compatibilism

[iambiguous]

Fine, let him explain all that to Jane. Let him explain how Mom was never able not to give birth to her, but here she is.

Now, a libertarian might suggest instead that, "you are with us now, Jane, because your mother did have free will and a friend of hers persuaded her not to abort you".

Different possibilities are likely in both a determined and in a free will world. But only in the free will universe are they attributable to men and women who were able to opt among conflicting possibilities.

"Jane, you're here because your mother didn't abort you"

Happy now?

Click.

It wouldn't surprise me in the least if you were convinced not only that this is really, really clever, but that it also encompasses a really, really profound insight as well.

But the bottom line [mine "here and now"] is that had Mary been compelled by a brain wholly in sync with the laws of matter to abort Jane, you wouldn't be telling her much at all. Except perhaps in a metal institution?

After all, why on Earth do any number of free will advocates come back again and again to insisting that human autonomy is crucial in order to hold people morally responsible for their behaviors?

Most people behave as compatibilists. They punish those who break the rules ... they hold them responsible for their actions.
I posted a study about this either at ILP or here. I suppose it's pointless to look for it and repost it.

Right, and around and around we go here. Bill breaks the law because he was never able not to. Society punishes Bill because it was never able not to. Only any number of compatibilists will still insist that Bill and society are morally responsible for doing what they could never have not done. But that too is only because they are compelled by their brains to insist that.

These anonymous "free will advocates" are arguing 'moral responsibility' from their comfy couches. If some serial rapist was stalking their neighborhood, they would lock him up whether he had autonomy or not. Right?

What's a "comfy couch" have to do with it? Again, if the serial rapist rapes because he was never able not to and the community locks him up because it was never able not to...?

Compelled or not, we think about this differently. So, is there anyone here who can link us to the argument or the scientific research that settles it once and for all?

It happened because John's argument did not persuade her. But that's not to say that another argument from another person would also have been rejected. What's crucial from the perspective of the truly hardcore determinists is that any arguments from anyone at all were futile because Mary's brain compelled her to abort Jane. John and myself and others involved were but more dominoes toppling over on cue.

Maybe she would reject every argument.

And maybe that's because she was never able not to.

Maybe she doesn't want a child under any circumstances.

Click.

Oh, she wanted children. Just not there and then.

A child is what you and John want.

Click.

On the contrary, as a Marxist feminist back then I supported her. It's just that John was making arguments that neither one of us could make go away. Then in conjunction with William Barrett's "rival goods", my own objective morality started to crumble. Now I am hopelessly drawn and quartered regarding conflicting value judgments. Only I may well not have been able not to be.

You seem to have no respect for what Mary wants. You don't seem to consider that what Mary does, is fulfilling Mary's real desires in the situation.

Again, I supported her decision. On the other hand, in a free will world, the same could be said of John. What he wanted and desired and why he wanted and desired it.

The part I root existentially in dasein and you root essentially in...what exactly?

The idea that "Mary's brain compelled her to abort", denies the possibility that Mary's brain represents her will.

Right, her will. And where does that originate...in God? The will to abort? The will to give birth? Only with God, some insist that her own will had damn well be in sync with His will.

[phyllo]

Click.

It wouldn't surprise me in the least if you were convinced not only that this is really, really clever, but that it also encompasses a really, really profound insight as well.

But the bottom line [mine "here and now"] is that had Mary been compelled by a brain wholly in sync with the laws of matter to abort Jane, you wouldn't be telling her much at all. Except perhaps in a metal institution?

I don't know why the fuck you want people to talk to "Jane"? Over and over.

What's the discussion about? What is she asking? What does she want to know? Why is she talking to me or Sam Harris or someone on this site?

Your "bottom line" implies that if Mary had free-will then "Jane" would be alive but she in not because of determinism.

When posters point out that implication, you deny that's what you are saying.

So what the fuck are you saying?

[Flannel Jesus]

So what the fuck are you saying?

It's in the name. "Iambiguous". Saved my self a lot of annoyance when I realized that his name tells the whole story.

[iambiguous]

Click.

It wouldn't surprise me in the least if you were convinced not only that this is really, really clever, but that it also encompasses a really, really profound insight as well.

But the bottom line [mine "here and now"] is that had Mary been compelled by a brain wholly in sync with the laws of matter to abort Jane, you wouldn't be telling her much at all. Except perhaps in a metal institution?

