Free will is wholly deterministic

[bahman]

When I choose to commit a crime, or not commit a crime I make a decision. The decision is based on a nexus of causalities which include all antecedent conditions including my motivation, volition, physical and mental needs, education, socialization, experience ad infinitem. It might be difficult for another to predict my choice. But that choice can only make sense if it is the sum of those causalities, the things that make me who I am. There are laws that might deter me, or encourage me. but it is not free in an absolute sense that I am free of the deterministic condition of the universe, the laws and cause and effect which cause my decision to be made of necessity to the conditions at that moment. It is an inescapable truth that I am determined to act thus, and in the full knowledge of the consequences and the responsibility which is wholly mine, I make the choice. Free will is illusory, such choices are determined or would be meaningless. I am that agent of determinism compatible with causality and the exercise of my will.

But apparently, God gives us free will. And about that, we have no choice, because he insists upon it. Unless you are a Calvinist, then you don't.

Does anyone care to refute this?

How do you define free will? You cannot refute something that you didn't provide a definition for it!

[Sculptor]

When I choose to commit a crime, or not commit a crime I make a decision. The decision is based on a nexus of causalities which include all antecedent conditions including my motivation, volition, physical and mental needs, education, socialization, experience ad infinitem. It might be difficult for another to predict my choice. But that choice can only make sense if it is the sum of those causalities, the things that make me who I am. There are laws that might deter me, or encourage me. but it is not free in an absolute sense that I am free of the deterministic condition of the universe, the laws and cause and effect which cause my decision to be made of necessity to the conditions at that moment. It is an inescapable truth that I am determined to act thus, and in the full knowledge of the consequences and the responsibility which is wholly mine, I make the choice. Free will is illusory, such choices are determined or would be meaningless. I am that agent of determinism compatible with causality and the exercise of my will.

But apparently, God gives us free will. And about that, we have no choice, because he insists upon it. Unless you are a Calvinist, then you don't.

Does anyone care to refute this?

How do you define free will? You cannot refute something that you didn't provide a definition for it!

Free will is the abiity of an agent to act by endogneous forces that determine that action free from the compulsion of other people.

[phyllo]

The aspect of the Determinism paradigm that I disagree with is the proposition that antecedent state A always leads to resultant state B, never C.

Okay, you're in state A and you decide to go to state B.

Let's say we could go back to state A.

So you're deciding once again in exactly the same state A.

The first time you thought that state B is better than state C. So you picked B.

Why would pick C when you think B is better?

There's nothing preventing you from picking C. But in state A you prefer B over C.

It seems you would always pick B no matter how often you go back to state A.

How can it work otherwise?

Oh, but in Determinism you don't "decide" anything. If you could "decide", then you could choose B or C. But according to Determinism, you're going to end up at B (never C), and the feeling that you had a "choice" in the matter is an illusion.

The situation was open ended. It didn't specify either free-will or determinism. It was intended to explore decisions.

Let's say you have free-will in the situation.

Why would you pick C if you prefer B?

If you preferred B the first time , then why would you not prefer B the second time?

[Walker]

Intent is not choice.

Decision and executing your intent, acting, making it real, is the choice.

Inasmuch as choice exists, correct. Action defines the choice, not speculation about what to do.

The final choice is never known until the action, and the action is proof of what had to be done, even if what had to be done was to deviate from the plan via screwup or whatever, a necessity made inevitable by conditions including deficiency of foresight capacity in the actor.

[Immanuel Can]

I'll be interested in their answer. But expect them to say, "Well, you can't prove free will..." because that's all they've got -- the defensive posture.

Nonsense. Of course you can prove you have free will.

Simply choose that which you hold as incontrovertibly true. The thing that you simply refuse to deny. And then deny it.

In your particular case: reject God. I bet you can't/won't.

One of the advantages of free will is I am not at all obligated to follow your advice. I can reject it. Which I now freely do.

[Skepdick]

One of the advantages of free will is I am not at all obligated to follow your advice. I can reject it. Which I now freely do.

Nobody said you are obliged to follow my advice. But you do seem obliged to follow God's advice.

For somebody with "free will" you are incredibly predictable...

[Immanuel Can]

One of the advantages of free will is I am not at all obligated to follow your advice. I can reject it. Which I now freely do.

Nobody said you are obliged to follow my advice. But you do seem obliged to follow God's advice.

Choose to follow the wisdom of the Supreme Being? Yes, yes, I do.

Thanks for noticing.

You'll find it very helpful to you, as well.

[Skepdick]

One of the advantages of free will is I am not at all obligated to follow your advice. I can reject it. Which I now freely do.

Nobody said you are obliged to follow my advice. But you do seem obliged to follow God's advice.

Choose to follow the wisdom of the Supreme Being? Yes, yes, I do.

Thanks for noticing.

You'll find it very helpful to you, as well.

