What could make morality objective?

[Iwannaplato]

But, as I pointed out above, he considers objectivity to actually be intersubjectivity.
And I can imagine that you might have many less objections to considering a certain morality intersubjective.

If we remove the semantic wordplay.... We can use a trivial proof by contradiction.

Let P be "Morality is objective."
Assume P is false - Morality is NOT objective.

My moral truth says X is wrong. Q
Your moral truth says X is NOT wrong: -Q

Because morality is NOT objective (P is false), both Q and -Q are true.
This is a contradiction.

Therefore the assumption must be wrong.
P is true.

I believe you just demonstrated that everyone's favorite ice cream is chocolate (and vanilla)
Just fill in your argument with people's sense of the best ice cream.

Though actually, I was trying to bridge their positions, not presenting one.

[Skepdick]

I believe you just demonstrated that everyone's favorite ice cream is chocolate (and vanilla)
Just fill in your argument with people's sense of the best ice cream.

Hardly. I am proving an emergent property of the system (as a whole), not about any of the individual parts.

[Iwannaplato]

I believe you just demonstrated that everyone's favorite ice cream is chocolate (and vanilla)
Just fill in your argument with people's sense of the best ice cream.

Hardly. I am proving a property about the system (as a whole), not about any of the individual parts.

Sure, but I was talking about how the chocolate ice create fan, who looks down on we vanilla ice cream prefers, will take your focused at the general level argument. Shouldn't your argument work for tastes also?

Let P be "Taste is objective."
Assume P is false - Taste is NOT objective.

My taste truth says X is the best. Q
Your taste truth says X is NOT wrong: -Q

Because taste is NOT objective (P is false), both Q and -Q are true.
This is a contradiction.

Therefore the assumption must be wrong.
P is true.

So, the vanilla team is reassured, but so is the chocolate team.

And in case it wasn't clear I wasn't presenting a position (on OM), I was trying to bridge their positions on that issue.

[Skepdick]

Sure, but I was talking about how the chocolate ice create fan, who looks down on we vanilla ice cream prefers, will take your focused at the general level argument. Shouldn't your argument work for tastes also?

No. The wetness of water applies to water, not to hydrogen; or oxygen atoms.

Similarly morality is an emergent property of human self-organisation.

[Iwannaplato]

Sure, but I was talking about how the chocolate ice create fan, who looks down on we vanilla ice cream prefers, will take your focused at the general level argument. Shouldn't your argument work for tastes also?

No. The wetness of water applies to water, not to hydrogen; or oxygen atoms.

Similarly morality is an emergent property of human self-organisation.

And tastes are not?

[Skepdick]

And tastes are not?

Sure. But what is taste a property of?

The systems we call "humans"; or the system made of humans?

[Iwannaplato]

And tastes are not?

Sure. But what is taste a property of?

The systems we call "humans"; or the system made of humans?

I don't know. Is this different from morals? I don't know what those two categories refer to?
And I don't know what the 'wetness' issue was analogous to, if it was analogous.

[Skepdick]

I don't know. Is this different from morals? I don't know what those two categories refer to?
And I don't know what the 'wetness' issue was analogous to, if it was analogous.

I'm talking about emergence/emergent properties. Certain properties don't manifest at every layer of abstraction/analysis.

Wetness was observation that the property manifests at the level of a water molecules, not at the level of atoms.
Similarly with tastes - they don't seem to manifest at the level of social self-correction/self-control/self-discipline. Nobody's going to socially ostracize you for choosing the wrong flavour icecream.

Morals aren't like that. They have an element of expected/demanded self-correction.

[Iwannaplato]

I'm talking about emergence/emergent properties. Certain properties don't manifest at every layer of abstraction/analysis.

Wetness was observation that the property manifests at the level of a water molecules, not at the level of atoms.
Similarly with tastes - they don't seem to manifest at the level of social self-correction/self-control/self-discipline. Nobody's going to socially ostracize you for choosing the wrong flavour icecream.

actually that's not true. It wasn't a complete ostracism but I lost status due to vanilla, which was not considered a flavor by many - sure, it was children. But let's go into tastes in general. Taste in sports certainly could damage you socially in many subcultures. Taste in clothes. And that's in modern western cultures that generally accept a variety of tastes. Earlier cultures and many subcultures restrict tastes and you were/are at risk. Men who hadn't corrected their long hair could received to immediate and often violent correction from others. Let alone those deciding to wear a dress. It's true that we'd probably have to go back in time and often into subcultures for food tastes. And availability kept most people from choosing to be outside the mainstream. But I think the boundary between taste and morals is very fuzzy and people can certainly be punished socially, economically and in many places even legally for all sorts of taste differences even now.

Morals aren't like that. They have an element of expected/demanded self-correction.

I see that everywhere. My sense of humor with friends is very different from that at work or in many social situations and certainly is most interactions with authorities. Other jokes would work fine in these situations (often). And I am not talking about pedophile or racist jokes. Just jokes that are too lateral for most people. Weird to them. And I suppose weird to me, but that's part of the appeal. Certainly taste in clothes can damage me in all sorts of practical ways - and we are not speaking about revealing clothing, even.

[Skepdick]

I'm talking about emergence/emergent properties. Certain properties don't manifest at every layer of abstraction/analysis.

