Is morality objective or subjective?

[Harbal]

I never got to be a mechanic; I got the sack from my job after a year.

We've all been there.

No we haven't all been there.

I've been there twice.

[Dontaskme]

I never got to be a mechanic; I got the sack from my job after a year.

We've all been there.

No we haven't all been there.

I've been there twice.

I've never been there.

[FlashDangerpants]

You haven't actually read many books have you? In fact in tems of a credibility claim you recently made, you are far behind me in this matter.

For every book, I make sure I read the 'Preface, Introduction and Conclusion'.

Then you haven't read the books.

[Veritas Aequitas]

You haven't actually read many books have you? In fact in tems of a credibility claim you recently made, you are far behind me in this matter.

For every book, I make sure I read the 'Preface, Introduction and Conclusion'.

Then you haven't read the books.

Use your common sense.
That is the minimal for every book I stored.
Where did I state explicitly those are the only sections I read for every book.

Note I edited to include this in my previous post.

• Even Henry Allison with more than 40 years as a Professor specializing in Kant admitted openly his missed out a critical point in the Critique of Pure Reason.
  In the Preface of his book; Transcendental Idealism: Interpretation and Defence, Allison wrote;
  • I was awakened from my “dogmatic slumber" on this issue, however, by the work of a former student, Michelle Grier.
    First in her Dissertation and then, more substantively, in an important book based upon it, Grier has shown conclusively that for Kant Transcendental illusion is inherent in the very nature of human reason.3
  If Allison a pro-Kantian could missed out such a critical point, what more with Blackburn an anti-Kantian[?] with superficial knowledge of Kantian philosophy.

[Skepdick]

Then you haven't read the books.

Have I read the book if I omitted any commas? Or have I only misunderstood the book? (just checking for the level ot nitpickery here)

[Sculptor]

For every book, I make sure I read the 'Preface, Introduction and Conclusion'.

Then you haven't read the books.

Use your common sense.
That is the minimal for every book I stored.
Where did I state explicitly those are the only sections I read for every book.

Note I edited to include this in my previous post.

• Even Henry Allison with more than 40 years as a Professor specializing in Kant admitted openly his missed out a critical point in the Critique of Pure Reason.
  In the Preface of his book; Transcendental Idealism: Interpretation and Defence, Allison wrote;
  • I was awakened from my “dogmatic slumber" on this issue, however, by the work of a former student, Michelle Grier.
    First in her Dissertation and then, more substantively, in an important book based upon it, Grier has shown conclusively that for Kant Transcendental illusion is inherent in the very nature of human reason.3
  If Allison a pro-Kantian could missed out such a critical point, what more with Blackburn an anti-Kantian[?] with superficial knowledge of Kantian philosophy.

Ah!

So in your won words please tell us all what is meant by the phrase "Transcendental illusion "!
#
I can wait.

[Dontaskme]

If somebody believed it was objectively wrong to "experience homosexuality," would they be objectively wrong?

“Belief” by its definition involves “knowing's self-reference” and is always “subjective”. The content of a belief are “percepts” and “concepts” which are “objective”.

Everything is both objective and subjective at the same time. There is an objective world that we observe and interact with, but those observations are limited by biological and cognitive filters and our perspective on it. In other words, we see truth but a limited version of it.

[Atla]

In Kantian philosophy, the concept of "transcendental illusion" is closely related to Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy and his exploration of the limits of human knowledge. It is a term he uses to refer to a particular kind of misunderstanding or misconception that arises when we attempt to apply the categories of the understanding, which are fundamental concepts for organizing our experience, beyond the limits of possible experience.

Kant wasn't as bright as VA believes, Kant simply fell for the "illusion of the transcendental illusion". Or maybe Kant was just trolling and everyone fell for it. The truth is that we simply can't know if the categories of the understanding can be applied to the noumenal world to some degree, or not. Kant just said that we can't do it at all, which is exactly the kind of (negative) knowledge claim that his philosophy prohibits us from making.

Now with hundreds of years of science behind us, it's fairly reasonable to argue that the categories of the understanding are able to reflect the surrounding noumenal world to a degree that is above zero.

[FlashDangerpants]

For every book, I make sure I read the 'Preface, Introduction and Conclusion'.

Then you haven't read the books.

Use your common sense.
That is the minimal for every book I stored.
Where did I state explicitly those are the only sections I read for every book.

Note I edited to include this in my previous post.

• Even Henry Allison with more than 40 years as a Professor specializing in Kant admitted openly his missed out a critical point in the Critique of Pure Reason.
  In the Preface of his book; Transcendental Idealism: Interpretation and Defence, Allison wrote;
  • I was awakened from my “dogmatic slumber" on this issue, however, by the work of a former student, Michelle Grier.
    First in her Dissertation and then, more substantively, in an important book based upon it, Grier has shown conclusively that for Kant Transcendental illusion is inherent in the very nature of human reason.3
  If Allison a pro-Kantian could missed out such a critical point, what more with Blackburn an anti-Kantian[?] with superficial knowledge of Kantian philosophy.

