What could make morality objective?

[Harbal]

What's your evidence that leads you to that conclusion? Or are you only stating what you prefer to believe, regardless of any evidence?

You are making a claim that I find rationally impossible, so I am obviously not going to accept it as true without very compelling evidence from you to support it.

Well, you don't find it "rationally impossible." That would require some sort of evidence, or some sort of rational argument. And for sure, you've offered no reasons or evidence for anybody to believe that morality (assuming such exists at all) is "subjective."

According to that reasoning you must then have to accept the existence of Zeus and Apollo.

Everyone knows there is such a thing as subjective morality, even if they also believe in objective morality. We all know it because we all have moral opinions, at least some of which we recognise as being a matter of personal judgement.

So it's certainly rationally possible that morality is objective. There's no rational reason it couldn't be

No moral opinion can be either true or false, because there is no actual referent by which to confirm it, so what is objective about it?

And it's not at all more plausible to jump to the conclusion that it's subjective -- especially when, downstream rationally of that position, you'd have to conclude that morality does not exist at all. For that is exactly what "subjective morality" amounts to: that all morality is a mere figment of a personal imagination. It's subjective unicorns. And that's just redundant.

A figment of the imagination is a belief in something that does not exist, so to believe in an objective moral truth would be such a figment. To recognise one's moral opinions as subjective feelings is not a figment, because those feelings do exist.

In order to promote your latest book or movie, all you need is a book or a movie.

No, that's not all you need; you also need a method of promotion. And that means you need to offer the people to whom you are "promoting" a thing a reason to accept it.

If the thing appeals to them, they are likely to accept it, but if it doesn't appeal, they probably won't accept it. For instance: your view of homosexuality does not appeal to me, so I don't accept it.

I think the fact that there is a vast variation in what different people -and groups of people- consider morally acceptable supports my case much more than yours.

Not at all, actually. That's a non-sequitur. Once again, you're capitulating to the fallacy called "bandwagon fallacy," namely that if enough people believe a thing, it must be more likely to be true. But that can be demonstrated false very easily.

But I am not saying that if enough people believe a thing, it must be more likely to be true, so how can I be "capitulating to the fallacy called bandwagon fallacy"? What I am saying is that the wide range of moral views on any given moral issue suggests that morality is not fixed, but is relative to personal perspective.

It's not about merely the objectivism; it's about the morality. If "being honest" or "not deceiving" is not an objectively good thing, then your adjuring of people to choose it is totally arbitrary. One is not better or worse for ignoring it completely.

Exactly. It can only be better or worse in my -or your- opinion.

But if that's the case, it's very hard to see how you hoped to shame me by choosing those accusations. Why should my purely subjective morality be duty bound to allign with yours, or to please you? But if those accusations were that I was doing something objectively wrong, then your accusation would make sense.

But then, your accusation would also be manifestly false.

So what do you want your (allegedly subjective) accusation to be: empty, or plain false? I'll take either one.

My comments about your conduct on the forum were my opinion, and you, or anyone else, should take them as such.

I don't know that it is impossible for anybody to live as a moral subjectivist,but I certainly think it would be very difficult to do it completely and constantly. Our moral opinions, especially our strongly held ones, do feel like objective truths to us, and I have never denied that,

That's a big admission, on your part. Thank you for your honesty.

But it's quite true: most people do resort to moral objectivism, at least intermittently, in their lives. And perhaps this should alert us to a problem with subective morality. Really, it's the third such problem. To reiterate, we've already seen that...

1. Nobody lives as a consistent moral subjectivist...which is strange, if moral subjectivism were true. Why should 100% of the people in the world be unable to live out a belief that was true?

It doesn't matter how objectively true any moral principle or precept seems to be, there is nothing out in the universe to which you can point and say, "here is the fact that shows X is morally wrong". If something seems morally wrong to you, you just tend to respond to it as though it is morally wrong. I don't think many of us will then go on to wonder, "ah, but is it subjectively or objectively wrong"?

[FlashDangerpants]

I don't know that it is impossible for anybody to live as a moral subjectivist, but I certainly think it would be very difficult to do it completely and constantly. Our moral opinions, especially our strongly held ones, do feel like objective truths to us, and I have never denied that, but we are arguing about whether there actually are such things as objective moral values, and I still maintain that such things are logically impossible.

You are making a mistake by letting IC set the terms of what it means to "live as a moral subjectivist". His point is absurd.