I don't know why the fuck you want people to talk to "Jane"? Over and over.

What I want is for the compatibilists among us to explain how they reconcile Mary never being able not to abort her unborn baby with Mary still being morally responsible for doing so. Again, the only way this makes sense to me is because in holding her morally responsible this too is something that they were compelled by their brains to do.

And Jane because her very postpartum existence itself is on the line here. No free will and she's shredded.

What's the discussion about? What is she asking? What does she want to know? Why is she talking to me or Sam Harris or someone on this site?

Well, someone might ask her, "suppose your mother was compelled by her brain wholly in sync with the laws of matter to abort you?"

And the fact that she is around to discuss anything at all with anyone at all revolves [in my view] around the assumption that her mother was not compelled to abort her. Now, depending on how content or miserable her life is at the time, she might be grateful to Mom or not. She might even be thinking seriously about suicide. But only in a free will world is that option not "beyond her control".

Your "bottom line" implies that if Mary had free-will then "Jane" would be alive but she in not because of determinism.

When posters point out that implication, you deny that's what you are saying.

So what the fuck are you saying?

More to the point [mine]: what the fuck are you reading?

Now, that's your bottom line regarding my bottom line. My own assumption "here and now" is that her friend's argument persuaded her to change her mind...but it might not have. After all, John's arguments didn't work on her. But if we lived in a world where John's arguments were in turn beyond his control...?

[iambiguous]

So what the fuck are you saying?

It's in the name. "Iambiguous". Saved my self a lot of annoyance when I realized that his name tells the whole story.

Why does this not surprise me?

Just for the record, however, the ambiguities in my life revolve around 1] "I" in the is/ought world 2] God and religion and 3] the Big questions like determinism/free will/compatibilism.

In the either/or world, on the other hand, reality is just as objective for me as for others.

[phyllo]

What I want is for the compatibilists among us to explain how they reconcile Mary never being able not to abort her unborn baby with Mary still being morally responsible for doing so.

I have done it, FJ has done it and IWP must have done it at least a half dozen times.

phyllo wrote: ↑Sat Dec 02, 2023 6:18 pm
Your "bottom line" implies that if Mary had free-will then "Jane" would be alive but she in not because of determinism.

When posters point out that implication, you deny that's what you are saying.

You wrote it again:

No free will and she's shredded.

Now, your nuance is ... In a deterministic world, Mary always gets an abortion, but in a free-will world she might or might not get an abortion.

But if we are talking to "Jane" then Mary definitely did not get an abortion. So the way you have presented the situation only gives two possibilities ... determinism = abortion, free-will = talking to "Jane", no abortion.

[Iwannaplato]

Now, your nuance is ... In a deterministic world, Mary always gets an abortion, but in a free-will world she might or might not get an abortion.

But if we are talking to "Jane" then Mary definitely did not get an abortion. So the way you have presented the situation only gives two possibilities ... determinism = abortion, free-will = talking to "Jane", no abortion.

Sometimes it seems like he is performing and asking us to perform a very weird moral rubik's cube.

There is a real abortion in his personal past. It happened. I assume he has changed the names.

So, in a determinist world, well that happened and was always going to happen. So, that happened.

But if we mentally go back in time to before that actual real abortion that happened, if it is still a determined world, well, it's going to happen again.

But if we mentally go back in time to before this specific, single example of an abortion and then there was free will, then someone might have changed her mind, or she could have changed her mind herself.

So, in related to that particular instance of abortion then and if we go back in time before it, then determinism means it must happen (again?) but free will means it might have happened.

And then he writes about this extremely odd thought experiment as if is a general rule.

If you point out that he is/seems to be making a very odd, extremely unjustified general rule (and you get lucky and he actually responds to this directly, he will deny having made this general rule. I believe he managed to be that clear with FJ once.

But then he will go back to making what seems like a general rule over and over anyway.

I think that is what is going on, but I'm not sure because it is a pleasant exception when he directly responds to points people make in a way that shows he understands what they are saying. Most responses are rehashes of what he has said hundreds of times before without having made it clear he understood the post he is responding to and sometimes not even clear he has read it.

I also think he has a very hard time seeing other perspectives. He can imagine other philosophical positions, to some degree.

But he can't seem to manage to have the kind if 'in-the-middle-of-a-discussion' insight into the perspective of his readers to be able to come to statements like:

Ah, ok. I see how I could have been clearer about X and this led you to think Y.