You haven't read Blackburn, but you baselessly assert that you know more about Kant and Hume than he. I don't think you've read Hume. Have you read Allison? Have you read other Kant scholars such as Berlin? Are you well read even on your specialist topic of Kant?

It's all a bit pointless to ask really. You don't read very well. You proved that beyond all possible doubt when you fooled yourself that a professional philosopher wrote a paper that was picked up by a professional editor and published by an academic publisher with the absurd argument that people who disagree with moral realism have a cognitive deficit. It goes almost without saying of course that none of those persons committed the career suicide you ascribe to them.

That is the only book I can say for sure that you ever did try to read though. I've never seen you comment much about other books other than to describe chapter titles.

[Immanuel Can]

Yes, we can condemn a crime against man simply by virtue of its being a crime against God, and for no other reason, but if we condemn it on the grounds of crimes against man being wrong, are we not then making the mistake of letting our personal feelings and judgement about crimes against man play a role in the way we approach morality?

Good catch: but no, I don't think we are.

We would, though, be doing that if we severed the two questions from each other. If we argued that there is a rationale for objective morality that depends on God, and a separate, distinct and unrelated rationale that made it wrong for us to do certain things, and right for us to do others, in regard solely to man, then we'd be in trouble in just the way you suggest.

But then why did God give us the faculty of having an emotional response to moral issues if he did not want us to be guided by it?

Be alerted by it, so we could use our brains. Our consciences, or our "emotional response" mechanism, if you like, was installed in us to operate like a moral fire-alarm: it was to alert us to attend to a moral problem. But our emotions were not meant to be the sum-and-total of that process: they initiate reasoning, so we can figure out what the problem is, and what the moral solution to it should be.

Consider conscience to be something like the fight-or-flight response: both are certainly very useful and necessary. But whether to fly or fight still has to be determined by the brain, not by the mere feeling of a need to fight or flee. And whether to do one thing or the other, in a moral situation, still has to be decided by the brain, not by the mere emotions.

But the truth is that the duty to God is primary and definitive, and the duty to man -- while just as real -- is derivative. This is what John Locke saw: that man's moral standing is derived from his personal standing as the creature and rightful child of God.

Are children not meant to learn to stand on their own two feet, and become independent of their parents? And isn't that what any decent parent would want?

To be independent of God? Of course not: to be that, one would have to be greater than the Supreme Being Himself. Besides, such a thing isn't even analytically possible: to be "independent of" the Source of all light, life, goodness, health and righeousness is possible only one way...and that place is called Hell.

But you're onto something: God does want us to grow up, morally-speaking. He does want us to become independent, freely-choosing individuals with identity and options of our own. And that's because the ultimate purpose of the process is that we would have what it takes to choose to be with Him as friends forever...or not. But that either way, it would be a free choice on our part.

However, any adult who is raising a child knows that freedom has another side -- responsibility. If one is made free in one area, one also has to have, at the same time, the opportunity to reap the consequences of one's freedom. So if I give my child the keys to the car and let him drive, I'm also giving him the opportunity to crash the car and kill himself or others. Yet, for his freedom's sake, I give him the keys anyway. It is more important that he should grow up than that he should be permanently preserved from all risk. For the sake of his freedom, his individuality, his growth, I allow him the possibility of a wretched choice.

But that's just how it has to be. There's no freedom without responsibilty. If freedom is a surpassing good (and I think it is, as do many people) then that's the cost of freedom. There is no other way it could be.

That's why severing the two always results in incoherence. We end up claiming that man has "rights" which turn out to be what philosophers have called "nonsense on stilts" (Jeremy Bentham) -- that is, high-sounding language, but language so lacking in underpinnings that when we examine it, it turns out to be supported by nothing.

If man has rights because of God, there's a reason he has rights. If we imagine man has "rights" without that, we become instantly powerless to say why any man has such "rights" at all.

But men grant each other rights, and put measures in place to protect those rights.

Sure. And such alleged "rights" are then limited by the power of men to issue and defend them...which is far from absolute. So they aren't what the Constitution of the US calls "unalienable" rights. They are "alienable," meaning that they can be taken away as easily as given, and by the same source.

Contrary to that, "unalienable" rights are those that inhere in the very nature of what one is. So, for example, a slave has an "unalienable" right to be free, even if he lives in slavery. Man has no right to enslave him. To be sure, man has the power to do so (because those men have freedom and power to do such things) but they are in violation of the moral standing of the enslaved person, and they are responsible, as well, to God, for what they are doing when they enslave him; for his natural, unalienable, sacred right is to be allowed his personal autonomy.

