Compatibilism is impossible

[Immanuel Can]

Stanford university didn't say that compatibilists think free will is an illusion.

I answered that: of course they don't. They want to convince us that free will and Determinism are "compatible." But the WAY they try to make them "compatible" is by saying, in one form and another, that free will isn't genuine. That Determinism IS real, but free will is just something that seems to be the case, but is not.

In other words...an illusion! Ta da!

You said Stanford didn't give a correct definition of Compatibilism, and then you tried to say it was "mine". It wasn't but I'll give you credit: let's say Standford was wrong. Okay. Now, where's your definition of Determinism?

[Flannel Jesus]

Stanford university didn't say that compatibilists think free will is an illusion.

I answered that: of course they don't. They want to convince us that free will and Determinism are "compatible." But the WAY they try to make them "compatible" is by saying, in one form and another, that free will isn't genuine.

But again, that's not what they say. That's what YOU say about what they say, but it's not what they say. They don't say it's not genuine. I just want to make sure you understand that.

I don't think I define determinism in any sort of unusual way. Wikipedia's first sentence of the topic seems good enough to me.

Determinism is the philosophical view that events are completely determined by previously existing causes.

[Immanuel Can]

Stanford university didn't say that compatibilists think free will is an illusion.

I answered that: of course they don't. They want to convince us that free will and Determinism are "compatible." But the WAY they try to make them "compatible" is by saying, in one form and another, that free will isn't genuine.

But again, that's not what they say. That's what YOU say about what they say,...

Let's suppose that's true. Then you need to say in what way what I say about them is unfair. For if what they say is essentially the same thing, or amounts to the same outcome, then I'm being fair, and it's no longer consequential whether or not they use the word "illusion": they still essentially are treating free will as an illusion, whether we or they call it that or not.

However, let's try this a different way, since I have no urge to fight with you over trivial differences in language.

Determinism is the philosophical view that events are completely determined by previously existing causes.

Okay, let's work with that.

Now we have a common definition for "Determinism." It's good enough for me, too...though it lacks some things. One thing that's going to turn out to be a problem is debating whether or not "previously existing causes" means only material things, or whether we include God or ideas as "causes," or even include human will as a "cause." Because I suggest that if we go so far as allowing that human will itself can be an initiating "cause," then we've abandoned any real Determinism in favour of free will...because that's exactly what free will views maintain is the case.

But you and I are not so much disagreeing about Determinism, so if we can both stipulate that neither of us imagines that Determinism allows free will as one of its "initiating causes," we can go forward.

Now what we need is a definition for Compatibilism that both you and I can live with. Your allegation appears to be that I get it wrong, and Stanford University got it wrong. So I'm going to propose that you offer a definition of what you consider "Compatibilism" to entail: and if, as with your proposed definition of Determinism, we can agree, then so much the better -- our discussion can make progress.

Fair enough?

[Flannel Jesus]

I answered that: of course they don't. They want to convince us that free will and Determinism are "compatible." But the WAY they try to make them "compatible" is by saying, in one form and another, that free will isn't genuine.

But again, that's not what they say. That's what YOU say about what they say,...

Let's suppose that's true. Then you need to say in what way what I say about them is unfair.

Well, first you said "the WAY they try to make them "compatible" is by saying, in one form and another, that free will isn't genuine." But now if you accept that they don't say that, then... well, then that's the thing you've said that's "unfair", or rather just explicitly incorrect. You said they say that, now you acknowledge that they don't say that, so... good, we agree, they don't say that.

Now what we need is a definition for Compatibilism that both you and I can live with. Your allegation appears to be that I get it wrong, and Stanford University got it wrong.

Which bit did I say Stanford got wrong? Can you spell it out for me please? Be as explicit as possible, because I don't remember this happening, and I'm suspecting that it's another case where, rather than me explicitly saying Stanford got it wrong, you're again applying your interpretation of things I've said to come to your own conclusion that I think Stanford got it wrong. Which bit did Stanford explicitly say that I explicitly disagreed with?

[Immanuel Can]

But again, that's not what they say. That's what YOU say about what they say,...

Let's suppose that's true. Then you need to say in what way what I say about them is unfair.

Well, first you said "the WAY they try to make them "compatible" is by saying, in one form and another, that free will isn't genuine." But now if you accept that they don't say that,

No, I think that's exactly right: they do believe free will is not genuine. I stand by that, and the Stanford definitions show I'm right, at least about those versions of Compatiblism Stanford mentions.

