Is morality objective or subjective?

[Gary Childress]

Your cheap thrill is blasphemy. Go play with yourself.

In this world "blasphemy" is the most virtuous act a living being can perform.

[Lacewing]

- No, man cannot create life. Frankenstein’s monster was a Halloween story, not reality.

Creation happens in different ways.

You receive the responses you do from a lot of people because you say very stupid and erratic things and you act like an extremist nutjob. You should be used to it by now.

[Lacewing]

Have you ever thought that even the existence of the entity that imagines God, known conceptually as 'Wo/Man' is also imagined?

Yes! However, although it's interesting to consider that, I don't really care about the imagining and illusion of it all because that doesn't seem to help much on the physical path being played on. There's this awareness 'here' in whatever capacity that is, and there's a sense that it's perfect to be experiencing/'doing this'.

I understand that there are many different experiences going on throughout all of 'existence'. From the perspective I've experienced, everything is part of a greater perfection for reasons that may be difficult to fathom with a human brain. I don't need to do anything in particular beyond living each moment fully for whatever this is. In other words: I don't need to fill life with a bunch of imaginings that I must defend and serve to protect an imaginary identity... but I could if I wanted to, as many human beings do. There are many ways to do it.

[Veritas Aequitas]

One point is Blackburn [and the majority who read Kant] understood Kant's Ethics to be purely and literally deontological, e.g. "where Kant mentioned it is a categorical imperative 'lying is not permissible' those who do not get the nuances, meant it is absolute even if one's children and other innocent lives are at stake.

Surely they must use their brain to understand a person of Kant's intelligence and rationality would not have insisted on such an imperative as absolute.

The rational view is that those have such a belief must understand they have misunderstood Kant and missed the nuances Kant presented.

Note I have argued whatever is a categorical imperative is never to be enforced but merely be used as an ideal and a guide only.

One point is enough, I won't go into the others.

You did read those chapters of Blackburn, didn't you? How does the above relate to what Blackburn actually wrote? Please show us in the text where Blackburn makes an error.

My charge is Blackburn did not fully understands Kantian Ethics.

As stated above;
One point is Blackburn [and the majority who read Kant] understood Kant's Ethics to be purely and literally deontological, e.g. "where Kant mentioned it is a categorical imperative 'lying is not permissible' period.
Those who do not get the nuances, meant it is absolute even if one's children and other innocent lives are at stake.

Here from Blackburn's book "Ruling Passion; .."

We classify actions as cases of telling what is not true, or promise-breaking, or killing, or theft, or alternatively as examples of loyalty, integrity, or principle.
When such characterizations of action give us our input, the Ethics that emerges will be one of right and wrong, obligations and duties, prohibitions and permissions.
This gives us a duty-governed or deontological system.
The Ten Commandments and other lists of religious ordinances telling us what we may or may not do are the best-known examples of Ethics of this type.

The Moral Philosophy of Immanuel Kant is their [deontologists] best-known philosophical expression.
Kant's concern was to give a systematic description of the real obligations and duties under which we lie, and to show that they all derive from a fundamental principle, binding upon all rational agents.

Chapter 2.1 Virtues, Ends, Duties

But as we have seen, according to the deontologist, Ethics touches ground in what I as an agent will do and will not do, here and now.
It [deontology] does not touch ground in the benefits or disasters it brings to people.

You don't kill, even to save life.

Chapter 2.3— Duty First?

Note I have argued and explained, whatever is a categorical imperative [as Kant intended on an overall basis] is never to be enforced but merely be used as an ideal and a guide only.
Kant did not focus on Applied Ethics in his Ethical works but he did recommend Applied Ethics [in contrast to Pure Ethics] should be based on consequentialism which is guided by the categorical imperative as a control feedback for improvements to sustain continual moral progress.

Surely they must use their brain to understand a person of Kant's intelligence and rationality would not have insisted on such an imperative "[You don't kill or lie, even to save life.]" as absolute.

