Compatibilism is impossible

[phyllo]

Now, why would you want to do what you don't want to do?

Would you ever do it?

[bahman]

Now, why would you want to do what you don't want to do?

For no specific reason!

Would you ever do it?

Yes, I can do it.

[Immanuel Can]

So you are not free.

What does it mean to be 'free'?

Compatibilism says you have the freedom to do what you want.

What greater freedom does free-will give you? The freedom to do what you don't want?

You've caught the problem correctly: Compatibilism assumes that "will" is merely a part of the material mechanisms of the universe, just as the physical world is; that it's not something distinct or of-a-different-order than material things. As such, will cannot be any special cause of anything. The secret truth behind all will is still that material pre-causes compel it to be whatever it is; and thus, our feeling of will or freedom is an illusion. We may believe in it strongly, and act as if it's special...in fact, every one of us does, all the time. But we're just fools, because it's not true. Will is just material causality.

So the two things aren't actually "compatible." For "compatibility," there needs to be two distinct entities that are "compatible." But what we call "Compatibilism" insists they're not actually distinct at all. We only think they are, imagine they are, and act as if they are.

And what do we call it when people believe something is real, but it's not?

"An illusion."

The result? The secret truth is that Compatibilism is just Determinism.

[phyllo]

You've caught the problem correctly: Compatibilism assumes that "will" is merely a part of the material mechanisms of the universe, just as the physical world is; that it's not something distinct or of-a-different-order than material things. As such, will cannot be any special cause of anything. The secret truth behind all will is still that material pre-causes compel it to be whatever it is; and thus, our feeling of will or freedom is an illusion. We may believe in it strongly, and act as if it's special...in fact, every one of us does, all the time. But we're just fools, because it's not true. Will is just material causality.

Compatibilism doesn't require that the world is purely physical/material.

We live in a physical world, so will or free-will is going to have physical aspects to it.

Even if existence is not 100% physical/material, people are going to make decisions based on what they want. Decisions based on their state. That's entirely compatible with compatibilism.

The result? The secret truth is that Compatibilism is just Determinism.

The difference is that (hard) determinism say that you have no freedom and that you being 'forced' to do things. Compatibilism says you do have freedom. In fact, as much freedom as the libertarian free-willists.

[Iwannaplato]

Compatibilism doesn't require that the world is purely physical/material.

That is correct.
Some philosophers are both physicalists/materialists and compatibilists. But they are not hinged on each other in either direction.

[Flannel Jesus]

And you'll notice not a single one called it an illusion.

Not using that word, no: and yet every single one of them thinks that it's freedom that's up for grabs, and not one of them thinks predetermination is. That's because, as I said, Compatibilism is really a kind of mental mistake, a confusing of explaining-away one element of the problem with having solved the problem of the conflict between the two. It also explains why there are different slants on Compatibilism, since it's not a single, coherent position at all.

Just saying.

I don't know why "single coherent position" is relevant. There's many flavours of every type of philosophy. Religious people don't all agree. Christians don't all agree. Libertarian free willians don't all conceptualise free will the same either. Do you also hold this against all of these positions equally? Because it's not a single unified position? It just seems like a remarkably unfair judgement, to say it against compatibilism as if it's not also a feature of literally everything else.

But, you now seem to realise that they don't tend to say it's an illusion, so that's good progress.

[Immanuel Can]

You've caught the problem correctly: Compatibilism assumes that "will" is merely a part of the material mechanisms of the universe, just as the physical world is; that it's not something distinct or of-a-different-order than material things. As such, will cannot be any special cause of anything. The secret truth behind all will is still that material pre-causes compel it to be whatever it is; and thus, our feeling of will or freedom is an illusion. We may believe in it strongly, and act as if it's special...in fact, every one of us does, all the time. But we're just fools, because it's not true. Will is just material causality.

Compatibilism doesn't require that the world is purely physical/material.

Well, Deterministic suppositions based on the metaphysical are possible. One could, for example, believe in the autocratic Calvinistic "god," or one could believe in a universal, controlling "spirit" of some kind. But those are a good deal less common than the ordinary, Materialist kinds of Determinism.

Secular Determinism would have to be Materialist, for sure.

We live in a physical world, so will or free-will is going to have physical aspects to it.

We don't know that we live in a world that is nothing but physical. Lots of people have thought, and still think, that's not the case. So no, there's no automatic road to the conclusion that will has to have any particular "physical aspects."

Even if existence is not 100% physical/material, people are going to make decisions based on what they want.

Compatibilism's going to have to imply that's a delusion...as in, we THINK we know "what we want," but the truth is that prior physical conditions are MAKING us to "want" what we think we "want," so it's really not us doing the "wanting" at all, even when we feel like it is.

The result? The secret truth is that Compatibilism is just Determinism.

The difference is that (hard) determinism say that you have no freedom and that you being 'forced' to do things. Compatibilism says you do have freedom. In fact, as much freedom as the libertarian free-willists.

No, it actually doesn't. Compatiblism does not "say" that.

