Is morality objective or subjective?

[FlashDangerpants]

"Moral" is not a physical property, it's true. It's a relational description.

I simply alluded to physical properties because they inhere to something. I wasn't asking if morality is physical, I was asking if moral properties are inherent properties that belong to something.

The inherent properties behind morality "belong" to God. They're not attached to objects, or even to situations, or to persons, apart from that.

I think you've got a bit of a Platonic idea about morality -- except that I see you don't really have a philosophy education, and so probably don't know Plato, so you're getting the same idea from somewhere else, apparently. But that's it actual origin, I would think. You seem to imagine "moral" as being independent of the identity and character of God. But it's not.

I hold a batchelors degree in philosophy and studied moral philosophy as part of that. I studied Plato at A Level when I was 18, so I already have all the basics of this stuff down thank you very much. You may now quit trying to condescend to me.

I obviously don't hold a platonic conception of morality, I was simply checking to see if you do because you have been so unclear on the subject. Now that we have established that "factual moral properties" are just the opinion of somebody very important, we don't need to worry about Plato, which I think we can all agree is good news.

The important thing is that there is no such thing as an inherent moral property about which we could even be correct or mistaken, so it's all just beliefs. You believe the source of your moral "facts" is the beliefs that are held by a big scary monster in the sky, I don't.

It actually says the opposite: it says you CAN reason about them IF you don't first reject God. It says God's "invisible" attributes and "divine nature" (which are the grounds of objective morality) can be "clearly understood" and one is "without excuse" for not knowing them.

But it says that once one rejects God, then there are no limits to how "futile" and "senseless" moral reasoning can become.

So back to what I wrote earlier then.... there's no systematic way to know moral truth without relgious ritual?

Show me the word "ritual" in what I suggested, and I'll respond to it.

Something still doesn't make sense though. How does us believing in God make it something we suddenly can know? Just in technical terms, that doesn't make any sense.

Actually it's just what H. and I have been discussing in the last few pages. There are two ways at looking at the world: in its relation to God, and out of that relation. If you look at it as in that relation, then you can see its moral features; if you deny that relationship exists, then you can only see "nature red in tooth and claw," the bare facts of physical laws and entropy, and none of it has any purposive or moral characteristics for you.

But the problem is in the original disposition of the onlooker, not in morality itself. It's like if you put on clear eyeglasses, you can see all colours; but if you put on rose-coloured glasses, you not only stop seeing other colours, but because you only see red, there's no point in seeing any colours at all. They're not distinct from one another. There's nothing to detect.

Just so, if one insists on seeing the world's landscape as a product of mere time and chance, and devoid of any Creator or purpose, what one sees is only the external shape of things, and not their moral tinges. But if one sees the world as a purposeful creation of a loving God, then one sees quite differently: purpose, intention, providence, meaning, morality...they all leap into sharper focus, and you start to see the world as it actually is, instead of divested of its moral character.

But you'll never know if you've never done that. The tinted glasses will not permit you to see anything but accidents and oddities, not adding up to or tending toward anything at all. So I understand why you feel committed to the proposition that there is no objective morality to detect.

You accuse me of Platonism and then you rip off the similie of the cave.

[Immanuel Can]

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sun Nov 05, 2023 4:53 pm

Lacewing wrote: ↑Sun Nov 05, 2023 4:33 pm

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sun Nov 05, 2023 2:58 pm
They have no good reason for their Atheism.

Wrong. Of course they do.

Great.

List those reasons.

> There is a great deal of physical evidence that our existence is natural within a system that is connected as one.
> Theism is full of inconsistencies and nonsense.
> There is no clear and Universal proof of a God that is not a fabrication of one man's/group's beliefs or another's.

These aren't "reasons." They're just wishful claims. And I can't even say the first one makes any sense: if everything is "connected as one," that doesn' t argue against the existence of God, or warrant Atheism. And the other two are just expressions of personal cynicism about other people's claims, not claims that warrant believing Atheism is true.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sun Nov 05, 2023 2:58 pm

Lacewing wrote: ↑Sun Nov 05, 2023 4:33 pm
Why are there so many different religions?

It does not follow that if there are many wrong answers to some question, there's less likely to be a right one.

The point was, 'if an all-powerful, ever-present god had clarified the singular truth for all, providing proof that is witnessed by everyone' -- which you just claimed has been done -- then why are there so many different religions?

