Is morality objective or subjective?

[CIN]

How does that work?

Read my OP for an explanation.

No, it's far too long, and far too indirect. Just say what you mean. Give me an example of an empirical observation that issues in a value.

I have done just that, in my OP. I'm not going to compromise my explanation to suit your laziness or short attention span. I don't do philosophy for the intellectually challenged. We're done here.

[Skepdick]

I have done just that, in my OP. I'm not going to compromise my explanation to suit your laziness or short attention span. I don't do philosophy for the intellectually challenged. We're done here.

You don't do philosophy for the intellectually challenged.
You do philosophy because you are intellectually challenged.

Objective evaluation is just another way to allude to computation.

Which does nothing to address the problem of there existing two (or more) objective evaluators which disagree on the value of the evaluation.

Is the value of "x=x" true; or false?

Some objective evaluators say it's true.
Some objective evaluators say it's false.

I'd explain the computer science to you, but philosophers are intellectually challenged.

Code: Select all

In [1]: class A: pass
In [2]: class B:
   ...:     def __eq__(self, other): return False
   
In [3]: x = A()
In [4]: eval('x == x')
Out[4]: True

In [5]: x = B()
In [6]: eval('x == x')
Out[6]: False

[Skepdick]

I'm an objectivist about values ('you did a bad thing when you kicked the cat') but I'm not an objectivist about morals ('you did a morally bad thing when you kicked the cat') because an action can only be morally good or bad if there's free will, and I don't see how there can be (what's the evidence for it? how would it work?).

Now that's just objectively bad reasoning.

Free will is not required for cat-kicking to be morally bad. If it's just bad (but not morally bad) that's good enogh for any moral purposes.

You kick the cat and go to court for it.
Your defense: Mr Judge, I have no free will - I can't be held accountable for my actions. The laws of physics made me do it.
Judge responds: I can't be held accountable for my judgments. I have no free will - I sentence you to 6 months in prison. The laws of physics made me do it.

[Will Bouwman]

Well, I imagine that after nearly 20 000 posts in 10 years, you have presented at least the bulk of your arguments.

Not nearly, actually.

Given that none of those you have presented so far have been persuasive (if anyone has been converted by Immanuel Can's efforts to date, please say so) do you not think it time to roll out something you have kept up your sleeve?

As for the universe, however you happen to see it, you clearly believe that we are looking at the same universe.

Yes, we are. But we may not be looking at it the same way.

For one thing, you and I have access to different sets of data. You were born in one place, I in another. You have had one set of experiences, I another. I am aware of some arguments, you of others. I have read some things, you others...and so on.

More importantly, though, you perhaps look at the universe with one set of expectations, and I another.

I'm surprised that you should appeal to the theory dependence of observation. Yes, it is manifestly so that your circumstances affect your outlook. As we see, Christians overwhelmingly are raised in a Christian tradition, Muslims come mostly from Islamic stock, Hindus Hinduism, Jews Judaism. Unless the universe is much more magical than it already appears, our beliefs do not alter what gods may or may not exist.

Have you ever asked yourself what would happen if (as the dubious story goes), Newton had not been the one sitting under his apple tree? When the apple fell on his head, what if it had been Fred Jones the novelist sitting there? Would gravity have then been discovered?

Probably not, right? It was because Newton was a brilliant physicist, somebody already interested in material phenomena and scientific explanations that he was able to recognize the apple falling for what it was: an exhibition of gravity.

As Newton in a rare moment of humility conceded: "If I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders of Giants." Newton was undoubtedly a brilliant mathematician, but others before him had already worked out that gravity acts according to an inverse square rule (more or less, as Einstein refined). Who knows what would have happened, but it is more likely than not that someone, Robert Hooke was a sniff away, would have invented the formula that was very much of its time.

Newton was prepared to see in a certain way; and it turns out he was really onto something important. But Fred Jones, sitting in the same place and contemplating how to pen his latest romance novel would doubtless have felt only irritation that something had hit him on the head.