You live quite authentically as a beliefs subectivist do you not? What would you have to do differently to meet IC's insane demands of that? The preposterous outcome that you would never believe your own beliefs because they are belief and you are "subjectivist" about belief which means you don't really believe your beliefs. It's entirely stupid.

You can hold that morality is a matter of belief without having to spiral into absolute skepticism. It's the same as having any other type of belief.

[Skepdick]

You are making a mistake by letting IC set the terms of what it means to "live as a moral subjectivist". His point is absurd.

You live quite authentically as a beliefs subectivist do you not? What would you have to do differently to meet IC's insane demands of that? The preposterous outcome that you would never believe your own beliefs because they are belief and you are "subjectivist" about belief which means you don't really believe your beliefs. It's entirely stupid.

You can hold that morality is a matter of belief without having to spiral into absolute skepticism. It's the same as having any other type of belief.

Didnt the whole identity politics/self-definition nonsense play out in the public domain already?

Believing that morality is a matter of belief plays out about as well as believing that being an attack helicopter is a matter of belief.

The postmodern gambit requires erasing the ontological True/False distinction.

Of course, you can claim to believe it. But you would be lying by contradiction.

[Immanuel Can]

You are making a claim that I find rationally impossible, so I am obviously not going to accept it as true without very compelling evidence from you to support it.

Well, you don't find it "rationally impossible." That would require some sort of evidence, or some sort of rational argument. And for sure, you've offered no reasons or evidence for anybody to believe that morality (assuming such exists at all) is "subjective."

According to that reasoning you must then have to accept the existence of Zeus and Apollo.

Of course not. You don't have to believe in unicorns just because you believe in horses.

Everyone knows there is such a thing as subjective morality,

"Everyone knows"? That's obviously untrue. What everybody knows is that people have different opinions about all kinds of things. But nothing makes those opinions especially worthy of being called "moral." That's quite a different question.

"Morality" can never be solely private, because it governs relations between the individual and the external world, and most particularly, the relations with other "counters," or people. Whether or not I share your values, your choices affect how you treat me; and likewise, how I make my choices governs how I treat you. So morality is an expression of a kind of agreement as to what is appropriate between people; and whether or not that is superintended by God, or merely idiosyncratic, imaginary and arbitrary, is the remaining question.

So it's certainly rationally possible that morality is objective. There's no rational reason it couldn't be

No moral opinion can be either true or false, because there is no actual referent by which to confirm it, so what is objective about it?

We don't at all know that no moral opinion can be true or false. And we don't agree that there's no actual referent by which to confirm it. So if you wish your conversation partner to believe that, you can't just say it; you need to show it. And so far, I'm not seeing your warrant.

To recognise one's moral opinions as subjective feelings is not a figment, because those feelings do exist.

If I have the feeling that there's a bogeyman in my room, it's certainly subjective: and it's true that "the feelings do exist." But it's an illusion, just a figment of my imagination, nonetheless. So you can't prove subjective morality exists by merely saying, "Well, people have the opinions." Opinions can be good or bad, right or wrong, true or false. And the fact of having an opinion has nothing to do with whether or not one has a justified opinion.

In order to promote your latest book or movie, all you need is a book or a movie.

No, that's not all you need; you also need a method of promotion. And that means you need to offer the people to whom you are "promoting" a thing a reason to accept it.

If the thing appeals to them, they are likely to accept it,

But they'll need grounds for it to appeal.

What I am saying is that the wide range of moral views on any given moral issue suggests that morality is not fixed, but is relative to personal perspective.

That's not logical. There can be a "wide range of views" about anything. It never suggests that the answer is "relative."

There is a "wide range of views" about the universe. That doesn't even remotely suggest there's not an objective universe or an objective truth about the universe. All it tells us is that lots of people are bound to be wrong about the universe...and that will be true of all views but one.

It's not about merely the objectivism; it's about the morality. If "being honest" or "not deceiving" is not an objectively good thing, then your adjuring of people to choose it is totally arbitrary. One is not better or worse for ignoring it completely.

But if that's the case, it's very hard to see how you hoped to shame me by choosing those accusations. Why should my purely subjective morality be duty bound to allign with yours, or to please you? But if those accusations were that I was doing something objectively wrong, then your accusation would make sense.

But then, your accusation would also be manifestly false.

So what do you want your (allegedly subjective) accusation to be: empty, or plain false? I'll take either one.