Very easy. Because men don't all love the truth. Many prefer to deny that God exists, or prefer to choose another god. But the Bible's claim is that they could and should know better.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sun Nov 05, 2023 2:58 pm

Lacewing wrote: ↑Sun Nov 05, 2023 4:33 pm
So between an all-powerful god and limited human man, everything is the limited human man's fault.


if human beings have free will about God, then it means they have the freedom to disbelieve in Him, if they wish to do so.
It doesn't imply they don't have sufficient reason to believe, nor that their problem is not one of will. It just means that "freedom" means having a choice between things.

LW said:
So, a human being is expected to believe and make choices although an all-powerful god is incapable of reaching every human with the same clarity -- and even theist beliefs vary and don't agree?

"Theist" is a very broad category, not a description of a particular belief system, but of a broad orientation of several belief systems. Some "Theisms" are correct, and some are not. There's no problem in knowing that, because they conflict.

God's not only capable of reaching anybody; the Bible says He's given enough information in the natural world that everybody has the ability to know He exists. The reason they don't is their choice, not a reflection of any fault on His side.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sun Nov 05, 2023 2:58 pm
Most of what's in it is not "guidebook" stuff at all. Much of it is narrative, some of it is poetry, lots of it is history, some is ethics, and so on.
LW claimed:
You know The Bible is used as a guidebook.

If that's all you think it is, then you don't know it at all.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sun Nov 05, 2023 2:58 pm
If one sends a message, then the recipient has to "interpret" it.
LW supposed:
If it is spoken with clarity they can understand, they don't need an interpreter.

No, interpretation is a fact of any communication at all. But interpretation is actually not really hard, when one has listened attentively and the Speaker has spoken accurately.

It is human beings who want to interpret for others... putting themselves between people and God.

I don't believe in priests. The Bible says "There is one God and one Mediator between God and man, the Man Christ Jesus." That One will do for me.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sun Nov 05, 2023 2:58 pm
Wokies? Leftists? Communists? Feminists?
LW said:
Of course, any belief system can be affected in this way... but I'm asking you how you perceive other types of theism as compared with your own? Could it be that you dismiss their type of theism in a similar way that atheists dismiss all theism? And if you're able to acknowledge that, isn't it clear that both you and atheists are using discernment about theism.

I'm not sure what you're trying to say here. Discernment is a good thing, not a bad one. It means knowing the false from the true, and the second-rate from the best. Who wouldn't want that?

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sun Nov 05, 2023 2:58 pm
people get ideologically committed to particular beliefs, and then begin to build their lives around the assumptions of that ideology, and can become resistant and unreasonable when they're challenged, because changing one's beliefs can involve all sorts of consequences they have been trusting their ideology to fend off.
LW continued:
Okay, great description. It should be understandable and reasonable to consider that people who do this (for any reason) are not necessarily discerning truth beyond the particular beliefs they are committed to. Furthermore, to preserve and defend what their lives are built around, they might use deception and distortion to fend off challenges -- rather than choosing clarity and truth.

Or they might decide they prefer the truth. And they might listen and discern. But the point I was (somewhat wryly) making is that the view you call "hypnotized" is not at all confined to religious subjects. There are powerful secular ideologies that do the same.

Atheists are not 'the enemy'.

No. They're not. They're not actually thoughtful enough to provide an actual "enemy." They're more of a minor nuisance, since they insist on complaining about Theists, rather than letting us have our view. But they're not a serious threat to anybody.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Fri Nov 03, 2023 5:32 pm
I think that if they were trying harder to understand Theism, they'd have more sophisticated criticisms. It actually gets quite boring when we Theists have to respond to the same few canards over, and over

But you don't even acknowledge the challenging questions as they are presented on this forum.

Name one.

I've taken on any I found that were even worthy of note. That is, in fact, why I am here. But some people are so ignorant of what Theists actually believe that they ask questions that are absurdly off-point, or founded in obvious fallacies. Should I humilate every such questioner? I choose not to. But I'm happy to take on any significant objections. They're just not all significant.

Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Fri Nov 03, 2023 5:32 pm
The claim was not that they weren't "sincere" in some vague sense; it's that they never had a method for knowing how to test whether or not God existed
LW responded:
How do you know?

What is your method?

My method is elegant in its simplicity and accuracy.