Newton was prepared to see things in the way advocated by the Royal Society, which, greatly influenced by Francis Bacon, was founded in 1660 with the expressed intention of being a "College for the Promoting of Physico-Mathematical Experimental Learning". Newton was 17 at the time, so again, very much of his time.

In the same way, a person has to be prepared to see the evidence as evidence of something. If he's already decided he's uninterested or skeptical of the idea of God, how is he going to recognize anything he sees, anything that happens to him, as an "act of God"? He's already ruled that explanation out, a priori. He's not open to the thought that anything that happens could be from God. So, naturally, nothing he sees seems to be that: his mind always finds an alternate interpretation of events -- "it was coincidence"..."I only thought I heard a voice"..."I just lucked out"..."It was only a dream or illusion"..."the Red Sea didn't actually part"..."the disciples stole the body"...and so on.

Well, "recognize" is putting the cart before the horse. If you are determined to see all evidence as the product of God, you are just as biased as anyone determined not to.

Right. So it turns out that the extra knowledge that you have is deeply personal that you can express, but not actually demonstrate.

Don't worry: you could demonstrate it to yourself, if you were willing.

It is not enough that I am willing to be persuaded. I have instead to will myself to believe something that I am not convinced of; that is the essence of confirmation bias.

Would it be irrational to hypothesise that your emotional and intellectual response to some stimulus only you feel might have some cause other than God? For instance:
"... research in the field of “neurotheology” — or the neuroscience of theological belief — has made some surprising discoveries that are bound to change how we think about spirituality.

For instance, some scientists suggest that religious experience activates the same brain circuits as sex and drugs.

Other research has suggested that damage to a certain brain region can make you feel as though someone’s in the room when nobody’s there."
https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articl ... xedContent
Would it be fair-minded to dismiss the findings of neuroscience?

No...but one would have to be careful how one interpreted those facts, or one could easily be fooled into a hasty conclusion.

The "finding of neuroscience" you indicate does not singularly conduce to the conclusion that God is a product of neurology.

No indeed. What it does mean is that there are at least two explanations for your belief in God. You can't prove the one that you wish to be true, and nobody can prove the other to the exclusion of your preferred hypothesis. There isn't enough evidence, hence the two competing ideas are underdetermined.

[Will Bouwman]

I don't think take nobody's word for it is the motto of the Royal Society.

It really is:

"The Royal Society's motto 'Nullius in verba' is taken to mean 'take nobody's word for it'. It is an expression of the determination of Fellows to withstand the domination of authority and to verify all statements by an appeal to facts determined by experiment."
https://royalsociety.org/about-us/history/

I had no idea what they claimed. My doubt was aimed at the reality of their practice. It's similar to my doubt about Socrates' actual position.

As I was saying to Immanuel Can, the Royal Society was founded in 1660, shortly after the Stuart Restoration. Prior to that England had been run by a bunch of protestant literalists, who were even more opposed to science than the Catholics they reacted to. To protestants the Bible was authoritative, to Catholics it was the interpretation of that book by Vatican 'scholars', and ultimately the pope. In science there was still more trust in Aristotle than was healthy, and Galen still was more authoritative than a few dissections later made him. It is that kind of authority that the Royal Society was determined to withstand. With an ironic twist, it was the Royal Society's elevation of Isaac Newton to an authoritative figure that lead to English mathematicians sticking to his methods of fluxions, rather than adopting the now standard Leibniz system that slowed English mathematical progress in the 18th century. Anyway, the point of Nullius in verba is not don't believe anyone, rather it is don't believe anyone who can't back up their claims with experimental evidence.
As for Socrates, you are not the first person to not like him. At his trial, more people thought he should be executed than found him guilty.

[henry quirk]

If necessitarianism were true; what other choice do we have but to live exactly the way we live?

None.

As I say: if necessitarianism is true, and some of us are compelled to believe we're free wills and are compelled to live as though we were free wills, then some of us would be compelled not only to believe in necessitarianism but would also be compelled to live as necessitarians. None do.

...and...

