Is morality objective or subjective?

[Immanuel Can]

You can't do it because no such dictionary and no such definition exists - you made it up.

Actually, what I wrote was this:

P.S. -- On the other matter, the trustworthiness of common dictionaries, I'm taking the liberty of giving you a link. There are many such other links. https://www.eapfoundation.com/vocab/dictionaries/ This is something you can research for yourself, and you'll find out that what I've said about the liabilities of standard dictionaries is quite correct. They aren't holy books: they are attempted committee definitions of words outside of any particular specialist context, and as such, are generally good but often not precise enough for more technical purposes in any given field.

It was you who tried to stipulate we needed some sort of "Atheist dictionary," not me.

I did not say any such thing, you will find. We don't need an "Atheist dictionary," and I didn't propose we needed one. What I said was that we do need more specialized definitions for ALL ideologies. The very idea of an "Atheist dictionary" is absurd, and I would never say that.

I hate to be contrary, but it was actually you that demanded that should be the test. I neither invented it nor promised it to you. You set those terms.

But if you want some such thing, I can accommodate, in spite of all that.

Here is Stanford University on the subject, at length. They don't, so far as I can detect, use the specific word "ideology." But then, that was your own stipulation, none of mine. The concept of Atheism being an ideology is certainly what they are supporting, especially my claim that Atheism has to include one basic precept, the denial of the existence of God (or gods).

"In philosophy, however, and more specifically in the philosophy of religion, the term “atheism” is standardly used to refer to the proposition that God does not exist (or, more broadly, to the proposition that there are no gods). Thus, to be an atheist on this definition, it does not suffice to suspend judgment on whether there is a God, even though that implies a lack of theistic belief. Instead, one must deny that God exists. This metaphysical sense of the word is preferred over other senses, including the psychological sense, not just by theistic philosophers, but by many (though not all) atheists in philosophy as well. For example, Robin Le Poidevin writes, “An atheist is one who denies the existence of a personal, transcendent creator of the universe, rather than one who simply lives his life without reference to such a being” (1996: xvii). J. L. Schellenberg says that “in philosophy, the atheist is not just someone who doesn’t accept theism, but more strongly someone who opposes it.” In other words, it is “the denial of theism, the claim that there is no God” (2019: 5).

This definition is also found in multiple encyclopedias and dictionaries of philosophy. For example, in the Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, William L. Rowe (also an atheist) writes, “Atheism is the position that affirms the nonexistence of God. It proposes positive disbelief rather than mere suspension of belief” (2000: 62). The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy recognizes multiple senses of the word “atheism”, but is clear about which is standard in philosophy:

[Atheism is] the view that there are no gods. A widely used sense denotes merely not believing in god and is consistent with agnosticism [in the psychological sense]. A stricter sense denotes a belief that there is no god; this use has become standard. (Pojman 2015, emphasis added)

Interestingly, the Encyclopedia of Philosophy recommends a slight broadening of the standard definition of “atheist”. It still requires rejection of belief in God as opposed to merely lacking that belief, but the basis for the rejection need not be that theism is false. For example, it might instead be that it is meaningless.

According to the most usual definition, an atheist is a person who maintains that there is no God, that is, that the sentence “God exists” expresses a false proposition. In contrast, an agnostic [in the epistemological sense] maintains that it is not known or cannot be known whether there is a God, that is, whether the sentence “God exists” expresses a true proposition. On our definition, an atheist is a person who rejects belief in God, regardless of whether or not the reason for the rejection is the claim that “God exists” expresses a false proposition. People frequently adopt an attitude of rejection toward a position for reasons other than that it is a false proposition. It is common among contemporary philosophers, and indeed it was not uncommon in earlier centuries, to reject positions on the ground that they are meaningless. (Edwards 2006: 358)" Underline mine.

What do you think science is?

I think it is exactly what philosophers of science say it is. I think it's a method, not a particular finding or conclusion.

[Immanuel Can]

I think we should agree on the definition of subjective and objective first. Something is subjective if it is dependent on biases, perceptions, emotions, opinions, imaginations, or conscious experiences. Something is objective if it can be confirmed by reason and it is independent of biases,..

No, I don't think that will do, and it's not the way I use the terms. It's also not the way the advocates of moral subjectivism will want you to characterize their view, obviously: why would they want to be accused of advocating something "dependent on biases, perceptions, emotions, opinions, or imaginations," as you put it? They won't.

Just for the record; I believe I am what you call an "advocate of moral subjectivism", and I am more than happy to accept bahman's definitions.

Just to be sure, then, you're content to accept that your views of morality are not objectively true at all, but are rather the product of what Bahman claims, namely "biases, perceptions, emotions, opinions, imaginations, or conscious experiences"? That's fine, for you?

So moral subjectivism is imaginary? It's just a thing you happen to perceive, but is not real? It's a product of your emotionalism? It's just your opinion, and so nobody else ought to be a subjectivist? And in saying all that, you're biased?

[Immanuel Can]

Could you please reply to all my comments?

We need to straighten this out, first. Remember: it was you who said that first we have to get the definitions straight, and indeed, we do.

Yes, we need a proper definition of objectivity and subjectivity first.

Taking your point, then, this is one aspect of your understanding of "objective" you've got wildly wrong. And there's little chance we'll be able to avoid making mistakes in thinking or expressing our views to each other until we've sorted it out.

The way you cherry-picking does not get us anywhere.

That we need the definitions is your "cherry." You "picked" it. I'm just taking you seriously, and doing what you asked.

