Compatibilism is impossible

[bahman]

Compatibilism doesn't require that the world is purely physical/material.

Accepting that there is another layer of reality that is causally efficacious leads to overdetermination.

I don't know what "overdetermination" means in the context of human decisions and behavior.

Can you dumb it down for me with an example?

Think of reality as it is made of two kinds of stuff, let's call them S1 and S2, both are causally efficacious. Given a state of affairs, let's call X1, S1 causes a new state of affairs, let's call it X2, while S2 causes another state of affairs, let's call it X3. That means that given X1 one expects to observe both X2 and X3 which are not necessarily equal. That is what philosophers mean by overdetermination.

[phyllo]

Accepting that there is another layer of reality that is causally efficacious leads to overdetermination.

I don't know what "overdetermination" means in the context of human decisions and behavior.

Can you dumb it down for me with an example?

Think of reality as it is made of two kinds of stuff, let's call them S1 and S2, both are causally efficacious. Given a state of affairs, let's call X1, S1 causes a new state of affairs, let's call it X2, while S2 causes another state of affairs, let's call it X3. That means that given X1 one expects to observe both X2 and X3 which are not necessarily equal. That is what philosophers mean by overdetermination.

You think that's a real example that clearly demonstrates something?

[bahman]

Compatibilism doesn't require that the world is purely physical/material.

Accepting that there is another layer of reality that is causally efficacious leads to overdetermination.

For example, it could be a non-physical monism that is compatiblist.

But monism is a system of thought that argues that reality is made of only one sort of stuff and all phenomena can be explained based on it.

[bahman]

I don't know what "overdetermination" means in the context of human decisions and behavior.

Can you dumb it down for me with an example?

Think of reality as it is made of two kinds of stuff, let's call them S1 and S2, both are causally efficacious. Given a state of affairs, let's call X1, S1 causes a new state of affairs, let's call it X2, while S2 causes another state of affairs, let's call it X3. That means that given X1 one expects to observe both X2 and X3 which are not necessarily equal. That is what philosophers mean by overdetermination.

You think that's a real example that clearly demonstrates something?

S1 and S2 can be anything like matter and soul. Matter says to go this way and soul says to go another way. That is overdetermination.

[phyllo]

S1 and S2 can be anything like matter and soul. Matter says to go this way and soul says to go another way. That is overdetermination.

So "matter" is your brain and "soul" is your mind? Is that what it is?

How can your soul think? Why would it think?

We already have an organ for thinking ... the brain. Why would we have another one which contradicts the first one?

[Immanuel Can]

Accepting that there is another layer of reality that is causally efficacious leads to overdetermination.

Right. That's the key issue: it's the question, "Can human will cause things?"

If the truth behind the illusion that will can cause is physical Determinism, then the answer is decidedly "NO," -- even if we, in our ordinary experience, imagine things to be otherwise. For then, the will is nothing but an effect caused by the material (or immaterial) stuff behind it.

I am a dualist and I think that reality is made of the mind and Quidia (physical for example). The mind can experience and cause. The mind causes a state of affairs based on what it experienced before. The causation is deterministic...

Well, that would be a self-contradiction.

You can't say "the mind causes" and also "the causation is deterministic," unless you make "mind" nothing more than an epiphenomenon or a "seeming" of the physical stuff. And I don't think that's what you're trying to do, is it?

...a fork in the chain of causality.

Determinism does not allow that there are any "forks." There's only the straight, linear relation between a specific cause and its specific effect.

[Immanuel Can]

We don't know that we live in a world that is nothing but physical. Lots of people have thought, and still think, that's not the case. So no, there's no automatic road to the conclusion that will has to have any particular "physical aspects."

You have already admitted that will is affected by the physical world.

Sure: but watch the wording, because it makes a huge difference.

"Affected" only implies that will makes its choices within a range of possible options, or under some influence from the physical world -- but at the end of the day, that the final decision is made not as a consequence of those things, but among them or even against them. What you're talking about is the idea that will is "determined" by physical causes. And that's not what I'm "admitting," because I think it's evidently untrue.

One such evidence is that we can go against physical stimuli if the reasonings of our mind induce us to do so. So, for example, the triathlete who is running and is thirsty, but refuses to drink anything (out of concern he might cause himself to cramp, perhaps) is making his physical longings subject to his mind, his will, his choice, his volitions. These override his physical stimuli.

Your brain says...

A "brain," by definition, does not "say" things to you. The brain is just a lump of meat. The mind "says" things to you. The mind is the entity that animates that brain, and which issues decisions or "says" things.

