Is morality objective or subjective?

[LuckyR]

...which of the 2500 gods is the correct one?

Only the one that actually exists, of course. There's no virtue in following imaginary or fake gods.

Also, let's say the Christian god made the objectively optimal moral code, how would an intellectually honest observer reconcile the myriad different (many extremely different) moral codes purported to be "Christian morals"?

Well, if we use divine revelation as the basis, then any codes which fall short of that are less good than any that conform to it. So, it's really not very hard.

So believe the god you already believe in. Brilliant! And you're still trying to shoehorn objectivity into this obviously subjective entity. Oh well, you do you.

[LuckyR]

It makes sense anyway: because even if it were true that ALL Scriptures are just human in origin, that would only mean that there was absolutely no authority to morality...and BOTH religious and secular "moralizing" were fraudulent. That objection won't solve the problem; it will only make it universal.

However, if there's some revelation that is not like the others, and is actually genuine, then that objection simply falls flat. One cannot dismiss divine revelation by mere personal fiat...especially since one is going to be held accountable to it regardless of one's protests.

Interestingly, even most Atheists keep believing and acting as if morality is real, despite their claim that it's only a matter of subjective taste or collective prejudice. So there's something about the relationship between Atheism as a worldview and morality that even Atheists are not actually believing.

Well, personal morality definitely exists, since that's the definition of morality.

Well, morality is "personal" only in the sense that every "person" needs some. But it's not "personal" in the sense of being "private to a person."

As I was saying to Harbal, morality has to govern relationships. That's why it can never be "personal," even if a person has to have some.

Well yes and no. Moral codes govern both behaviour in relationships as well as when no one is looking (perhaps governs more in the latter). As to it's being "personal" we're using two different meanings of the word to address two different aspects of morality.

[Immanuel Can]

Subjective taste is real to the one who is tasting, and it is quite effective in attracting us towards some things and avoiding others.

Sure, it has some possibility of making individuals act: but it only attracts the person experiencing it, and gives no reason at all for anybody else.

That's why morality can never be a matter of mere taste. It cannot arbitrate a relationship between people. Taste is private. Morals are social or universal, or at least in-common with others.

We can argue about the value of that kind of morality, but it's the kind most people practice.

That's just a way of saying that what most people practice is selfishness or self-will, rather than morality. Because in addition to always being about relationships, a second feature of morality is this -- it never needs to kick in at all, until what an agent wants to do, and what's "right" to do (in some contested sense) are different, or opposite, or conflicting with each other.

This is to say, you'll never know whether or not you're a faithful partner if you never meet anybody with whom you'd desire to cheat. Or you never know whether or not you're an honest person until telling the truth looks like it's going to get you in trouble and lying seems much more desirable. On the other hand, if the only reason one has never stolen is that one has had no access to other people's things, one is not sure at all what one's moral stand on that is.

Morality is about the "oughts" of things, not the "wants" of things.

And I'm sure some do think that their moral opinions are a reference to objective truths, such as stealing really is wrong, but most won't think it because of God, they will see it as something that is just self evident.

And that's only to say that they have no idea why they are being good...it may be a tradition they've been taught and forgotten they were taught, or it may be that they fear social shaming, or it may be that they don't think they can get away with something...but there are actually no "self-evident" moral principles, because to be "principled" is to know why one ought to do what one ought to do, and to choose to do it (especially contrary to one's immediate advantage) for the principle's sake: it's not merely to do it accidentally or in ignorance.

[Immanuel Can]

Well, personal morality definitely exists, since that's the definition of morality.

Well, morality is "personal" only in the sense that every "person" needs some. But it's not "personal" in the sense of being "private to a person."

As I was saying to Harbal, morality has to govern relationships. That's why it can never be "personal," even if a person has to have some.

Well yes and no. Moral codes govern both behaviour in relationships as well as when no one is looking (perhaps governs more in the latter). As it's being "personal" we're using two different meanings of the word to address two different aspects of morality.

