What could make morality objective?

[Skepdick]

Here's a popular fallacy.

Premise: Identities or categories - and so sameness and difference - are linguistic things.
Conclusion: Therefore, in reality - outside language - there are no identities or categories, and therefore no sameness and difference.

Here's a non-starter: what do you identify as "reality" ? What or where is a "category"?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here's a popular fallacy.

Premise: Identities or categories - and so sameness and difference - are linguistic things.
Conclusion: Therefore, in reality - outside language - there are no identities or categories, and therefore no sameness and difference.

This non sequitur comes from mistaking what we say for the way things are - the original philosophical delusion, which has had deep and ramifying consequences.

It has led to the silly idea that, beyond the fact that it's necessary for communication, agreement on the use of signs constitutes what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity.

(The things we call cats and dogs - features of reality - are what they are whatever we call them, and whether we say they're the same as or different from each other.)

It has led to the silly idea that to construct a model of reality is to construct reality - and that all we can know about reality are the models we construct, which means that reality is 'mind-dependent', or 'not mind-independent'.

And it has led to the silly idea that, since what we call facts are supposedly our inventions, any declarative can assert a fact - so that 'abortion is morally wrong' can be just as much a factual assertion, with a classical truth-value, as 'water is H2O'.

'What we call facts aren't what we say they are'. But. 'There are moral facts - which are what we say they are'.

In this article [Self, Philosophical Consideration], it is stated Rorty asserted, the claim of an unchanging metaphysical substance such as the Self is driven by linguistic practices, i.e. language.

• Similar to Foucault, Richard Rorty argues that there is no unchanging metaphysical substance such as the Self.
  While Foucault emphasized the idea that the Self is a product of society and culture, Rorty [1989] also considers it [the Self] to be a product of linguistic practices"
  
  Rorty, R. (1989). Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Rorty in Philosophy_and_the_Mirror_of_Nature [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosoph ... _of_Nature]
do not accept there are absolutely mind-independent things out there awaiting to be mirrored [to be discovered] by humans.

Just as the self is not an independent thing but a linguistic grounded thing, to Rorty [..I believe - subject to confirmation] the claim of mind-independent things out there are driven and grounded on language.

At present I am reading
The Dream of Reality: Heinz von Foerster's Constructivism
by Lynn Segal

• Von Foerster [Constructivist]—cybernetician, mathematician, physicist, and philosopher—claims that we CONSTRUCT or INVENT reality rather than discover it. 13
  This book shall make a radical departure from these assumptions.
  It will construct an epistemology that argues that
  what we can know is a function of the observer rather than what is observed. 6
  Our first point of departure is examining how language generates the notion of objectivity [of mind-independence]. 6
  Observers live in language the way fish live in water.
  
  We assume that ‘reality" contains things or objects which exist independently of the observer. 6
  
  This, in brief, is how we assume objective knowledge is established,
  by matching something in the mind
  with something that we believe exists independently of us in the world of matter. 12

[Peter Holmes]

Here's a popular fallacy.

Premise: Identities or categories - and so sameness and difference - are linguistic things.
Conclusion: Therefore, in reality - outside language - there are no identities or categories, and therefore no sameness and difference.

This non sequitur comes from mistaking what we say for the way things are - the original philosophical delusion, which has had deep and ramifying consequences.

It has led to the silly idea that, beyond the fact that it's necessary for communication, agreement on the use of signs constitutes what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity.

(The things we call cats and dogs - features of reality - are what they are whatever we call them, and whether we say they're the same as or different from each other.)

It has led to the silly idea that to construct a model of reality is to construct reality - and that all we can know about reality are the models we construct, which means that reality is 'mind-dependent', or 'not mind-independent'.

And it has led to the silly idea that, since what we call facts are supposedly our inventions, any declarative can assert a fact - so that 'abortion is morally wrong' can be just as much a factual assertion, with a classical truth-value, as 'water is H2O'.

'What we call facts aren't what we say they are'. But. 'There are moral facts - which are what we say they are'.

In this article [Self, Philosophical Consideration], it is stated Rorty asserted, the claim of an unchanging metaphysical substance such as the Self is driven by linguistic practices, i.e. language.