The rational view is that those have such a belief must understand they have misunderstood Kant and missed the nuances Kant presented. They have to read Kant's work very thoroughly, i.e. every chapter, para, sentence and word therein.

[Dontaskme]

Have you ever thought that even the existence of the entity that imagines God, known conceptually as 'Wo/Man' is also imagined?

Yes! However, although it's interesting to consider that, I don't really care about the imagining and illusion of it all because that doesn't seem to help much on the physical path being played on. There's this awareness 'here' in whatever capacity that is, and there's a sense that it's perfect to be experiencing/'doing this'.

I understand that there are many different experiences going on throughout all of 'existence'. From the perspective I've experienced, everything is part of a greater perfection for reasons that may be difficult to fathom with a human brain. I don't need to do anything in particular beyond living each moment fully for whatever this is. In other words: I don't need to fill life with a bunch of imaginings that I must defend and serve to protect an imaginary identity... but I could if I wanted to, as many human beings do. There are many ways to do it.

Fair enough Lacewing. I like you're response, I agree with you that on the human level, we don't need to do anything other than just be.

Of course, there are the deeper integra's of existence underpinning our temporal human appearance as an apparent relation between the Absolute of all that is, was and ever will be.

Reality being the absolute nothingness appearing as absolutely everything, including the appearance of an individual human form and it's unique individuality in this conception, within the real dream of illusory separation.

[Iwannaplato]

Note I have argued and explained, whatever is a categorical imperative [as Kant intended on an overall basis] is never to be enforced but merely be used as an ideal and a guide only

Which is still deontology.

Surely they must use their brain to understand a person of Kant's intelligence and rationality would not have insisted on such an imperative "[You don't kill or lie, even to save life.]" as absolute.

Then it would not be an ideal or guide for many real life situations.

It doesn't make sense to say it is an ideal, but if it saves lives to lie, it's ok. Then it's not an ideal. The ideal would then be unless it would hurt someone don't lie - the details of the guideline and how it's worded don't matter, so let's not quibble over that. You don't present something in a deontological form if you expect people to drop it in all sorts of contexts.

The rational view is that those have such a belief must understand they have misunderstood Kant and missed the nuances Kant presented. They have to read Kant's work very thoroughly, i.e. every chapter, para, sentence and word therein.

But here's the thing VA: your argument above does not quote a sentence, chapter, para, etc. from Kant. Which is odd. Point to the specific thing they are missing.

Here's what your argument above consists of:
You're not using your brain if you disagree with me.
You haven't read Kant well enough.

Those are not arguments. They are ad homs and present neither critique of the positions others have nor support for your own.

[Dontaskme]

the Christian God Himself must of had a "sense" that it was okay for Adam and Eve and Noah and Naamah to produce offspring through incestuous sexual intercourse.

When you think about this on an even deeper level.

The Christian God claims all children of the earth have just one Father, namely the lord their God.

That implies, every living baby born to earth share the same one Father, making us offspring of the one Father God, made in his image, ALL incestuous as we have no other choice but to mate with each other.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Note I have argued and explained, whatever is a categorical imperative [as Kant intended on an overall basis] is never to be enforced but merely be used as an ideal and a guide only

Which is still deontology.

Surely they must use their brain to understand a person of Kant's intelligence and rationality would not have insisted on such an imperative "[You don't kill or lie, even to save life.]" as absolute.

Then it would not be an ideal or guide for many real life situations.

It doesn't make sense to say it is an ideal, but if it saves lives to lie, it's ok. Then it's not an ideal. The ideal would then be unless it would hurt someone don't lie - the details of the guideline and how it's worded don't matter, so let's not quibble over that. You don't present something in a deontological form if you expect people to drop it in all sorts of contexts.

The rational view is that those have such a belief must understand they have misunderstood Kant and missed the nuances Kant presented. They have to read Kant's work very thoroughly, i.e. every chapter, para, sentence and word therein.