Well, we do have to be precise with our wording here, or there's a real danger of confusion.

But let me put it simply: if you were the only person on earth, and the only such agent in the universe, then you would have no need of morality at all. You would simply be able to do whatever you wanted, and that would be the only question you could ask yourself: "what do I want?" not "what should I be doing rather than what I want?" Only the latter is morality. The former is just desire.

But let there be one more moral agent or "counter" in the universe...another human being or God, and for the first time, you would have to ask yourself, "what is the right way for me to be relating to this entity, and this entity to be relating to me?" In other words, morality would become a viable concern.

Now, there are people who imagine that he or she, individually, is the only moral "counter" in the universe. He/she not only does not believe in a God or gods, but also that other people are unimportant in the moral equation. He/she does not honour others, but often perhaps uses others for purposes that he/she has. Such individuals are narcissistic and amoral people, psychopaths, not capable of morality at all. Their decisions are made wholly personally, rather than with due regard for anything else, whether a person or a principle. And no doubt, there are a few such around. (My psychiatrist friend says they're more alarmingly common than you might believe, actually.) But they are not moral persons. They're amoral.

So no, there isn't really a sense in which morality can be exclusively a "personal" matter, in that sense of "personal."

[Harbal]

Sure, it has some possibility of making individuals act: but it only attracts the person experiencing it, and gives no reason at all for anybody else.

That's why morality can never be a matter of mere taste. It cannot arbitrate a relationship between people. Taste is private. Morals are social or universal, or at least in-common with others.

We can argue about the value of that kind of morality, but it's the kind most people practice.

That's just a way of saying that what most people practice is selfishness or self-will, rather than morality. Because in addition to always being about relationships, a second feature of morality is this -- it never needs to kick in at all, until what an agent wants to do, and what's "right" to do (in some contested sense) are different, or opposite, or conflicting with each other.

This is to say, you'll never know whether or not you're a faithful partner if you never meet anybody with whom you'd desire to cheat. Or you never know whether or not you're an honest person until telling the truth looks like it's going to get you in trouble and lying seems much more desirable. On the other hand, if the only reason one has never stolen is that one has had no access to other people's things, one is not sure at all what one's moral stand on that is.

Morality is about the "oughts" of things, not the "wants" of things.

And I'm sure some do think that their moral opinions are a reference to objective truths, such as stealing really is wrong, but most won't think it because of God, they will see it as something that is just self evident.

And that's only to say that they have no idea why they are being good...it may be a tradition they've been taught and forgotten they were taught, or it may be that they fear social shaming, or it may be that they don't think they can get away with something...but there are actually no "self-evident" moral principles, because to be "principled" is to know why one ought to do what one ought to do, and to choose to do it (especially contrary to one's immediate advantage) for the principle's sake: it's not merely to do it accidentally or in ignorance.

You may criticise it as weak and inadequate, or even worthless, but I think what I have tried to describe is what most people's experience of morality is. Were you to ask the average person why they think things like lying, cheating and adultery are wrong, I suspect very few would mention God in their explanation.

[Immanuel Can]

You may criticise it as weak and inadequate, or even worthless,

Not merely that, but as inadequate as a description of "morality" at all. It's pretty clear that subjectivists haven't even understood the basics, like that morality governs relations, or that morality has to involve something other than, and opposite to, "I want." They've just failed to put in the clear thought to get the term right, I would say. They've mistaken morality for pure ego.

...but I think what I have tried to describe is what most people's experience of morality is.

Perhaps. But then, all that would say is that people don't have an experience of actual morality, but only of being self-centered, and of being unthinking beyond it. What I desire and what is right are manifestly concepts that have nothing inherently to do with one another. I may often want things that are immoral.

Were you to ask the average person why they think things like lying, cheating and adultery are wrong, I suspect very few would mention God in their explanation.