I just have to ask, because you've pulled this stunt three times now: are you deliberately trying to pretend not to understand me, and then to act as if we agree on what we don't, rather than facing the issues? That's a game I'm not going to play. Just letting you know.

Now what we need is a definition for Compatibilism that both you and I can live with. Your allegation appears to be that I get it wrong, and Stanford University got it wrong.

Which bit did I say Stanford got wrong? Can you spell it out for me please?

Sure. I gave you the Stanford explanation, and you refused to believe it, and claimed it was "mine." I already quoted that: did you read it?

Now, do you have your own definition of Compatibilism to offer? Because if you have a sincere desire to get us both on the same page, that's what we need now.

And if you don't have a definition, then are you really in a position to criticize anybody else's, whether you want to refer to Stanford's or call theirs "mine"?

[Flannel Jesus]

Let's suppose that's true. Then you need to say in what way what I say about them is unfair.

Well, first you said "the WAY they try to make them "compatible" is by saying, in one form and another, that free will isn't genuine." But now if you accept that they don't say that,

No, I think that's exactly right: they do believe free will is not genuine. I stand by that, and the Stanford definitions show I'm right, at least about those versions of Compatiblism Stanford mentions.

It's really simple: do they say it or don't they? If they don't say it, then you saying they say it is not correct - they don't say it.

Now I already know your answer, and it's the same as mine: "I answered that: of course they don't. "

You asked me what was "unfair", I think I'm being pretty clear about it.

[Immanuel Can]

Well, first you said "the WAY they try to make them "compatible" is by saying, in one form and another, that free will isn't genuine." But now if you accept that they don't say that,

No, I think that's exactly right: they do believe free will is not genuine. I stand by that, and the Stanford definitions show I'm right, at least about those versions of Compatiblism Stanford mentions.

It's really simple: do they say it or don't they?

Problem: that's not "simple," but "oversimplistic." If you say "small domesticated feline," you're saying "cat," even if you use another synonym. If you classify Determinism as the fact that cannot be doubted, and position free will as the thing that has to be explained-away, you've called free will an "illusion," even if you didn't use that word.

Here's what I know. You're not dumb. You read Stanford's definitions, and you know that that is exactly what they say is the case: all forms of Compatibilism affirm Determinism as the primary fact, and make free will the thing to be traded-away. You can see it.

You claim that all this is the wrong definition of Compatibilism. But what I don't know is your definition of Compatibilism. I'm ready to hear, and to work with it, if it's reasonable.

Now, I've asked you for it three times, and you haven't given it. So the obvious conclusion is either that a) you don't have one, or b) you do have such a definition, but are afraid to offer it because you have no confidence in it.

So I'll ask once more, and see what you say: What is your definition of Compatiblism? Or would you rather admit to having none?

Your choice. But no more red herrings. Depending on what you say next, I'll know exactly what to think.

[Flannel Jesus]

Problem: that's not "simple," but "oversimplistic." If you say "small domesticated feline," you're saying "cat," even if you use another synonym. If you classify Determinism as the fact that cannot be doubted, and position free will as the thing that has to be explained-away, you've called free will an "illusion," even if you didn't use that word.

Here's what I know. You're not dumb. You read Stanford's definitions, and you know that that is exactly what they say is the case: all forms of Compatibilism affirm Determinism as the primary fact, and make free will the thing to be traded-away. You can see it.

Wrong. This is, once again, your interpretation of what compatibilists say, it's not what they explicitly say, it's not what they think they're saying. If you want to present it as the result of your analysis of their beliefs, that's fine - this is what you believe about their beliefs. Presenting it like it's simply what they say, though, is wrong.

The difference between "this is what they say" and "this is what I think about what they say" is huge.

Now, I've asked you for it three times, and you haven't given it. So the obvious conclusion is either that a) you don't have one, or b) you do have such a definition, but are afraid to offer it because you have no confidence in it.

So I'll ask once more, and see what you say: What is your definition of Compatiblism? Or would you rather admit to having none?

Compatibilism is the idea that free will, properly understood, is FULLY compatible with determinism. Not compatible as long as free will is an illusion, or "not genuine" - Fully

[Immanuel Can]

Now, I've asked you for it three times, and you haven't given it. So the obvious conclusion is either that a) you don't have one, or b) you do have such a definition, but are afraid to offer it because you have no confidence in it.

So I'll ask once more, and see what you say: What is your definition of Compatiblism? Or would you rather admit to having none?

Compatibilism is the idea that free will, properly understood, is FULLY compatible with determinism.

Sorry...that won't work. It's far too vague.

