compatibilism

[henry quirk]

Where does compatibilism fit?

5F73CD48-B1B0-4BC8-A2C0-A7BC29DC9980.png

[henry quirk]

Worth another look...

https://www.informationphilosopher.com/ ... onomy.html

Determinism is the position that every event is caused, the inevitable and necessary consequence of antecedent events, in a chain of events with just one possible future.

"Hard" and "soft" determinism are terms invented by William James, who lamented the fact that some determinists were co-opting the term freedom for themselves. He called them "soft" determinists, because, abhoring harsh words like fatality, necessity, and even predetermination, they say determinism’s "real name is freedom; for freedom is only necessity understood, and bondage to the highest is identical with true freedom."

"Hard" determinists deny the existence of free will. "Soft" determinists co-opt the term.

Compatibilism is the most common name used today for James' category of soft determinism. For compatibilists, free will is compatible with determinism.

Semicompatibilists are agnostic about free will and determinism, but claim that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism. Narrow incompatibilism is a similar concept.

Hard incompatibilists think both free will and moral responsibility are not compatible with determinism (they mean pre-determinism).

Illusionists are hard incompatibilists, who say that free will is an illusion. They usually deny moral responsibility, but some say we can preserve responsibility by maintaining the illusion.

Impossibilists are also hard incompatibilists. They say moral responsibility is impossible.

Incompatibilism is the idea that free will and determinism are incompatible. Incompatibilists include both hard determinists and libertarians. Incompatibilists include both hard determinists and libertarians (both yellow in the taxonomy). This confuses the debate by analytic language philosophers - who are normally committed to clear and unambiguous concepts - and adds difficulties for students of philosophy.

Soft incompatibilists says that free will is incompatible with pre-determinism, and that pre-determinism is not true. Using "soft" is preferable to the loose usage of the term "incompatibilist" to describe a libertarian, since "incompatibilist" is ambiguous and also used for determinists, the "hard" incompatibilists.

Source and Leeway Incompatibilism locate indeterminism in the Actual Sequence or Alternative Sequences. The first in each pair breaks the causal chain in the actual sequence, the last pair provide alternative possibilities in alternative sequences.

Indeterminism is the position that there are random (chance) events in a world of possible futures. The irreducible indeterminism is quantum indeterminacy.

Libertarians believe that indeterminism makes free will possible. Note that there many philosophers who admit indeterminism may be true but that it does not really explain free will ("hard" indeterminists?). See the standard argument against free will - If our actions are determined, we are not free. If they are random, we are not responsible for them. So indeterminism is not enough. We need a limited indeterminism in the first stage and also "adequate determinism" in the second stage of a two-stage model.

Agent-causal indeterminists are libertarians who think that agents have originating causes for their actions that are not events. Actions do not depend on any prior causes. Some call this "metaphysical" freedom.

Non-causal indeterminists simply deny any causes whatsoever for libertarian free will.

Event-causal indeterminists generally accept the view that random events (most likely quantum mechanical events) occur in the world. Whether in the physical world, in the biological world (where they are a key driver of genetic mutations), or in the mind, randomness and uncaused events are real. They introduce the possibility of accidents, novelty, and human creativity.

Soft Causality is the idea that most events are adequately determined by normal causes, but that some events are not precisely predictable from prior events, because there are occasional quantum events that start new causal chains with unpredictable futures. These events are said to be causa sui.

Soft Libertarians accept some indeterminism in the Actual Sequence. They are source incompatibilists.

While microscopic quantum events are powerful enough to deny strict determinism, the magnitude of these events is generally so small, especially for large macroscopic objects, that the world is still overwhelmingly deterministic. We call this "adequate determinism."

Although random quantum mechanical events break the strictly deterministic causal chain, which has just one possible future, random events are probable causes for later events. They start new causal chains with unpredictable futures. They are said to be causa sui. They need not be the direct cause of human actions, which would make the actions random, but simply provide alternative possibilities for willed actions.

[phyllo]

This is not incompatible with determinism.