The average rich Westerner? Perhaps. But not so many on a world scale. We have the luxury of living as if God doesn't exist, because we have enough technology, medicine, welfare programs, health care, entertainments, consumer goods, etc. to distract ourselves for an entire lifetime. (That was essentially Nietzsche's point when he said, "God is dead," actually: not that God was actually "dead," but that we are not any longer in need of that concept, God, because the West had advanced beyond needing such a concept, and become entirely self-sufficient.) But historically, even in currently "advanced" countries, and certainly everywhere else, God is not nearly so forgettable.

And at the end of our own lives, or when tragedy strikes us -- as eventually it inevitably does -- we find even our own spoiled, distracted thoughts turning to the question of what to do when our self-sufficiency runs out. And at the end, we're all driven to prayer.

Paradoxically, that's what makes Atheism so common and so vigorous in the West. In the absence of any "threat" of God existing, it would surely not be; it would be as tame and uninteresting as a lobby of people who hated unicorns and leprechauns. But the truth is, things are not like that. It actually takes a pretty vigorous effort to fight off the knowledge of God, and God remains a viable and important focus for most people, even in Western societies. Hence, Atheism still has attractions for some, because it is needed in order to fight off the creeping suspicion that God really does exist, and that some business remains to be done with him before the darkness inevitably swallows us all.

In a way, Atheists are more "religious" than some agnostics. For there are religious people for whom religion is little more than habit, and agnostics who genuinely don't think about the question of God at all, plausibly; but Atheists, to a man, are obsessed with God. He's the entire focus of their creedal activity, and nothing else preoccupies them in that realm at all. The whole energy of their confession is concentrated on banning Him from the world.

A funny position for anybody who claims it's an unimportant question, no?

[Harbal]

You may criticise it as weak and inadequate, or even worthless,

Not merely that, but as inadequate as a description of "morality" at all. It's pretty clear that subjectivists haven't even understood the basics, like that morality governs relations, or that morality has to involve something other than, and opposite to, "I want." They've just failed to put in the clear thought to get the term right, I would say. They've mistaken morality for pure ego.

...but I think what I have tried to describe is what most people's experience of morality is.

Perhaps. But then, all that would say is that people don't have an experience of actual morality, but only of being self-centered, and of being unthinking beyond it. What I desire and what is right are manifestly concepts that have nothing inherently to do with one another. I may often want things that are immoral.

Were you to ask the average person why they think things like lying, cheating and adultery are wrong, I suspect very few would mention God in their explanation.

The average rich Westerner? Perhaps. But not so many on a world scale. We have the luxury of living as if God doesn't exist, because we have enough technology, medicine, welfare programs, health care, entertainments, consumer goods, etc. to distract ourselves for an entire lifetime. (That was essentially Nietzsche's point when he said, "God is dead," actually: not that God was actually "dead," but that we are not any longer in need of that concept, God, because the West had advanced beyond needing such a concept, and become entirely self-sufficient.) But historically, even in currently "advanced" countries, and certainly everywhere else, God is not nearly so forgettable.

And at the end of our own lives, or when tragedy strikes us -- as eventually it inevitably does -- we find even our own spoiled, distracted thoughts turning to the question of what to do when our self-sufficiency runs out. And at the end, we're all driven to prayer.

Paradoxically, that's what makes Atheism so common and so vigorous in the West. In the absence of any "threat" of God existing, it would surely not be; it would be as tame and uninteresting as a lobby of people who hated unicorns and leprechauns. But the truth is, things are not like that. It actually takes a pretty vigorous effort to fight off the knowledge of God, and God remains a viable and important focus for most people, even in Western societies. Hence, Atheism still has attractions for some, because it is needed in order to fight off the creeping suspicion that God really does exist, and that some business remains to be done with him before the darkness inevitably swallows us all.