But here's the thing VA: your argument above does not quote a sentence, chapter, para, etc. from Kant.

Here's what your argument above consists of:
You're not using your brain if you disagree with me.
You haven't read Kant well enough.

Those are not arguments. They are ad homs and present neither critique of the positions others have nor support for your own.

I wrote:
One point is Blackburn [and the majority who read Kant] understood Kant's Ethics to be purely and literally deontological, e.g. "where Kant mentioned it is a categorical imperative 'lying is not permissible' period.

Note I highlighted purely and literally to get my point across.
In the broadest sense, the Kantian approach is 'deontological'.
But the term 'deontological' is typical associated with fixed rules or else, it will this threat or punishment, I would prefer to separate Kant's ethics from being labelled as 'deontological' in the typical sense.

Kant's Ethics is more of an 'Goal Oriented' approach sort of Ethics, not Rules Oriented as most read it to be.

Yes, I deliberately did not provide supporting references [which I have] from Kant.
I don't intend to, except the inference, a philosopher of Kant standing, i.e. being recognized as one of 'the greatest philosopher of all times' is not likely to insist on something so absurd as;

"no killing or lying -period! even if otherwise, it save lives*"

*kill one to save many.

[FlashDangerpants]

One point is Blackburn [and the majority who read Kant] understood Kant's Ethics to be purely and literally deontological, e.g. "where Kant mentioned it is a categorical imperative 'lying is not permissible' those who do not get the nuances, meant it is absolute even if one's children and other innocent lives are at stake.

Surely they must use their brain to understand a person of Kant's intelligence and rationality would not have insisted on such an imperative as absolute.

The rational view is that those have such a belief must understand they have misunderstood Kant and missed the nuances Kant presented.

Note I have argued whatever is a categorical imperative is never to be enforced but merely be used as an ideal and a guide only.

One point is enough, I won't go into the others.

You did read those chapters of Blackburn, didn't you? How does the above relate to what Blackburn actually wrote? Please show us in the text where Blackburn makes an error.

My charge is Blackburn did not fully understands Kantian Ethics.

As stated above;
One point is Blackburn [and the majority who read Kant] understood Kant's Ethics to be purely and literally deontological, e.g. "where Kant mentioned it is a categorical imperative 'lying is not permissible' period.
Those who do not get the nuances, meant it is absolute even if one's children and other innocent lives are at stake.

Here from Blackburn's book "Ruling Passion; .."

We classify actions as cases of telling what is not true, or promise-breaking, or killing, or theft, or alternatively as examples of loyalty, integrity, or principle.
When such characterizations of action give us our input, the Ethics that emerges will be one of right and wrong, obligations and duties, prohibitions and permissions.
This gives us a duty-governed or deontological system.
The Ten Commandments and other lists of religious ordinances telling us what we may or may not do are the best-known examples of Ethics of this type.

The Moral Philosophy of Immanuel Kant is their [deontologists] best-known philosophical expression.
Kant's concern was to give a systematic description of the real obligations and duties under which we lie, and to show that they all derive from a fundamental principle, binding upon all rational agents.

Chapter 2.1 Virtues, Ends, Duties

But as we have seen, according to the deontologist, Ethics touches ground in what I as an agent will do and will not do, here and now.
It [deontology] does not touch ground in the benefits or disasters it brings to people.

You don't kill, even to save life.

Chapter 2.3— Duty First?

Note I have argued and explained, whatever is a categorical imperative [as Kant intended on an overall basis] is never to be enforced but merely be used as an ideal and a guide only.
Kant did not focus on Applied Ethics in his Ethical works but he did recommend Applied Ethics [in contrast to Pure Ethics] should be based on consequentialism which is guided by the categorical imperative as a control feedback for improvements to sustain continual moral progress.

Surely they must use their brain to understand a person of Kant's intelligence and rationality would not have insisted on such an imperative "[You don't kill or lie, even to save life.]" as absolute.

