Is morality objective or subjective?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Moral subjectivism is just the rejection of moral objectivism - the claim that there are moral facts. For lack of evidence and valid and sound argument, moral objectivism is irrational - in my opinion.

And since to be rational is to have or seek good, strong reasons for what we do and believe, moral subjectivism can be perfectly rational.

Unable to demonstrate that his team's morally disgusting - but, fortunately, invented - god is the source of moral value - or even that it exists - IC tries to divert attention away from this intellectual and moral failure by arguing that moral subjectivity is irrational or even incoherent.

It isn't.

I have argued the basis you refute moral objectivism or moral realism is based on your "what is fact" which is grounded on an illusion, thus your delusional conclusion.
PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

The onus is on you the positive claimant to prove your 'what is fact' is really real before you can start to refute moral objectivity/realism.

Note 62% of moral philosophers in a large survey accept Moral Realism in 2020 and 56% in 2019.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=34275
The onus is on you to understand [not necessary agree] their argument and refute them before you can claim there is lack of evidence for moral objectivism.

Note Simon Blackburn's Challenge to moral subjectivists;

Simon Blackburn derived quasi-realism[2][page needed] from a Humean account of the origin of our moral opinions, adapting Hume's genealogical account in the light of evolutionary game theory. To support his case, Blackburn has issued a challenge, Blackburn's Challenge,[3][page needed] to anyone who can explain how two situations can demand different ethical responses without referring to a difference in the situations themselves.
Because this challenge is effectively unmeetable, Blackburn argues that there must be a realist component in our notions of ethics.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quasi-realism

Can you refute Blackburn's Challenge?

I am reading Blackburn's Essay .. [in parts];
His comment on re Moral Realism [pg 129];

I have now given several examples of the device of propositional reflection, the ways in which expressions of attitude and propositions concerning the interrelations of attitudes with each other and with beliefs are given a syntax that makes them appear to relate to facts in a peculiar, unobservable, moral realm. It must in no way be considered surprising that this device should exist. For disagreement in moral attitude is one of the most important disagreements there is, and working out the consequences of moral attitudes, one of the most important subjects there is. The device of propositional reflection enables us to bring the concepts of propositional logic to this task. It enables us to use notions like truth, knowledge, belief, inconsistency, entailment, and implication to give moral argument all the structure and elegance of argument about facts.
But isn't the theory saying that there is really no such thing as moral truth, and nothing to be known, believed, entailed—only the appearance of such things? Not at all. It is a complete mistake to think that the notion of moral truth and the associated notions of moral attributes and propositions disappear when the realistic theory is refuted. To think that a moral proposition is true is to concur in an attitude to its subject: this is the answer to the question with which I began the essay. To identify this attitude further is a task beyond the scope of this essay, but it is the central remaining task for the metaphysic of ethics. To think, however, that the anti-realist results show that there is no such thing as moral truth is quite wrong.

To think there are no moral truths is to think that nothing should be morally endorsed,
that is, to endorse the endorsement of nothing, and this attitude of indifference
is one that it would be wrong to recommend, and silly to practise.

I have argued,
The Christianity's Morality is Objective
viewtopic.php?t=40947
albeit has a very low degree of objectivity.

This is based on the point that,
there are objective moral FSK-ed facts, so morality is objective.

There are Moral Facts
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=34619

What is a [FSK-ed] Fact?
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29486

[Skepdick]

Sometimes I kick my turntable when it gets stuck. I wonder if it'll work with you.

To know the experience that knowledge is actual, requires a mind/ a knower. That's the objective world experienced subjectively.

And sometimes I have to kick it twice. Much harder the second time.

[FlashDangerpants]

Note Simon Blackburn's Challenge to moral subjectivists;

Simon Blackburn derived quasi-realism[2][page needed] from a Humean account of the origin of our moral opinions, adapting Hume's genealogical account in the light of evolutionary game theory. To support his case, Blackburn has issued a challenge, Blackburn's Challenge,[3][page needed] to anyone who can explain how two situations can demand different ethical responses without referring to a difference in the situations themselves.
Because this challenge is effectively unmeetable, Blackburn argues that there must be a realist component in our notions of ethics.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quasi-realism

Can you refute Blackburn's Challenge?

Nobody has an actual problem with this. Try and find somebody who would want to argue that two situations can demand different ethical responses if all relevant factors were the same. They are going to say that the idiom of circumstances that demand things is misleading.

But Mackie and the error theorists have no issue and don't need that move. Nor does any moral realist. Nor does any fictionalist. Only non-cogs and actual relativists might need to make it. Which is why Blackburn poses the issue, to show that his brand of non-cognitivism is different from others (arguably) in this respect.

Your demand here is much like what happened when IC got hold of Frege-Geach and went hog wild demanding moral syllogisms of everyone without understanding why they are problematic only for a very select group of enemies that he doesn't have much access to.

If you can trick Willy B into overcomitting to some emotivist stuff he wrote a few months ago, then you can possibly drop that bomb on him. But it misses Pete, it probably misses Sculptor, it gets nowhere near me. And I would expect Iambiggyboy to have a canned response ready for this involving overuse of the German word Dasein.

[Dontaskme]

Sometimes I kick my turntable when it gets stuck. I wonder if it'll work with you.

