattern of logic. That's just a personal confession of not knowing at the present moment, plausibly due to simply not having had particular experiences or knowing particular things.

"Sound" is usually a word we assign, especially in philosophy, to a syllogism or formal pattern of having reasoned a thing out, rather than to a confession of personal lack-of-knowledge. And "rational" implies some such pattern that other "rational" persons are logically able to follow. But a lack of experience is merely one's own situation.

So "sound rational reasons"? Maybe not. Maybe just a personal feeling or preference, or at most, an admission of limited knowledge on the subject, right?

Are my reasons for being agnostic unsound and irrational? And if so, why do you feel that way?

[Harbal]

I know we've talked about this before, but there really isn't any evidence of God's existence. There might be things that suggest it to you, but that isn't evidence.

All "evidence" is something that "suggests" the truth. When a murder has been committed, perhaps there are no witnesses. The disposition of the body is "suggestive" of a murder, not a suicide, perhaps. The blunt instrument on the floor is "suggestive" of being the murder weapon. The DNA traces are "suggestive" of the identity of the murderer -- but never quite conclusive, since he might have been present for other reasons. But taken together, these things may well "suggest" that there is no other possible "reasonable" conclusion than that X murdered Y.

Well what do you see in "existence" that is analogous to the dead body, and what evidence have you identified that shows it didn't die of natural causes?

"Suggestions" come in various intensities, ranging from low-percentage to high-percentage. "Low" might be 50-50. "High" might be 99.999%. But in all cases,"evidence" is never more than suggestive.

But when you come across a state of affairs that current human knowledge does not seem able to explain, you are only allowing for one possible conclusion; God. Hardly surprising, then, that that is the conclusion you always arrive at.

However, when you say "there really isn't any evidence," then you're making a categorical claim about all that exists, here, there or anywhere. It's not a modest claim: it proposes that the speaker has been everywhere that "evidence" could exist, and seen it all, and excluded all possibilities that anywhere, anytime, there is or has been any evidence.

When I said there is no evidence, I just assumed you to know that I meant no evidence that we are aware of.

[Immanuel Can]

That I don't know if there's a God or not, or if there is, which God or account of God is the most accurate (if any of the present accounts are). If I said I did, I'd be lying.

Well, fair enough. It's honest, if not very compelling.

However, that's not a "reason," per se. It's not attached to any evidence or proof of something, or even to a pattern of logic. That's just a personal confession of not knowing at the present moment, plausibly due to simply not having had particular experiences or knowing particular things.

"Sound" is usually a word we assign, especially in philosophy, to a syllogism or formal pattern of having reasoned a thing out, rather than to a confession of personal lack-of-knowledge. And "rational" implies some such pattern that other "rational" persons are logically able to follow. But a lack of experience is merely one's own situation.

So "sound rational reasons"? Maybe not. Maybe just a personal feeling or preference, or at most, an admission of limited knowledge on the subject, right?

Are my reasons for being agnostic unsound and irrational? And if so, why do you feel that way?

Not "irrational," which implies mental disorder of some kind; just not specifically rational. That is, they are based on feeling and personal experience, not on evidence, or logic or proof of some kind. They are, perhaps, a testimony to the limitedness of your personal experience: you have an absence of knowledge of any evidence, you're saying.

And as you also say, "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."

[Gary Childress]

Well, fair enough. It's honest, if not very compelling.

However, that's not a "reason," per se. It's not attached to any evidence or proof of something, or even to a pattern of logic. That's just a personal confession of not knowing at the present moment, plausibly due to simply not having had particular experiences or knowing particular things.

"Sound" is usually a word we assign, especially in philosophy, to a syllogism or formal pattern of having reasoned a thing out, rather than to a confession of personal lack-of-knowledge. And "rational" implies some such pattern that other "rational" persons are logically able to follow. But a lack of experience is merely one's own situation.

So "sound rational reasons"? Maybe not. Maybe just a personal feeling or preference, or at most, an admission of limited knowledge on the subject, right?

Are my reasons for being agnostic unsound and irrational? And if so, why do you feel that way?

Not "irrational," which implies mental disorder of some kind; just not specifically rational. That is, they are based on feeling and personal experience, not on evidence, or logic or proof of some kind. They are, perhaps, a testimony to the limitedness of your personal experience: you have an absence of knowledge of any evidence, you're saying.

And as you also say, "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."

So being agnostic because one doesn't possess evidence that there is a god is not "specifically rational"? How so?