The rational view is that those have such a belief must understand they have misunderstood Kant and missed the nuances Kant presented. They have to read Kant's work very thoroughly, i.e. every chapter, para, sentence and word therein.

A few points jump right out there.

One is that you left out the words "According to the more rigorous versions of this approach" in your second snippet and seem to be fooling yourself that Blackburn only knows one deontologist. Nonetheless, we can overlook it because there is a famous example of Kant saying that last bit. Kant is quite well known for his absolute prohibition on lying, according to the rules he sets, for arriving at a moral maxim that is to be assented to by all on grounds of reason. Blackburn has obviously read the essay "On the Supposed Right to Lie From Benevolent Motives" becasue he is a philosophy professor. You.. perhaps haven't? He argues quite explicitly that it is still wrong to lie to the murderer at the door in that does he not?

Another is that if one is to summarise Kent's postion in one or two sentences one cannot do much better thant "Kant's concern was to give a systematic description of the real obligations and duties under which we lie, and to show that they all derive from a fundamental principle, binding upon all rational agents." So you are not doing great with the finding things that Blackburn wrote about Kant that are incorrect crusade. However you are five chapters away from where you said you found the actual problem so I can be patient if you are finally reading a book.

I am overjoyed to learn that you "have argued and explained, whatever is a categorical imperative [as Kant intended on an overall basis] is never to be enforced but merely be used as an ideal and a guide only." Because the thing I wrote that seems to have kicked off your Blackburn vendetta was that Immanuel Can had made an odd choice to use Kantian imperatives and moral motivation as part of his attempt to bully Harbal. In concurrence with your view, I also see Kant as weak on the subject of moral motivation. Your way of describing it has something to do with "guide only" but a viable philosopher would point to the purpose of the Categtorical Imperative being to chain practical reason to pure reason (pure reason not being inherently motivating in the way that want/need based reasoning necessarily is), with pure reason in command. That being the opposite of what Hume does when he sets passions as the rightful master of reason.

So, let us know when you finally reach those chapters that you said you already read, and do let us know how you get on. I advise against your speed reading, it lets you down. And I suggest you avoid dropping crucial content in the quote-editing phase.

[Immanuel Can]

Although I can't unequivocally say that incest, per se, is morally wrong, I suspect that in most instances of it I would be able to say it. I somehow doubt there are many cases that don't include some element of abuse.

"Abuse"? Is that another thing you're prepared to say is objectively wrong? Or would you only say, "Well, I don't like abuse, but it's okay for others"?

I suppose my yardstick would be, is anyone being damaged or hurt by it, but that is my main yardstick for most, if not all, moral issues.

Indeed. But why is "damaging" or "hurting" people really wrong? In fact, don't the terms "damage" and "abuse" imply already that you're placing a moral condemnation on those actions? Why call something "damage" or "abuse," unless we all already know that they are bad things? But how do we know?

What I'm pointing out is that in using such words..."abuse," "damage," "hurt"...you are drawing on a particular conception of what is right and wrong for human beings. You may never have thought of it in such precise terms, perhaps: nevertheless, there must be some set of moral assumptions you're already taking as a given, as essentially and objective truth about the nature of those actions.

So, for example, we might agree that a parent performing certain actions toward their offspring is "abuse," or "damage" or "hurt." But pedophiles, for example, do not at all agree. One of my psychologist friends tell me that one of the justifications that pedophiles routinely use for their actions is that they are being "loving," or "helping" the younger victim, by "leading" them and "helping them to explore" (i.e. what you and I call sexual grooming and rape).

So if you and I know how vile and wrong that is, how do we know? And what should we, by way of resistance and protection of children, explain to our law-makers and law-enforcement agencies, that would help them to know that when they are arresting pedophiles, they are not stopping people from "helping" and "loving," but from "harming," "damaging" and "abusing" their victims? (Of course, "victim" is another such morally-laden word: it implies already that we are seeing one person as being abused by the other.)