No matter how hard I try - I just can't seem to muster the will to believe. I guess my maker wired me without choice on the matter.

[LuckyR]

Okay, you're in state A and you decide to go to state B.

Let's say we could go back to state A.

So you're deciding once again in exactly the same state A.

The first time you thought that state B is better than state C. So you picked B.

Why would pick C when you think B is better?

There's nothing preventing you from picking C. But in state A you prefer B over C.

It seems you would always pick B no matter how often you go back to state A.

How can it work otherwise?

Oh, but in Determinism you don't "decide" anything. If you could "decide", then you could choose B or C. But according to Determinism, you're going to end up at B (never C), and the feeling that you had a "choice" in the matter is an illusion.

The situation was open ended. It didn't specify either free-will or determinism. It was intended to explore decisions.

Let's say you have free-will in the situation.

Why would you pick C if you prefer B?

If you preferred B the first time , then why would you not prefer B the second time?

Well, as economists discovered awhile back, humans don't behave rationally or logically a certain amount of the time, hence the refinement (and supplanting) of Rational Choice Theory with Behavioral Economic Theory.

[phyllo]

Well, as economists discovered awhile back, humans don't behave rationally or logically a certain amount of the time, hence the refinement (and supplanting) of Rational Choice Theory with Behavioral Economic Theory.
Top

Okay, you don't want to think about it. Fine.

[Immanuel Can]

No matter how hard I try - I just can't seem to muster the will to believe. I guess my maker wired me without choice on the matter.

That's a Determinist talking.

I'm not one of those.

[LuckyR]

Well, as economists discovered awhile back, humans don't behave rationally or logically a certain amount of the time, hence the refinement (and supplanting) of Rational Choice Theory with Behavioral Economic Theory.

Okay, you don't want to think about it. Fine.

Uummm... thought about it. Addressed it, ie since humans don't always act logically, repeating a logic based algorithm will NOT always give the same conclusion.

[Skepdick]

No matter how hard I try - I just can't seem to muster the will to believe. I guess my maker wired me without choice on the matter.

That's a Determinist talking.

I'm not one of those.

I have no choice but not to believe you. I guess God must have made me this way.

[Walker]

pre-redundant

[Walker]

... folks only do what they must do...

That's an assumption, not a truth. In practice, we all act as if it isn't true, and nobody lives as a Determinist. So the burden's on the Determinist to show why we're all crazy, and that Determinism, not our decisions, make everything happen. However, if he succeeds, he fails: for he would then have made us "change our minds," which we cannot do, if we are Determined.

So again, the whole idea of that falls apart right away.

One makes decisions because one must. One thinks, because one must. One edits and changes formatting because one must. It's the nature of the beast.

*

Compulsion can have various causes, including morality.

Not if the mind is not real. And Determinism has to say it's not real: what's real is only brain chemistry. So morality doesn't "compel" anything, especially in Determinist thought.

The compulsion of morality is commonly called, conscience.

I think the stumbling point for those whose curiosity as to “why,” ends with the word choice, is the assumption that doing what one must do absolves the doer of responsibility.

I do know people for whom, I think, that is the chief attraction of Determinism. For example, I know one wife, now married to a dear friend, whose misspent youth has been reshaped by her into a story of "I couldn't help it, because Determinism." But I think such rationalizations are pretty evidently not rational. They're emotional.

Even though her need is to rationalize the past, she is still responsible for her actions, even though her need may not be consistent with an abstraction call Determinism.

Doing what one must do does not absolve responsibility, not even if the doer is of unsound mind.

Actually, it does.

Would you execute the insane? Would you punish children the way you punish an adult for the same fault? Would you indict somebody who didn't know a thing the same as somebody who did?

Clearly not: those would be injustices. In court, a person must be capable of what they call "a guilty mind." If they are not, then they may be the physical cause of an indictable offense; but they are not morally responsible for it.

Insanity, childhood, and ignorance are mitigating factors in the punishment of wrong doing and in the decision of what to do with the miscreant, however these factors, or mitigating circumstances, do not absolve responsibility for the doing. The exception to this is if one is a Brandon in good standing with The Party. In that case, any old rationalization is reason enough to absolve the Brandon of responsibility for ignoring laws and abusing the power entrusted by the people, for personal gain, which is something he had to do btw. Perhaps he was blackmailed by a foreign govt. such as perhaps, Ukraine.

All things considered, the piece that is moved is the one that had to be moved.

Well, life is not chess. And if chess were like that, then nobody would ever play chess at all, anyway. One situation, and only one move? It would make for a very dull game, to be sure.

Life is like chess in that each move, or action, no matter how minute, defines true intent in every case, even the case of accidents*, and the hippy chick has a need to evade responsibility for her actions, that is, rationalize the past so that she smells like a rose bud.

Hmm. There are no accidents, sounds like something that would fit into the Determinist Template.