Compatibilism is impossible

[Atla]

Something must be off when there are 3 categories, where it should be a power of 2 in classical logic.

In the compatibilist view, free will is not necessarily the ability to choose without any constraints or external influences but rather the capacity to act in accordance with one's own desires and motivations. As long as individuals are able to make choices based on their own internal mental states, compatibilists argue that their actions can be considered free.

It's like, two groups of mathemathicans are debating whether or not the Riemann hypothesis is true. One group says yes, the other says no.
And a third group comes along and claims that their views are compatible because oranges are tasty.

[Immanuel Can]

I don't think that's it my dude

Okay. Have a go. What are the two "compatible" things in "Compatibilism"?

Well, you haven't said they're compatible at all. You literally said one is "strictly am illusion".

Right. That's what makes Compatibilism not a viable or reasonable position.

It doesn't actually make any sense. It's really Determinism, but with a superficial tip-of-the-hat to free will at the door, one that doesn't amount to more than a smokescreeen. But what people like about it is that it lets them fool themselves that they've found a middle road and included both.

But they haven't.

[Flannel Jesus]

Something must be off when there are 3 categories, where it should be a power of 2 in classical logic.

In the compatibilist view, free will is not necessarily the ability to choose without any constraints or external influences but rather the capacity to act in accordance with one's own desires and motivations. As long as individuals are able to make choices based on their own internal mental states, compatibilists argue that their actions can be considered free.

It's like, two groups of mathemathicans are debating whether or not the Riemann hypothesis is true. One group says yes, the other says no.
And a third group comes along and claims that their views are compatible because oranges are tasty.

It is a power of 2. There are 4 positions.

Free will exists and determinism isn't true.
Free will exists and determinism is true.
Free will doesn't exist and determinism isn't true.
Free will doesn't exist and determinism is true.

Compatibilists can be either of the top two positions.

Incompatiblists can hold every position except "free will exists and determinism is true."

[Flannel Jesus]

Okay. Have a go. What are the two "compatible" things in "Compatibilism"?

Well, you haven't said they're compatible at all. You literally said one is "strictly am illusion".

Right. That's what makes Compatibilism not a viable or reasonable position.

It doesn't actually make any sense.

Right, so your definition of compatibilism doesn't make sense. I think we can both agree on that

[Atla]

Something must be off when there are 3 categories, where it should be a power of 2 in classical logic.

In the compatibilist view, free will is not necessarily the ability to choose without any constraints or external influences but rather the capacity to act in accordance with one's own desires and motivations. As long as individuals are able to make choices based on their own internal mental states, compatibilists argue that their actions can be considered free.

It's like, two groups of mathemathicans are debating whether or not the Riemann hypothesis is true. One group says yes, the other says no.
And a third group comes along and claims that their views are compatible because oranges are tasty.

It is a power of 2. There are 4 positions.

Free will exists and determinism isn't true.
Free will exists and determinism is true.
Free will doesn't exist and determinism isn't true.
Free will doesn't exist and determinism is true.

Compatibilists can be either of the top two positions.

Incompatiblists can hold every position except "free will exists and determinism is true."

No offense but I think that's still just the same conflation fallacy. If we want a simple non-multiversal view with 4 positions, then I'd suggest:

1. "Deterministic free will" doesn't exist and "psychological/everyday life free will" doesn't exist.
2. "Deterministic free will" does exist and "psychological/everyday life free will" doesn't exist.
3. "Deterministic free will" doesn't exist and "psychological/everyday life free will" does exist.
4. "Deterministic free will" does exist and "psychological/everyday life free will" does exist.

[attofishpi]

Okay. Have a go. What are the two "compatible" things in "Compatibilism"?

Well, you haven't said they're compatible at all. You literally said one is "strictly am illusion".

Right. That's what makes Compatibilism not a viable or reasonable position.

It doesn't actually make any sense. It's really Determinism, but with a superficial tip-of-the-hat to free will at the door, one that doesn't amount to more than a smokescreeen. But what people like about it is that it lets them fool themselves that they've found a middle road and included both.