Determinism is not materialism or physicalism.

for example, one can say that a person has a non-physical soul.

The determinist position is that soul is part of the character of the person. It's a factor in the state of the person at any moment. It plays a role in decisions. It is a cause for the decisions.

Well, that's certainly one interpretation.

Somebody told you otherwise?

[henry quirk]

Sumthin' to chew on...

Two Conceptions of Free Will

Matthew Gliatto

The concept of free will is subtle and is easily misunderstood. One major cause of the confusion is that people often conflate two different conceptions of free will: compatibilist free will and libertarian free will. One of these, libertarian free will, is truly free will, while the other, compatibilist free will, can be thought of as either a misunderstanding or an excuse. But either way, it is not actually free will.

In order to understand the distinction between the two, one must first understand the concept of determinism. Since antiquity, people have been wondering whether or not the course of history is pre-determined. Determinism says yes, it is. According to a determinist, once the initial conditions of the world were set up, it was pre-determined that everything would happen exactly as it did. It was pre-determined that the Roman Empire would fall in 476 AD. It was pre-determined that the Spanish Armada would sink in 1588. It was pre-determined that the coronavirus pandemic would happen in 2020. You get the idea. There was only ever one possibility for the history of the world. And likewise, there’s only one possibility for the future.

After reading the above paragraph, you would probably conclude that a determinist could not possibly believe in free will. And you would be correct. However, there are some philosophers who make excuses and who argue that determinism and free will can both be true at the same time. This is where the idea of compatibilist free will (also called compatibilism) comes from.

The word “compatibilist” in compatibilist free will comes from this argument that the idea of free will is compatible with determinism. According to compatibilism, free will can be defined as a situation in which there is no external force that prevents you from doing what you want. (By “external”, they mean outside your own body, outside your own brain.) For example, there is no external force that is preventing me from going outside right now. So according to a compatibilist, I am free to go outside right now …… even though, in the philosophical sense, my future behavior has already been determined.
This also goes for situations where someone chooses between multiple options. For example, let’s say you ask a little child whether they would rather go to Wendy’s or Dunkin Donuts. There is no external force preventing the kid from choosing either of those options. So according to a compatibilist, that child has free will and is making a free choice ……… even though a compatibilist would also say that the child’s choice has already been determined (we just don’t know what it is yet). Thus, compatibilists claim that we are free to do what we want, even though our future behaviors have already been determined. They think of freedom as simply the absence of obstacles.

The other conception of free will is libertarian free will (libertarianism). Libertarianism is the idea that there is a “ghost in the machine” inside our brains that makes decisions independently of all science and all circumstances. To be sure, the science and the circumstances matter, but the “ghost” has the final say. A compatibilist would hold that science — specifically neuroscience — could fully explain the process by which a person makes a decision and does something. But libertarianism says no: science isn’t everything. There is a ghost in the machine, and the ghost has the power to make decisions, and there is no scientific process that could explain what the ghost is going to do or how the ghost works.

(By the way, this “ghost in the machine” is often associated with some of the more traditional terms for a person’s source of identity, such as a soul, a self, an Atman, or a spirit.)

Instead of proposing that free will is somehow compatible with determinism, libertarianism posits that determinism is false: the future is not pre-determined, not even by neuroscience, because the ghost in the machine has the freedom to decide our course of action.

Thus, there are three major positions that a philosopher could take with regard to free will and determinism:
1. Compatibilism: Determinism and free will are compatible with each other. Determinism is true and free will exists [but in my opinion, that’s not true free will].
2. Libertarianism: Determinism and free will are incompatible. Determinism is false and free will exists. The ghost in the machine makes free choices.
3. Hard determinism: Determinism and free will are incompatible. Determinism is true, and there is no free will.

There are philosophers who have promoted each of these three positions. One notable compatibilist philosopher is Daniel Dennett. He has written a book promoting compatibilism. In past ages, renowned philosophers such as David Hume and John Stuart Mill were also compatibilists. And Thomas Aquinas was essentially a compatibilist, even though he was living in a pre-scientific era. Meanwhile, George Berkeley (the namesake of UC Berkeley) promoted libertarian free will, and Immanuel Kant and William James both criticized compatibilism, although they did not necessarily endorse libertarian free will. And a philosopher named Gregg Caruso has promoted hard determinism. (How Gregg Caruso feels motivated to get up in the morning is beyond me.)