But why? What makes some actions feel "bad," and others feel "good"? Why shouldn't we just say, "C'mon, Harbal...your reservations about incest or your antipathy to creating genetically damaged children are just tastes. You can get over them"?

Well unless I were in a position to prevent the creation of genetically damaged children, which I usually am not, it wouldn't make any difference what you say to me.

Ah. Now we get to the key point at which we're stuck.

I'm asking you why the intentional production of genetically-anomalous (shall we say) children is wrong, and you're saying only "Well, I have no power or responsibility to prevent such things." But this is really to evade the point: you're not being asked to legislate or make arrests. And of course much of what goes on in the moral sphere is not under your control. But we are asking not a question of your power or jurisdiction, but of right judgment. And that, we all should have.

Why? Because we all need to make moral decisions all the time...not about incest or genetic damage or pedophiles, maybe, but about other matters in our own lives. We all need to know how to vote, how to support good public policy, what principles of justice to encourage, and at the very least, to have sound judgment in all the matters we personally control. So we are going to need right judgment.

To do this, for all the matters in which we DO have power, we're going to have to test our moral theories, and make sure they're sound. It's too late to try and figure them out when we're in a dilemma, particularly when the strongest incentive may be on the side of doing something that later sober reflection would reveal to be bad. So to prepare our judgment for such challenges, we test what we personally believe by employing hard cases; hard cases can clarify the issues and enable us to drill down to our own basic assumptions and evaluate whether they're in good shape or not.

That's what we were doing. So it doesn't matter at all that you are not a functionary in the justice system, or that you don't know any pedophiles, practitioners of incest or Hamas bombers. What matters is whether or not your own moral suppositions are in the shape you should want them to be, so that when they get strained or tested, you're in a position to find them reliable in guiding you to be the kind of person you respect...or more precisely, the kind of person you should respect.

If you are making the point that I do not have the power to enforce my moral verdicts, you are right, I very often don't.

My question would actually be quite the opposite.

I'm fairly certain, by your own account, that you're not in a position to enforce your own moral verdicts on others. That's not really relevant, since our cases are all hypothetical. The question's not about powers of enforcement, but about sound moral judgment -- a faculty applicable to all situations.

If our distaste for incest turned out to be innate, rather than just cultural, I would, indeed, conclude that nature had a hand in it.

"Nature had a hand?" I wasn't aware that NATURE had any "hands" at all. And that's true whether we mean something merely metaphorical; for nature qua nature has no intentions, directing or planning in it, we are told by the Atheist-Materialist-Physicalist group. It's merely an impersonal force, not an anthropomorphic being of some kind.

So it's not as if "nature" will instruct us in moral issues, since "nature" has no intentions at all. And the danger, if we imagine it does, is that we'll mistake what is only our own desire for power or our own prejudices as receiving from "nature" some sort of objectivity which our deepest beliefs, as Atheists and Materialists, would tell us it simply cannot have.

Genetically damaged individuals would not be conducive to the survival our species,

That's debatable, of course. But if it were true, we have no imperative to make our species survive, anyway. The dodo bird and the Tasmanian tiger died out, and it was no moral failing on their part that they did. Even if we say that EACH Tasmanian tiger had a drive to survive, that doesn't imply they had to concern themselves with the survival of OTHER Tasmanian tigers, or that the drive they had was any kind of "moral" imperative. And nature did not intervene to prevent the extinction, either.

If we are just sophisticated animals, a kind of lofty Tasmanian tiger, then why should our species be the only one deserving of special moral status?

I don't see nature as a moral agent.

That's correct, of course. In itself, it simply cannot be. We would have to think, perhaps, that nature was a "map" created for us by some Intelligence with moral authority, if we were to suppose that nature qua nature can tell us anything about morality. So far as Materialists et al. know, it's just an accidental coming-together of random atoms. Nature has no such secrets for us.

If I did have reason to think there were a creator, such as God, then I may well go along with the rest of your reasoning in this instance.