He's capable of saying he may be missing something (noticing his own confusion). But he cannot look at his own communication, see what people are responding to, and either finds a new way to communicate it that specifically avoids the confusion he is creating or justifies the claims he seems to be making.

So, he carries ambiguities (note the warning in his name) forward through time, impervious to improving communication.

And sometimes this seems rather convenient, which doesn't mean it's a conscious pattern.

IOW it is possible he is very concerned about the moral judgment of this particular individual Mary (and perhaps himself and what he did or did not do in his real life). So, he has this thought experiment about this specific case, and has this in the manner I explained above. But then he writes about it in ways that imply unjustified conclusions about abortion (and free will and determinism) in general.

When it is pointed out he really doesn't understand what people are talking about, mulling in his head about this specific, real life case.

Now, I'm sure he will see this focus on HIM as Stooge behavior. But there is a real life problem with the way he communicates and it affects the few people who actually spend some energy trying to communicate with him - which is taking him seriously. Getting around the impasse requires focus on him. But given that he doesn't seem able to take feedback to get a sense of the perspectives of people he is discussing these issues with, I respond on occasion to you and FJ, given that I think you both can see the perspectives of others and also can have some alternate perspectives on how you yourselves are communicating.

[iambiguous]

Why Sam Harris is confused about free will
Dan Jones

It’s good to know that if Harris found himself doing something out of character he would excuse himself from responsibility for his actions. But I would wager that most people, if they heard that Sam Harris got caught stealing anchovies, would hold him responsible even if he doesn’t have a history of theft.

Or [perhaps] it's better to know that if you find yourself doing something out of character it then dawns on you that nothing that you do can ever be out of character if your character itself is "beyond your control". Both genetically and memetically. Excusing yourself is no exception. Same with holding Sam responsible. You did so because it was never an option not to do so.

Then [again] this part...

But that’s not the real problem. The deeper issue is that everything in Harris’s scenario ­— the thoughts, intentions, beliefs and desires — are the product of deterministic processes.

Those "internal" components of the human mind? And the part where the brain ends and the mind begins?

On Harris’s view, there’s no more real agency here than in a rain cloud. That is, thoughts, intentions and so on are part of the causal story of why someone behaved as they did, and help establish causal responsibility for their actions, but the same goes for clouds: the conditions in them are causally responsible for the rain they produce. In neither case, however, does causal responsibility establish or entail moral responsibility.

Now, how would Harris respond to this himself in terms of his own arguments? Was he or was he not capable of arguing anything other than what his brain compelled him to? And yet if it is the case that he was not, then wouldn't he have to acknowledge in turn that, in regard to the many debates he has with others over this and over God and religion, they merely played out as would rain falling from a cloud?

Again, compatibilist philosophers attempt to provide a way of thinking about thoughts, intentions, beliefs and desires that could support a worthwhile concept of moral agency and responsibility — but Harris wants nothing to do with this.

And "here and now" I don't either. Which is why I would be curious to hear Sam's assessment of Mary and Jane.

As so if clouds aren’t responsible for the typhoons they visit upon people in a morally relevant sense, then why and how are people ever morally responsible for the behaviour they direct towards other people?

Uh, good point?

[iambiguous]

What I want is for the compatibilists among us to explain how they reconcile Mary never being able not to abort her unborn baby with Mary still being morally responsible for doing so.

I have done it, FJ has done it and IWP must have done it at least a half dozen times.

Well, in that case -- click -- your understanding of having "done it" is very different from mine.

Your "bottom line" implies that if Mary had free-will then "Jane" would be alive but she in not because of determinism.

When posters point out that implication, you deny that's what you are saying.

You wrote it again:

No free will and she's shredded.

And that is because I was referring to Mary and the unborn baby that she did abort. As I noted above, however, there was always the possibility in a free will world that someone might have persuaded her not to abort the baby. Aside from John, I'm not really sure who else among her family and friends she might have talked to about the pregnancy. What's crucial though is that there either is some measure of autonomy in the human brain or there is not.

Is there? Well, given my own attempt to "think it through" I have come to conclude -- here and now -- that sans God it does not appear likely. Not if the human brain is itself just more matter.

Now, your nuance is ... In a deterministic world, Mary always gets an abortion, but in a free-will world she might or might not get an abortion.