In a way, Atheists are more "religious" than some agnostics. For there are religious people for whom religion is little more than habit, and agnostics who genuinely don't think about the question of God at all, plausibly; but Atheists, to a man, are obsessed with God. He's the entire focus of their creedal activity, and nothing else preoccupies them in that realm at all. The whole energy of their confession is concentrated on banning Him from the world.

A funny position for anybody who claims it's an unimportant question, no?

I still say the definition of morality that I am describing is much closer to the generally accepted one than yours is. You are free to define the word however you like, but then the thing you are talking about will be different to what everyone else is discussing.

[Immanuel Can]

I still say the definition of morality that I am describing is much closer to the generally accepted one than yours is.

Perhaps. But it's really no "definition" at all, then. What it's "defining" is mere self-satisfaction, not at all anything recognizable as "morality."

You are free to define the word however you like, but then the thing you are talking about will be different to what everyone else is discussing.

I think you'll find that although many people may have a weak idea, or no credible idea, of what "morality" is, they still look to it to do some of the same functions they have always expected of a real "morality." They'll still expect it to provide order and direction to their conceptions of social justice, for example; they'll still complain that "injustices" like theft, violence or slander are "wrong" in an essentially objective sense, they'll still need to order their relationships with people and things by some principle, they'll still struggle with guilt and conscience when they do what they sense is "the wrong thing," they'll still hope that following some conception they have of good behaviour confirms them to be "good people," and they'll still object when things are "unfair" even if there was never any promise of "fairness" in their own essential worldview in the first place. All of that is moralizing, and in quite an objective mode, as well.

People are often illogical. But that's the value of logic: that it disciplines these rogue and inconsistent prejudices by requiring them to be made sensible. So using logic, we can see that their premises about the world do not fit with the value-judgments they routinely make; and we can quite straightforwardly grasp that they are not understanding themselves clearly, and are operating by instinct, habit, fear or tradition rather than by clear understanding of what they are doing.

That's pretty routine. But so is the fact that people want and need morality, even if in their personal theorizing, they mistakenly suppose it's all only subjective anyway. You'll note here, on this thread, that many people who profess to be Atheists or skeptics of some kind when it comes to questions about God, still rather irrationally want not to let morality cease to be a thing. They've undercut the moral authority of their own worldview, but they still yearn to be able to tell us that their "morality" is real and certain. It's like they want to talk like a subjectivist, when morality pinches them, particularly, but have all the benefits and cachet of moral objectivism anyway. They're wanting to have their cake, and eat it too.

That's people.

[henry quirk]

there isn't really a sense in which morality can be exclusively a "personal" matter, in that sense of "personal."

As I say...

The impasse is the same as always: the definitions of moral, morality, etc. I've yet to see any offered by anyone (including me) everyone agrees to. All definitions are skewed to favor morality is just opinion or morality is factual.

I haven't seen any of the subjectivists say morality is impossible or morality doesn't exist. To a man they say morality is opinion. They reject moral realism, yes. They don't reject morality, as they define it.

So, for the subjectivist, morality is nuthin' but a personal matter. For him it can't be anything else. He has no measure for right or wrong outside of his opinion of the moment. In weight, choosing not to rape or slave or murder, or steal or defraud is of no more consequence than choosing not to have coffee before bedtime. How it conveniences or inconveniences him is his only measure.

[LuckyR]

Well, morality is "personal" only in the sense that every "person" needs some. But it's not "personal" in the sense of being "private to a person."

As I was saying to Harbal, morality has to govern relationships. That's why it can never be "personal," even if a person has to have some.

Well yes and no. Moral codes govern both behaviour in relationships as well as when no one is looking (perhaps governs more in the latter). As it's being "personal" we're using two different meanings of the word to address two different aspects of morality.

Well, we do have to be precise with our wording here, or there's a real danger of confusion.

But let me put it simply: if you were the only person on earth, and the only such agent in the universe, then you would have no need of morality at all. You would simply be able to do whatever you wanted, and that would be the only question you could ask yourself: "what do I want?" not "what should I be doing rather than what I want?" Only the latter is morality. The former is just desire.