Wetness was observation that the property manifests at the level of a water molecules, not at the level of atoms.
Similarly with tastes - they don't seem to manifest at the level of social self-correction/self-control/self-discipline. Nobody's going to socially ostracize you for choosing the wrong flavour icecream.

actually that's not true. It wasn't a complete ostracism but I lost status due to vanilla, which was not considered a flavor by many - sure, it was children. But let's go into tastes in general. Taste in sports certainly could damage you socially in many subcultures. Taste in clothes. And that's in modern western cultures that generally accept a variety of tastes. Earlier cultures and many subcultures restrict tastes and you were/are at risk. Men who hadn't corrected their long hair could received to immediate and often violent correction from others. Let alone those deciding to wear a dress. It's true that we'd probably have to go back in time and often into subcultures for food tastes. And availability kept most people from choosing to be outside the mainstream. But I think the boundary between taste and morals is very fuzzy and people can certainly be punished socially, economically and in many places even legally for all sorts of taste differences even now.

I think you are working harder than necessary to fuzz the lines. There's loss of reputation, there's loss of status; there's loss of freedom; there's loss of capital, there's loss of health, there's losses of many kinds. To equate them is to seek some sort of perfect, universal, exception-free categorization scheme. That's impossible. Type I and Type II errors shall remain.

Something being generally true doesn't require it to be universally true.

Morals aren't like that. They have an element of expected/demanded self-correction.

I see that everywhere. My sense of humor with friends is very different from that at work or in many social situations and certainly is most interactions with authorities. Other jokes would work fine in these situations (often). And I am not talking about pedophile or racist jokes. Just jokes that are too lateral for most people. Weird to them. And I suppose weird to me, but that's part of the appeal. Certainly taste in clothes can damage me in all sorts of practical ways - and we are not speaking about revealing clothing, even.

Yeah.. when you stretch "damage" to a maximum then even a prison sentence for crimes committed is damaging to you.

[FlashDangerpants]

C Therefore, there are moral facts, and morality is objective.

But, as I pointed out above, he considers objectivity to actually be intersubjectivity.
And I can imagine that you might have many less objections to considering a certain morality intersubjective.

Mmm. What constitutes objectivity is obviously a big issue - maybe the biggest - and the idea of a calculable continuum between objectivity and subjectivity is a-whole-nother can of worms - which itself seems to cut across the idea of intersubjectivity. Why isn't it interobjectivity? What's so primary about the subject?

Just trying to nail down the premises atm.

There's calculable, then there's measurable and even estimatable, but are these things interchangeable? And what role for confirmable and observable? Half a decade of this continuum conversation has yielded very little information thus far, you are to be commended for attmepting to uncover the previously unmentionable.

[Peter Holmes]

But, as I pointed out above, he considers objectivity to actually be intersubjectivity.
And I can imagine that you might have many less objections to considering a certain morality intersubjective.

Mmm. What constitutes objectivity is obviously a big issue - maybe the biggest - and the idea of a calculable continuum between objectivity and subjectivity is a-whole-nother can of worms - which itself seems to cut across the idea of intersubjectivity. Why isn't it interobjectivity? What's so primary about the subject?

Just trying to nail down the premises atm.

There's calculable, then there's measurable and even estimatable, but are these things interchangeable? And what role for confirmable and observable? Half a decade of this continuum conversation has yielded very little information thus far, you are to be commended for attempting to uncover the previously unmentionable.

There's nothing to uncover, of course. It's laughable nonsense, as you've been saying for ages, as is the mystical 'principle of continuum'.

[Skepdick]

There's nothing to uncover, of course. It's laughable nonsense, as you've been saying for ages, as is the mystical 'principle of continuum'.

What's so "mystical" about superlatives?

[Skepdick]

There's calculable, then there's measurable and even estimatable, but are these things interchangeable? And what role for confirmable and observable?

And what about rankable?

Either X is better than not-X (X > not-X); or not-X is better than X (not-X > X)

For X in {getting kicked in the balls, educated, poor}

[Iwannaplato]

I think you are working harder than necessary to fuzz the lines. There's loss of reputation, there's loss of status; there's loss of freedom; there's loss of capital, there's loss of health, there's losses of many kinds. To equate them is to seek some sort of perfect, universal, exception-free categorization scheme. That's impossible. Type I and Type II errors shall remain.

Morals and tastes are treated in all those ways. Many moral judgements are consider objective but there is no direct enforcement. But if we go back to your orginal argument, it seems to me it ended up with a paradox that also applies to tastes. There's nothing in that argument that says only certain types of outcomes will be considered. It was looking at assertions. There are many people, if not all people on some set of taste issues who view what gets called taste as objective. I don't see on what ground we do not use your very abstract argument to show that viewing Tastes are Objective as false also leads to a contradiction. It seemed like after I asked about the same argument being applied to tastes, now that argument only works if certain criteria are met by the what gets put in as the category in question. But I see nothing in the argument that indicates the category must be of a certain kind, and certainly not in the way you mention.

What's wrong with the parallel argument with Tastes inserted instead of morals, and how is this clear in the steps of the argument?

I don't grant that the two categories are that different. In fact, I see no reason to separate out taste from morals. I think there's one category, not two. There are interpersonal portions to both, and self alone portions to both. They are preferences about direct experiences and preferences about consequences of actions.
But even setting that aside it seems like your argument should hold for tastes and all sorts of judgments of objectivity.

In general it seems when two people have differing positions, you seem to work towards showing that it's actually a linguistic difference. With morals one can look at it as they are objective or one can look at it as they are subjective. With other issues also.

But here with taste being objective. This is simply false. The person who thinks that classical music is better than punk music is confused. Even though that argument, the one you used against saying that objective morals is false, it seems to me, could be used here.