Complete bullshit from my frame of mind. And my "nuance" still revolves around this:

All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter.

Then those here who actually believe that what they believe about all of this reflects, what, the ontological truth about the human condition itself?

Then those who are compelled in turn to insist on a teleological component as well. Usually in the form of one or another God.

Meanwhile, philosophers and scientists and theologians have been grappling with this profound mystery now for thousands of years.

Again, unless, of course, someone here can link me to a philosophical or scientific or theological argument that resolves all of that. Going back to where the human condition fits into the existence of existence itself.

[phyllo]

Well, in that case -- click -- your understanding of having "done it" is very different from mine.

Your understanding of "done it" is : an argument that all reasonable men and women are obligated to accept.
(And I'm being generous by leaving out the word 'optimal'.)

My understand of "done it" is : a reasonable argument or description.

All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter.

Then those here who actually believe that what they believe about all of this reflects, what, the ontological truth about the human condition itself?

Then those who are compelled in turn to insist on a teleological component as well. Usually in the form of one or another God.

Meanwhile, philosophers and scientists and theologians have been grappling with this profound mystery now for thousands of years.

Again, unless, of course, someone here can link me to a philosophical or scientific or theological argument that resolves all of that. Going back to where the human condition fits into the existence of existence itself.

All you want is a complete and certain answer to everything.

Talk about unrealistic expectations.

[phyllo]

In neither case, however, does causal responsibility establish or entail moral responsibility.

There is no difference between "responsibility" and "moral responsibility".

As so if clouds aren’t responsible for the typhoons they visit upon people in a morally relevant sense, then why and how are people ever morally responsible for the behaviour they direct towards other people?

If putting clouds in prison would prevent typhoons, then we would do it.

We already do similar things:

Cliffs are covered in wire mesh to prevent rock falls.

Snow is blasted by cannons to prevent accumulation and subsequent avalanches.

Water is constrained in various ways (dams, breakwaters, levees, etc) to prevent destructive events.

[phyllo]

Now, your nuance is ... In a deterministic world, Mary always gets an abortion, but in a free-will world she might or might not get an abortion.

But if we are talking to "Jane" then Mary definitely did not get an abortion. So the way you have presented the situation only gives two possibilities ... determinism = abortion, free-will = talking to "Jane", no abortion.

Sometimes it seems like he is performing and asking us to perform a very weird moral rubik's cube.

There is a real abortion in his personal past. It happened. I assume he has changed the names.

So, in a determinist world, well that happened and was always going to happen. So, that happened.

But if we mentally go back in time to before that actual real abortion that happened, if it is still a determined world, well, it's going to happen again.

But if we mentally go back in time to before this specific, single example of an abortion and then there was free will, then someone might have changed her mind, or she could have changed her mind herself.

So, in related to that particular instance of abortion then and if we go back in time before it, then determinism means it must happen (again?) but free will means it might have happened.

And then he writes about this extremely odd thought experiment as if is a general rule.

If you point out that he is/seems to be making a very odd, extremely unjustified general rule (and you get lucky and he actually responds to this directly, he will deny having made this general rule. I believe he managed to be that clear with FJ once.

But then he will go back to making what seems like a general rule over and over anyway.

I think that is what is going on, but I'm not sure because it is a pleasant exception when he directly responds to points people make in a way that shows he understands what they are saying. Most responses are rehashes of what he has said hundreds of times before without having made it clear he understood the post he is responding to and sometimes not even clear he has read it.

I also think he has a very hard time seeing other perspectives. He can imagine other philosophical positions, to some degree.

But he can't seem to manage to have the kind if 'in-the-middle-of-a-discussion' insight into the perspective of his readers to be able to come to statements like:

Ah, ok. I see how I could have been clearer about X and this led you to think Y.

He's capable of saying he may be missing something (noticing his own confusion). But he cannot look at his own communication, see what people are responding to, and either finds a new way to communicate it that specifically avoids the confusion he is creating or justifies the claims he seems to be making.

So, he carries ambiguities (note the warning in his name) forward through time, impervious to improving communication.

And sometimes this seems rather convenient, which doesn't mean it's a conscious pattern.

IOW it is possible he is very concerned about the moral judgment of this particular individual Mary (and perhaps himself and what he did or did not do in his real life). So, he has this thought experiment about this specific case, and has this in the manner I explained above. But then he writes about it in ways that imply unjustified conclusions about abortion (and free will and determinism) in general.