I simply ask Atheists what test they have performed to convince themselves that God doesn't exist, and they tell me they have none. Some even boast that they think they don't need one. And then they want to insist they don't owe me an answer. I've never met a single Atheist that has a test for whether or not God exists. Not one.

So then I know...by their own testimony. They've got nothing. And I can see why, too.

[Lacewing]

...

Ah! I see it's still a waste of time talking with you, I.C.

[Veritas Aequitas]

You did read those chapters of Blackburn, didn't you? How does the above relate to what Blackburn actually wrote? Please show us in the text where Blackburn makes an error.

My charge is Blackburn did not fully understands Kantian Ethics.

As stated above;
One point is Blackburn [and the majority who read Kant] understood Kant's Ethics to be purely and literally deontological, e.g. "where Kant mentioned it is a categorical imperative 'lying is not permissible' period.
Those who do not get the nuances, meant it is absolute even if one's children and other innocent lives are at stake.

Here from Blackburn's book "Ruling Passion; .."

We classify actions as cases of telling what is not true, or promise-breaking, or killing, or theft, or alternatively as examples of loyalty, integrity, or principle.
When such characterizations of action give us our input, the Ethics that emerges will be one of right and wrong, obligations and duties, prohibitions and permissions.
This gives us a duty-governed or deontological system.
The Ten Commandments and other lists of religious ordinances telling us what we may or may not do are the best-known examples of Ethics of this type.

The Moral Philosophy of Immanuel Kant is their [deontologists] best-known philosophical expression.
Kant's concern was to give a systematic description of the real obligations and duties under which we lie, and to show that they all derive from a fundamental principle, binding upon all rational agents.

Chapter 2.1 Virtues, Ends, Duties

But as we have seen, according to the deontologist, Ethics touches ground in what I as an agent will do and will not do, here and now.
It [deontology] does not touch ground in the benefits or disasters it brings to people.

You don't kill, even to save life.

Chapter 2.3— Duty First?

Note I have argued and explained, whatever is a categorical imperative [as Kant intended on an overall basis] is never to be enforced but merely be used as an ideal and a guide only.
Kant did not focus on Applied Ethics in his Ethical works but he did recommend Applied Ethics [in contrast to Pure Ethics] should be based on consequentialism which is guided by the categorical imperative as a control feedback for improvements to sustain continual moral progress.

Surely they must use their brain to understand a person of Kant's intelligence and rationality would not have insisted on such an imperative "[You don't kill or lie, even to save life.]" as absolute.

The rational view is that those have such a belief must understand they have misunderstood Kant and missed the nuances Kant presented. They have to read Kant's work very thoroughly, i.e. every chapter, para, sentence and word therein.

A few points jump right out there.

One is that you left out the words "According to the more rigorous versions of this approach" in your second snippet and seem to be fooling yourself that Blackburn only knows one deontologist. Nonetheless, we can overlook it because there is a famous example of Kant saying that last bit. Kant is quite well known for his absolute prohibition on lying, according to the rules he sets, for arriving at a moral maxim that is to be assented to by all on grounds of reason. Blackburn has obviously read the essay "On the Supposed Right to Lie From Benevolent Motives" becasue he is a philosophy professor. You.. perhaps haven't? He argues quite explicitly that it is still wrong to lie to the murderer at the door in that does he not?

Another is that if one is to summarise Kent's postion in one or two sentences one cannot do much better thant "Kant's concern was to give a systematic description of the real obligations and duties under which we lie, and to show that they all derive from a fundamental principle, binding upon all rational agents." So you are not doing great with the finding things that Blackburn wrote about Kant that are incorrect crusade. However you are five chapters away from where you said you found the actual problem so I can be patient if you are finally reading a book.

I am overjoyed to learn that you "have argued and explained, whatever is a categorical imperative [as Kant intended on an overall basis] is never to be enforced but merely be used as an ideal and a guide only." Because the thing I wrote that seems to have kicked off your Blackburn vendetta was that Immanuel Can had made an odd choice to use Kantian imperatives and moral motivation as part of his attempt to bully Harbal. In concurrence with your view, I also see Kant as weak on the subject of moral motivation. Your way of describing it has something to do with "guide only" but a viable philosopher would point to the purpose of the Categtorical Imperative being to chain practical reason to pure reason (pure reason not being inherently motivating in the way that want/need based reasoning necessarily is), with pure reason in command. That being the opposite of what Hume does when he sets passions as the rightful master of reason.