But they haven't.

lol

[attofishpi]

The problem for both sides is what to do with two clear facts: 1) that all choices happen within circumstances, or can be influenced by things, but 2) that our powers of making choices seem to us to be so genuine that we all act, all the time, as if Determinism is not the case. And this is the Gordian Knot that Compatibilism tries to cut: it tries to say "Determinism is true, but since we don't know it's true, and since we act like it's not, the two things are "compatible."

But they're not. Either human will makes A difference, or human will makes NO difference. If it makes any difference at all, then the "free will" position is true; if it makes none at all, then Determinism is true.

Your premises are non-sequitur to your conclusion that it's either Determinism or Free-Will with no Compatibilism.

Nobody can refute against the fundamental property of the observable universe, that it operates by deterministic causality. However, humans having free-will within that deterministic universe and having some affect on the causality of the rest of the causality of the deterministic universe does NOT mean compatibilism is not valid.

So Compatibilism has no real status or value as an explanation.

Only to you, likely because you don't like the concept of any type of determinism where the universe is concerned since that would conflict with you faith in God and 'His' direction(s).
I can help you on that point as one with understanding of God, but you probably won't want to hear what I have to say.

[Trajk Logik]

Isn't that the hard problem?

No, the hard problem of consciousness is related to the phenomena of how an unconscious matter could become conscious in a given configuration.

You mean like how a neuron (unconscious matter) becomes conscious? Is every part of the brain conscious, or is part of it unconscious matter?

What is a physical state relative to a mental state?

Physical state is a general term for state of matter but mental state only applies to the brain.

Is a brain physical? Is any part of it unconscious while other parts are conscious? How does a group of neurons "lead into" the experience of visual depth and empty space? What do you mean by "lead into" in describing how physical states "lead into" mental states?

This is a deterministic chain of causality. Free will on another hand is the ability to initiate or terminate a chain of causality. This is true since we are dealing with two options in an undecided situation which requires an agent to choose one of the options and initiate a chain of causality. This, initiating or terminating a causal chain, is impossible in a physical/deterministic world. Therefore compatibilism is impossible.

I don't see the difference. If determinism is a chain of causality and free will is the ability to start or end a chain of causality, then it's all causation/determinist, isn't it?

No, under determinism there is only one chain of causality which starts from the Big Bang and never finishes.

Right, and all of your decisions occur within that range of causal events. As I said, you don't make decisions in a vacuum. You and your decisions and actions are part of this causal chain of events.

Sure, the Big Bang was necessary for you to be here making your decisions, but so what your birth and every other event that led up to the very moment of your decision to start this thread, and then continues on with the consequences of your decision such as the responses to your thread. Your decision is a necessary cause for the subsequent consequence, so I don't know what you mean initiating or terminating a chain of causality. You'd need to provide an example. Where was your decision to start this thread terminated?

This is ignoring the fact that prior causes are part of you making a decision, and continue after you've made it in the consequences of your decision. You don't make decisions in a vacuum. Your life experiences and the current situation will determine what options you have at any given moment.

Yes, I am assuming that options are real. This means that there are two states of affairs available to choose from. This is not allowed in a deterministic world since given a state of affairs there is only one state of affairs available to choose from.

Just because you have multiple states of affairs to choose from doesn't mean that you could have chosen other than what you did. It's no different than IF-THEN statements. Decision-making has to take into account the current situation (IF) and your available choices (which is not all possible choices because you have a limited memory and limited time to make the choice), (THEN).

While making a decision, you may have several (nested) IF-THEN statements but you disqualify the THEN options when they do not fit the IF conditions. In other words, you could never have chosen those options even though they exist in your programming because the conditions for which they would have been chosen were not true.

Free will is the illusion that because you have options initially leads you to believe that any of those options are valid in some situation, but you always end up choosing one option by reasoning, and would always choose that option given the same information and the same situation.

That is not always the case. Think of a situation in which you cannot forecast the market. Reasoning has no place in such a situation. Can you invest in the market? Of course, you can although you cannot forecast the market.

We make decisions based on some information that we have in the moment. I'm willing to bet that there was some reason you invested in some stock rather than another. They may not be valid reasons, but they are still reasons all the same. We are not omniscient which is what contributes to the illusory ideas of randomness, probabilities and possibilities.

What I am arguing is that free will is impossible in a deterministic world.

Free will as an idea or illusion can exist in a deterministic world.

What?