My comments about your conduct on the forum were my opinion, and you, or anyone else, should take them as such.

Then they were false opinions. For I was not "being dishonest," and was not "deceiving." Your opinion was one of the many errant ones in the universe.

Moreover, even if you genuinely held that opinion, and even if subjectivism were true, then your own insistence was that it meant no more than "Harbal feels like..."

And now that we know that, why should I feel shame or even moral hesitancy on the basis of it? It's unbacked by objective facts, by your own testimony on the subject.

It doesn't matter how objectively true any moral principle or precept seems to be, there is nothing out in the universe to which you can point and say, "here is the fact that shows X is morally wrong".

God. And consequently, objective reality as He created it to be.

If something seems morally wrong to you, you just tend to respond to it as though it is morally wrong. I don't think many of us will then go on to wonder, "ah, but is it subjectively or objectively wrong"?

Well, you certainly seem to be wondering that. For otherwise, why would you be at such pains to argue that morality is subjective?

But we come back to my #2 and #3 observations, as well. People have very strong incentives for insisting, contrary to the objective facts, that morality is subjective. It's a wish-fulfillment fantasy. They get to live by their own wishes, and nobody can tell them they can't do anything at all. That's a heck of an inducement to prefer subjectivism to objective truth.

A subjective view of morality would also automatically make every person in the universe "moral," and morally equivalent to every other one. To be "moral," all one would have to do is to have an opinion. So you and I, who might donate to charity, would be morally equivalent to the Hamas terrorist who slits a baby's throat...all of us would be "moral," in exactly the same way: subjectively.

But then, "moral" would mean absolutely nothing at all. If all things are "moral," then "morality" itself fails to describe any distinctive or special phenomenon, and disappears into moral nihilism of the most complete sort. We could not even use the word in a meaningful way: there would be no difference at all between "having a bare opinion" on the one hand, and "having a moral/good/fair/true/functional/etc. opinion," on the other.

So what do you mean when you say, "X is moral/immoral?" By subjectivism's lights, you can't mean anything at all. You can only be saying, "This is the opinion I happen to have." And you could be Ghandi or Hitler. You'd still be a person with a subjective opinion. But then, so what? All it would show is that the speaker does not even know what "moral" could possibly mean. He/she has nothing specific in mind, except perhaps that old incentive to gratuitious self-approval.

[Immanuel Can]

You are making a mistake by letting IC set the terms of what it means to "live as a moral subjectivist". His point is absurd.

You live quite authentically as a beliefs subectivist do you not? What would you have to do differently to meet IC's insane demands of that? The preposterous outcome that you would never believe your own beliefs because they are belief and you are "subjectivist" about belief which means you don't really believe your beliefs. It's entirely stupid.

You can hold that morality is a matter of belief without having to spiral into absolute skepticism. It's the same as having any other type of belief.

Didnt the whole identity politics/self-definition nonsense play out in the public domain already?

Believing that morality is a matter of belief plays out about as well as believing that being an attack helicopter is a matter of belief.

The postmodern gambit requires erasing the ontological True/False distinction.

Of course, you can claim to believe it. But you would be lying by contradiction.

Good heavens!

Are we about to agree on something?

Well put. I concur.

I think the key area of controversy they're expressing is not so much the true/false distinction itself, which all but the most radical and crazy Pomo-types would still nominally affirm, but rather whether the kind of ontology that applies to true/false can also apply to moral/immoral. Hume thought it couldn't. But Hume only thought so because he'd already decided to be an Atheist, and that's what Atheists have to think, logically speaking. Since they have already presumptively (and presumptuously) ruled out the grounds of morality, so they are kind of committed already to believing that morality has no grounds (i.e. is subjective).

It would be awfully hard for them to argue that morality was ontologically grounded in reality, and at the same time, that reality itself has no particular meaning or values inherent to it, but is the mere accidental product of time, chance and a lucky explosion in space.

[iambiguous]

So my argument is this;
P1 What emerged and realized as facts of reality therefrom our perception and knowledge of those facts, i.e. truths, thence our ways of describing them - must be conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK, enabling objectivity.
P2 Morality [FSK-ed] is part of reality [FSK-ed].
C Therefore, there are moral facts [FSK-ed], and morality [FSK-ed] is objective [FSK-ed].

I have never understood why, in discussing human morality "philosophically", it never seems to occur to some to bring their technical assessments down out of the syllogistic clouds in order to note how their "theoretical arguments" are applicable to the world that, from day to day to day, we interact in socially, politically and economically.