So, let us know when you finally reach those chapters that you said you already read, and do let us know how you get on. I advise against your speed reading, it lets you down. And I suggest you avoid dropping crucial content in the quote-editing phase.

As stated earlier, I had read 'Ruling Passion .." Preface, Chapter1, 7, 8 and 9 plus I had a quick scan over the other chapters where I noted Blackburn does not understand Kantian Ethics fully, thus misrepresented Kant's Ethics re the essence.

Then I decided to read the rest of the Chapters, so, cover the whole book.
That is where I presented the Blackburn's view of Kant's Ethics from Chapter 2.1 and 2.3, i.e. that Kantian Ethics is the typical deontology as absolutely 'obligations and duties.'
This Blackburn's overall deontological view of Kant is represented in his other Chapters 7 and 8 where he explained in more details.
As such, there is no need for me to search for the supporting point in Chapter 7 & 8.

Given my serious focus on Kant, obviously I would have read "On the Supposed Right to Lie From Benevolent Motives"
Most non-Kantian philosophers had mocked Kant on this, misrepresented and strawmaning Kant.
Many notable Kantians had countered the misrepresentations, e.g. Allen Wood, Korsgaard and others.

Kant and the right to lie
reviewed essay: On a supposed right to
lie from philanthropy, by Inmanuel Kant (1797)
Allen W. Wood

• "Kant’s strict views on lying have been regularly cited as a reason for
  thinking there is something fundamentally wrong with Kantian ethics.
  Some of Kant’s statements here seem so excessive that most Kantians
  who have dealt with the topic have tried to distance themselves from them,
  usually claiming that they do not (or need not) follow from Kant’s own
  principles. In this chapter, I will do a little of that, partly by questioning
  whether the famous example of the “murderer at the door” really fits the
  principles Kant applies to it. By and large, however, I will argue Kant’s
  views about veracity are reasonable or at least defensible, if not selfevident.
  This is mainly because I also think some of them –especially his position in the brief, late and famous (or notorious) essay On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy (1797)– have been badly misunderstood.
  My principal aim here will be to correct that misunderstanding."

The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil - Korsgaard
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/hand ... ttoLie.pdf

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_a_Supp ... nt_Motives

• "Helga Varden has written, "Kant's example of lying to the murderer at the door has been a cherished source of scorn for thinkers with little sympathy for Kant's philosophy and a source of deep puzzlement for those more favorably inclined... After World War II our spontaneous, negative reaction to this apparently absurd line of argument is made even starker by replacing the murderer at the door with a Nazi officer looking for Jews hidden in people's homes. Does Kant really mean to say that people hiding Jews in their homes should have told the truth to the Nazis, and that if they did lie, they became co-responsible for the heinous acts committed against those Jews who, like Anne Frank, were caught anyway?" Varden argues that Kant's views have been misrepresented by subsequent thinkers and that Kant's justification for lying being wrong is not that the person who is lied to is wronged, as is commonly argued."

If you are a rational critical thinker with wisdom, you surely would have doubted a person of Kant's stature would NOT have insisted on such absurd absolutism of ethical action. Then, you would have researched who and what are the counters to the misrepresentations in taking it out of context.

In concurrence with your view, I also see Kant as weak on the subject of moral motivation. Your way of describing it has something to do with "guide only" but a viable philosopher would point to the purpose of the Categtorical Imperative being to chain practical reason to pure reason (pure reason not being inherently motivating in the way that want/need based reasoning necessarily is), with pure reason in command.
That being the opposite of what Hume does when he sets passions as the rightful master of reason.

Kant deliberately asserted he did not want to focus on Applied Ethics but rather on getting the Groundwork and Metaphysics foundation of Ethics to be very sound.
Therefrom the applied aspects of Ethics will take care [like flow of water] of itself.
Kant thus focus on the Categorical Imperatives rather on the Hypothetical Imperatives which can be infinite from the combination of the wide range of human and external variables and conditions.

Kant never opposed Hume directly with 'passion is the slave of reason'.
After Kant awoke from his rationalism dogmatic slumber and gave up rationalism [reason as master of passion].
Then he made both 'passion' and 'reason' complementary so that ethical actions can be optimized.

but a viable philosopher would point to the purpose of the Categtorical Imperative being to chain practical reason to pure reason (pure reason not being inherently motivating in the way that want/need based reasoning necessarily is), with pure reason in command.