"Objective" and "subjective" are ontological claims, in regard to morality, not epistemological differentiators. That is, they answer the question, "What is morality made of" not "Who knows what morality is?" And you can see this is true, because the second question, the one you think it's answering, actually can't even be asked if the reality of morality is not taken for granted first. So we have to answer the question of whether morality is objective (really real, regardless of our perceptions) or subjective (only made up by our imaginings and perceptions) before we can go on.

No, objective in the context of morality does not mean something real like North America or polio. It only applies to human and intellectual beings and not other creatures like animals. Why? Because morality is about the rightness or wrongness of an action in a situation. Only intellectual beings can judge a situation intellectually and decide properly based on moral codes. So objectiveness of morality is tied to intellectuality and reason.

"Tied to," in one sense only: that it takes an intelligent and morally-aware being to understand it. But that does not imply that what that being is perceiving is proceeding from himself (subjective). That's an assumption, and one you'd need to prove.

My ability to perceive my computer screen is "tied to" my ability to see. But that does not mean that my computer screen is subjective, and is the product of my seeing. My computer screen is really there, whether I see it or not; and it's only my loss if I don't. Perceiving a computer screen takes an intelligent being; but the computer screen is objectively real, whether I like that or not, and whether I benefit from it or not.

If morality is not based on reason then it is arbitrary.

"Based on" in what sense? It only has to be "perceivable by way of reason" for it not to be arbitrary. It is not a product of reasoning, anymore than my computer screen is a product of my seeing.

Look, this actually can be made very simple. So I'll give that a try.

At one time, every person on the planet had the subjective belief that the Earth is flat. Every person on that Earth experienced the Earth as flat. Nobody even doubted that it was flat. It looked flat. Things didn't fall off it. People walked about in lines, not curves. Everybody knew, with total conviction, that they were standing on a flat plane.

But it wasn't objectively true. The Earth is a globe. Not one person knew it, then. They would only know it later.

That's the difference between subjective and objective. "Subjective" is what all the flat-earthers of that day believed. "Objective" is the truth that the Earth was always round, was never flat, and never would be flat, despite both their opinions and their experiences. That's why opinion and experience (and bias, and imagination, etc.) do not change the subjective-objective dichotomy.

Clear?

[Harbal]

No, I don't think that will do, and it's not the way I use the terms. It's also not the way the advocates of moral subjectivism will want you to characterize their view, obviously: why would they want to be accused of advocating something "dependent on biases, perceptions, emotions, opinions, or imaginations," as you put it? They won't.

Just for the record; I believe I am what you call an "advocate of moral subjectivism", and I am more than happy to accept bahman's definitions.

Just to be sure, then, you're content to accept that your views of morality are not objectively true at all,

They are true in the sense that they actually are my views on morality.

but are rather the product of what Bahman claims, namely "biases, perceptions, emotions, opinions,

More or less, yes.

imaginations

I'm not sure what you mean by that; you'd have to explain.

That's fine, for you?

It's neither fine nor not fine; it's just the way it is.

So moral subjectivism is imaginary?

No, it's real.

It's just a thing you happen to perceive

No, I don't just happen to perceive it; I perceive it because it is programmed into me by the evolutionary process.

but is not real?

Of course it is real. Our sense of morality is a behavioural driver (don't know the technical term).

It's a product of your emotionalism?

In part.

It's just your opinion, and so nobody else ought to be a subjectivist? And in saying all that, you're biased?

I don't understand that.

[Immanuel Can]

Just for the record; I believe I am what you call an "advocate of moral subjectivism", and I am more than happy to accept bahman's definitions.

Just to be sure, then, you're content to accept that your views of morality are not objectively true at all,

They are true in the sense that they actually are my views on morality.

But the claims contained in there are NOT objectively true; right?

but are rather the product of what Bahman claims, namely "biases, perceptions, emotions, opinions,

More or less, yes.

You're okay with your moral claims being called "biased"?

imaginations

I'm not sure what you mean by that; you'd have to explain.

Well, Bahman would have to. It's not my word.

So moral subjectivism is imaginary?

No, it's real.

But the content thereof is merely imaginary?

It's just a thing you happen to perceive

No, I don't just happen to perceive it; I perceive it because it is programmed into me by the evolutionary process.

Then it's just programming. You're free to resist, reject or ignore it, therefore? Or are you only as moral as you're predetermined by this "programming" to be?

but is not real?

Of course it is real. Our sense of morality is a behavioural driver (don't know the technical term).

But again, the content is false, right?

It's a product of your emotionalism?

In part.

You don't mind being called merely "emotional" instead of "moral"?

It's just your opinion, and so nobody else ought to be a subjectivist? And in saying all that, you're biased?

I don't understand that.

Ask Bahman. I don't share that view, and can't explain it. And I don't know why you were willing to agree with it. The adjectives chosen seem rather lunatic, to me. And I don't know why you'd sit still for being told that your subjectivism has, as its content, just bunk.

But you can ask Bahman whatever it was that was meant.

[Harbal]

Just to be sure, then, you're content to accept that your views of morality are not objectively true at all,

They are true in the sense that they actually are my views on morality.

But the claims contained in there are NOT objectively true; right?

By claims, I assume you mean moral precepts. No, moral precepts are not objectively true or false, they are only true or false in relation to some supposed standard or other. In your case, the supposed standard would be the wishes of God.

but are rather the product of what Bahman claims, namely "biases, perceptions, emotions, opinions,

More or less, yes.

You're okay with your moral claims being called "biased"?

Of course they are biased.

So moral subjectivism is imaginary?

No, it's real.

But the content thereof is merely imaginary?