How can that not be the whole point of moral philosophy?

[Immanuel Can]

I have never understood why, in discussing human morality "philosophically", it never seems to occur to some to bring their technical assessments down out of the syllogistic clouds in order to note how their "theoretical arguments" are applicable to the world that, from day to day to day, we interact in socially, politically and economically.

You really don't "get it," do you? You have no idea what theory is about?

A "theory" is a thinking-through of a problem or situation in advance, so that we don't have to learn about it the hard way.

That is, to theorize is to pre-construct, using reason, logic and existing knowledge, what will ensue if we were to try to do something in reality. When you try to figure out, before you do it, what will happen if you build your house a certain way, or say certain things to certain people, or pursue particular life goals, and try to do so before you actually engage the high-stakes game of actually doing those things, you are theorizing. And nowhere is it more important to theorize properly, rationally and consistently than in moral philosophy, when we are considering undertaking things that are actually right or wrong, and have serious moral consequences.

If you don't "get" that, then I dare say there's good reason you're confused by what we're doing here.

[iambiguous]

We don't at all know that no moral opinion can be true or false.

Not counting all the folks here who in regard to such things as the war between Israel and Hamas, are utterly convinced [as individual subjects] that their own moral assessment of the conflict is the one and the only true assessment. In other words, it's not just their own "personal opinion" at all.

Ah, but how do they know this? For many, it's because they were raised in Gaza or Israel and were indoctrinated as children to be Muslims or Jews. Their morality is derived from God. The same God, perhaps, but widely conflicting interpretations of what worshipping and adoring Him mean.

Same with Christians. They lived particular lives and their own personal experiences predisposed them to choose Jesus Christ. Just as Muslims lived lives that predisposed them to choose Muhammad. As for the Jews:

"The Messiah is believed in Judaism to be a righteous king who will be sent by God to unite people all over the world regardless of race, culture or religion. Many Jews believe that when the Messiah comes, he will do the following: rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem." BBC

And we don't agree that there's no actual referent by which to confirm it. So if you wish your conversation partner to believe that, you can't just say it; you need to show it. And so far, I'm not seeing your warrant.

Again, it's not that people don't agree, but the fact that given their at times widely divergent individual lives, of course they don't agree...about lots and lots of things.


Which is why, from my own frame of mind, it's so fundamentally important that in regard to things like morality, immortality and salvation, we are able to demonstrate why what we believe about God is in fact the objective truth for all rational men and women.

And how do Christians and Muslims and Jews here go about accomplishing that?

[iambiguous]

I have never understood why, in discussing human morality "philosophically", it never seems to occur to some to bring their technical assessments down out of the syllogistic clouds in order to note how their "theoretical arguments" are applicable to the world that, from day to day to day, we interact in socially, politically and economically.

You really don't "get it," do you? You have no idea what theory is about?

What I "get" is that no matter what others construe "ethical theory" to be here up in the philosophical clouds, they had better be asking themselves "what would Jesus do?" if they wish to embody a truly righteous morality.

In order to, among other things, avoid eternal damnation in Hell. Right?

Mere mortals have all manner of One True Paths to choose from:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_r ... traditions
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_p ... ideologies
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_s ... philosophy

But you are here to remind them -- to warn them -- that they had best embrace the moral Commandments embedded in the Christian Bible.

Or else.

Go ahead, explain to those here who are not willing or able to what that involves for their very soul.

Oddly enough, in my view, you yourself seem to forget that this is in fact the bottom line for you in regard to morality. You go on and on exchanging theoretical assessments of morality up in the philosophical clouds, when all the while you know that others will be damned for all of eternity if they don't toe your own True Christian line.

That is the bottom line, isn't it?

A "theory" is a thinking-through of a problem or situation in advance, so that we don't have to learn about it the hard way.

In regard to what set of circumstances? Abortion? Homosexuality? Wars in the "Holy Land"? Crony capitalism? Gender roles? Gun control?

Really, note how your point here is applicable to the behaviors that you choose in regard to moral conflicts such as these.

Instead, you prefer to keep it all...academic:

That is, to theorize is to pre-construct, using reason, logic and existing knowledge, what will ensue if we were to try to do something in reality. When you try to figure out, before you do it, what will happen if you build your house a certain way, or say certain things to certain people, or pursue particular life goals, and try to do so before you actually engage the high-stakes game of actually doing those things, you are theorizing. And nowhere is it more important to theorize properly, rationally and consistently than in moral philosophy, when we are considering undertaking things that are actually right or wrong, and have serious moral consequences.