This is a wrong view of Kantian Ethics.

Kant wrote:
“Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and steadily we reflect upon them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me.”

Pure Reason do not command at all.
Pure Reason is the basis for transcendental illusions i.e. God, Soul, THE Universe, Freedom, albeit these are useful illusions.
In a way, the Categorical Imperatives [practical] are also illusions, i.e. useful illusions to be used as guide only.
What drives practical actions toward the ideal [useful illusions] is the inherent moral impulse [empirical guided by reason] where Kant would have agreed with Hume's sentiments [which Hume admitted his ignorance of where they came from].

I am surprised you did not ask me for references from Kant to support the above?
In any case, I will not do so even that I have them.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I simply ask Atheists what test they have performed to convince themselves that God doesn't exist, and they tell me they have none. Some even boast that they think they don't need one. And then they want to insist they don't owe me an answer.

I've never met a single Atheist that has a test for whether or not God exists. Not one.

It is Impossible for God to be Real
viewtopic.php?t=40229

You have not given an effective counter to the above argument.

[Harbal]

It does. But you don't like them, apparently. You become annoyed whenever I quote it.

Well they must have sneaked past me while I was putting all my attention into being annoyed. So what was the principle upon which the wrongness of incest was founded, according to the Bible?

It's founded on the nature of God Himself, on the fact that God is a loving, attentive and diligent Father, not an exploiter or betrayer. And there's really no better basis on which for it to be founded.

That's not a principle; it is just saying this, that or the other is wrong because God loves you. It explains nothing. It is also dependent on belief in God -a specific God- and trust in the Bible, which I and many others don't have. Your argument for objective morality is looking a bit sparce, I thought there would be more to it.

Isn't that what I've been saying all along?

Yes. But then, you can't say anything is ever wrong at all...so, we're back to moral nihilism.

I can say when I think something is morally wrong, and in most cases I can say why I think it is wrong, and that probably disqualifies me from adopting moral nihilism.

[Dontaskme]

The inherent properties behind morality "belong" to God.

What empirical evidence does God test his moral theory against?

It says God's "invisible" attributes and "divine nature" (which are the grounds of objective morality) can be "clearly understood" and one is "without excuse" for not knowing them.

What empirical evidence does God test his moral theory against?


.

[Dontaskme]

The only God there is.

When you say the only God there is, do you mean the uncreated God who has no beginning and no end?


So how can such a God know he exists if he's uncreated? because logic states, that for a 'known thing' to exist, it cannot exist without being created from existing energy which can only imply that energy cannot be created or destroyed, therefore, the creator and the created, or knower and known, must essentially be the same one energy interacting with itself only, known to itself only as and through knowledge of the word in this conception.

There is no God before Man, or Father before son if they are one and the same existence. In other words, something cannot exist prior to it's own existence. Knower and known, or creator and created have to exist in the exact same moment as one knowing, they cannot be separated out into two separate essences for example: God and man.

So all this knowledge is basically constructs of concept in this conception, as and through the medium of WORDS, it's an uncreated story told and read by no thing and everything, the same thing. And that's a truth you cannot accept IC

And if you think that's just a load of old clap trap nonsense, then you should maybe stop once in awhile and listen to the words coming out of you're own personal clap-trap.

[Sculptor]

Yes. But then, you can't say anything is ever wrong at all...so, we're back to moral nihilism.

How ironic of you.
That,my friend, is YOUR problem.
People who accept that morals are things to be argued for realise the truth of the matter.
You do not realise or even accept the possibility that what you say can be wrong, because you believe in your own myth of objectivity. whomsoever you decide is worthy of your scorn and hate is justified by that myth and you think is beyond critique.


It just makes you laughable

[Dontaskme]

But then, you can't say anything is ever wrong at all...so, we're back to moral nihilism.

You can't say anything is ever wrong at all, when you know a thing is wrong.

Maybe we, like all other lower animals, have every incentive to put our own needs and survival ahead of everything else, and no objective necessity of doing otherwise, if we so choose...and we're back to moral nihilism.

Nietzsche got there so much faster than that.

''T h e -D a y 's -F i r s t -T h o u g h t .
The best way to begin a day well is to think, on awakening,
whether we cannot give pleasure during the day
to at least one person. If this could become a
substitute for the religious habit of prayer our
fellow-men would benefit by the change.''