• Similar to Foucault, Richard Rorty argues that there is no unchanging metaphysical substance such as the Self.
  While Foucault emphasized the idea that the Self is a product of society and culture, Rorty [1989] also considers it [the Self] to be a product of linguistic practices"
  
  Rorty, R. (1989). Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Rorty in Philosophy_and_the_Mirror_of_Nature [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosoph ... _of_Nature]
do not accept there are absolutely mind-independent things out there awaiting to be mirrored [to be discovered] by humans.

Just as the self is not an independent thing but a linguistic grounded thing, to Rorty [..I believe - subject to confirmation] the claim of mind-independent things out there are driven and grounded on language.

At present I am reading
The Dream of Reality: Heinz von Foerster's Constructivism
by Lynn Segal

• Von Foerster [Constructivist]—cybernetician, mathematician, physicist, and philosopher—claims that we CONSTRUCT or INVENT reality rather than discover it. 13
  This book shall make a radical departure from these assumptions.
  It will construct an epistemology that argues that
  what we can know is a function of the observer rather than what is observed. 6
  Our first point of departure is examining how language generates the notion of objectivity [of mind-independence]. 6
  Observers live in language the way fish live in water.
  
  We assume that ‘reality" contains things or objects which exist independently of the observer. 6
  
  This, in brief, is how we assume objective knowledge is established,
  by matching something in the mind
  with something that we believe exists independently of us in the world of matter. 12

I think Rorty was right to reject belief in an 'unchanging metaphysical substance' - and right to see bewitchment by our linguistic devices as the source of that belief.

But the premise that there's no unchanging metaphysical substance doesn't entail the antirealist conclusion that reality is therefore mind-dependent - or not mind-independent.

[Skepdick]

But the premise that there's no unchanging metaphysical substance doesn't entail the antirealist conclusion that reality is therefore mind-dependent - or not mind-independent.

Peter "Dumb Cunt" Holmes can't seem to reason his way out of a wet paper bag.

Anti-realism doesn't make any assertions about reality's mind-dependence or indepenence.
Anti-realism simply doesn't accept the conclusions of realists on grounds of insufficiency.

You claim that reality "exists" (whatever the hell that means) [1]; and that reality is mind-independent [2]?

Tell us what evaluation framework for proofs/evidence you are going to use and prove those claims.

Queue the usual avoidance and sophistry; instead of admitting that those are merely his default positions; and not the product of reason.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here's a popular fallacy.

Premise: Identities or categories - and so sameness and difference - are linguistic things.
Conclusion: Therefore, in reality - outside language - there are no identities or categories, and therefore no sameness and difference.

This non sequitur comes from mistaking what we say for the way things are - the original philosophical delusion, which has had deep and ramifying consequences.

It has led to the silly idea that, beyond the fact that it's necessary for communication, agreement on the use of signs constitutes what we call facts and, therefore, objectivity.

(The things we call cats and dogs - features of reality - are what they are whatever we call them, and whether we say they're the same as or different from each other.)

It has led to the silly idea that to construct a model of reality is to construct reality - and that all we can know about reality are the models we construct, which means that reality is 'mind-dependent', or 'not mind-independent'.

And it has led to the silly idea that, since what we call facts are supposedly our inventions, any declarative can assert a fact - so that 'abortion is morally wrong' can be just as much a factual assertion, with a classical truth-value, as 'water is H2O'.

'What we call facts aren't what we say they are'. But. 'There are moral facts - which are what we say they are'.

In this article [Self, Philosophical Consideration], it is stated Rorty asserted, the claim of an unchanging metaphysical substance such as the Self is driven by linguistic practices, i.e. language.

• Similar to Foucault, Richard Rorty argues that there is no unchanging metaphysical substance such as the Self.
  While Foucault emphasized the idea that the Self is a product of society and culture, Rorty [1989] also considers it [the Self] to be a product of linguistic practices"
  
  Rorty, R. (1989). Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Rorty in Philosophy_and_the_Mirror_of_Nature [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosoph ... _of_Nature]
do not accept there are absolutely mind-independent things out there awaiting to be mirrored [to be discovered] by humans.

Just as the self is not an independent thing but a linguistic grounded thing, to Rorty [..I believe - subject to confirmation] the claim of mind-independent things out there are driven and grounded on language.

