Good and Evil

[Gary Childress]

Can you explain both of your quotations above, then?

How is it that "evil" must be "malice," but you don't think "malice" is "evil"?

What our ancestors referred to as "evil" seems to mostly be malice. Apologies I wasn't more clear in my introduction.

Okay. Well, I guess you'd be telling our ancestors, then, that they were imagining things: that "malice" isn't "evil" after all.

Malice is malice.

[Immanuel Can]

What our ancestors referred to as "evil" seems to mostly be malice. Apologies I wasn't more clear in my introduction.

Okay. Well, I guess you'd be telling our ancestors, then, that they were imagining things: that "malice" isn't "evil" after all.

Malice is malice.

Well, ain't that a profound claim!

I think you get the point, Gary. If "malice" or something else isn't "evil," there's nothing for anybody to complain about. There's nothing to analyze. There's really nothing to say, but exactly the kind of empty tautology you just floated to us. And it's not exactly a world-beater of a revelation, is it?

[Gary Childress]

Okay. Well, I guess you'd be telling our ancestors, then, that they were imagining things: that "malice" isn't "evil" after all.

Malice is malice.

Well, ain't that a profound claim!

I think you get the point, Gary. If "malice" or something else isn't "evil," there's nothing for anybody to complain about. There's nothing to analyze. There's really nothing to say, but exactly the kind of empty tautology you just floated to us. And it's not exactly a world-beater of a revelation, is it?

OK. So I guess evil is another word for malice in that case. So what's your objection?

[Immanuel Can]

Malice is malice.

Well, ain't that a profound claim!

I think you get the point, Gary. If "malice" or something else isn't "evil," there's nothing for anybody to complain about. There's nothing to analyze. There's really nothing to say, but exactly the kind of empty tautology you just floated to us. And it's not exactly a world-beater of a revelation, is it?

OK. So I guess evil is another word for malice in that case. So what's your objection?

I don't have an "objection" to that. I do think that malice is evil. But you say it isn't: that "malice" is just "malice." You stop well short of identifying it with evil. And that being so, I can't see what you have to complain about. According to you, and regardless of what people might instinctively think, the truth is that nothing evil is entailed in malice.

Can't say I agree. But then, I can't see what you were saying in the first place.

[Gary Childress]

Well, ain't that a profound claim!

I think you get the point, Gary. If "malice" or something else isn't "evil," there's nothing for anybody to complain about. There's nothing to analyze. There's really nothing to say, but exactly the kind of empty tautology you just floated to us. And it's not exactly a world-beater of a revelation, is it?

OK. So I guess evil is another word for malice in that case. So what's your objection?

I don't have an "objection" to that. I do think that malice is evil. But you say it isn't: that "malice" is just "malice." You stop well short of identifying it with evil. And that being so, I can't see what you have to complain about. According to you, and regardless of what people might instinctively think, the truth is that nothing evil is entailed in malice.

Can't say I agree. But then, I can't see what you were saying in the first place.

OK. So malice is "evil". What is "evil"?

[Gary Childress]

Or how about this?

What makes all things that are "evil", "evil"?

[Immanuel Can]

Or how about this?

What makes all things that are "evil", "evil"?

Name something that's evil, then, and we can ask what makes it evil.

Oh, I see...two messages: you said "malice."

Okay, what makes malice evil?

[Gary Childress]

Or how about this?

What makes all things that are "evil", "evil"?

Name something that's evil, then, and we can ask what makes it evil.

Oh, I see...two messages: you said "malice."

Okay, what makes malice evil?

Well, I don't know what "evil" is, so I can't really give an example of something like that, but malice is generally described as "ill will", as in "ill will" toward something or someone.

I don't deny that there is malice in the world. Malice is malice, as I say. However, I don't know that malice is "evil". It's malice. I suspect that in theology "evil" is certain instances of "malice". However, I'm not sure how to differentiate "evil" malice from "ok" (or whatever the appropriate name for the alternative is) malice.

[Immanuel Can]

Well, I don't know what "evil" is, so I can't really give an example of something like that, but malice is generally described as "ill will", as in "ill will" toward something or someone.

But unless it's evil, why do you attach the word "ill" to it? That assumes that there's something "wrong" with the will in question, so it assumes the wanted conclusion, but doesn't prove it.

If malice is not, at least in some strained sense, "bad," then we cannot be upset about its existence. But in what sense is it "bad"? (We can use any negative synonym, such as "bad," "nasty," "unhealthy," "unhelpful," "unattractive," "harmful," etc., and in every case, we get exactly the same problem: so let's just stick with "bad," because it's simple.)

[Gary Childress]

Well, I don't know what "evil" is, so I can't really give an example of something like that, but malice is generally described as "ill will", as in "ill will" toward something or someone.

But unless it's evil, why do you attach the word "ill" to it? That assumes that there's something "wrong" with the will in question, so it assumes the wanted conclusion, but doesn't prove it.

If malice is not, at least in some strained sense, "bad," then we cannot be upset about its existence. But in what sense is it "bad"? (We can use any negative synonym, such as "bad," "nasty," "unhealthy," "unhelpful," "unattractive," "harmful," etc., and in every case, we get exactly the same problem: so let's just stick with "bad," because it's simple.)

Intending harm to someone or something else is pretty much doing "ill" toward that something or someone. I doubt it's "beneficial" to them. So I would call malice "ill" will.