How on Earth is that applicable to your own "His way or burn in Hell" moral philosophy?

Cite particular examples from your own life.

If you don't "get" that, then I dare say there's good reason you're confused by what we're doing here.

What you and all of the other moral and political and spiritual objectivists here do is to anchor yourself to one or another deontological font -- God or No God -- and never, ever have to confront "the agony of choice in the face of uncertainty" all the way to the grave.

It's not what the moral objectivists believe but that what they do believe "in their head" about things like religion and morality need be as far as it goes to make it true.

Including those YouTube videos that you refuse to explore in depth with me.

[Immanuel Can]

I have never understood why, in discussing human morality "philosophically", it never seems to occur to some to bring their technical assessments down out of the syllogistic clouds in order to note how their "theoretical arguments" are applicable to the world that, from day to day to day, we interact in socially, politically and economically.

You really don't "get it," do you? You have no idea what theory is about?

What I "get" is that no matter what others construe "ethical theory" to be here up in the philosophical clouds

Then you don't get it at all.

The blueprint for your house is a "theory" of what the final house will look like. And it's a very good thing there is such a "theory": because if it were not properly worked out, there's very little chance your house would end up standing up or working properly.

A scientific "theory" is an estimate of what might work in practice, so far as demonstrating a scientific principle goes. And it's very good there is such a kind of "theory": because if there were not, there would be no science at all.

An ethical "theory" is an attempt to figure out what makes an action right or wrong, desirable or undesirable, good or bad, useful or useless, or any other of dozens of such value-terms, before we actually do it. And it's a very good thing we have ethical "theories," because if we did not, we'd be unable to make any moral decisions at all. Moreover, we'd be doing moral and immoral things indiscriminately, having no "theory" as to why we ought to choose one action over the other. There'd be no laws, since they articulate moral theory. There'd be no justice, since it requires a theory of justice. There'd be no human rights, because they are also necessarily the products of a particular ethical theory.

So now you know what a "theory" actually is. The rest of what you wrote...not relevant. Not bothering.

[Veritas Aequitas]

1 To clarify. Factual premises are (classically) true or false, or not shown to be true or false. Validity and soundness refer to arguments. So your P1 is not valid or invalid, sound or unsound. It's just true or false, or not shown to be true or false.

2 Your P1 is false, or not shown to be true. So your argument is unsound - and that's the end. There's no point going on to your P2 or conclusion. It doesn't matter if your argument is valid - if the conclusion follows from the premises.

3 But as it happens, your P2 is irrelevant. The fact that people have moral opinions ('morality is part of reality') is trivially true and inconsequential in this argument. So what? If your P2 were 'we say there are moral facts' - it would be false, because not all of us do say that - and anyway it would beg the question, because you're trying to show that there are moral facts.

This is why I'm trying to clean up your P1. The convoluted clutter that you think so important - about emergence, realisation and fsks - doesn't do what you think it does. Hence - here's your argument:

P1 The things we believe and say are facts of reality are facts of reality.
P2 We believe and say there are moral facts of reality.
C Therefore, there are moral facts, and morality is objective.

That's how useless it really is.

The above is the usual strawmanning - the "millionth" time.

Where is your intellectual and philosophical integrity.

It is so philosophically irresponsible for you to force me to accept your version of an argument grounded on illusion.
How do you justify that is being responsible.

PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

Why Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?t=40167

PH's Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39992
You have not countered effectively why your 'what is fact' is not illusory.

The point is we have to ensure there is a valid P1 before we can proceed further or its soundness be questioned.
I insist my P1 is valid but I understand you do not agree it is sound.
If not, why is my P1 not valid?

My P1 can be analyzed into the various sub-premises with its own supported argument,
P1 What emerged and realized as facts of reality therefrom our perception and knowledge of those facts, i.e. truths, thence our ways of describing them - must be conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK, enabling objectivity.

P1a There are two senses of objectivity i.e. [1] Realist and [2] Anti-Realist or FSK-ed
P1b Whatever is conditioned upon a human-based FSK is objective [FSK-ed].
P1c Whatever things emerged and realized as real is conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK.
P1d Whatever is reality is conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK.
P1e Whatever is a real fact is conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK.
P1f Whatever is real factual truth is conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK.
P1g Whatever is perception is conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK.
P1h Whatever is Knowledge is conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK.
P1i Whatever is description of all the above is conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK.