Locke also said something very much like that, by the way. And it's Locke that all our "human rights" codes quote.

And rights are very often granted on the grounds of what many regard as "self evident truths".

You're echoing the American Constitution. But you're not quoting that sentence properly. It reads,

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

So it's not the rights that are "self-evident": it's the truth that man has been endowed by God with such rights that is the self-evident fact, and that these rights are of the unalienable sort, and that they consist in life, liberty...etc.

Anyway, all that aside, can I ask you a question to help me understand how we could best avoid the danger of allowing subjectivity to enter into our moral outlook? I am going to assume you will say, "Yes, of course you can, so go ahead, ask me anything you like".

Yes, of course you can, so go ahead, ask me anything you like.

Thank you.

My pleasure.

Supposing you were to witness, or even read or hear about, a man torturing a child, and as a gift to you, I will make the man a Member of Hamas, and the child Israeli. What do you think your response would be; could you describe it?

Well, that's speculative, of course. I'd like to say I'd courageously rush in and intervene. But that would be silly to say, since it costs me nothing to imagine it, and it would require great moral fortitude to save a child from the clutches of a vicious terrorist. I will not preen myself, therefore, as an exemplar of such courage. Were I in the situation, I would hope I would do the right thing; but I am a man like any other, and men can be craven, at times.

But I expect you'll want to draw that to an analogy with God, and say something to the effect of, "Why didn't God prevent the Palestinians from killing the Jews?" However, let's consider how He would have to go about doing that, and what the general consequences of such an operating procedure would be; and we'll see why, perhaps, granting humans freedom entails the opening of a door even to such things.

[Immanuel Can]

My personal subjective belief is that it's not wrong to experience homosexuality. My personal subjective belief also states that somebody who believes (not me) the experience of homosexuality is wrong, is in my opinion, not objectively wrong to have that belief, that person would be right in their own personal subjective belief to state that the experience of homosexuality is wrong, else why would they even have the belief in the first place, if they doubted in their own mind, whether their belief was true or not? but then they could change their mind of course, in which case they'd still believe their belief is the true and correct one.

All this is, is an elaborate way of saying, "I can tell you nothing whatsover about the actual moral status of homosexuality. One side could be right, the other side could be right...in fact, everybody's simultaneously right and wrong, and homosexuality has no moral status at all."

Since you have no information about the moral status of anything, then, what is your point about homosexuality?

[Harbal]

And rights are very often granted on the grounds of what many regard as "self evident truths".

You're echoing the American Constitution. But you're not quoting that sentence properly. It reads,

No, I am not thinking of the American constitution, so quoting any of it would not be relevant. I was thinking more of an exchange I once had with henry quirk. If I understand henry’s view correctly, he thinks we humans have rights by courtesy of some sort of deity, or other, but when pressed about how he could know what these rights are, he seems to point to the self-evident truth of our entitlement. I think his reasoning runs something along the lines of; we all know that we do not want to be deprived of our life, liberty and property, and we somehow know we have a legitimate claim on these things that no one has the right to violate. Now I don’t believe in henry’s deity, of course, but I can understand where he is coming from as far as things being self-evident is concerned, but I would only go as far as saying that it only seems self-evident that, for example, slavery is wrong. I think this distinction makes little or no difference in a “real life” situation, because the emotive power of the sentiment is the same in both cases; it is only when we examine the matter that we realise there is no ontologically objective fact, or phenomenon, anywhere to support the claim of self-evidence; there are only subjective phenomena, such as ideas and emotions, by which we can test it.

I don't think henry actually used the term, "self-evident", so I hope I am not misrepresenting his views.

Supposing you were to witness, or even read or hear about, a man torturing a child, and as a gift to you, I will make the man a Member of Hamas, and the child Israeli. What do you think your response would be; could you describe it?

Well, that's speculative, of course. I'd like to say I'd courageously rush in and intervene. But that would be silly to say, since it costs me nothing to imagine it, and it would require great moral fortitude to save a child from the clutches of a vicious terrorist. I will not preen myself, therefore, as an exemplar of such courage. Were I in the situation, I would hope I would do the right thing; but I am a man like any other, and men can be craven, at times.

But I expect you'll want to draw that to an analogy with God, and say something to the effect of, "Why didn't God prevent the Palestinians from killing the Jews?" However, let's consider how He would have to go about doing that, and what the general consequences of such an operating procedure would be; and we'll see why, perhaps, granting humans freedom entails the opening of a door even to such things.

No, I am not interested in why God does not intervene to prevent human suffering, and I'm sure you have a stock explanation, anyway.