To know the experience that knowledge is actual, requires a mind/ a knower. That's the objective world experienced subjectively.

And sometimes I have to kick it twice. Much harder the second time.

You can kick it as many times as you like it won't change the fact that the objective world is experienced subjectively as and through the senses, which are coloured by subjective experiences.

[Skepdick]

You can kick it as many times as you like it won't change the fact that the objective world is experienced subjectively as and through the senses, which are coloured by subjective experiences.

So is my experience of being thirsty is objective? Subjective? What?

This turntable is fucked... Off to the junk yard.

[Atla]

Sometimes I kick my turntable when it gets stuck. I wonder if it'll work with you.

To know the experience that knowledge is actual, requires a mind/ a knower. That's the objective world experienced subjectively.

And sometimes I have to kick it twice. Much harder the second time.

I bet you kick puppies too. Well you shouldn't.

[Dontaskme]

So is my experience of being thirsty is objective? Subjective? What?

This turntable is fucked... Off to the junk yard.

It's not a 'my' experience, there is only the experience.

So yeah, I guess the 'my' in question is pretty well fucked. Questions can only arise to the sense of 'my self' where there isn't one.

[Immanuel Can]

I didn't ask you to reject all your own claims before I gave you my account of what morality is and how I think it works, and it is not reasonable for you to demand that of me.

It's certainly reasonable for us to eliminate the inherently irrational. Neither moral nihilism nor moral objectivism is inherently irrational. You may wish to say that you prefer to think neither is true, but it's not inherently obvious that neither can be.

However, moral subjectivism fails even the most basic tests of logic and definition. And we should surely eliminate the irrational before we go on to consider which rational alternative is at least possibly true.

A good way at arriving at good sense is to eliminate the nonsense first. Subjectivism cannot make sense. So we need to start with eliminating that.

Then there are only two alternatives: moral nihilsm and moral objectivism. And we can eliminate moral nihilism, eventually. And we'll be left with moral objectivism -- which your worldview provides no possibility of being true, but still allows to be rational. And we get to the crux of the matter, which turns out to be the question you most want me not to speak about: is there a God?

So do you want me to talk about that, or do you still imagine it's irrelevant to the question of what morality actually is? I cannot both talk about the reasons for moral objectivism and NOT talk about God.

[Peter Holmes]

Moral objectivism is demonstrably irrational.

[Skepdick]

Moral objectivism is demonstrably irrational.

On moral subjectivism this statement is impossible to be true.

There's just your subjective rationality and my subjective rationality.

They are different, of course, but which one is "irrational" and why?

[promethean75]

How many times will u say this at a forum before u realize they hath not ears, and move on to another one, Peter Groove Holmes?

[Atla]

A good way at arriving at good sense is to eliminate the nonsense first. Subjectivism cannot make sense. So we need to start with eliminating that.

Yeah we absolutely must get rid of subjectivism because IC can't beat it in a debate. But he must beat it somehow, God is expecting results by now.

[Harbal]

I didn't ask you to reject all your own claims before I gave you my account of what morality is and how I think it works, and it is not reasonable for you to demand that of me.

It's certainly reasonable for us to eliminate the inherently irrational. Neither moral nihilism nor moral objectivism is inherently irrational. You may wish to say that you prefer to think neither is true, but it's not inherently obvious that neither can be.

However, moral subjectivism fails even the most basic tests of logic and definition. And we should surely eliminate the irrational before we go on to consider which rational alternative is at least possibly true.

A good way at arriving at good sense is to eliminate the nonsense first. Subjectivism cannot make sense. So we need to start with eliminating that.

I think the notion of morality being based on objective truth is irrational, but I didn't require that it be "eliminated" before I was prepared to say what I thought morality actually was. How many debates have you witnessed where the second one to speak demands that the first admits he is wrong before he is prepared to proceed? The rationality of my argument, or lack of it, is absolutely no obstacle to your presenting your case, so please just get on with it.

Then there are only two alternatives: moral nihilsm and moral objectivism. And we can eliminate moral nihilism, eventually. And we'll be left with moral objectivism -- which your worldview provides no possibility of being true, but still allows to be rational. And we get to the crux of the matter, which turns out to be the question you most want me not to speak about: is there a God?

So do you want me to talk about that, or do you still imagine it's irrelevant to the question of what morality actually is? I cannot both talk about the reasons for moral objectivism and NOT talk about God.

I suppose I could accept the existence of God hypothetically if that helps.

[Peter Holmes]

To be rational is to have or seek good/strong reasons for what we do and believe.

There are no good/strong reasons to believe that there are moral facts. For example, the existence of a god - even if it were ever demonstrated - would not mean that there are moral facts. That claim is incoherent, and therefore irrational.

[Skepdick]

To be rational is to have or seek good/strong reasons for what we do and believe.

There are no good/strong reasons to believe that there are moral facts.

Surely on moral subjectivism there are no such things as "good/strong" reasons?

There are just your reasons to believe which are good/strong in your opinion; and my reasons to believe which are good/strong in my opinion.

For example, the existence of a god - even if it were ever demonstrated - would not mean that there are moral facts. That claim is incoherent, and therefore irrational.

Surely on moral subjectivism there are no such things as "incoherence" and "irrationality"?

There's just what is correhent and rational to you; and what is coherent and rational to me.