Compatibilism is impossible

[Flannel Jesus]

Well, I had a quick look at the article. It would take me a long time to discuss the article here arguing with what I agree or disagree. I have an issue with the definition of free will that you cited, namely the classical definition: "For the classical compatibilist, then, free will is an ability to do what one wants." This to me is the definition of will rather than free will.

It's okay if you don't like the compatiblist definition of free will. Plenty of people don't. But then the position is not so much "compatibilism is impossible" as it is "I don't like compatibilist semantics".

Which is fine. There's no law saying you have to like it. Rejecting compatibilism for semantic reasons is a completely normal and common thing many thinkers do. But there's not really much to talk about after that - you use one definition of "free will", they use another, so what else is there to say?

[bahman]

Well, I had a quick look at the article. It would take me a long time to discuss the article here arguing with what I agree or disagree. I have an issue with the definition of free will that you cited, namely the classical definition: "For the classical compatibilist, then, free will is an ability to do what one wants." This to me is the definition of will rather than free will.

It's okay if you don't like the compatiblist definition of free will. Plenty of people don't. But then the position is not so much "compatibilism is impossible" as it is "I don't like compatibilist semantics".

Which is fine. There's no law saying you have to like it. Rejecting compatibilism for semantic reasons is a completely normal and common thing many thinkers do. But there's not really much to talk about after that - you use one definition of "free will", they use another, so what else is there to say?

It would be difficult to convince confused people. I agree with that if that is what you want to say. Mixing will with free will is an unacceptable mistake to me. Define free will according to the classical definition and achieve what you want, hurray, such an achievement, in other words, failure in my opinion!

[Immanuel Can]

Well, I had a quick look at the article. It would take me a long time to discuss the article here arguing with what I agree or disagree. I have an issue with the definition of free will that you cited, namely the classical definition: "For the classical compatibilist, then, free will is an ability to do what one wants." This to me is the definition of will rather than free will.

It's okay if you don't like the compatiblist definition of free will. Plenty of people don't. But then the position is not so much "compatibilism is impossible" as it is "I don't like compatibilist semantics".

Which is fine. There's no law saying you have to like it. Rejecting compatibilism for semantic reasons is a completely normal and common thing many thinkers do. But there's not really much to talk about after that - you use one definition of "free will", they use another, so what else is there to say?

Actually, the adjective "free" in "free will" is usually appended to distinguish the concept from "constrained will," or Determinism, not to suggest that will ever operates with absolutely no conditions or circumstances involved.

The idea is to emphasize that volition is a genuine causal agency, and that people's choices can make a difference in what happens; whereas, under Determinism, will is said to be just an "epiphenomenon," or "seeming," with the deep truth remaining that everything, including the appearance of volition, is actually predetermined by material causes of some kind.

The problem for both sides is what to do with two clear facts: 1) that all choices happen within circumstances, or can be influenced by things, but 2) that our powers of making choices seem to us to be so genuine that we all act, all the time, as if Determinism is not the case. And this is the Gordian Knot that Compatibilism tries to cut: it tries to say "Determinism is true, but since we don't know it's true, and since we act like it's not, the two things are "compatible."

But they're not. Either human will makes A difference, or human will makes NO difference. If it makes any difference at all, then the "free will" position is true; if it makes none at all, then Determinism is true.

So Compatibilism has no real status or value as an explanation.

[LuckyR]

I think we can agree on the fact that the brain is a set of neurons that interact with each other. Any mental state, the physical state of the brain, leads into another mental state by following the laws of physics. This is a deterministic chain of causality. Free will on another hand is the ability to initiate or terminate a chain of causality. This is true since we are dealing with two options in an undecided situation which requires an agent to choose one of the options and initiate a chain of causality. This, initiating or terminating a causal chain, is impossible in a physical/deterministic world. Therefore compatibilism is impossible.

So if Determinists say that antecedent state X can only lead to resultant state Y (never Z) and Free Will says that antecedent state X can possibly lead to resultant states Y, Z and W, what is your understanding of the Compatiblist argument?

[bahman]

I think we can agree on the fact that the brain is a set of neurons that interact with each other. Any mental state, the physical state of the brain, leads into another mental state by following the laws of physics. This is a deterministic chain of causality. Free will on another hand is the ability to initiate or terminate a chain of causality. This is true since we are dealing with two options in an undecided situation which requires an agent to choose one of the options and initiate a chain of causality. This, initiating or terminating a causal chain, is impossible in a physical/deterministic world. Therefore compatibilism is impossible.

So if Determinists say that antecedent state X can only lead to resultant state Y (never Z) and Free Will says that antecedent state X can possibly lead to resultant states Y, Z and W, what is your understanding of the Compatiblist argument?

Determinism is valid if there is only one state of affairs available at any given point in time so the system goes from one state of affairs to another one. A system cannot evolve deterministically when there are options given the definition of determinism.

[LuckyR]

I think we can agree on the fact that the brain is a set of neurons that interact with each other. Any mental state, the physical state of the brain, leads into another mental state by following the laws of physics. This is a deterministic chain of causality. Free will on another hand is the ability to initiate or terminate a chain of causality. This is true since we are dealing with two options in an undecided situation which requires an agent to choose one of the options and initiate a chain of causality. This, initiating or terminating a causal chain, is impossible in a physical/deterministic world. Therefore compatibilism is impossible.