(I should add that there is actually a fourth possible position, which is that there is some sort of inherent randomness in the universe which has nothing to do with a person’s choices. So under that view, determinism is false, but free will doesn’t exist either. There’s just randomness. However, that is not relevant here.)

One curious aspect of libertarianism is that you can’t define what freedom (free will) means. A compatibilist defines freedom as the absence of obstacles. But under libertarianism, there’s no way to define it. There’s no way to put it into words. You have to just understand the concept. At first, I would say that libertarianism understands freedom to be a choice made by the ghost in the machine ………… but then you would still have to define the word “choice”, so that definition didn’t really accomplish anything. This is analogous to a point I was making in a previous blog post about how under the propensity theory of probability, the word “probability” cannot be defined; you have to just intuitively understand what it is.

Having explained these two conceptions of free will, my next task is to explain why I consider the concept of compatibilist free will to be either a misunderstanding or an excuse.

I sometimes ask people if they believe in free will. Most of the time, the people in question are not familiar with philosophy. They almost always say that they believe in free will, and they justify this by saying something like, “I mean, I make choices every day …… yesterday, I had a choice about whether I wanted grilled cheese or a hamburger, and I chose grilled cheese. That was a free choice.” My response to them is: yes, but that’s only compatibilist free will. For all you know, it might have been pre-determined that you were going to select grilled cheese. Therefore, you have not demonstrated that true free will — libertarian free will — exists.

Thus, for people who aren’t familiar with philosophy, the concept of compatibilist free will is just a misunderstanding. They just don’t understand the subtle distinction between compatibilist free will and libertarian free will. However, I think that for people who do understand philosophy, the concept of compatibilist free will is not merely a misunderstanding; it is an excuse.

For example, Daniel Dennett has written a book promoting compatibilism. In his view, even though our actions have been pre-determined by science, we don’t know what they are yet, and there’s no external force that stops us from doing what we want to do, so that means we have free will. Now, Daniel Dennett is a talented thinker, and he certainly understands the distinction between the two conceptions of free will. And I’m sure that within himself, he knows that compatibilist free will isn’t really free will. But he knows that it is very bleak to say, “There is no free will,” and he doesn’t want to sound like a total pessimist, so he makes an excuse and claims that compatibilist free will is still free will ……… even though within himself, he knows it isn’t.

Compatibilist free will is like decaf coffee. Decaf coffee looks like coffee, tastes like coffee, smells like coffee, and has the word “coffee” in its name. But it won’t wake you up, because it has no caffeine. So in the end, it isn’t really coffee. In the same way, compatibilist free will has the phrase “free will” in its name, and it is presented as if it were free will. But under compatibilism, your choices have been pre-determined, so compatibilist free will is not really free will. It’s like decaf coffee. It’s like fool’s gold. It’s like an artificial Christmas tree. It’s just not the real thing.

One further difference between compatibilism and libertarianism is that only compatibilist free will can be proven to exist. If you define free will as simply the absence of obstacles, then no one can doubt that free will exists. Since people make choices every day (recall my above made-up conversation about the grilled cheese and the hamburger), then the existence of compatibilist free will is obvious. However, no one will ever prove or disprove the existence of libertarian free will. Does this “ghost in the machine” really make free choices? Does it really have the power to decide our course of action? We will never know. It can’t be proven either way.

I conclude this essay with two disclaimers:
1. The philosophical concept of libertarianism has no relation to the political concept of libertarianism. I might promote philosophical libertarianism, but I will never promote political libertarianism. In fact, libertarianism is my least favorite political theory. Anyway, the philosophical concept of libertarianism has nothing to do with politics.
2. I realize that the phrase “ghost in the machine” sounds rather silly, but I like it anyway. It was coined by the philosopher Gilbert Ryle. I think it’s a great way of putting it.