And now we're into the difference between "brain" and "mind." If the mind makes the choice, then free will is true; if the brain is merely neurologically reconstructed by physical predeterminants to create a sensation of "wanting" particular things, but actually makes that volition happen without submitting it to the judgments of your mind, then Determinism would be true.

[bahman]

S1 and S2 can be anything like matter and soul. Matter says to go this way and soul says to go another way. That is overdetermination.

So "matter" is your brain and "soul" is your mind? Is that what it is?

The mind to me is not what people call the soul.

How can your soul think? Why would it think?

The soul is not necessarily the thinker. It is traditionally believed to cause motion in matter while matter intrinsically moves based on the laws of nature. That is overdeterminition.

We already have an organ for thinking ... the brain. Why would we have another one which contradicts the first one?

Yes, that is overdeterminition.

[Iwannaplato]

S1 and S2 can be anything like matter and soul. Matter says to go this way and soul says to go another way. That is overdetermination.

So "matter" is your brain and "soul" is your mind? Is that what it is?

How can your soul think? Why would it think?

We already have an organ for thinking ... the brain. Why would we have another one which contradicts the first one?

I was a little unclear what you were saying, but it seemed like you thought Phyllo was saying there had to be another substance. I was saying that compatiblism need not be a dualism. I am not saying there is a monism or a dualism. I was talking about the category of compatiblism.

[bahman]

Right. That's the key issue: it's the question, "Can human will cause things?"

If the truth behind the illusion that will can cause is physical Determinism, then the answer is decidedly "NO," -- even if we, in our ordinary experience, imagine things to be otherwise. For then, the will is nothing but an effect caused by the material (or immaterial) stuff behind it.

I am a dualist and I think that reality is made of the mind and Quidia (physical for example). The mind can experience and cause. The mind causes a state of affairs based on what it experienced before. The causation is deterministic...

Well, that would be a self-contradiction.

You can't say "the mind causes" and also "the causation is deterministic," unless you make "mind" nothing more than an epiphenomenon or a "seeming" of the physical stuff. And I don't think that's what you're trying to do, is it?

No, there is no contradiction. Matter cannot cause change in itself. Matter just dictates what is the available state of affairs. For example, you cannot fly but you can stand up, run; simply move according to the laws of nature. The laws of nature are deterministic.

...a fork in the chain of causality.

Determinism does not allow that there are any "forks." There's only the straight, linear relation between a specific cause and its specific effect.

The forks happen all the time and that is where the mind has to decide. We face forks all the time. How could we face a fork if reality is purely deterministic and linear?

[Immanuel Can]

Matter cannot cause change in itself.

Change in matter is just energy-transfer. But Materialists regard energy as part of the Material equation, not as something metaphysical. So they're not admitting any dualism, even though they do believe change happens.

...a fork in the chain of causality.

Determinism does not allow that there are any "forks." There's only the straight, linear relation between a specific cause and its specific effect.

The forks happen all the time

I think they do. Determinists say that's an illusion.

Determinists say that there was only ever one way things were going to go, given the prior conditions of matter and energy. For them, no "mind" entered the equation at all. All that happened was that prior conditions set things up so that what seemed to us to be our choice was actually only an inevitable outcome.

Imagine in this way: that we're all billiard balls rolling around on a table. Physical forces give us a "poke," and we roll in particular directions, bounce off things, and go other directions, and so forth. But all of it, like the geometric movements on a pool table, are just inevitable.

But now, imagine that one of the pool balls is capable of thought. And as he's rolling around the table, he's saying to himself, "I'm choosing to roll over by the 8-ball," or "I wanted to hit that cushion and change direction into the side pocket," or whatever. But the pool ball doesn't realize that he's just being played by the physics of the table. So he's fooled into thinking he's making choices, whereas the truth is that the physics of the table never made it possible for him to do anything at all for himself, or to move in any way that was not predestined for him by the original forces in action on the table.

That's how Determinists have to see us as being. We're all stupid pool balls, who only imagine we have freedom. But we don't.

How could we face a fork if reality is purely deterministic and linear?

That's a tough one for Determinism to explain in any satisfying or non-reductional way. But I'll give it a try for you.

They would say that we DON'T actually face a fork. We only imagine we do. This odd phenomena of imagining-choices-that-don't-exist is hard for them to account for; but they can persevere, and say that we don't know why we have such odd imaginings, but we do. And nevertheless, Determinism is true, and one way is all there ever was...no forks are real.

[phyllo]

"Affected" only implies that will makes its choices within a range of possible options, or under some influence from the physical world -- but at the end of the day, that the final decision is made not as a consequence of those things, but among them or even against them.

The final decision is a consequence of what? Nothing?