So if Determinists say that antecedent state X can only lead to resultant state Y (never Z) and Free Will says that antecedent state X can possibly lead to resultant states Y, Z and W, what is your understanding of the Compatiblist argument?

Determinism is valid if there is only one state of affairs available at any given point in time so the system goes from one state of affairs to another one. A system cannot evolve deterministically when there are options given the definition of determinism.

So, Compatiblism says...?

[attofishpi]

The problem for both sides is what to do with two clear facts: 1) that all choices happen within circumstances, or can be influenced by things, but 2) that our powers of making choices seem to us to be so genuine that we all act, all the time, as if Determinism is not the case. And this is the Gordian Knot that Compatibilism tries to cut: it tries to say "Determinism is true, but since we don't know it's true, and since we act like it's not, the two things are "compatible."

But they're not. Either human will makes A difference, or human will makes NO difference. If it makes any difference at all, then the "free will" position is true; if it makes none at all, then Determinism is true.

Your premises are non-sequitur to your conclusion that it's either Determinism or Free-Will with no Compatibilism.

Nobody can refute against the fundamental property of the observable universe, that it operates by deterministic causality. However, humans having free-will within that deterministic universe and having some affect on the causality of the rest of the causality of the deterministic universe does NOT mean compatibilism is not valid.

So Compatibilism has no real status or value as an explanation.

Only to you, likely because you don't like the concept of any type of determinism where the universe is concerned since that would conflict with you faith in God and 'His' direction(s).
I can help you on that point as one with understanding of God, but you probably won't want to hear what I have to say.

[Flannel Jesus]

So, Compatiblism says...?

Your question was very clear. Hopefully there's a similarly clear answer forthcoming.

[Immanuel Can]

So, Compatiblism says...?

Determinism: "All events and phenomena are predetermined by prior physical causes" (not including human will, which is not authentic).

Free Will: "Human volition is a causal agency, even if constrained to one degree or another by circumstances or material events."

Compatibilism: "Both, in a sense: but only in that Determinism is ultimate truth, and free will is strictly an illusion within which we all live."

[Flannel Jesus]

Compatibilism: "Both, in a sense: but only in that Determinism is ultimate truth, and free will is strictly an illusion within which we all live."

I don't think that's it my dude

[bahman]

So if Determinists say that antecedent state X can only lead to resultant state Y (never Z) and Free Will says that antecedent state X can possibly lead to resultant states Y, Z and W, what is your understanding of the Compatiblist argument?

Determinism is valid if there is only one state of affairs available at any given point in time so the system goes from one state of affairs to another one. A system cannot evolve deterministically when there are options given the definition of determinism.

So, Compatibilism says...?

Well, they have lots of arguments that you can find here. For example, classical compatibilists define free will as an ability to do what one wants. That is however the definition of will rather than free will. Others denied that freedom requires the ability to do otherwise. When it comes to the consequence argument they object all sorts of nonsense you can find in the manuscript.

[attofishpi]

Compatibilism: "Both, in a sense: but only in that Determinism is ultimate truth, and free will is strictly an illusion within which we all live."

I don't think that's it my dude

Ya, and he's got me on ignore, bloody wimp!

[bahman]

The problem for both sides is what to do with two clear facts: 1) that all choices happen within circumstances, or can be influenced by things, but 2) that our powers of making choices seem to us to be so genuine that we all act, all the time, as if Determinism is not the case. And this is the Gordian Knot that Compatibilism tries to cut: it tries to say "Determinism is true, but since we don't know it's true, and since we act like it's not, the two things are "compatible."

But they're not. Either human will makes A difference, or human will makes NO difference. If it makes any difference at all, then the "free will" position is true; if it makes none at all, then Determinism is true.

Your premises are non-sequitur to your conclusion that it's either Determinism or Free-Will with no Compatibilism.

Nobody can refute against the fundamental property of the observable universe, that it operates by deterministic causality. However, humans having free-will within that deterministic universe and having some affect on the causality of the rest of the causality of the deterministic universe does NOT mean compatibilism is not valid.

So Compatibilism has no real status or value as an explanation.

Only to you, likely because you don't like the concept of any type of determinism where the universe is concerned since that would conflict with you faith in God and 'His' direction(s).
I can help you on that point as one with understanding of God, but you probably won't want to hear what I have to say.

How could humans be causally efficacious if the world evolves deterministically?

[Immanuel Can]

Compatibilism: "Both, in a sense: but only in that Determinism is ultimate truth, and free will is strictly an illusion within which we all live."

I don't think that's it my dude

Okay. Have a go. What are the two "compatible" things in "Compatibilism"?

[Flannel Jesus]

Compatibilism: "Both, in a sense: but only in that Determinism is ultimate truth, and free will is strictly an illusion within which we all live."

I don't think that's it my dude

Okay. Have a go. What are the two "compatible" things in "Compatibilism"?

Well, you haven't said they're compatible at all. You literally said one is "strictly am illusion". That's... actually more like what anybody who DOESN'T believe in free will would say. If it must be an illusion because determinism is the case, that's explicitly incompatiblism.