But let there be one more moral agent or "counter" in the universe...another human being or God, and for the first time, you would have to ask yourself, "what is the right way for me to be relating to this entity, and this entity to be relating to me?" In other words, morality would become a viable concern.

Now, there are people who imagine that he or she, individually, is the only moral "counter" in the universe. He/she not only does not believe in a God or gods, but also that other people are unimportant in the moral equation. He/she does not honour others, but often perhaps uses others for purposes that he/she has. Such individuals are narcissistic and amoral people, psychopaths, not capable of morality at all. Their decisions are made wholly personally, rather than with due regard for anything else, whether a person or a principle. And no doubt, there are a few such around. (My psychiatrist friend says they're more alarmingly common than you might believe, actually.) But they are not moral persons. They're amoral.

So no, there isn't really a sense in which morality can be exclusively a "personal" matter, in that sense of "personal."

Not so much, assuming you don't torture kittens. But you're free to go for it I suppose.

[Iwannaplato]

So, for the subjectivist, morality is nuthin' but a personal matter. For him it can't be anything else. He has no measure for right or wrong outside of his opinion of the moment. In weight, choosing not to rape or slave or murder, or steal or defraud is of no more consequence than choosing not to have coffee before bedtime. How it conveniences or inconveniences him is his only measure.

There may be subjectivists like this, but there is nothing about subjectivist positions that entails not caring.
There may be moral realists who don't care about rape or slavery. In fact there were periods where the majority of moral realists believed the latter was fine in many countries. And rape was also OK to moral realists in many contexts.

So, neither moral realism nor subjectivism are a guarantee of caring about rape or slavery.

Just because someone has a metaethical position that morals are subjective does not mean they think actions do not have consquences. Nor does it mean they are indifferent. It just means they don't think there is a way to determine objective morals.

Their loathing of rape might lead them to all sorts of reactions to it.

And moral realists are capable of convincing people all sorts of atrocities are good. That's right to believe that kiling all the jews or raping the women of the enemy or torturing people for blashemy or whatever anyone here might think of as either morally wrong or simply as acts they despise can and has been justified through moral realism.

This doesn't mean moral realists need to think rape, etc. are good acts, but it's in the realm of possibility.
Just as subjectivists need not and most do not consider not getting coffee and rape as on a par with each other. And they are not hypocrites if the fight for legislation against rape.

Empathy, disgust, dislike, yearnings for a safe society and many other facets of subjective humans can all lead to very similar positions on acts in society as some moral realists have.

Many of the hot button issues today have moral realists fighting eachother with subjectivists on one of the two teams.

[Immanuel Can]

Well yes and no. Moral codes govern both behaviour in relationships as well as when no one is looking (perhaps governs more in the latter). As it's being "personal" we're using two different meanings of the word to address two different aspects of morality.

Well, we do have to be precise with our wording here, or there's a real danger of confusion.

But let me put it simply: if you were the only person on earth, and the only such agent in the universe, then you would have no need of morality at all. You would simply be able to do whatever you wanted, and that would be the only question you could ask yourself: "what do I want?" not "what should I be doing rather than what I want?" Only the latter is morality. The former is just desire.

But let there be one more moral agent or "counter" in the universe...another human being or God, and for the first time, you would have to ask yourself, "what is the right way for me to be relating to this entity, and this entity to be relating to me?" In other words, morality would become a viable concern.

Now, there are people who imagine that he or she, individually, is the only moral "counter" in the universe. He/she not only does not believe in a God or gods, but also that other people are unimportant in the moral equation. He/she does not honour others, but often perhaps uses others for purposes that he/she has. Such individuals are narcissistic and amoral people, psychopaths, not capable of morality at all. Their decisions are made wholly personally, rather than with due regard for anything else, whether a person or a principle. And no doubt, there are a few such around. (My psychiatrist friend says they're more alarmingly common than you might believe, actually.) But they are not moral persons. They're amoral.