[phyllo]

What's your point?

[phyllo]

Does one need a "ghost in the machine" to explain human behavior?

In philosophy, Occam's razor (also spelled Ockham's razor or Ocham's razor; Latin: novacula Occami) is the problem-solving principle that recommends searching for explanations constructed with the smallest possible set of elements. It is also known as the principle of parsimony or the law of parsimony (Latin: lex parsimoniae). Attributed to William of Ockham, a 14th-century English philosopher and theologian, it is frequently cited as Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem, which translates as "Entities must not be multiplied beyond necessity",[1][2] although Occam never used these exact words. Popularly, the principle is sometimes inaccurately[3] paraphrased as "The simplest explanation is usually the best one."[4]

This philosophical razor advocates that when presented with competing hypotheses about the same prediction, one should prefer the one that requires the fewest assumptions[3] and that this is not meant to be a way of choosing between hypotheses that make different predictions. Similarly, in science, Occam's razor is used as an abductive heuristic in the development of theoretical models rather than as a rigorous arbiter between candidate models.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Occam%27s_razor

[Flannel Jesus]

Libertarianism is the idea that there is a “ghost in the machine” inside our brains that makes decisions independently of all science and all circumstances.

Independently of all science? This isn't an informed opinion, this guy is writing like a 16 year old Christian who just found the philosophy section of Wikipedia. "Independently of all science" lmao. That's funny.

[henry quirk]

That's funny.

If you thought that was a hoot, you'll find this high-larious...

Interviewing the dead Albert Einstein about free will

by Jon Rappoport

It was a strange journey into the astral realm to find Albert Einstein.

I slipped through gated communities heavily guarded by troops protecting dead Presidents. I skirted alleys where wannabe demons claiming they were Satan’s reps were selling potions made from powdered skulls of English kings. I ran through mannequin mansions where trainings for future shoppers were in progress. Apparently, some souls come to Earth to be born as aggressive entitled consumers. Who knew?

Finally, in a little valley, I spotted a cabin, and there on the porch, sitting in a rocker, smoking a pipe and reading The Bourne Ultimatum, was Dr. Einstein.

He was wearing an old sports jacket with leather patches on the elbows, jeans, and furry slippers.

I wanted to talk with the great man because I’d read a 1929 Saturday Evening Post interview with him. He’d said:

“I am a determinist. As such, I do not believe in free will…Practically, I am, nevertheless, compelled to act as if freedom of the will existed. If I wish to live in a civilized community, I must act as if man is a responsible being.”

Dr, Einstein went inside and brought out two bottles of cold beer and we began our conversation:

Q: Sir, would you say that the underlying nature of physical reality is atomic?

A: If you’re asking me whether atoms and smaller particles exist everywhere in the universe, then of course, yes.

Q: And are you satisfied that, wherever they are found, they are the same? They exhibit a uniformity?

A: Surely, yes.

Q: Regardless of location.

A: Correct.

Q: So, for example, if we consider the make-up of the brain, those atoms are no different in kind from atoms wherever in the universe they are found.

A: That’s true. The brain is composed entirely of these tiny particles. And the particles, everywhere in the universe, without exception, flow and interact and collide without any exertion of free will. It’s an unending stream of cause and effect.

Q: And when you think to yourself, “I’ll get breakfast now,” what is that?

A: The thought?

Q: Yes.

A: Ultimately, it is the outcome of particles in motion.

Q: You were compelled to have that thought.

A: As odd as that may seem, yes. Of course, we tell ourselves stories to present ourselves with a different version of reality, but those stories are social or cultural constructs.

Q: And those “stories” we tell ourselves—they aren’t freely chosen rationalizations, either. We have no choice about that.

A: Well, yes. That’s right.

Q: So there is nothing in the human brain that allows us the possibility of free will.

A: Nothing at all.

Q: And as we are sitting here right now, sir, looking at each other, sitting and talking, this whole conversation is spooling out in the way that it must. Every word. Neither you nor I is really choosing what we say.