Sure, some versions of free-will are incompatible with determinism. It comes down to how one defines free-will.

[Immanuel Can]

Well, you haven't said they're compatible at all. You literally said one is "strictly am illusion".

Right. That's what makes Compatibilism not a viable or reasonable position.

It doesn't actually make any sense.

Right, so your definition of compatibilism...

No, not "mine."

Here's what Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has to say on the subject:

"Compatibilists, on the other hand, claim that these concerns [Incompatibilist ones, that is] miss the mark. Some compatibilists hold this because they think the truth of causal determinism would not undermine our freedom to do otherwise (Berofsky 1987, Campbell 1997, Vihvelin 2013, etc.). As a result, these compatibilists tell us, the truth of causal determinism poses no threat to our status as morally responsible agents (notice the enthymematic premise here: the freedom to do otherwise is sufficient for the kind of control an agent must possess to be morally responsible for her actions). Other compatibilists show less concern in rebutting the conclusion that the freedom to do otherwise is incompatible with determinism. Compatibilists of this stripe reject the idea that such freedom is necessary for meaningful forms of free will (e.g., Frankfurt 1969, 1971; Watson 1975, Dennett 1984)—the “varieties of free will worth wanting,” (Dennett 1984). And even more notably, some compatibilists simply deny that freedom of this sort is in any way connected to morally responsible agency (e.g., Fischer 1994, Fischer & Ravizza 1998, Scanlon 1998, Wallace 1994, Sartorio 2016)."

You'll notice that in all three of the current versions of Compatibilism, it's the "freedom" component that's up for grabs. It's not the Determinism one. All that they appear to disagree about is how to explain away the "freedom" side of the equation. So as I said, they hold that Determinism is ultimate, the thing that cannot be really doubted, and free will is the doubtful element, something merely negotiable or to-be-explained-away in some form.

As for their differences, Stanford concludes: "What we see here is not a unified front in the face of the incompatibilist challenge(s)." In other words, there really isn't a singular, compelling Compatibilism, just three (or more) different attempts to deal with the alleged deep reality of Determinism by dispensing with the "freedom" problem in some way.

[Flannel Jesus]

And you'll notice not a single one called it an illusion.

[bahman]

Isn't that the hard problem?

No, the hard problem of consciousness is related to the phenomena of how an unconscious matter could become conscious in a given configuration.

You mean like how a neuron (unconscious matter) becomes conscious? Is every part of the brain conscious, or is part of it unconscious matter?

No, I mean how the brain can be conscious given the fact that its parts, electrons, protons, etc. are unconscious.

What is a physical state relative to a mental state?

Physical state is a general term for state of matter but mental state only applies to the brain.

Is a brain physical?

Yes.

Is any part of it unconscious while other parts are conscious?

Probably. No one knows.

How does a group of neurons "lead into" the experience of visual depth and empty space?

That is the hard problem of consciousness. No one has an answer for that.

What do you mean by "lead into" in describing how physical states "lead into" mental states?

I said one mental state leads to another mental state following the laws of nature.

I don't see the difference. If determinism is a chain of causality and free will is the ability to start or end a chain of causality, then it's all causation/determinist, isn't it?

No, under determinism there is only one chain of causality which starts from the Big Bang and never finishes.

Right, and all of your decisions occur within that range of causal events. As I said, you don't make decisions in a vacuum. You and your decisions and actions are part of this causal chain of events.

That is the problem: How can you decide to do otherwise if there is only one chain of causality?

Sure, the Big Bang was necessary for you to be here making your decisions, but so what your birth and every other event that led up to the very moment of your decision to start this thread, and then continues on with the consequences of your decision such as the responses to your thread. Your decision is a necessary cause for the subsequent consequence, so I don't know what you mean initiating or terminating a chain of causality. You'd need to provide an example. Where was your decision to start this thread terminated?

The point is whether I could do otherwise, don't start this thread. This means that we are dealing with options when a decision is needed. This means that a chain of causality forks at the point when a decision is needed. The system cannot evolve deterministically in such a situation given the definition of determinism. Therefore, an agent with the capacity to decide is needed.

This is ignoring the fact that prior causes are part of you making a decision, and continue after you've made it in the consequences of your decision. You don't make decisions in a vacuum. Your life experiences and the current situation will determine what options you have at any given moment.