No, I don't imagine that I have the opinion that stealing is morally wrong, I actually do have that opinion.

No, I don't just happen to perceive it; I perceive it because it is programmed into me by the evolutionary process.

Then it's just programming. You're free to resist, reject or ignore it, therefore?

Yes, I am free to ignore it, just as I am free to ignore my programming to experience the sensation of hunger, or sexual attraction, or the urge to breath.

Of course it is real. Our sense of morality is a behavioural driver (don't know the technical term).

But again, the content is false, right?

The content of morality is basically a set of feelings about moral issues, so you would have to tell me what a false feeling is before I could answer that.

It's a product of your emotionalism?

In part.

You don't mind being called merely "emotional" instead of "moral"?

Nobody has ever called me emotional when I was expecting them to call me moral, so I don't know if I would mind.

[Immanuel Can]

They are true in the sense that they actually are my views on morality.

But the claims contained in there are NOT objectively true; right?

By claims, I assume you mean moral precepts. No, moral precepts are not objectively true or false, they are only true or false in relation to some supposed standard or other.

But in subjectivism, there is nothing "standard." Everybody does exactly what they may feel like. If they feel (conventionally) "moral," they do that; if they're not feeling it, then they don't -- and there's no actual difference, either way.

No, it's real.

But the content thereof is merely imaginary?

No, I don't imagine that I have the opinion that stealing is morally wrong, I actually do have that opinion.

But the content of the opinion is merely imaginary. So if I say, "Slavery is wrong," I'm only imagining it is. Sure, I have an opinion; but the precept it renders to me amounts to nothing but a product of my imagination.

No, I don't just happen to perceive it; I perceive it because it is programmed into me by the evolutionary process.

Then it's just programming. You're free to resist, reject or ignore it, therefore?

Yes, I am free to ignore it, just as I am free to ignore my programming to experience the sensation of hunger, or sexual attraction, or the urge to breath.

However, none of those is any intrinsically moral urge. There's nothing wrong with eating, or having sex with your wife, or breathing. There is, in fact, everything right with those things. But is your programming to dislike slavery, rape and racism just the same thing, a mere product of programming, and thus unrelated to objective truth?

Of course it is real. Our sense of morality is a behavioural driver (don't know the technical term).

But again, the content is false, right?

The content of morality is basically a set of feelings

If it were, then there's no difference between the statements, "I feel I like slavery," and "Slavery is immoral." They're both just feelings the respective speakers have. Ultimately, then, slavery's fine...according to subjectivism.

[Harbal]

But the claims contained in there are NOT objectively true; right?

By claims, I assume you mean moral precepts. No, moral precepts are not objectively true or false, they are only true or false in relation to some supposed standard or other.

But in subjectivism, there is nothing "standard." Everybody does exactly what they may feel like. If they feel (conventionally) "moral," they do that; if they're not feeling it, then they don't -- and there's no actual difference, either way.

Then perhaps "subjectivism" refers to some other form of moral theory, because your above description bears no resemblance to what I and others have repeatedly described to you.

No, I don't imagine that I have the opinion that stealing is morally wrong, I actually do have that opinion.

But the content of the opinion is merely imaginary. So if I say, "Slavery is wrong," I'm only imagining it is. Sure, I have an opinion; but the precept it renders to me amounts to nothing but a product of my imagination.

If my distaste for slavery is such that it leads me to denounce slavery as a moral wrong, what exactly have I imagined? It isn't as if I've imagined that some universal law regarding the moral status of slavery exists, or imagined that a god who disapproves of slavery exists.

Yes, I am free to ignore it, just as I am free to ignore my programming to experience the sensation of hunger, or sexual attraction, or the urge to breath.

However, none of those is any intrinsically moral urge. There's nothing wrong with eating, or having sex with your wife, or breathing. There is, in fact, everything right with those things. But is your programming to dislike slavery, rape and racism just the same thing, a mere product of programming, and thus unrelated to objective truth?

We are biologically "programmed" with a sense of morality, but that programming is not preloaded with specific moral attitudes, those usually come from social programming; we tend to absorb them from our social environment. So I suppose the presence of our innate capacity for morality is a matter of objective truth, but our moral values cannot be said to be related to objective truth in the same way. If we say that it is objectively true that the prevailing social attitude to a particular moral issue is such and such, and our own moral attitude aligns with it, can we then say that our attitude is based on an objective truth? I would say not, but others might look upon it that way.

The content of morality is basically a set of feelings

If it were, then there's no difference between the statements, "I feel I like slavery," and "Slavery is immoral." They're both just feelings the respective speakers have. Ultimately, then, slavery's fine...according to subjectivism.

What a strange line of reasoning. It isn't up to your usual standard of sophistry.


I found this, but it was just one of many similar examples, so I think it reasonable to regard it as a generally acceptable definition of morality.

There does not seem to be much reason to think that a single definition of morality will be applicable to all moral discussions. One reason for this is that “morality” seems to be used in two distinct broad senses: a descriptive sense and a normative sense. More particularly, the term “morality” can be used either

descriptively to refer to certain codes of conduct put forward by a society or a group (such as a religion), or accepted by an individual for her own behavior, or

normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people.

In what way does my definition, as you understand it, substantially differ from this?

[Immanuel Can]

By claims, I assume you mean moral precepts. No, moral precepts are not objectively true or false, they are only true or false in relation to some supposed standard or other.

But in subjectivism, there is nothing "standard." Everybody does exactly what they may feel like. If they feel (conventionally) "moral," they do that; if they're not feeling it, then they don't -- and there's no actual difference, either way.