A: I may not like it, but yes, it’s deterministic destiny. The particles flow.

Q: When you pause to consider a question I ask you…even that act of considering is mandated by the motion of atomic and sub-atomic particles. What appears to be you deciding how to give me an answer…that is a delusion.

A: The act of considering? Why, yes, that, too, would have to be determined. It’s not free. There really is no choice involved.

Q: And the outcome of this conversation, whatever points we may or may not agree upon, and the issues we may settle here, about this subject of free will versus determinism…they don’t matter at all, because, when you boil it down, the entire conversation was determined by our thoughts, which are nothing more than atomic and sub-atomic particles in motion—and that motion flows according to laws, none of which have anything to do with human choice.

A: The entire flow of reality, so to speak, proceeds according to determined sets of laws. Yes.

Q: And we are in that flow.

A: Most certainly we are.

Q: The earnestness with which we might try to settle this issue, our feelings, our thoughts, our striving—that is irrelevant. It’s window dressing. This conversation actually cannot go in different possible directions. It can only go in one direction.

A: That would ultimately have to be so.

Q: Now, are atoms and their components, and any other tiny particles in the universe…are any of them conscious?

A: Of course not. The particles themselves are not conscious.

Q: Some scientists speculate they are.

A: Some people speculate that the moon can be sliced and served on a plate with fruit.

Q: What do you think “conscious” means?

A: It means we participate in life. We take action. We converse. We gain knowledge.

Q: Any of the so-called faculties we possess—are they ultimately anything more than particles in motion?

A: Well, no, they aren’t. Because everything is particles in motion. What else could be happening in this universe? Nothing.

Q: All right. I’d like to consider the word “understanding.”

A: It’s a given. It’s real.

Q: How so?

A: The proof that it’s real, if you will, is that we are having this conversation. It makes sense to us.

Q: Yes, but how can there be understanding if everything is particles in motion? Do the particles possess understanding?

A: No they don’t.

Q: To change the focus just a bit, how can what you and I are saying have any meaning?

A: Words mean things.

Q: Again, I have to point out that, in a universe with no free will, we only have particles in motion. That’s all. That’s all we are. So where does “meaning” come from?

A: “We understand language” is a true proposition.

Q: You’re sure.

A: Of course.

Q: Then I suggest you’ve tangled yourself in a contradiction. In the universe you depict, there would be no room for understanding. Or meaning. There would be nowhere for it to come from. Unless particles understand. Do they?

A: No.

Q: Then where do “understanding” and “meaning” come from?

A: [Silence.]

Q: Furthermore, sir, if we accept your depiction of a universe of particles, then there is no basis for this conversation at all. We don’t understand each other. How could we?

A: But we do understand each other.

Q: And therefore, your philosophic materialism (no free will, only particles in motion) must have a flaw.

A: What flaw?

Q: Our existence contains more than particles in motion.

A: More? What would that be?

Q: Would you grant that whatever it is, it is non-material?

A: It would have to be, but…

Q: Then, driving further along this line, there is something non-material which is present, which allows us to understand each other, which allows us to comprehend meaning. We are conscious. Puppets are not conscious. As we sit here talking, I understand you. Do you understand me?

A: Of course.

Q: Then that understanding is coming from something other than particles in motion. Without this non-material quality, you and I would be gibbering in the dark.

A: You’re saying that, if all the particles in the universe, including those that make up the brain, possess no consciousness, no understanding, no comprehension of meaning, no freedom, then how can they give birth to understanding and freedom. There must be another factor, and it would have to be non-material.

Q: Yes. That’s what I’m saying. And I think you have to admit your view of determinism and particles in motion—that picture of the universe—leads to several absurdities.

A: Well…perhaps I’m forced to consider it. Otherwise, we can’t sit here and understand each other.

Q: You and I do understand each other.

A: I hadn’t thought it through this way before, but if there is nothing inherent in particles that gives rise to understanding and meaning, then everything is gibberish. Except it isn’t gibberish. Yes, I seem to see a contradiction. Interesting.