At present I am reading
The Dream of Reality: Heinz von Foerster's Constructivism
by Lynn Segal

• Von Foerster [Constructivist]—cybernetician, mathematician, physicist, and philosopher—claims that we CONSTRUCT or INVENT reality rather than discover it. 13
  This book shall make a radical departure from these assumptions.
  It will construct an epistemology that argues that
  what we can know is a function of the observer rather than what is observed. 6
  Our first point of departure is examining how language generates the notion of objectivity [of mind-independence]. 6
  Observers live in language the way fish live in water.
  
  We assume that ‘reality" contains things or objects which exist independently of the observer. 6
  
  This, in brief, is how we assume objective knowledge is established,
  by matching something in the mind
  with something that we believe exists independently of us in the world of matter. 12

I think Rorty was right to reject belief in an 'unchanging metaphysical substance' - and right to see bewitchment by our linguistic devices as the source of that belief.

But the premise that there's no unchanging metaphysical substance doesn't entail the antirealist conclusion that reality is therefore mind-dependent - or not mind-independent.

You have to answer the above question by Skepdick which I agree with and I had mentioned that a '1000' times.

'Change' is always temporal thus associated with time.
Time do not exist as a mind-independent thing.
Therefore 'change' cannot be absolutely mind*-independent.
* human conditions.

[Peter Holmes]

In this article [Self, Philosophical Consideration], it is stated Rorty asserted, the claim of an unchanging metaphysical substance such as the Self is driven by linguistic practices, i.e. language.

• Similar to Foucault, Richard Rorty argues that there is no unchanging metaphysical substance such as the Self.
  While Foucault emphasized the idea that the Self is a product of society and culture, Rorty [1989] also considers it [the Self] to be a product of linguistic practices"
  
  Rorty, R. (1989). Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.

Rorty in Philosophy_and_the_Mirror_of_Nature [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosoph ... _of_Nature]
do not accept there are absolutely mind-independent things out there awaiting to be mirrored [to be discovered] by humans.

Just as the self is not an independent thing but a linguistic grounded thing, to Rorty [..I believe - subject to confirmation] the claim of mind-independent things out there are driven and grounded on language.

At present I am reading
The Dream of Reality: Heinz von Foerster's Constructivism
by Lynn Segal

• Von Foerster [Constructivist]—cybernetician, mathematician, physicist, and philosopher—claims that we CONSTRUCT or INVENT reality rather than discover it. 13
  This book shall make a radical departure from these assumptions.
  It will construct an epistemology that argues that
  what we can know is a function of the observer rather than what is observed. 6
  Our first point of departure is examining how language generates the notion of objectivity [of mind-independence]. 6
  Observers live in language the way fish live in water.
  
  We assume that ‘reality" contains things or objects which exist independently of the observer. 6
  
  This, in brief, is how we assume objective knowledge is established,
  by matching something in the mind
  with something that we believe exists independently of us in the world of matter. 12

I think Rorty was right to reject belief in an 'unchanging metaphysical substance' - and right to see bewitchment by our linguistic devices as the source of that belief.

But the premise that there's no unchanging metaphysical substance doesn't entail the antirealist conclusion that reality is therefore mind-dependent - or not mind-independent.

You have to answer the above question by Skepdick which I agree with and I had mentioned that a '1000' times.

'Change' is always temporal thus associated with time.
Time do not exist as a mind-independent thing.
Therefore 'change' cannot be absolutely mind*-independent.
* human conditions.

So, no humans = no time = no change = no physical causation = no empirical evidence... and no humans. Sorted.

[Skepdick]

So, no humans = no time = no change = no physical causation = no empirical evidence... and no humans. Sorted.

You tell us, Mr Realist. At what timescale does reality function?

Is reality one event; or is it chunked up into time intervals? Does reality have a past, present and future? Or what?

[Atla]

You have to answer the above question by Skepdick which I agree with and I had mentioned that a '1000' times.

The two intellectual giants have joined forces, together they are unstoppable.. it's game over.

[Skepdick]

The two intellectual giants have joined forces, together they are unstoppable.. it's game over.

You got this backwards... It is game over.

Enough with the silly, circular philosophical games.

[Iwannaplato]

You have to answer the above question by Skepdick which I agree with and I had mentioned that a '1000' times.

But Skepdick in that post wrote....