Then perhaps "subjectivism" refers to some other form of moral theory, because your above description bears no resemblance to what I and others have repeatedly described to you.

A "standard" is something that's "standard" for everybody. But if morality is subjective, it's not "standard" for anybody to believe...rather, one can believe whatever one wants, and there's no "standard" they have to come up to. That's basic.

No, I don't imagine that I have the opinion that stealing is morally wrong, I actually do have that opinion.

But the content of the opinion is merely imaginary. So if I say, "Slavery is wrong," I'm only imagining it is. Sure, I have an opinion; but the precept it renders to me amounts to nothing but a product of my imagination.

If my distaste for slavery is such that it leads me to denounce slavery as a moral wrong, what exactly have I imagined? It isn't as if I've imagined that some universal law regarding the moral status of slavery exists, or imagined that a god who disapproves of slavery exists.

Right. So all you've imagined is that you, for this present moment, feel that slavery is unpleasant.

It's not wrong. It's not evil. There's no justification in telling anybody else to stop doing it. That's the entire sum and total of your moral knowledge about slavery, if subjectivism is true.

That surely does not seem enough moral knowledge. In fact, it seems almost nothing at all.

Yes, I am free to ignore it, just as I am free to ignore my programming to experience the sensation of hunger, or sexual attraction, or the urge to breath.

However, none of those is any intrinsically moral urge. There's nothing wrong with eating, or having sex with your wife, or breathing. There is, in fact, everything right with those things. But is your programming to dislike slavery, rape and racism just the same thing, a mere product of programming, and thus unrelated to objective truth?

We are biologically "programmed" with a sense of morality, but that programming is not preloaded with specific moral attitudes, those usually come from social programming; we tend to absorb them from our social environment.

Wait. So is it yourself that has the programming, or your society? From which does this "programming" and the authority to make it stick, come?

So I suppose the presence of our innate capacity for morality is a matter of objective truth, but our moral values cannot be said to be related to objective truth in the same way.

Right. To put it simply, you can say, "It's objectively true that I have feelings about X," but you can't say, "The particular feelings I have are objectively right." You also can't really call them "moral," and have "moral" refer to anything, because there's nothing "moral" or "immoral" about having a feeling.

If we say that it is objectively true that the prevailing social attitude to a particular moral issue is such and such, and our own moral attitude aligns with it, can we then say that our attitude is based on an objective truth? I would say not, but others might look upon it that way.

I'd say you're right to say not. And it's pretty easy to see why you're right. For just as it's not at all obvious that the having of a feeling by one person makes that feeling moral or right, so too there's no reason to thing that if more than one person -- or a whole society -- happens to share a particular feeling, then that feeling is moral or right. It's still just a feeling.

To be objectively right, that feeling would have to refer to some action, cognition or motive that was itself objectively right. And that's the thing that subjectivism insists can never happen, since it holds that nothing is objectively right.

The content of morality is basically a set of feelings

If it were, then there's no difference between the statements, "I feel I like slavery," and "Slavery is immoral." They're both just feelings the respective speakers have. Ultimately, then, slavery's fine...according to subjectivism.

What a strange line of reasoning.

Not at all. It's the obvious conclusion, if subjectivism were true. If your mind rebels at that thought, it may be because subjectivism isn't true.

I found this, but it was just one of many similar examples, so I think it reasonable to regard it as a generally acceptable definition of morality.

There does not seem to be much reason to think that a single definition of morality will be applicable to all moral discussions. One reason for this is that “morality” seems to be used in two distinct broad senses: a descriptive sense and a normative sense. More particularly, the term “morality” can be used either

descriptively to refer to certain codes of conduct put forward by a society or a group (such as a religion), or accepted by an individual for her own behavior, or

normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people.

Well, it's not great: it leaves a huge number of serious questions dangling, for sure. Like...

If we say "moral" descriptively, then what are we saying? That a society, group or individual wants to do something? What makes their choice "moral"? Does the fact that he, or they, choose to use the word "moral" add any actual information to what they are doing? Not if "moral" doesn't objectively mean anything. So what are we "describing," since subjectivism says nothing in the world is ever morally objective? How can you describe it, then?

And if we use it normatively, what are we saying? Are we saying that it's a "code"? Whose "code"? And why not just one precept? Why a "code" of them? Then, why would we think there was only one kind of rationality? What "conditions" can we "specify" under which everybody is bound to agree? When has this normative "coding" espoused by all "rational people" ever happened in real life? And what makes this particular group of individuals special enough decide arbitrarily what's "moral" for us all to do? Who made them king?

I don't know what to make of a definition with that many open questions in it.

[bahman]

I think we should agree on the definition of subjective and objective first. Something is subjective if it is dependent on biases, perceptions, emotions, opinions, imaginations, or conscious experiences. Something is objective if it can be confirmed by reason and it is independent of biases,..

No, I don't think that will do, and it's not the way I use the terms. It's also not the way the advocates of moral subjectivism will want you to characterize their view, obviously: why would they want to be accused of advocating something "dependent on biases, perceptions, emotions, opinions, or imaginations," as you put it? They won't.

Just for the record; I believe I am what you call an "advocate of moral subjectivism", and I am more than happy to accept bahman's definitions.

To him morality is objective and it is what God says. Period.

[bahman]

We need to straighten this out, first. Remember: it was you who said that first we have to get the definitions straight, and indeed, we do.

Yes, we need a proper definition of objectivity and subjectivity first.

Taking your point, then, this is one aspect of your understanding of "objective" you've got wildly wrong. And there's little chance we'll be able to avoid making mistakes in thinking or expressing our views to each other until we've sorted it out.