Q: And if these non-material factors—understanding and meaning—exist, then other non-material factors can exist.

A: For example, freedom. I suppose so.

Q: And the drive to eliminate freedom in the world…is more than just the attempt to substitute one automatic reflex for another.

A: That would be…yes, that would be so.

Q: Scientists would be absolutely furious about the idea that, despite all their maneuvering, the most essential aspects of human life are beyond the scope of what they, the scientists, are “in charge of.”

A: It would be a naked challenge to the power of science.

Einstein puffed on his pipe and looked out over the valley. He took a sip of his beer. After a minute, he said, “Let me see if I can summarize this, because it’s really rather startling. The universe is nothing but particles. All those particles follow laws of motion. They aren’t free. The brain is made up entirely of those same particles. Therefore, there is nothing in the brain that would give us freedom. These particles also don’t understand anything, they don’t make sense of anything, they don’t grasp the meaning of anything. Since the brain, again, is made up of those particles, it has no power to allow us to grasp meaning or understand anything. But we do understand. We do grasp meaning. Therefore, we are talking about qualities we possess which are not made out of energy. These qualities are entirely non-material.”

He nodded.

“In that case,” he said, “there is…oddly enough, a completely different sphere or territory. It’s non-material. Therefore, it can’t be measured. Therefore, it has no beginning or end. If it did, it would be a material continuum and we could measure it.”

He pointed to the valley.

“That has energy. But what does it give me? Does it allow me to be conscious? Does it allow me to be free, to understand meaning? No.”

Then he laughed. He looked at me.

“I’m dead,” he said, “aren’t I? I didn’t realize it until this very moment.”

I shook my head. “No. I would say you WERE dead until this moment.”

He grinned. “Yes!” he said. “That’s a good one. I WAS dead.”

He stood up.

“Enough of this beer,” he said. “I have some schnapps inside. Let me get it. Let’s drink the good stuff! After all, I’m apparently Forever. And so are you. And so are we all.”

High-larious, right?

[Flannel Jesus]

High-larious, right?

Yeah, that is indeed hilariously bad.

[henry quirk]

Yeah, that is indeed hilariously bad.

Oh, you ain't seen nuthin' yet...stay tuned.

[Flannel Jesus]

Unsubscribe.

[iambiguous]

If cutting a path in the jungle is an example of libertarian free-will, then do ants, jaguars, boars also have libertarian free-will when they make a path in the jungle?

How about beavers building dams. Or birds building nests? Or termites?

As with termites and birds and beavers and ants and jaguars and boars and all other living, biological creatures who might create paths in the jungle, human beings can create them too.

But, come on, do we speak of free will in regard to...termites? No, each and every one of the animals above are propelled by brains almost entirely intertwined in biological imperatives.

But "somehow" when their brains eventually evolved into our brains, at the very least [God or No God] we acquired the psychological illusion of free will, right?

We are the only animals with brains capable of either creating or finding paths that permit us to go in this -- https://youtu.be/ngWBddVNVZs?si=yX1fRCE1BuaqS4YM -- direction.

No one is going tp ask, "ought termites and beavers and ants, etc., behave as they do in creating paths in the jungle?" But what about those man-made paths in the film?

And the new paths that will be forged as the Europeans arrive in the jungle at the end of the film.

So, what do we have above. There is an appeal to incredulity. There is an ad populum argument.

He posts things like this and I don't really have a clue as to how they pertain to my points. Here the gap between the paths all those other animals create in the jungle and the paths that our own species create. The gap between brains almost entirely compelled by genes and brains bursting at the seams historically, culturally and experientially with ever evolving and changing social, political, moral, economic and religious memes.

But the interesting thing is

Iambigious presents it as clear. If humans have free will, they are the only species that has it on earth.

Sure, if others here wish to argue that termites and ants and all those other creatures embody free will in forging paths through the jungle...just as the men and women in Apocalypto do...fine.

Instead, the argument that some determinists make is that, ironically enough, the human beings in the film don't have free will either.

In orher words, brains are brains are brains: matter entirely in sync with the laws of nature.