Each of the above premises are supported by an argument [posted in various threads].

I insist they are valid and to avoid the dragging of the above cumbersome points, the combinations of them into one premise P1 is valid.

If not, tell me why the above statements are not valid.

[Peter Holmes]

1 To clarify. Factual premises are (classically) true or false, or not shown to be true or false. Validity and soundness refer to arguments. So your P1 is not valid or invalid, sound or unsound. It's just true or false, or not shown to be true or false.

2 Your P1 is false, or not shown to be true. So your argument is unsound - and that's the end. There's no point going on to your P2 or conclusion. It doesn't matter if your argument is valid - if the conclusion follows from the premises.

3 But as it happens, your P2 is irrelevant. The fact that people have moral opinions ('morality is part of reality') is trivially true and inconsequential in this argument. So what? If your P2 were 'we say there are moral facts' - it would be false, because not all of us do say that - and anyway it would beg the question, because you're trying to show that there are moral facts.

This is why I'm trying to clean up your P1. The convoluted clutter that you think so important - about emergence, realisation and fsks - doesn't do what you think it does. Hence - here's your argument:

P1 The things we believe and say are facts of reality are facts of reality.
P2 We believe and say there are moral facts of reality.
C Therefore, there are moral facts, and morality is objective.

That's how useless it really is.

The above is the usual strawmanning - the "millionth" time.

Where is your intellectual and philosophical integrity.

It is so philosophically irresponsible for you to force me to accept your version of an argument grounded on illusion.
How do you justify that is being responsible.

PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

Why Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?t=40167

PH's Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39992
You have not countered effectively why your 'what is fact' is not illusory.

The point is we have to ensure there is a valid P1 before we can proceed further or its soundness be questioned.
I insist my P1 is valid but I understand you do not agree it is sound.
If not, why is my P1 not valid?

My P1 can be analyzed into the various sub-premises with its own supported argument,
P1 What emerged and realized as facts of reality therefrom our perception and knowledge of those facts, i.e. truths, thence our ways of describing them - must be conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK, enabling objectivity.

P1a There are two senses of objectivity i.e. [1] Realist and [2] Anti-Realist or FSK-ed
P1b Whatever is conditioned upon a human-based FSK is objective [FSK-ed].
P1c Whatever things emerged and realized as real is conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK.
P1d Whatever is reality is conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK.
P1e Whatever is a real fact is conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK.
P1f Whatever is real factual truth is conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK.
P1g Whatever is perception is conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK.
P1h Whatever is Knowledge is conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK.
P1i Whatever is description of all the above is conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK.

Each of the above premises are supported by an argument [posted in various threads].

I insist they are valid and to avoid the dragging of the above cumbersome points, the combinations of them into one premise P1 is valid.

If not, tell me why the above statements are not valid.

1 I've just explained to you the terminology: factual assertions are (classically) true or false; the terms 'valid' and 'sound' refer to arguments (in this context). But you completely ignore this and ask why your P1 isn't valid. So, I'll continue this conversation when you bother to get these things right.

2 I'm showing you what your P1 actually means. And your question should be: why is my P1 false or not shown to be true? And I've answered that question a million times.

[Skepdick]

I think the key area of controversy they're expressing is not so much the true/false distinction itself, which all but the most radical and crazy Pomo-types would still nominally affirm, but rather whether the kind of ontology that applies to true/false can also apply to moral/immoral.

Well, sure. This follows directly from the True/False distinction - it has an inherent and implicit moral component.

It's generally accepted that telling the truth is right/preferable as a social norm over telling falsehoods. Imagine if sworn testimonies in court were this instead: I do solemnly and sincerely and falsely declare and affirm that the evidence I shall give shall be the falsehood, the whole falsehood, and nothing but the falsehood.

Hume thought it couldn't. But Hume only thought so because he'd already decided to be an Atheist, and that's what Atheists have to think, logically speaking. Since they have already presumptively (and presumptuously) ruled out the grounds of morality, so they are kind of committed already to believing that morality has no grounds (i.e. is subjective).

Which necessarily requires them to erase the True/False dichotomy, in fact the notion of Falsehood simply disappears in a subjective moral system.

There's only your truth and my truth. Everybody is just so deeply misunderstood.