[Immanuel Can]

Well, I don't know what "evil" is, so I can't really give an example of something like that, but malice is generally described as "ill will", as in "ill will" toward something or someone.

But unless it's evil, why do you attach the word "ill" to it? That assumes that there's something "wrong" with the will in question, so it assumes the wanted conclusion, but doesn't prove it.

If malice is not, at least in some strained sense, "bad," then we cannot be upset about its existence. But in what sense is it "bad"? (We can use any negative synonym, such as "bad," "nasty," "unhealthy," "unhelpful," "unattractive," "harmful," etc., and in every case, we get exactly the same problem: so let's just stick with "bad," because it's simple.)

Intending harm to someone or something else is pretty much doing "ill" toward that something or someone. I doubt it's "beneficial" to them. So I would call malice "ill" will.

Now you've rolled in another of the negative synonyms: "harm." But that's not legit, because harm is an undefined negative again. And then you've suggested they have some duty to be "beneficial," (another undefined value term) to others: but from where do you get that, and from where do you know what is truly "beneficial"?

You see, you can't create a justification by merely employing yet another pejorative synonym for "bad." So let's work from "bad."

What makes malice "bad"? You've already said there's no objectivity to the "badness," because there's no "evil." So wouldn't you have to say that malice isn't "bad" at all?

[Gary Childress]

But unless it's evil, why do you attach the word "ill" to it? That assumes that there's something "wrong" with the will in question, so it assumes the wanted conclusion, but doesn't prove it.

If malice is not, at least in some strained sense, "bad," then we cannot be upset about its existence. But in what sense is it "bad"? (We can use any negative synonym, such as "bad," "nasty," "unhealthy," "unhelpful," "unattractive," "harmful," etc., and in every case, we get exactly the same problem: so let's just stick with "bad," because it's simple.)

Intending harm to someone or something else is pretty much doing "ill" toward that something or someone. I doubt it's "beneficial" to them. So I would call malice "ill" will.

Now you've rolled in another of the negative synonyms: "harm." But that's not legit, because harm is an undefined negative again. And then you've suggested they have some duty to be "beneficial," (another undefined value term) to others: but from where do you get that, and from where do you know what is truly "beneficial"?

You see, you can't create a justification by merely employing yet another pejorative synonym for "bad." So let's work from "bad."

What makes malice "bad"? You've already said there's no objectivity to the "badness," because there's no "evil." So wouldn't you have to say that malice isn't "bad" at all?

If you can 'ground' your definitions any better than I can, I'd like to see it. If you think "Malice" isn't harmful or bad, then I don't know what to tell you, other than you seem obsessed with the word, "objective" and infuse it with some sort of relation to a "God" that may or may not exist.

[Immanuel Can]

What makes malice "bad"? You've already said there's no objectivity to the "badness," because there's no "evil." So wouldn't you have to say that malice isn't "bad" at all?

If you can 'ground' your definitions any better than I can, I'd like to see it.

Yep, I can.

I can define things like "harm" and "malice" in terms of the teleological purpose of a human being. For example, to wound somebody unnecessarily is to do harm, and to act on malice. And I have no hesitation in identifying both as evil, because they contravene the purposes of God for a human life.

Of course, there's more detail we need down-in-the-weeds, so to speak; but my answer will turn out to be some form of the above, in every case.

Now, you may say, "Well, I don't believe in God." Righty ho. All that means is that you will misunderstand the teleological purpose of human life, and that you will very likely therefore cause harm. But it won't mean harm isn't a thing. And if you do it intentionally, then you'll also be malicious. And that will also be a real and objective thing.

You see, it's almost too easy for an objectivist to do, especially a Theist...but impossible for any subjectivist.

[Gary Childress]

What makes malice "bad"? You've already said there's no objectivity to the "badness," because there's no "evil." So wouldn't you have to say that malice isn't "bad" at all?

If you can 'ground' your definitions any better than I can, I'd like to see it.

Yep, I can.

I can define things like "harm" and "malice" in terms of the teleological purpose of a human being. For example, to wound somebody unnecessarily is to do harm, and to act on malice. And I have no hesitation in identifying both as evil, because they contravene the purposes of God for a human life.

Of course, there's more detail we need down-in-the-weeds, so to speak; but my answer will turn out to be some form of the above, in every case.

Now, you may say, "Well, I don't believe in God." Righty ho. All that means is that you will misunderstand the teleological purpose of human life, and that you will very likely therefore cause harm. But it won't mean harm isn't a thing. And if you do it intentionally, then you'll also be malicious. And that will also be a real and objective thing.

You see, it's almost too easy for an objectivist to do, especially a Theist...but impossible for any subjectivist.

I can say harm and malice are harmful and therefore "immoral". You'd just reject it on the grounds that I'm agnostic, though.

[Immanuel Can]

I can say harm and malice are harmful and therefore "immoral". You'd just reject it on the grounds that I'm agnostic, though.

So far you've told me that "malice is malice." Now "harm is harmful."

I'm sorry, Gary...it's just tautologies.

Let me try again: how does this "harm" thing end up being "immoral"? Lions "harm" gazelles; but nobody calls them "immoral." Sunbathers "harm" mosquitoes, but nobody calls them "immoral" either. Heck, athletes "harm" their own muscles, and people praise them for working out and staying fit.

How do you logically connect "harm" and "immorality"?