The way you cherry-picking does not get us anywhere.

That we need the definitions is your "cherry." You "picked" it. I'm just taking you seriously, and doing what you asked.

You need to pay attention to my whole argument if you want we reach to a conclusion. You pick up one sentence and comment on it ignoring what was said before and after.

"Objective" and "subjective" are ontological claims, in regard to morality, not epistemological differentiators. That is, they answer the question, "What is morality made of" not "Who knows what morality is?" And you can see this is true, because the second question, the one you think it's answering, actually can't even be asked if the reality of morality is not taken for granted first. So we have to answer the question of whether morality is objective (really real, regardless of our perceptions) or subjective (only made up by our imaginings and perceptions) before we can go on.

No, objective in the context of morality does not mean something real like North America or polio. It only applies to human and intellectual beings and not other creatures like animals. Why? Because morality is about the rightness or wrongness of an action in a situation. Only intellectual beings can judge a situation intellectually and decide properly based on moral codes. So objectiveness of morality is tied to intellectuality and reason.

"Tied to," in one sense only: that it takes an intelligent and morally-aware being to understand it. But that does not imply that what that being is perceiving is proceeding from himself (subjective). That's an assumption, and one you'd need to prove.

I don't understand what you want me to prove. Could you please elaborate? Morality is either based on reason or not. In the first case it is objective and unique and in the second case is subjective and arbitrary. We don't have another option.

My ability to perceive my computer screen is "tied to" my ability to see. But that does not mean that my computer screen is subjective, and is the product of my seeing. My computer screen is really there, whether I see it or not; and it's only my loss if I don't. Perceiving a computer screen takes an intelligent being; but the computer screen is objectively real, whether I like that or not, and whether I benefit from it or not.

You mix the two instances of objectivity, one is related to morality, and another is related to objects. Cannot you see that?

If morality is not based on reason then it is arbitrary.

"Based on" in what sense? It only has to be "perceivable by way of reason" for it not to be arbitrary. It is not a product of reasoning, anymore than my computer screen is a product of my seeing.

Look, this actually can be made very simple. So I'll give that a try.

At one time, every person on the planet had the subjective belief that the Earth is flat. Every person on that Earth experienced the Earth as flat. Nobody even doubted that it was flat. It looked flat. Things didn't fall off it. People walked about in lines, not curves. Everybody knew, with total conviction, that they were standing on a flat plane.

But it wasn't objectively true. The Earth is a globe. Not one person knew it, then. They would only know it later.

That's the difference between subjective and objective. "Subjective" is what all the flat-earthers of that day believed. "Objective" is the truth that the Earth was always round, was never flat, and never would be flat, despite both their opinions and their experiences. That's why opinion and experience (and bias, and imagination, etc.) do not change the subjective-objective dichotomy.

Clear?

No, you are wrong again. The truth as I mentioned in my other post is objective. Regarding the geometry of Earth, one may believe that it is flat or it is a sphere. The belief in the first case is wrong and in the second case is true, rather than subjective and objective.

[Harbal]

[q

But in subjectivism, there is nothing "standard." Everybody does exactly what they may feel like. If they feel (conventionally) "moral," they do that; if they're not feeling it, then they don't -- and there's no actual difference, either way.

Then perhaps "subjectivism" refers to some other form of moral theory, because your above description bears no resemblance to what I and others have repeatedly described to you.

A "standard" is something that's "standard" for everybody. But if morality is subjective, it's not "standard" for anybody to believe...rather, one can believe whatever one wants, and there's no "standard" they have to come up to. That's basic.

A standard (noun) is an arbitrary set of criteria against which something is judged, and can be used as a reference by one person, or many people. Most European countries use the metric standard of weights and measures, whereas the UK uses both the metric standard and the imperial standard. Two companies that manufacture the same product could operate to different standards in respect of materials and workmanship. A single craftsman might work to a standard he has set for himself. Standards are by no means universal.

If my distaste for slavery is such that it leads me to denounce slavery as a moral wrong, what exactly have I imagined? It isn't as if I've imagined that some universal law regarding the moral status of slavery exists, or imagined that a god who disapproves of slavery exists.

Right. So all you've imagined is that you, for this present moment, feel that slavery is unpleasant.

I've imagined my distaste for slavery, you mean?

It's not wrong. It's not evil. There's no justification in telling anybody else to stop doing it.

I might consider it wrong, or "evil", but you might not; we are both free to make our own judgement. We may or may not believe we are justified in telling anybody else to stop doing it. You, for example, seem to feel you are justified in telling a woman she is morally wrong for having an abortion, whereas I would not feel I could justify doing that.

That's the entire sum and total of your moral knowledge about slavery, if subjectivism is true.

Moral knowledge?

We are biologically "programmed" with a sense of morality, but that programming is not preloaded with specific moral attitudes, those usually come from social programming; we tend to absorb them from our social environment.

Wait. So is it yourself that has the programming, or your society? From which does this "programming" and the authority to make it stick, come?

I'll try to explain it using the analogy of a computer. A computer comes with software pre-installed -let's say a spreadsheet programme in this instance- which would be analogous to our sense of morality. That programme can't really do anything until it has some data to work on, which is input by the computer operator. Our sense of morality seems to work in a similar way, but the data it needs comes mostly from our social environment, in the form of moral attitudes that prevails among the other members of our social group. We may also be influenced by opinions and ideas we read, or are told by individuals, which do not align with with those generally held within our social group. If we are impressionable enough, we may even allow ourselves to be influenced by religious indoctrination.