One such evidence is that we can go against physical stimuli if the reasonings of our mind induce us to do so. So, for example, the triathlete who is running and is thirsty, but refuses to drink anything (out of concern he might cause himself to cramp, perhaps) is making his physical longings subject to his mind, his will, his choice, his volitions. These override his physical stimuli.

As if his decision, his mind, his will, his choice, his volitions are somehow above and separate from the world. As if he is not part of the world.

A "brain," by definition, does not "say" things to you. The brain is just a lump of meat. The mind "says" things to you. The mind is the entity that animates that brain, and which issues decisions or "says" things.

"Mind" is just an abstraction wrapping up brain, hormones, emotions, feeling, etc into one word.

If the mind makes the choice, then free will is true; if the brain is merely neurologically reconstructed by physical predeterminants to create a sensation of "wanting" particular things, but actually makes that volition happen without submitting it to the judgments of your mind, then Determinism would be true.

That does not logically follow.
There is no reason to believe that determinism doesn't apply to mind.

[bahman]

Matter cannot cause change in itself.

Change in matter is just energy-transfer. But Materialists regard energy as part of the Material equation, not as something metaphysical. So they're not admitting any dualism, even though they do believe change happens.

Change cannot happen if there is no mind. I have an argument for that: Think of a change in the state of matter, X to Y. This change should happen at two different points in time since otherwise process is simultaneous and there cannot be a change. This means that there is a gap between the two states of affairs. This means that matter in the state of X cannot possibly cause matter in the state of Y. Therefore the change is impossible. That means that there should exist a mind with the ability to experience matter in X and cause matter in Y.

Determinism does not allow that there are any "forks." There's only the straight, linear relation between a specific cause and its specific effect.

The forks happen all the time

I think they do. Determinists say that's an illusion.

Cool, we are in the same page.

How could we face a fork if reality is purely deterministic and linear?

That's a tough one for Determinism to explain in any satisfying or non-reductional way. But I'll give it a try for you.

They would say that we DON'T actually face a fork. We only imagine we do. This odd phenomena of imagining-choices-that-don't-exist is hard for them to account for; but they can persevere, and say that we don't know why we have such odd imaginings, but we do. And nevertheless, Determinism is true, and one way is all there ever was...no forks are real.

Hmm, it seems we are in the same page.

[Immanuel Can]

"Affected" only implies that will makes its choices within a range of possible options, or under some influence from the physical world -- but at the end of the day, that the final decision is made not as a consequence of those things, but among them or even against them.

The final decision is a consequence of what? Nothing?

Determinists think there's no actual such thing as a "decision." What you think is a "decision" is only the inevitable playing out of what the physical prior causes set up.

One such evidence is that we can go against physical stimuli if the reasonings of our mind induce us to do so. So, for example, the triathlete who is running and is thirsty, but refuses to drink anything (out of concern he might cause himself to cramp, perhaps) is making his physical longings subject to his mind, his will, his choice, his volitions. These override his physical stimuli.

As if his decision, his mind, his will, his choice, his volitions are somehow above and separate from the world. As if he is not part of the world.

Determinism says that there's only one kind of explanation "in the world": physical-causal explanation. And having assumed its own conclusion, it insists that it must always be true, and there can be no other kind of explanation that is genuine.

But what if that's not the case? What if there are two types of perfectly sensible explanation possible? What if physical events are explainable in terms of ordinary physical cause and effect, just as the Determinists think; but that mental phenomena, such as choices, volitions, identity, mind and will, have to be explained another way?

That doesn't mean that mental explanations are "separate from the world," but rather that they are a perfectly reasonable and appropriate strategy of explanation of some events within the ordinary world; the difference between the two being that some events involve only purely physical entities, like rocks, water, planets, etc., but others involve things that have life: and with life comes volition, choice, and so on.

A "brain," by definition, does not "say" things to you. The brain is just a lump of meat. The mind "says" things to you. The mind is the entity that animates that brain, and which issues decisions or "says" things.

"Mind" is just an abstraction wrapping up brain, hormones, emotions, feeling, etc into one word.

Why would we assume that?

It doesn't at all seem obvious that it's true. It's certainly not the way the average live organism, especially human ones, experiences the world. So why would we jump to that conclusion, and be bound by it, rather than the obvious testimony of our own experiences?

[phyllo]

Change cannot happen if there is no mind.

So a thermostat can't change the temperature in a room?

The forks happen all the time

You're walking down a path and there is a fork.

You go one way or the other based on your goals. Or one path looks nicer. Or someone has told you that there is a pot of gold at the end of the right-hand path. Whatever. You made a decision for some reason.