What I wanted to know is what your emotional response would be; what feelings you would have about it. We know you would recognise it as a crime against God, that goes without saying, but what would you, as a person, feel?

[FlashDangerpants]

I think this distinction makes little or no difference in a “real life” situation, because the emotive power of the sentiment is the same in both cases; it is only when we examine the matter that we realise there is no ontologically objective fact, or phenomenon, anywhere to support the claim of self-evidence; there are only subjective phenomena, such as ideas and emotions, by which we can test it.

This guy philosophies!

[Immanuel Can]

And rights are very often granted on the grounds of what many regard as "self evident truths".

You're echoing the American Constitution. But you're not quoting that sentence properly. It reads,

No, I am not thinking of the American constitution, so quoting any of it would not be relevant. I was thinking more of an exchange I once had with henry quirk.

Henry's an American. So though you weren't thinking of that, no doubt Henry was.

If I understand henry’s view correctly, he thinks we humans have rights by courtesy of some sort of deity, or other, but when pressed about how he could know what these rights are, he seems to point to the self-evident truth of our entitlement.

Yes, if that's what he says, then you're right; it would be problematic. But I'm not sure that's what he thinks.

I would only go as far as saying that it only seems self-evident that, for example, slavery is wrong.

I agree...but for different reasons, I think.

So why is slavery "self-evidently" wrong? Please share your reasoning, if you will.

I think this distinction makes little or no difference in a “real life” situation, because the emotive power of the sentiment is the same in both cases; it is only when we examine the matter that we realise there is no ontologically objective fact, or phenomenon, anywhere to support the claim of self-evidence; there are only subjective phenomena, such as ideas and emotions, by which we can test it.

I'm still interested: how does one go about "testing" through "subjective phenomena"?

I don't think henry actually used the term, "self-evident", so I hope I am not misrepresenting his views.

Oh, fair enough...Good disclaimer, I guess. I'd be surprised if Henry didn't have more behind his view that a bald claim to some imagined "self-evidence." He's usually quite thoughtful about forming his views...occasional spiky barbs notwithstanding.

Supposing you were to witness, or even read or hear about, a man torturing a child, and as a gift to you, I will make the man a Member of Hamas, and the child Israeli. What do you think your response would be; could you describe it?

Well, that's speculative, of course. I'd like to say I'd courageously rush in and intervene. But that would be silly to say, since it costs me nothing to imagine it, and it would require great moral fortitude to save a child from the clutches of a vicious terrorist. I will not preen myself, therefore, as an exemplar of such courage. Were I in the situation, I would hope I would do the right thing; but I am a man like any other, and men can be craven, at times.

But I expect you'll want to draw that to an analogy with God, and say something to the effect of, "Why didn't God prevent the Palestinians from killing the Jews?" However, let's consider how He would have to go about doing that, and what the general consequences of such an operating procedure would be; and we'll see why, perhaps, granting humans freedom entails the opening of a door even to such things.

No, I am not interested in why God does not intervene to prevent human suffering, and I'm sure you have a stock explanation, anyway.

Thank you for your kind vote of confidence.

What I wanted to know is what your emotional response would be; what feelings you would have about it. We know you would recognise it as a crime against God, that goes without saying, but what would you, as a person, feel?

What I can know for sure is that whatever I might "feel" would be unreliable, if the subjective is all I have.

The Hamas torturer, no doubt, feels some sort of glee, excitement, or maybe even a satsifaction with himself. The Israeli victim might feel horror, humiliation, terror, or even rage. I might feel pity, disgust or anxiety for the victim's welfare...and I doubt that that list exhausts the emotive terms we could possibly supply to that situation, or the range of emotions others might feel. Gaza observers might feel pride, patriotism and admiration -- or shame, disgust and rejection. An Israeli rescue squad might feel wrath and determination, or a desire for revenge...

And in that assembly of emotions, all in play by some person at the time, which one is the key to our subjectivist account of what's "moral" in that situation?

[Peter Holmes]

All this is, is an elaborate way of saying, "I can tell you nothing whatsover about the actual moral status of homosexuality. One side could be right, the other side could be right...in fact, everybody's simultaneously right and wrong, and homosexuality has no moral status at all."

Since you have no information about the moral status of anything, then, what is your point about homosexuality?

How can there be 'information about the [actual] moral status of anything'? Of what would that 'information' consist? Would the fact that one team's invented god thinks that X is morally wrong be 'information'?

P1 Agent A thinks X is morally wrong.
C Therefore, (it's a fact that) X is morally wrong.

This non sequitur would and should be laughed out of court in any moral debate. And why 'should'? - Well, because anyone's thinking something is so doesn't make it so. NB - theistic special pleading?