What "makes it stick" comes from conviction rather than authority, I would say. Once we have formed a moral attitude, our emotions and intuitions are the kinds of things that tend us toward sticking to it.

So I suppose the presence of our innate capacity for morality is a matter of objective truth, but our moral values cannot be said to be related to objective truth in the same way.

Right. To put it simply, you can say, "It's objectively true that I have feelings about X," but you can't say, "The particular feelings I have are objectively right."

Exactly so. I know that you believe you can say that your morals are objectively right, but I don't accept that. No one else has to accept it, either, and your telling them that they will find out in the end adds no weight to your argument.

You also can't really call them "moral," and have "moral" refer to anything, because there's nothing "moral" or "immoral" about having a feeling.

I might call them moral feelings, but what I would mean -and what most people would understand me to mean- is that I have feelings about moral matters and issues.

If we say that it is objectively true that the prevailing social attitude to a particular moral issue is such and such, and our own moral attitude aligns with it, can we then say that our attitude is based on an objective truth? I would say not, but others might look upon it that way.

I'd say you're right to say not. And it's pretty easy to see why you're right. For just as it's not at all obvious that the having of a feeling by one person makes that feeling moral or right, so too there's no reason to thing that if more than one person -- or a whole society -- happens to share a particular feeling, then that feeling is moral or right. It's still just a feeling.

Yes, someone who did not share that moral feeling would probably see it that way.

To be objectively right, that feeling would have to refer to some action, cognition or motive that was itself objectively right. And that's the thing that subjectivism insists can never happen, since it holds that nothing is objectively right.

Yes, I agree.

There does not seem to be much reason to think that a single definition of morality will be applicable to all moral discussions. One reason for this is that “morality” seems to be used in two distinct broad senses: a descriptive sense and a normative sense. More particularly, the term “morality” can be used either

descriptively to refer to certain codes of conduct put forward by a society or a group (such as a religion), or accepted by an individual for her own behavior, or

normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people.

Well, it's not great: it leaves a huge number of serious questions dangling, for sure.

I realise that you would like the definition to say more, and that you would like it even better if you were the one to decide what more it did say, but we can't go round tampering with dictionaries until we have modified them all to our own taste, can we?

If we say "moral" descriptively, then what are we saying? That a society, group or individual wants to do something? What makes their choice "moral"?

Nothing makes it moral in the sense of being morally right or wrong; it is moral in the sense of being related to morality.

Does the fact that he, or they, choose to use the word "moral" add any actual information to what they are doing? Not if "moral" doesn't objectively mean anything. So what are we "describing," since subjectivism says nothing in the world is ever morally objective? How can you describe it, then?

When we use the word, "moral", we are conveying the information that whatever we are referring to is related to the subject of morality. That is regardless of whether we believe morality to be a matter of objective truth, or subjective opinion.

And if we use it normatively, what are we saying? Are we saying that it's a "code"? Whose "code"?

Anybody's code.

And why not just one precept? Why a "code" of them?

It is hard to see how we could deal with the whole area of morality with just one precept, whether it be objective or subjective morality.

Then, why would we think there was only one kind of rationality? What "conditions" can we "specify" under which everybody is bound to agree?

I think that is more of an ideal than an expectation.

When has this normative "coding" espoused by all "rational people" ever happened in real life?

I don't believe it ever has, or ever will. Perhaps it could be achieved if we could get the whole world to accept one particular variant of one particular belief system, such as your particular variant of Christianity, but I can't help you with that, and I hope no one else can.

And what makes this particular group of individuals special enough decide arbitrarily what's "moral" for us all to do? Who made them king?

Only some of us think we have the authority, or are a representative of an authority, that entitles us to impose our moral views on everyone else. I'm sure you have come across such people yourself.

I don't know what to make of a definition with that many open questions in it.

You only have yourself to blame for putting the open questions there when there was no need for them.

[Immanuel Can]

You pick up one sentence and comment on it ignoring what was said before and after.

You're upset with me because when you said, "The first thing we need is to define our terms," I said, "Yes," and have been agreeing, and taking you seriously, and attempting to do just that?

Why?

No, objective in the context of morality does not mean something real like North America or polio. It only applies to human and intellectual beings and not other creatures like animals. Why? Because morality is about the rightness or wrongness of an action in a situation. Only intellectual beings can judge a situation intellectually and decide properly based on moral codes. So objectiveness of morality is tied to intellectuality and reason.

"Tied to," in one sense only: that it takes an intelligent and morally-aware being to understand it. But that does not imply that what that being is perceiving is proceeding from himself (subjective). That's an assumption, and one you'd need to prove.

I don't understand what you want me to prove.

That morality is merely "subjective." And if we had a common definition of that term worked out, just as you claimed we needed to, then youwould know exactly what I'm asking. I'm wanting you to show that a "morality," something worthy of that name, can be premised on nothing more than the subjective feelings of an individual, and on no objective realities at all.

Morality is either based on reason or not.

"Based on"?

Well, engineering is "based on" mathematics. But nobody thinks that mathematics can lead to the building of only one kind of bridge. Just so, morality maybe be "based on reason," but reason, like mathematics, is only a process, not a product. The utility of reason, like the results of mathematics, depends entirely on what premises you plug into it. If you start with a bad suppostion, such as "morality is subjective," you'll reason your way to, "Therefore no moral claims are objectively true," as inevitably as you'll reason from 2+2 to 4.

I'm saying you've plugged in the wrong variables. So what seems reasonable to you becomes untrue. That's why appealing to reason alone, without fixing the premises, will not save us here from false conclusions.