THAT, my friend, is the essential point.

The differences between you and me are ultimately matters of what we believe is real in the first place. Believe in God, and certain other beliefs must follow; disbelieve in God, and the same is true -- other beliefs fall into line, as surely as effect follows cause, or night follows day.

My lack of belief in God is not my main stumbling block here; because even if I believed in God, I still wouldn't recognise his commandments regarding our behaviour as morality; I would just see them as a set of rules issued by my superior.

That's actually because of the relationship which you perceive yourself to have to God. You see Him as merely a potential tyrant. You don't conceive of Him as a loving Father. And that makes a huge difference, as well, as to how you receive His moral instructions...were He to give any, let us say.

...morality is founded purely on our own sense of right and wrong,...

I understand that, up to now, that's what you have always thought. Lots of people in the modern West, particularly, have supposed that. But what we may suppose, or what we may be told, may not always be true. And this is really where the weakness of subjectivism gets exposed badly; for subjectivism offers us no basis for our sense of right and wrong. It simply requires us to believe that the mere having of a particular "sense" is an indicator of morality, which makes our "sense" of things uncriticizable, unreformable and inexplicable...as well as incapable of informing others, shaping a system of justice, or instructing us on our own best interests, among other things.

In short, it assumes that our own individual "sense" of things has to be always perfect, unimpeachably trustworthy, and totally sound.

And it's not, apparently. The hard cases we consider make that very clear.

[Immanuel Can]

1) Doesn't one typically only test for what they think might exist? Generally, if someone goes looking for something, they are already motivated to find it.

God fits that. We have no particular reason to think He doesn't exist...

So you're skewing this to focus on your beliefs, rather than answering the simple and straight-forward question that was posed. We're talking about atheists, who don't believe in God

So am I. They have no good reason for their Atheism.

Why wouldn't an all-powerful, ever-present god clarify the singular truth for all, providing proof that is witnessed by everyone?

He has. They didn't like it.

Why is it left up to humans to see and agree despite so many diverse paths that claim to be the ONE path?

It's not. Mankind has enough information to make the right decision. The problem is not a matter of information, but one of will.

Why would any archaic book be the guide book for all time?

If it's just an "archaic guidebook," particularly one that was merely a human artifact, it wouldn't be. But then, that doesn't describe what the Bible actually is.

Let me reverse the question to you: if God did send a revelation of Himself for the good of humanity, at what point in history is the right point for Him to have sent it?

...hypnotizing power of human belief and potential that can tie one to a theist framework and create one's dependency on it...

This is kind of vague and wordy.

Is your question, "How do we know we're not just believing in something because we want to believe in it? That's how I'm presently understanding it. Or have I missed some element of your question in my simplifying of it?

Many atheists have demonstrated heartfelt desire and commitment to explore theism

This is the opposite of what you said above. You said Atheists "were previously theists," and then that they had a "heartfelt desire to explore theism."

It's not the opposite at all.

It is, actually. One doesn't "explore" what one already "knows." If Atheists are former Theists, then presumably they "know" Theism...or they weren't really Theists at all, but something much less-informed than to be a real Theist. But why would Atheists be "exploring" a thing they already know, let alone "demonstrate heartfelt desire and commitment" to find out things they already know?

I'm referring to atheists who were previously theists and who had a heartfelt desire to explore theism when they were theists.

Same confusion, but in one sentence. Were these Atheists formerly real Theists, or were they Atheists who wanted to explore Theism? Or are you trying to say something like, "These Atheists used to really believe Theism, but now they don't...and they were sincere," or something like that?

This is in response to your claim that atheists have no test results because they haven't tested theism for themselves.

You've missed the claim. The claim was not that they weren't "sincere" in some vague sense; it's that they never had a method for knowing how to test whether or not God existed, and so they just disbelieved by gratuitious will.