When it is pointed out he really doesn't understand what people are talking about, mulling in his head about this specific, real life case.

Now, I'm sure he will see this focus on HIM as Stooge behavior. But there is a real life problem with the way he communicates and it affects the few people who actually spend some energy trying to communicate with him - which is taking him seriously. Getting around the impasse requires focus on him. But given that he doesn't seem able to take feedback to get a sense of the perspectives of people he is discussing these issues with, I respond on occasion to you and FJ, given that I think you both can see the perspectives of others and also can have some alternate perspectives on how you yourselves are communicating.

That sums it up pretty well.

I would just add that he does not seem to recognize that he is in a particular unique situation.

He knows that an abortion took place ... therefore, in a determined world, Mary could never not have had an abortion.

But if events had been slightly different, when a chance encounter makes Mary change her mind and Mary gives birth, he would be here making a completely different claim ... in a determined world, Mary could never have had an abortion.

Sure, that didn't happen. But if we are in a free-will world, it didn't happen to free-will Mary either. Why entertain the possibility in a free-will world but not in a determined world?

[Iwannaplato]

That sums it up pretty well.

I would just add that he does not seem to recognize that he is in a particular unique situation.

He knows that an abortion took place ... therefore, Mary could never not had an abortion.

But if events had been slightly different, when a chance encounter makes Mary change her mind and Mary gives birth, he would be here making a completely different claim ... Mary could never have had an abortion.

Sure, that didn't happen. But if we are in a free-will world, it didn't happen to free-will Mary either. Why entertain the possibility in a free-will world but not in a determined world?

That's a good way of putting it.
It would be great if a similar poster with the opposite experience and the same way of framing the issue arrive.
This not-iambiguous was with someone who did not have an abortion but died in childbirth.
Someone talked her OUT of getting an abortion.
So, he's always asking about a Mary who died and a Jane who lived. And making (seeming) generalizations about the effects of free will/determinism on abortion and parental survival, except they are not the same as Iambiguous's.

Or the not-Iambiguous ended up being the father of Pol Pot or some serial killer. And they explain how the fact that not having an abortion leads to the death of many people, in the context of free will and determinism.

Then it'd be time to take out the popcorn.

[Flannel Jesus]

That sums it up pretty well.

I would just add that he does not seem to recognize that he is in a particular unique situation.

He knows that an abortion took place ... therefore, Mary could never not had an abortion.

But if events had been slightly different, when a chance encounter makes Mary change her mind and Mary gives birth, he would be here making a completely different claim ... Mary could never have had an abortion.

Sure, that didn't happen. But if we are in a free-will world, it didn't happen to free-will Mary either. Why entertain the possibility in a free-will world but not in a determined world?

That's a good way of putting it.
It would be great if a similar poster with the opposite experience and the same way of framing the issue arrive.

The reason that will never happen is because it's beside the point. Iambiguous is just miscommunicating what he's actually trying to say, and if he knew how to communicate it clearly, none of this would be a problem.

What he's actually trying to say, I think -- this is the most charitable interpretation, a steelman if you will -- is that, if we have Mary in a determined universe, and we have a very very similar Mary in a "free will" universe - which I will assume to mean Libertarian free will at this point, because he seems to be putting this "free will" universe as being mutually exclusive with determinism - then what Iambiguous is saying is, if both versions of Mary have an abortion, it makes sense to hold the Libertarian Free Will version of Mary "responsible" but not the determinism one, because the libertarian free will version of Mary *could have done otherwise* but the determinism one couldn't.

THAT'S what he's spending so much breath failing at saying, as far as I can tell.

[phyllo]

What he's actually trying to say, I think -- this is the most charitable interpretation, a steelman if you will -- is that, if we have Mary in a determined universe, and we have a very very similar Mary in a "free will" universe - which I will assume to mean Libertarian free will at this point, because he seems to be putting this "free will" universe as being mutually exclusive with determinism - then what Iambiguous is saying is, if both versions of Mary have an abortion, it makes sense to hold the Libertarian Free Will version of Mary "responsible" but not the determinism one, because the libertarian free will version of Mary *could have done otherwise* but the determinism one couldn't.

Before one moves on to 'responsibility', one has to be clear about the decisions and actions that can occur in free-will and determined worlds.

We're not in agreement on that.

People are not actors performing a script.