Anti-realism doesn't make any assertions about reality's mind-dependence or indepenence.

But you make assertions about realitys mind-dependence or indepedence, so his post is not relevant to your issues with PH.

[Sculptor]

There is only one way that morality could be objective.

An all powerful ultimate being who imposes hos moral values and his will upon all living things, and punishes transgressions whilst rewarding complaince to his will. Only in this way could morality be onjective, universal and unbias. Such rules would have to apply to all moral beings equally and without favour.

There is just one little problem with this. For the morality to remain objective that would entail the supreme being also complying and obeying the rules. Because he is setting the rules, that would mean that the ultmiate being himself would have to allow all other moral being to be able to have the same power to set rules too. And then the cicle of subjectivity would close in upon the whole subjct extinguishing the objectivity of morality.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I think Rorty was right to reject belief in an 'unchanging metaphysical substance' - and right to see bewitchment by our linguistic devices as the source of that belief.

But the premise that there's no unchanging metaphysical substance doesn't entail the antirealist conclusion that reality is therefore mind-dependent - or not mind-independent.

You have to answer the above question by Skepdick which I agree with and I had mentioned that a '1000' times.

'Change' is always temporal thus associated with time.
Time do not exist as a mind-independent thing.
Therefore 'change' cannot be absolutely mind*-independent.
* human conditions.

So, no humans = no time = no change = no physical causation = no empirical evidence... and no humans. Sorted.

The argument here is the opposition against your claim that facts are absolutely independent of human conditions, i.e. opinions, beliefs, judgments, description, and the like.

The point is time, change, physical causation, empirical evidence cannot be absolutely independent of human conditions, i.e. opinions, beliefs, judgments, description, and the like.

[Veritas Aequitas]

You have to answer the above question by Skepdick which I agree with and I had mentioned that a '1000' times.

But Skepdick in that post wrote....

Anti-realism doesn't make any assertions about reality's mind-dependence or indepenence.

But you make assertions about realitys mind-dependence or indepedence, so his post is not relevant to your issues with PH.

The point is not what ANTI-philosophical_realism* asserts but rather it is the onus on philosophical realism to prove their positive claim.
* there is a wide variety of anti-philosophical_realism making all sorts of claims.

[Veritas Aequitas]

There is only one way that morality could be objective.

An all powerful ultimate being who imposes hos moral values and his will upon all living things, and punishes transgressions whilst rewarding complaince to his will. Only in this way could morality be onjective, universal and unbias. Such rules would have to apply to all moral beings equally and without favour.

There is just one little problem with this. For the morality to remain objective that would entail the supreme being also complying and obeying the rules. Because he is setting the rules, that would mean that the ultmiate being himself would have to allow all other moral being to be able to have the same power to set rules too. And then the cicle of subjectivity would close in upon the whole subjct extinguishing the objectivity of morality.

Your claim is baseless and groundless.
What you are ignorant of is there are two main senses of objectivity.

Two Senses of 'Objective'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39326
i.e.

• 1. Objectivity in the Philosophical Realism Sense
  
  2. Objectivity in the FSK Sense

Your basis of 'objectivity' is as in,
1. Objectivity in the Philosophical Realism Sense

In this case, objectivity is a myth, illusory and nonsensical which is same as that claimed by theists.

What is Objectivity-proper is this;
What is Philosophical Objectivity?
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=31416

[Skepdick]

There is only one way that morality could be objective.

An all powerful ultimate being who imposes hos moral values and his will upon all living things, and punishes transgressions whilst rewarding complaince to his will. Only in this way could morality be onjective, universal and unbias. Such rules would have to apply to all moral beings equally and without favour.

There is just one little problem with this. For the morality to remain objective that would entail the supreme being also complying and obeying the rules. Because he is setting the rules, that would mean that the ultmiate being himself would have to allow all other moral being to be able to have the same power to set rules too. And then the cicle of subjectivity would close in upon the whole subjct extinguishing the objectivity of morality.

The problem with self-determination is the problem with everything else: interpretation.

I have determined that I am following my own rules.
You have determined that I am not following my own rules.

Whose interpretation of the rules is correct? Well, mine. Of course. They are my rules, not your rules.

This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because any course of action can be made out to accord with the rule--L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §201a