My ability to perceive my computer screen is "tied to" my ability to see. But that does not mean that my computer screen is subjective, and is the product of my seeing. My computer screen is really there, whether I see it or not; and it's only my loss if I don't. Perceiving a computer screen takes an intelligent being; but the computer screen is objectively real, whether I like that or not, and whether I benefit from it or not.

You mix the two instances of objectivity, one is related to morality, and another is related to objects. Cannot you see that?

Objectivity means exactly the same thing in both cases. That's what I'm pointing out to you. I believe in a morality that is a real thing, that inheres in all situations, that is always there whether you and I recognize it or not. Like my computer screen, you and I could ignore it, deny it, or wish it away, and it will make not one scratch of difference to the fact that it's there -- because it's entirely grounded in God, not in you and me.

That's what objective means, when I call morality "objective."

If morality is not based on reason then it is arbitrary.

"Based on" in what sense? It only has to be "perceivable by way of reason" for it not to be arbitrary. It is not a product of reasoning, anymore than my computer screen is a product of my seeing.

Look, this actually can be made very simple. So I'll give that a try.

At one time, every person on the planet had the subjective belief that the Earth is flat. Every person on that Earth experienced the Earth as flat. Nobody even doubted that it was flat. It looked flat. Things didn't fall off it. People walked about in lines, not curves. Everybody knew, with total conviction, that they were standing on a flat plane.

But it wasn't objectively true. The Earth is a globe. Not one person knew it, then. They would only know it later.

That's the difference between subjective and objective. "Subjective" is what all the flat-earthers of that day believed. "Objective" is the truth that the Earth was always round, was never flat, and never would be flat, despite both their opinions and their experiences. That's why opinion and experience (and bias, and imagination, etc.) do not change the subjective-objective dichotomy.

Clear?

No, you are wrong again.

I'm not wrong, even if you happen to think the Earth is flat. It's not. One can deny that morality is objective; but all that happens is that one gets, thereby, to be wrong also.

[Harbal]

No, I don't think that will do, and it's not the way I use the terms. It's also not the way the advocates of moral subjectivism will want you to characterize their view, obviously: why would they want to be accused of advocating something "dependent on biases, perceptions, emotions, opinions, or imaginations," as you put it? They won't.

Just for the record; I believe I am what you call an "advocate of moral subjectivism", and I am more than happy to accept bahman's definitions.

To him morality is objective and it is what God says. Period.

Yes, I think most of us are aware of that by now.

I accept that lots of people practice morality on that basis, and it is not always necessarily a bad or undesirable thing. What is frustrating is IC's outright refusal to accept that morality can be practiced in any meaningful or satisfactory way under any other circumstances, when many of us know from experience that it can, and most certainly is.

[Immanuel Can]

[q

Then perhaps "subjectivism" refers to some other form of moral theory, because your above description bears no resemblance to what I and others have repeatedly described to you.

A "standard" is something that's "standard" for everybody. But if morality is subjective, it's not "standard" for anybody to believe...rather, one can believe whatever one wants, and there's no "standard" they have to come up to. That's basic.

A standard (noun) is an arbitrary set of criteria against which something is judged,

Well, the word "arbitrary" assumes your conclusion. I don't agree. Some standards are arbitrary, like "How long do we want each piece of wood to be cut?" and some are very far from arbitrary, such as "How fast do I have to travel to break the sound barrier?" But one thing that's common to all things that we call a "standard" is that they have to be applicable to more than one thing. The firmest standards are universal. The weakest are arbitrary. But they all are used to measure in mulitple cases.

And the decisions of subjectivity, by defnition, only have to apply to one thing. So they're not "standard" for anything at all.

Standards are by no means universal.

Actually, a great many are. I can tell you by "standard" that you will not live for 150 years. The speed of light will not change for you. The necesssary ratio between planetary size, speed and distance in order to produce orbit will not change for if your subjective wishes do. Your X and Y chromosomes will make you a man or a woman, no matter what you want. These are universal standards.

If my distaste for slavery is such that it leads me to denounce slavery as a moral wrong, what exactly have I imagined? It isn't as if I've imagined that some universal law regarding the moral status of slavery exists, or imagined that a god who disapproves of slavery exists.

Right. So all you've imagined is that you, for this present moment, feel that slavery is unpleasant.

I've imagined my distaste for slavery, you mean?

No. You've felt your distaste. And it's real. But it means nothing more. It doesn't say so much as one thing about slavery itself.

It's not wrong. It's not evil. There's no justification in telling anybody else to stop doing it.

I might consider it wrong, or "evil", but you might not;

You don't. You can't. You deny there's any standard. There's no such thing, according to subjectivism, that "evil" can mean. All you can say is, "For the present moment, I feel distaste for it," and subjectivism can say nothing more.

And you could change your mind about even that in the next five seconds.

That's the entire sum and total of your moral knowledge about slavery, if subjectivism is true.

Moral knowledge?

Yes. You're claiming moral knowledge right now. You're saying, "Morality is subjective." That's a knowledge claim, is it not? Or did you only mean, "I wish morality would be subjective?"

We are biologically "programmed" with a sense of morality, but that programming is not preloaded with specific moral attitudes, those usually come from social programming; we tend to absorb them from our social environment.

Wait. So is it yourself that has the programming, or your society? From which does this "programming" and the authority to make it stick, come?

I'll try to explain it using the analogy of a computer...the data it needs comes mostly from our social environment...