Yes, I am assuming that options are real. This means that there are two states of affairs available to choose from. This is not allowed in a deterministic world since given a state of affairs there is only one state of affairs available to choose from.

Just because you have multiple states of affairs to choose from doesn't mean that you could have chosen other than what you did. It's no different than IF-THEN statements. Decision-making has to take into account the current situation (IF) and your available choices (which is not all possible choices because you have a limited memory and limited time to make the choice), (THEN).

While making a decision, you may have several (nested) IF-THEN statements but you disqualify the THEN options when they do not fit the IF conditions. In other words, you could never have chosen those options even though they exist in your programming because the conditions for which they would have been chosen were not true.

So you are not free.

Free will is the illusion that because you have options initially leads you to believe that any of those options are valid in some situation, but you always end up choosing one option by reasoning, and would always choose that option given the same information and the same situation.

That is not always the case. Think of a situation in which you cannot forecast the market. Reasoning has no place in such a situation. Can you invest in the market? Of course, you can although you cannot forecast the market.

We make decisions based on some information that we have in the moment. I'm willing to bet that there was some reason you invested in some stock rather than another. They may not be valid reasons, but they are still reasons all the same. We are not omniscient which is what contributes to the illusory ideas of randomness, probabilities and possibilities.

Well, there cannot be any reason if you cannot forecast the market. You might lose or gain money which is not clear at the point of decision.

Free will as an idea or illusion can exist in a deterministic world.

What?

Sure, some versions of free-will are incompatible with determinism. It comes down to how one defines free-will.

Well, people define free-will differently, some of them mix free will with will.

[Immanuel Can]

And you'll notice not a single one called it an illusion.

Not using that word, no: and yet every single one of them thinks that it's freedom that's up for grabs, and not one of them thinks predetermination is. That's because, as I said, Compatibilism is really a kind of mental mistake, a confusing of explaining-away one element of the problem with having solved the problem of the conflict between the two. It also explains why there are different slants on Compatibilism, since it's not a single, coherent position at all.

Just saying.

[attofishpi]

And you'll notice not a single one called it an illusion.

Not using that word, no: and yet every single one of them thinks that it's freedom that's up for grabs, and not one of them thinks predetermination is. That's because, as I said, Compatibilism is really a kind of mental mistake, a confusing of explaining-away one element of the problem with having solved the problem of the conflict between the two. It also explains why there are different slants on Compatibilism, since it's not a single, coherent position at all.

Just saying.

Y is it most idiots insist on saying that.

The problem for both sides is what to do with two clear facts: 1) that all choices happen within circumstances, or can be influenced by things, but 2) that our powers of making choices seem to us to be so genuine that we all act, all the time, as if Determinism is not the case. And this is the Gordian Knot that Compatibilism tries to cut: it tries to say "Determinism is true, but since we don't know it's true, and since we act like it's not, the two things are "compatible."

But they're not. Either human will makes A difference, or human will makes NO difference. If it makes any difference at all, then the "free will" position is true; if it makes none at all, then Determinism is true.

Your premises are non-sequitur to your conclusion that it's either Determinism or Free-Will with no Compatibilism.

Nobody can refute against the fundamental property of the observable universe, that it operates by deterministic causality. However, humans having free-will within that deterministic universe and having some affect on the causality of the rest of the causality of the deterministic universe does NOT mean compatibilism is not valid.

So Compatibilism has no real status or value as an explanation.

Only to you, likely because you don't like the concept of any type of determinism where the universe is concerned since that would conflict with you faith in God and 'His' direction(s).

I can help you on that point as one with understanding of God, but you probably won't want to hear what I have to say.

PS. I am not sure how the "ignore list" works (because I think it is a pathetic concept) but perhaps you are failing to have the chance to address me,

[phyllo]

So you are not free.

What does it mean to be 'free'?

Compatibilism says you have the freedom to do what you want.

What greater freedom does free-will give you? The freedom to do what you don't want?

[bahman]

So you are not free.

What does it mean to be 'free'?

Compatibilism says you have the freedom to do what you want.

What greater freedom does free-will give you? The freedom to do what you don't want?

Yes, for example, freedom to do what you don't want!