So no, there isn't really a sense in which morality can be exclusively a "personal" matter, in that sense of "personal."

Not so much, assuming you don't torture kittens. But you're free to go for it I suppose.

Well, somebody who thinks every decision can simply be made with reference to what he wants or feels certainly can want or feel he would like to harm things...and not just kittens. There's nothing preventing such feelings. There's certainly no "morality" to interfere with any such wish.

I think you can see where "personal morality" goes, just by looking at Epstein Island. No doubt the victimizers who visited "felt" they wanted to do things there. And their "personal morality" didn't stop them, or give them reason even to feel ashamed.

But they knew they were objectively doing wrong. They knew they were being evil. And how do we know they knew? Because they have exhibited what is called in court "a guilty mind." Rather than happily admitting their actions, they have sought to deny them and cover them up.

But if "personal morality" were a thing, why should they? In those terms, they did nothing wrong, did they? They wanted to do what they did, then they did it; and that's the end of the story for "personal morality."

[Harbal]

I still say the definition of morality that I am describing is much closer to the generally accepted one than yours is.

Perhaps. But it's really no "definition" at all, then. What it's "defining" is mere self-satisfaction, not at all anything recognizable as "morality."

You are free to define the word however you like, but then the thing you are talking about will be different to what everyone else is discussing.

I think you'll find that although many people may have a weak idea, or no credible idea, of what "morality" is, they still look to it to do some of the same functions they have always expected of a real "morality." They'll still expect it to provide order and direction to their conceptions of social justice, for example; they'll still complain that "injustices" like theft, violence or slander are "wrong" in an essentially objective sense, they'll still need to order their relationships with people and things by some principle, they'll still struggle with guilt and conscience when they do what they sense is "the wrong thing," they'll still hope that following some conception they have of good behaviour confirms them to be "good people," and they'll still object when things are "unfair" even if there was never any promise of "fairness" in their own essential worldview in the first place. All of that is moralizing, and in quite an objective mode, as well.

People are often illogical. But that's the value of logic: that it disciplines these rogue and inconsistent prejudices by requiring them to be made sensible. So using logic, we can see that their premises about the world do not fit with the value-judgments they routinely make; and we can quite straightforwardly grasp that they are not understanding themselves clearly, and are operating by instinct, habit, fear or tradition rather than by clear understanding of what they are doing.

That's pretty routine. But so is the fact that people want and need morality, even if in their personal theorizing, they mistakenly suppose it's all only subjective anyway. You'll note here, on this thread, that many people who profess to be Atheists or skeptics of some kind when it comes to questions about God, still rather irrationally want not to let morality cease to be a thing. They've undercut the moral authority of their own worldview, but they still yearn to be able to tell us that their "morality" is real and certain. It's like they want to talk like a subjectivist, when morality pinches them, particularly, but have all the benefits and cachet of moral objectivism anyway. They're wanting to have their cake, and eat it too.

That's people.

Very well, IC, I can see you are determined to have it all your own way, no matter what. I really don't think you are going to win anyone over with that dogmatic attitude, though.

[Immanuel Can]

I still say the definition of morality that I am describing is much closer to the generally accepted one than yours is.

Perhaps. But it's really no "definition" at all, then. What it's "defining" is mere self-satisfaction, not at all anything recognizable as "morality."

You are free to define the word however you like, but then the thing you are talking about will be different to what everyone else is discussing.

I think you'll find that although many people may have a weak idea, or no credible idea, of what "morality" is, they still look to it to do some of the same functions they have always expected of a real "morality." They'll still expect it to provide order and direction to their conceptions of social justice, for example; they'll still complain that "injustices" like theft, violence or slander are "wrong" in an essentially objective sense, they'll still need to order their relationships with people and things by some principle, they'll still struggle with guilt and conscience when they do what they sense is "the wrong thing," they'll still hope that following some conception they have of good behaviour confirms them to be "good people," and they'll still object when things are "unfair" even if there was never any promise of "fairness" in their own essential worldview in the first place. All of that is moralizing, and in quite an objective mode, as well.