Excerpt from the book:
Human-All-Too-Human
By FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE
A book for free spirits.

[henry quirk]

That is not true. Morality entails that a person ought not do something unnecessary that will knowingly, significantly harm others, even if it's to their own personal benefit. That includes what is known as "greed". Morality is also, arguably, different from social laws in that it serves as a guide telling us what laws ought or ought not be imposed.

This is what I posted...

your life, liberty, and property are yours, full stop. The other's guy's life , liberty, and property are his, full stop.

You have absolute say so about yours and no say so at all about his. He has absolute say so about his and no say so at all about yours

Not sure how you see anything in there that justifies or excuses doing sumthin' unnecessarily that knowingly, significantly harms others.

[henry quirk]

You need an argument to be against slavery?

Seems to me, in a philosophy forum, yeah, you do.

[Immanuel Can]

I simply ask Atheists what test they have performed to convince themselves that God doesn't exist, and they tell me they have none. Some even boast that they think they don't need one. And then they want to insist they don't owe me an answer.

I've never met a single Atheist that has a test for whether or not God exists. Not one.

It is Impossible for God to be Real
viewtopic.php?t=40229

You have not given an effective counter to the above argument.

A good example of an argument being vastly overestimated by an Atheist. Thank you. It quite proves my contention that Atheists are sometimes far too easily impressed with arguments based on fundamental and obvious mistakes.

That being the case, it was never worth refuting.

[henry quirk]

It's wrong, period, who cares what [*any] culture thinks. (if I'm mistaken, Henry, let me know)

You're not wrong.

*gotta be inclusive

[FlashDangerpants]

....

Many more points occur... In no particular order:

1. It is particularly bizarre to witness you of all people accusing Prof. Blackburn and most other scholars, of projecting an absurd argument onto Kant. You still believe Boyd wrote an essay about me and Pete and Sculptor being moral antirealists because we lack cognitive function. That's the dumbest bullshit misreading ever, and you have stuck to it for years after "at least 20" reads of the source. So until you rectify that failure of yours, you can reel your neck in.

2. Korsgaard doesn't argue what you think, and if you had read her instead of learning about her from a hurried review of a wikipedia page about the pamphlet in question, you would know not to invoke her for this purpose. She is a neo-Kantian constructivist, she takes Kant's basic premises in the critiques and then re-applies them rather than arguing hermeneutics about Kant's particular intent. That's why she is famous for using Kantian principles to argue for animal rights, something Kant himself very definitely doesn't argue for.

3. Here's Johannes A. Niederhauser of Birkbeck College giving quite a scorching riposte to the Skorsgaard essay you linked, at one point he really loses his shit tbh. Truth be told you would likely prefer Niederhauser to Skorsgaard as he is very much arguing on behalf of Kant in the original form, not some modernised new version of him.

4. However, this all comes at a price for you. To horribly simplify, the way out of the issue for Kant is that he is talking about a different type of lie (he compares ethical and judicial lies in the gwk) and that the act of misleading in the murderer at the door counts as one but not really the other. Niederhauser does have an interesting extra bit that I had never heard of before to explain the sudden lurch into consequentialism that Kant did in that essay. I won't ruin it for you.

5. Blackburn knows all about the judicial/ethical thing, and as does Korsgaard, in both cases it isn't very important to the case they are presenting though. Niederhauser shows why Kant doesn't need to alter his imperative and rules based approach to deal with the murderer at the door. Blackburn is showing how the basic reasoning that attaches rightness and wrongness to actions works under differing moral schemas and thus simply doesn't need to address the two types of lying one of which is a duty and the other a wrong under that circumstance. And skorsgaard.... well maybe her essay is a bit bullshitty, but normally she's got her own thing going and it works fairly well.

6. I don't need you to offer a quote for Kant telling us that all interest is ultimately practical and even that of speculative reason is only conditional and is complete in practical use alone. Everyone knows it already. The point you don't seem to get is that this is why Kant is known to be weak on the subject of moral motivation.

None of this really changes anything. Kant did write that to lie would not be justified even to save a life, and he meant it. He just differentiates between two types of lie and applies different imperatigves and reason to them. So Blackburn wasn't wrong, either about where deontology touches ground or about its obligations and duties focus. As if that was ever in doubt.