If somebody just walks up to you and says, "You have leukemia," you have every right to ask them, "How did you test for that?" If an Atheist says, "There is no God," you have the same right: you should ask, "How did you find that out?" And if he has no good answer, you have no reason at all to take his claim seriously.

You do not know what people have tested for themselves

What we do know -- both you and I know -- is that if somebody, by their own admission, has no test in the first place, then they haven't tested anything. It's just that simple.

[Immanuel Can]

The important point is rather that the Atheist claims to have no evidence for God, while refusing to set any test for evidence.

The test has already been ongoing...

So you know what it is?

Great.

What is it?

[Lacewing]

[Reality being] the absolute nothingness appearing as absolutely everything, including the appearance of an individual human form and it's unique individuality in this conception, within the real dream of illusory separation.

I've experienced awareness of something like this... during my near death experience. However, from discussions on this forum, I have come to question concepts like 'reality' and 'truth' when they refer to something singular and/or for all and/or beyond this physical life.

Reality and truth may look -- and be experienced -- differently depending on what facet/perspective one is gazing through in a physical world. Beyond this physical world, such concepts probably have absolutely no meaning or significance at all. The concepts are of the human world: what is 'real' and 'true' is what matters to human beings -- which varies. Reality might be used as a claim of absoluteness, but it is likely just a particular perspective of a particular moment.

The concept of time, also, is most likely a product of (and tool for) our physical world -- and is meaningless beyond that.

(Thanks for inspiring the discussion.)

[Walker]

Your cheap thrill is blasphemy. Go play with yourself.

In this world "blasphemy" is the most virtuous act a living being can perform.

Actually, just as cursing reveals a stunted vocabulary, blasphemy reveals low self-esteem and low sense of self-worth. Daily cursing and blasphemy keeps that self-esteem well-lubricated, ready to go from 0-60 at a moment's notice, all in the service of proving to yourself and the world who you think you are.

One wonders, where will the energy go with this? Will it go into contemplation, something worth reading, or self-justification to lubricate the stunted, blasphemous self-concept?

[Harbal]

Although I can't unequivocally say that incest, per se, is morally wrong, I suspect that in most instances of it I would be able to say it. I somehow doubt there are many cases that don't include some element of abuse.

"Abuse"? Is that another thing you're prepared to say is objectively wrong? Or would you only say, "Well, I don't like abuse, but it's okay for others"?

I suppose my yardstick would be, is anyone being damaged or hurt by it, but that is my main yardstick for most, if not all, moral issues.

Indeed. But why is "damaging" or "hurting" people really wrong? In fact, don't the terms "damage" and "abuse" imply already that you're placing a moral condemnation on those actions? Why call something "damage" or "abuse," unless we all already know that they are bad things? But how do we know?

What I'm pointing out is that in using such words..."abuse," "damage," "hurt"...you are drawing on a particular conception of what is right and wrong for human beings. You may never have thought of it in such precise terms, perhaps: nevertheless, there must be some set of moral assumptions you're already taking as a given, as essentially and objective truth about the nature of those actions.

So, for example, we might agree that a parent performing certain actions toward their offspring is "abuse," or "damage" or "hurt." But pedophiles, for example, do not at all agree. One of my psychologist friends tell me that one of the justifications that pedophiles routinely use for their actions is that they are being "loving," or "helping" the younger victim, by "leading" them and "helping them to explore" (i.e. what you and I call sexual grooming and rape).

So if you and I know how vile and wrong that is, how do we know? And what should we, by way of resistance and protection of children, explain to our law-makers and law-enforcement agencies, that would help them to know that when they are arresting pedophiles, they are not stopping people from "helping" and "loving," but from "harming," "damaging" and "abusing" their victims? (Of course, "victim" is another such morally-laden word: it implies already that we are seeing one person as being abused by the other.)

What, exactly, does the Bible have to say about incest? You could explain why my idea of subjective moral judgement isn't viable for ever and a day, but I will only get a real sense of how weak it is if I am able to compare it to the real thing.