He must be a free will determinist. Since he manages to have confidence enough to present his view as if the opposed view was silly.
He must think his brain, at least, is autonomous.

Because it knows that since we only talk about humans free will, we can rule out animals having it. (ad populum)

Over and again, this is his own "rooted existentially in dasein" depiction of me here. Whereas I am the first to admit that in regard to things like morality and determinism, my own conclusions are no less just existential leaps of faith. I don't say views other than mine are silly. I simply ask others to close the gap between what they believe in their heads "here and now" about compatibilism and moral responsibility [given a particular context] and what they are actually able to demonstrate that all rational men and women are obligated to believe in turn.

Starting here:

All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter.

Then those here who actually believe that what they believe about all of this reflects, what, the ontological truth about the human condition itself?

Then those who are compelled in turn to insist on a teleological component as well. Usually in the form of one or another God.

Meanwhile, philosophers and scientists and theologians have been grappling with this profound mystery now for thousands of years.

Either in the only possible reality in the only possible world or of their own volition.

[iambiguous]

Here is a weird part of these discussions:

You live in a free-will world and you want a car. That's okay.

You live in a determined world and you want a car. There's something suspicious and illegitimate about that.

Over and again, he comes back around to this.

You have free will and you want a car. You have free will and you steal the car. You have free will, get drunk, and drive the car into a pedestrian, killing her. And her child.

Society holds you morally responsible for choosing these things of your own volition and punishes you.

Or...

You don't have free will and were never able not to do those things. Society was never able not to punish you. In fact, everything pertaining to you and the car and the two dead people and society above is entirely fated/destined to happen.



Now, sure, maybe his lumping the two scenarios together as though they were interchangeable is the more reasonable frame of mind. Maybe I still just don't get it.

Or maybe he still just doesn't get my point of view. Either because of his own free will he simply lacks the intelligence to, or, in a wholly determined universe, he was never able to get it.

[Iwannaplato]

double post

[Iwannaplato]

So, what do we have above. There is an appeal to incredulity. There is an ad populum argument.

He posts things like this and I don't really have a clue as to how they pertain to my points.

I indicated later what I was referring to that was an appeal to incredulity and what was an ad populum argument.[/quote]

But the interesting thing is

Iambigious presents it as clear. If humans have free will, they are the only species that has it on earth.

Sure, if others here wish to argue that termites and ants and all those other creatures embody free will in forging paths through the jungle...just as the men and women in Apocalypto do...fine.

No, here's the point. You haven't argued, but have asserted, that if anyone has free will, humans do and those species don't. Back it up. How do you know this? I understand that you think other people have the burden when they disagree with you, but actually you presented some ideas that you think are so obviously true that there was incredulousness on your part that someone would think differently and this incredulousness is repeated here. So, you want to shift the burden to me, regarding a position I did not assert, but actually you can try to back up your own claims.

Humans have more plastic neurobiologies. They are more affected by experience. Animals are more hardwired. Peachy.
But it's all causes. So, why it is so obvious that if anyone has free will it's humans.

I was pointing out that you seem confident in the truth of some things. Suddenly the possibility of deterministic chains of causation are not stopping you from expressing things with a lot of certainty (yes, I realize you are not claiming you must be correct, but certain enough to mock other positions.)

Yet if someone else has a similar certainty around the free will determinism debate you wonder how they could possible be sure, given that their thoughts might well be caused inevitably in that direction.

THAT SAID: TTTTTTTTThe real irony was of course that it was precisely Phyllo's point. He was pointing out that by Henry's and your logic we could then say that animals making paths had free will. Because you both, oddly and conveniently, found Phyllo's post to be like a libertarian free will post.

So, he said, in my paraphrase....really????????????????? If you think that describes free will, then these various animals would have free will
KNOWING FULL WELL THAT NEITHER YOU BOTH nor he believe that to be the case. It was a reduction ad absurdum of the 'interpretation' you both made of his post, a post indicating only one possible outcome and things being determined.

One wonders why one even bothers.
[/quote]