It would be awfully hard for them to argue that morality was ontologically grounded in reality, and at the same time, that reality itself has no particular meaning or values inherent to it, but is the mere accidental product of time, chance and a lucky explosion in space.

Well, that would be a coherent story. Truth is all there is. Chance. Luck. Giant space explosion.

But then suddenly - a second truth-value appears. Falsehood. Where from?

[Veritas Aequitas]

double posting

[Veritas Aequitas]

1 To clarify. Factual premises are (classically) true or false, or not shown to be true or false. Validity and soundness refer to arguments. So your P1 is not valid or invalid, sound or unsound. It's just true or false, or not shown to be true or false.

2 Your P1 is false, or not shown to be true. So your argument is unsound - and that's the end. There's no point going on to your P2 or conclusion. It doesn't matter if your argument is valid - if the conclusion follows from the premises.

3 But as it happens, your P2 is irrelevant. The fact that people have moral opinions ('morality is part of reality') is trivially true and inconsequential in this argument. So what? If your P2 were 'we say there are moral facts' - it would be false, because not all of us do say that - and anyway it would beg the question, because you're trying to show that there are moral facts.

This is why I'm trying to clean up your P1. The convoluted clutter that you think so important - about emergence, realisation and fsks - doesn't do what you think it does. Hence - here's your argument:

P1 The things we believe and say are facts of reality are facts of reality.
P2 We believe and say there are moral facts of reality.
C Therefore, there are moral facts, and morality is objective.

That's how useless it really is.

The above is the usual strawmanning - the "millionth" time.

Where is your intellectual and philosophical integrity.

It is so philosophically irresponsible for you to force me to accept your version of an argument grounded on illusion.
How do you justify that is being responsible.

PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

Why Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?t=40167

PH's Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39992
You have not countered effectively why your 'what is fact' is not illusory.

The point is we have to ensure there is a valid P1 before we can proceed further or its soundness be questioned.
I insist my P1 is valid but I understand you do not agree it is sound.
If not, why is my P1 not valid?

My P1 can be analyzed into the various sub-premises with its own supported argument,
P1 What emerged and realized as facts of reality therefrom our perception and knowledge of those facts, i.e. truths, thence our ways of describing them - must be conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK, enabling objectivity.

P1a There are two senses of objectivity i.e. [1] Realist and [2] Anti-Realist or FSK-ed
P1b Whatever is conditioned upon a human-based FSK is objective [FSK-ed].
P1c Whatever things emerged and realized as real is conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK.
P1d Whatever is reality is conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK.
P1e Whatever is a real fact is conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK.
P1f Whatever is real factual truth is conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK.
P1fi Whatever is true or false regarding reality is conditioned upon a human based FSK.
P1g Whatever is perception is conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK.
P1h Whatever is Knowledge is conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK.
P1i Whatever is description of all the above is conditioned upon a human-based FSR-FSK.

Each of the above premises are supported by an argument [posted in various threads].

I insist they are valid and to avoid the dragging of the above cumbersome points, the combinations of them into one premise P1 is valid.

If not, tell me why the above statements are not valid.

1 I've just explained to you the terminology: factual assertions are (classically) true or false; the terms 'valid' and 'sound' refer to arguments (in this context). But you completely ignore this and ask why your P1 isn't valid. So, I'll continue this conversation when you bother to get these things right.

At this stage I am not asking whether the statement above are true or false.
I can add another premise above,

P1fi Whatever is true or false regarding reality is conditioned upon a human based FSK.

All the above statements comprising my P1 are valid.
That you contest any of the above is regarding its soundness.

2 I'm showing you what your P1 actually means. And your question should be: why is my P1 false or not shown to be true? And I've answered that question a million times.

Note there are two senses of reality and objectivity, as I had argued, i.e.
1. the independent of human conditions view -realism
2. the FSK-ed view - antirealism.

As I had argued a 'million' times, the grounding to your realism view is grounded on an illusion.
PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

Why Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?t=40167

PH's Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39992 Apr 23, 2023 8:06 am

As such you do not have any credibility to critique my P1 as unsound, unless you can prove your realism is really real.

Since my whole of P1 is grounded on a human-based FSK, the other alternative is for you to prove my FSK basis is false.
I have argued all scientific facts and truths are conditioned within the human-based scientific FSK.
What is a Framework and System of Knowledge? [FSK]
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=31889

Why the Scientific FSK is the Most Credible and Reliable
viewtopic.php?f=12&t=39585