You've left out the key thing, the thing which all three of the Stanford definitions do not neglect to include, and the only one that separates one version of Compabililism from the others: that is, the answer to the question "How?"

That is, HOW does the fact of Determinism reconcile with free will?

So fill in that missing piece, if you would be so kind. Then I'll be able to see what your actual justification for belief in Compatibilism would be.

[Flannel Jesus]

Sorry...that won't work. It's far too vague.

You've left out the key thing, the thing which all three of the Stanford definitions do not neglect to include, and the only one that separates one version of Compabililism from the others: that is, the answer to the question "How?"

That is, HOW does the fact of Determinism reconcile with free will?

So fill in that missing piece, if you would be so kind. Then I'll be able to see what your actual justification for belief in Compatibilism would be.

Which things in the Stanford article do you consider answers to the "how" question? Please quote.

[Immanuel Can]

Sorry...that won't work. It's far too vague.

You've left out the key thing, the thing which all three of the Stanford definitions do not neglect to include, and the only one that separates one version of Compabililism from the others: that is, the answer to the question "How?"

That is, HOW does the fact of Determinism reconcile with free will?

So fill in that missing piece, if you would be so kind. Then I'll be able to see what your actual justification for belief in Compatibilism would be.

Which things in the Stanford article do you consider answers to the "how" question? Please quote.

I will. But just answer the question anyway, because it's an extremely reasonable request.

Saying that Determinism and free will are "compatible," especially "fully," but not saying HOW is like saying, "Pigs can fly," but not saying how that can be true.

Here's Stanford again:

"Compatibilists, on the other hand, claim that these concerns [Incompatibilist ones, that is] miss the mark. Some compatibilists hold this because they think the truth of causal determinism would not undermine our freedom to do otherwise (Berofsky 1987, Campbell 1997, Vihvelin 2013, etc.). As a result, these compatibilists tell us, the truth of causal determinism poses no threat to our status as morally responsible agents (notice the enthymematic premise here: the freedom to do otherwise is sufficient for the kind of control an agent must possess to be morally responsible for her actions). Other compatibilists show less concern in rebutting the conclusion that the freedom to do otherwise is incompatible with determinism. Compatibilists of this stripe reject the idea that such freedom is necessary for meaningful forms of free will (e.g., Frankfurt 1969, 1971; Watson 1975, Dennett 1984)—the “varieties of free will worth wanting,” (Dennett 1984). And even more notably, some compatibilists simply deny that freedom of this sort is in any way connected to morally responsible agency (e.g., Fischer 1994, Fischer & Ravizza 1998, Scanlon 1998, Wallace 1994, Sartorio 2016)."

So you've got three there: "otherwise"-ness (but with an enthymeme entailed, which is a fault of not being explicit enough), "rejecting the idea that freedom is necessary for free will," and "denying that freedom is in any way connected to moral agency."

But you took issue with all of those, so what's your way of getting the job done?

[Flannel Jesus]

But you took issue with all of those, so what's your way of getting the job done?

No, I didn't take issue with a single one of those things. I took an issue with you taking those things, interpreting them as "not genuine free will", and then saying that compatibilists also say it's not genuine free will.

If you think the compatibilist vision of free will is not free will, that's fine, that's your thing. Saying that compatibilists also say it's not genuine... that's simply not the case. They don't say it.

In other words, I'm not bothered by your analysis of compatibilism, I'm bothered by you presenting your analysis as if they agree with it.

[Immanuel Can]

No...

I'm sorry...I missed the part where you told me HOW your Compatibilism works. Would you answer that now, please?

[Flannel Jesus]

No...

I'm sorry...I missed the part where you told me HOW your Compatibilism works. Would you answer that now, please?

This conversation isn't about "my" compatibilism. You said compatibilists say certain things, and your sources don't support that. That's what this is about. I'm not trying to convince anybody of "my" compatibilism whatsoever.

Compatibilists don't say they believe in free will as long as free will is an illusion. They don't say they believe in free will buy only if it's not genuine. These things are true regardless of what my takes are.

[Immanuel Can]

No...

I'm sorry...I missed the part where you told me HOW your Compatibilism works. Would you answer that now, please?

This conversation isn't about "my" compatibilism.

That's EXACTLY what I want to know about, so I can get on the same page, and we can talk about the same thing. So far, I understand that you believe that Determinism and free will are supposed to reconcile fully. None of the Stanford definitions assume that: all of them say it's only true if some mechanism or angle is taken into account. But you've not told me what your angle or mechanism is, so I can't find out if we agree about what "Compatibilism" even entails.

So? What's your way of making Determinism and free will "fully" compatible?