In all three of the paradigmatic examples cited from Stanford, for example, the assumption is that Determinism is an absolute reality, and "freedom" is the element to be explained-away. Note that none of them even start to question Determinism, and none of them make any attempt at all to say why Determinism might not be real. They all exert their explaining-away strategies exclusively on the "freedom" side.

That's because they don't see Determinism as being at all negotiable. Even for Compatibilists, it has no "give" in it. No wonder, then, that Determinism has been called "the iron cage," even by a thoroughgoing secularist like Max Weber. It's the one reality that secular Materialism tells us nobody can "get out of." Freedom, on the other hand, is the concept treated as maleable to the purpose of explanation, and subsumable to Determinism. No Compatibilist explanation goes the other way.

[bahman]

Compatibilism doesn't require that the world is purely physical/material.

Accepting that there is another layer of reality that is causally efficacious leads to overdetermination.

[Immanuel Can]

And you'll notice not a single one called it an illusion.

Not using that word, no: and yet every single one of them thinks that it's freedom that's up for grabs, and not one of them thinks predetermination is. That's because, as I said, Compatibilism is really a kind of mental mistake, a confusing of explaining-away one element of the problem with having solved the problem of the conflict between the two. It also explains why there are different slants on Compatibilism, since it's not a single, coherent position at all.

Just saying.

I don't know why "single coherent position" is relevant.

Oh, that's easy: because only if one gets to a singular position that is actually rationally coherent has one any chance of being close to the truth...except by pure accident, if one happened to stumble up next to the truth without even knowing it, of course.

Do you also hold this against all of these positions equally?

We should. Inconsistency is a sign that there's controversy remaining; but worse than that, much worse, is incoherence. Because a truly incoherent position has literally a 0% chance of ever being right. It means it doesn't even "keep faith with," or "remain true to" itself...so it's bound to be wrong.

But, you now seem to realise that they don't tend to say it's an illusion, so that's good progress.

You've misunderstood, it seems. What I said to you was that they might not use that specific word (which they wouldn't, since their self-declared task is to "reconcile" not "eliminate," of course), but that the net effect of their view remains that free will is going to be interpreted as an illusion anyway.

I'll say again: Compatibilism makes Determinism the non-negotiable, baseline reality, and freedom a thing that gets explained-away -- usually with reference to seemings or "epiphenomena" in the human experience.

They're saying we're believing in a thing that isn't real. That's an illusion, of course, by definition.

[Immanuel Can]

Compatibilism doesn't require that the world is purely physical/material.

Accepting that there is another layer of reality that is causally efficacious leads to overdetermination.

Right. That's the key issue: it's the question, "Can human will cause things?"

If the truth behind the illusion that will can cause is physical Determinism, then the answer is decidedly "NO," -- even if we, in our ordinary experience, imagine things to be otherwise. For then, the will is nothing but an effect caused by the material (or immaterial) stuff behind it.

[phyllo]

We don't know that we live in a world that is nothing but physical. Lots of people have thought, and still think, that's not the case. So no, there's no automatic road to the conclusion that will has to have any particular "physical aspects."

You have already admitted that will is affected by the physical world. Here:

The problem for both sides is what to do with two clear facts: 1) that all choices happen within circumstances, or can be influenced by things

And unless you want to argue that will is in no way the product of some sort of thinking in the brain, the conclusion that there are physical aspects of will or free-will is perfectly valid.

Compatibilism's going to have to imply that's a delusion...as in, we THINK we know "what we want," but the truth is that prior physical conditions are MAKING us to "want" what we think we "want," so it's really not us doing the "wanting" at all, even when we feel like it is.

This is the weird dualism that comes up constantly in these discussions.

Your brain says that you want a red sports car but there is a 'real you' that actually really wants something else. A 'real you' that is doing completely different thinking, has different desires and different motivations than the 'brain you'.

I would say that what your brain wants is what you want.

[phyllo]

That's the key issue: it's the question, "Can human will cause things?"

Seriously?

Bacteria can cause disease.

Obviously humans are a cause.

"Human will" is something special?

[bahman]

Compatibilism doesn't require that the world is purely physical/material.

Accepting that there is another layer of reality that is causally efficacious leads to overdetermination.

Right. That's the key issue: it's the question, "Can human will cause things?"

If the truth behind the illusion that will can cause is physical Determinism, then the answer is decidedly "NO," -- even if we, in our ordinary experience, imagine things to be otherwise. For then, the will is nothing but an effect caused by the material (or immaterial) stuff behind it.

I am a dualist and I think that reality is made of the mind and Quidia (physical for example). The mind can experience and cause. The mind causes a state of affairs based on what it experienced before. The causation is deterministic unless the mind faces options or in other words a fork in the chain of causality. The mind can cause a new chain of causality based on its choice from the available options. So humans can freely decide.

[phyllo]

Compatibilism doesn't require that the world is purely physical/material.

Accepting that there is another layer of reality that is causally efficacious leads to overdetermination.

I don't know what "overdetermination" means in the context of human decisions and behavior.

Can you dumb it down for me with an example?

[Iwannaplato]

Compatibilism doesn't require that the world is purely physical/material.

Accepting that there is another layer of reality that is causally efficacious leads to overdetermination.

For example, it could be a non-physical monism that is compatiblist.