Magnus Anderson wrote: ↑Mon Sep 25, 2023 11:43 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Sep 25, 2023 4:57 amHere are my point;
Philosophical Realists believe the physical-T-rex toy [1] exists as absolutely mind-independent, i.e. it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not.
Philosophical Realists when informed understand [2] is an
illusion, i.e. it is "dependent" on the mind of the observer.
You can simply say "Philosophical realists believe that T-rex toys exist". There is no need for "as absolutely mind independent". That part seems to be redundant. Instead of adding clarification, it adds confusion.
There is a serious contention between Philosophical Realism vs ANTI-Philosophical_Realism which require to differentiate between "as absolutely mind independent" and "relative mind-independent."
see:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism
The is a deeper philosophical issue so, precision is necessary.
Let us recap.
1) A thing is said to be mind-independent if and only if it is not a perception.
2) Mind-independent things do not exist. In other words, only perceptions exist.
3) A T-rex toy, by definition, is not a perception. In other words, it's a mind-independent thing.
4) Therefore, T-rex toys do not exist.
You're basically arguing that only perceptions exist. That makes you a subjective idealist at best and a solipsist at worst. ( I know you've denied being either in the past but you weren't convincing. )
Your 1 is too narrow, in our case, it should be;
Philosophical realists believe a thing is mind-independent if and only if it is not absolutely conditioned upon the human conditions [mind, brain, body, perceptions, beliefs, knowledge, and the like].
So, your
"2) Mind-independent things do not exist. In other words, only perceptions exists"
is not valid.
It should be;
2) Absolute mind-independent things do not exist, what exist as real is conditioned upon a human-based FSK [human conditions].
3) A T-rex toy claimed as absolutely mind-independent [unconditioned by humans] cannot exist as real.
As Ramachandran [famous neuroscientist] as I stated;
- “Indeed, the line between perceiving and hallucinating is not as crisp as we like to think. In a sense, when we look at the world, we are hallucinating all the time.
One could almost regard perception as the act of choosing the one hallucination that best fits the incoming data.”
― V.S. Ramachandran, The Tell-Tale Brain: A Neuroscientist's Quest for What Makes Us Human
As such, our perception of reality is on a
continuum of hallucinating [in one perspective] from low objectivity [e.g. 2 above] to high objectivity [e.g. 1 above].
It depends on how you define the word "hallucination". Dr. Ramachandran seems to be stretching it too much. He's a scientist after all not an English professor.
But in any case, whether or not we hallucinate all the time does not seem related to the question of whether or not mind-independent things exist. Even if we hallucinate all the time, how exactly does it follow that mind-independent things do not exist?
If we hallucinate all the time, then what is objective real is that hallucination that is verifiable and justifiable within a human-based FSK of which the scientific FSK [model, system] is the most credible and objective as the standard.
In this sense, hallucinations claimed by a schizo in general cannot be as objective as that which are verifiable by the scientific FSK.
The hallucination re the T-Rex toy is also not as objective as scientific objectivity because science can prove the T-Rex toy is merely pieces of wood with painting of various colors.
Whilst scientific claims are the most real and objective, they are at best polished conjectures.
Mind-independent things cannot exist as real because we need some sort of mind-dependent mechanism [reasoning] to infer they are mind-independent.
As such, logically and rationally whatever the follow from the above cannot be absolute mind-independent.
I have argued, the drive of philosophical realists to assume and claim there are absolutely mind-independent things is purely psychological rather than epistemological. Philosophical realists are ignorant of what is going within their internal self as a biological organism.
Kant [alluded] and Hume has pointed this out; are you very familiar with Kant and Hume?
If you are not, then you must provide reservations that your claim could be wrong, which I am sure it is wrong.