People are often illogical. But that's the value of logic: that it disciplines these rogue and inconsistent prejudices by requiring them to be made sensible. So using logic, we can see that their premises about the world do not fit with the value-judgments they routinely make; and we can quite straightforwardly grasp that they are not understanding themselves clearly, and are operating by instinct, habit, fear or tradition rather than by clear understanding of what they are doing.

That's pretty routine. But so is the fact that people want and need morality, even if in their personal theorizing, they mistakenly suppose it's all only subjective anyway. You'll note here, on this thread, that many people who profess to be Atheists or skeptics of some kind when it comes to questions about God, still rather irrationally want not to let morality cease to be a thing. They've undercut the moral authority of their own worldview, but they still yearn to be able to tell us that their "morality" is real and certain. It's like they want to talk like a subjectivist, when morality pinches them, particularly, but have all the benefits and cachet of moral objectivism anyway. They're wanting to have their cake, and eat it too.

That's people.

Very well, IC, I can see you are determined to have it all your own way, no matter what. I really don't think you are going to win anyone over with that dogmatic attitude, though.

One can be dogmatically wrong. Or one can be dogmatically right, of course. But I'm not actually being "dogmatic" at all: I'm just pointing out what's pretty obviously true about what morality is. Being rational and analytical is the opposite of being "dogmatic," really.

[LuckyR]

Well, we do have to be precise with our wording here, or there's a real danger of confusion.

But let me put it simply: if you were the only person on earth, and the only such agent in the universe, then you would have no need of morality at all. You would simply be able to do whatever you wanted, and that would be the only question you could ask yourself: "what do I want?" not "what should I be doing rather than what I want?" Only the latter is morality. The former is just desire.

But let there be one more moral agent or "counter" in the universe...another human being or God, and for the first time, you would have to ask yourself, "what is the right way for me to be relating to this entity, and this entity to be relating to me?" In other words, morality would become a viable concern.

Now, there are people who imagine that he or she, individually, is the only moral "counter" in the universe. He/she not only does not believe in a God or gods, but also that other people are unimportant in the moral equation. He/she does not honour others, but often perhaps uses others for purposes that he/she has. Such individuals are narcissistic and amoral people, psychopaths, not capable of morality at all. Their decisions are made wholly personally, rather than with due regard for anything else, whether a person or a principle. And no doubt, there are a few such around. (My psychiatrist friend says they're more alarmingly common than you might believe, actually.) But they are not moral persons. They're amoral.

So no, there isn't really a sense in which morality can be exclusively a "personal" matter, in that sense of "personal."

Not so much, assuming you don't torture kittens. But you're free to go for it I suppose.

Well, somebody who thinks every decision can simply be made with reference to what he wants or feels certainly can want or feel he would like to harm things...and not just kittens. There's nothing preventing such feelings. There's certainly no "morality" to interfere with any such wish.

I think you can see where "personal morality" goes, just by looking at Epstein Island. No doubt the victimizers who visited "felt" they wanted to do things there. And their "personal morality" didn't stop them, or give them reason even to feel ashamed.

But they knew they were objectively doing wrong. They knew they were being evil. And how do we know they knew? Because they have exhibited what is called in court "a guilty mind." Rather than happily admitting their actions, they have sought to deny them and cover them up.

But if "personal morality" were a thing, why should they? In those terms, they did nothing wrong, did they? They wanted to do what they did, then they did it; and that's the end of the story for "personal morality."

Well you are oversimplistically confusing an expedient legal defense for evidence of a guilty mind. A faulty premise renders the rest of the argument equally erroneous.