That's the core of your answer. And what that means, then, is that you're not a subjectivist. You don't think the meaning of morality comes from you, personally. Rather, you're saying that morality is social indoctrination. But the legitimacy of that social indoctrination is the problem: how do you know that your society is telling you the right things? Other societies tell you very different things. Which society do you owe it to follow, and why that one?

What "makes it stick" comes from conviction rather than authority, I would say. Once we have formed a moral attitude, our emotions and intuitions are the kinds of things that tend us toward sticking to it.

That's exactly the same as saying, "Indoctrination tends to work." Yes, sometimes it does; often it does. But only for those who give in, or who give up thinking, doubting and questioning. Shame on the indoctrinators, and shame on us.

So I suppose the presence of our innate capacity for morality is a matter of objective truth, but our moral values cannot be said to be related to objective truth in the same way.

Right. To put it simply, you can say, "It's objectively true that I have feelings about X," but you can't say, "The particular feelings I have are objectively right."

Exactly so.

So you don't know that slavery, rape and pedophilia are wrong. You just don't like them, maybe, and maybe only for the present moment. And when somebody does them, or when you change your mind, then subjectivism will lead you to conclude you can legitimately indulge or even become any of those perps.

I know that you believe you can say that your morals are objectively right, but I don't accept that. No one else has to accept it, either, and your telling them that they will find out in the end adds no weight to your argument.

I'm not campaigning for "my morals." I'm arguing there are universal ones. And whether you and I deny them will not change the matter one whit. It will only make us objectively wrong.

You also can't really call them "moral," and have "moral" refer to anything, because there's nothing "moral" or "immoral" about having a feeling.

I might call them moral feelings, but what I would mean -and what most people would understand me to mean- is that I have feelings about moral matters and issues.

You're missing the point. I'm asking what calling them "moral" adds. Why not just call them what you say they are: nothing but "feelings"? On what basis would you call some feelings "moral" and others just "feelings"? Call them all what they are, I would say.

Do I need to point out that the words "mores," from which we get "morals," and "ethos," from which we get "ethics" are both terms (one from Latin, one from Greek, that mean "the traditions of the people"? They don't ever mean something purely individualistic. They always mean how one is treating others, and whether that's right in relation to them, not just to you.

Moreover, though neither word tells us whether these "traditions" or "habits of the people" are based on something higher (like the will of the gods or God), or merely the contingent practices of a particular social group for the present time, for sure they aren't just the choices of an individual. They're common traditions, codes, precepts or practices.

Therefore, why do you call "moral" what is only your personal choice? It makes no logical sense.

If we say that it is objectively true that the prevailing social attitude to a particular moral issue is such and such, and our own moral attitude aligns with it, can we then say that our attitude is based on an objective truth? I would say not, but others might look upon it that way.

I'd say you're right to say not. And it's pretty easy to see why you're right. For just as it's not at all obvious that the having of a feeling by one person makes that feeling moral or right, so too there's no reason to thing that if more than one person -- or a whole society -- happens to share a particular feeling, then that feeling is moral or right. It's still just a feeling.

Yes, someone who did not share that moral feeling would probably see it that way.

But I might share your particular feeling, and what I say would still be the case. It would still be nothing but a feeling, even if both you and I were having the same one.

To be objectively right, that feeling would have to refer to some action, cognition or motive that was itself objectively right. And that's the thing that subjectivism insists can never happen, since it holds that nothing is objectively right.

Yes, I agree.

Well, then, any thought of "morality" is really out the window. Mores, morals, mean no more than "contingent feelings," whether of just you, or you and me, or of our whole society. It makes no difference, then, whether we have those feelings at all. No feeling is "better" than another. Your desire to feed orphans and a cannibal's desire to eat them are just as "good" as each other. Which is to say, neither "good" nor "bad." (Even if they taste good.)

There does not seem to be much reason to think that a single definition of morality will be applicable to all moral discussions. One reason for this is that “morality” seems to be used in two distinct broad senses: a descriptive sense and a normative sense. More particularly, the term “morality” can be used either

descriptively to refer to certain codes of conduct put forward by a society or a group (such as a religion), or accepted by an individual for her own behavior, or

normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people.

Well, it's not great: it leaves a huge number of serious questions dangling, for sure.

I realise that you would like the definition to say more, and that you would like it even better if you were the one to decide what more it did say, but we can't go round tampering with dictionaries until we have modified them all to our own taste, can we?

Yes, we certainly can. For definitions are just the attempts of a committee to arrive at a common way of explaining something. And their success is often relative...definitions can easily be imprecise or even confused, as the one above is.

If we say "moral" descriptively, then what are we saying? That a society, group or individual wants to do something? What makes their choice "moral"?

Nothing makes it moral in the sense of being morally right or wrong; it is moral in the sense of being related to morality.

That's circular. You can't use the word "moral" to explain why something is "moral."

When we use the word, "moral", we are conveying the information that whatever we are referring to is related to the subject of morality.

Circular, again. Explain "morality" without using the word "morality," if you would. That will take out the circularity.

That is regardless of whether we believe morality to be a matter of objective truth, or subjective opinion.

"Regardless of whether we believe"? Then it's objectively so?

And what makes this particular group of individuals special enough decide arbitrarily what's "moral" for us all to do? Who made them king?

Only some of us think we have the authority, or are a representative of an authority, that entitles us to impose our moral views on everyone else. I'm sure you have come across such people yourself.

But you're not one of those, are you? And this group of people spoken of in the definition -- are they more legitimately "kingly" in this regard than you? Please tell me who these august specimens are. If I must bow to them, and accept their definition of who gets to tell me what to do, at least you could give me their credentials.