Each and every necessitarian, no matter where, no matter when, lives his life as a libertarian free will. Not a one naturally, or intentionally, lives as though he were not a libertarian free will.

[Immanuel Can]

Well, I imagine that after nearly 20 000 posts in 10 years, you have presented at least the bulk of your arguments.

Not nearly, actually.

Given that none of those you have presented so far have been persuasive (if anyone has been converted by Immanuel Can's efforts to date, please say so) do you not think it time to roll out something you have kept up your sleeve?

It depends on what you ask. It seems that people want to recycle the same debates. And maybe, as you say, that's because I'm insufficiently clear or persuasive. Maybe. Or maybe it's because people choose their Atheism for reasons other than intellection, and thus intellection is unable to dislodge them from their commitments.

Either way, we shall see.

I'm surprised that you should appeal to the theory dependence of observation.

I can't imagine why. It's obvious that people have a priori assumptions that set what they are prepared to recognize. Those a prioris, though, can be good or bad, depending on whether they're a priori truths or a priori falsehoods. So at the end of the day, it simply moves the debate back one step, to the question, "How good are one's a prioris?" And that's right where the debate definitely needs to go.

Christians overwhelmingly are raised in a Christian tradition, Muslims come mostly from Islamic stock, Hindus Hinduism, Jews Judaism.

That's clearly a gross oversimplification of facts, given that not merely one tradition but many recognize the phenomenon known as "conversion." It's manifest that many people change beliefs, which should not at all be possible if "stock" is determinative of anything.

I think people tend to migrate (or "convert") in two ways: they convert from a false belief to a truer one, or from a true belief to one that is more false. They do the former on things like reason and evidence, including logic, learning and experience, or the latter on the basis of preferring a comforting falsehood to an uncomfortable truth...usually for purely existential motives.

Unless the universe is much more magical than it already appears, our beliefs do not alter what gods may or may not exist.

Quite right. Our beliefs do not alter the existence or non-existence of anything...a salutary reminder not merely for the religious, but for the Atheists, to be sure.

Newton was prepared to see in a certain way; and it turns out he was really onto something important. But Fred Jones, sitting in the same place and contemplating how to pen his latest romance novel would doubtless have felt only irritation that something had hit him on the head.

Newton was prepared to see things in the way advocated by the Royal Society, which, greatly influenced by Francis Bacon, was founded in 1660 with the expressed intention of being a "College for the Promoting of Physico-Mathematical Experimental Learning". Newton was 17 at the time, so again, very much of his time.

Not a victim of "his time," though: his insight was genuinely new, genuinely revelatory. The more important thing to note, though, is that his so-important insight was a product of his scientific orientation. Another person, like a Fred Jones, would have undergone exactly the same revelatory experience and have seen nothing in it.

What we see is very much a product of what we are willing to see...particularly when it comes to recognizing something as "evidence" of something.

If you are determined to see all evidence as the product of God, you are just as biased as anyone determined not to.

That would be so. But one need not be predetermined at all. Like Newton, one can adopt an openness to particular kinds of interpretations, even interpretations that one's esteemed colleagues have never seen, and then choose among the possible explanations that which is the most plausible. That's how we discover things, and how we recognize a phenomenon or piece of data as "telling" in some particular way.

Much depends on one's mental state when one arrives at the experience.

Right. So it turns out that the extra knowledge that you have is deeply personal that you can express, but not actually demonstrate.

Don't worry: you could demonstrate it to yourself, if you were willing.

It is not enough that I am willing to be persuaded. I have instead to will myself to believe something that I am not convinced of; that is the essence of confirmation bias.

But you can fight your bias. Or you can keep it, but open just a crack of doubt, so as to be open to new data and experiences. That's the thing that Atheists struggle with the most: they claim they owe others, and themselves, no data or evidence for their Atheism, and thus, having arbitrarily foreclosed on any question of the existence of God, they're in no position to recognize anything as evidence for God when it appears.

Some modicum of epistemic humility is what is most required for them. It wouldn't require them to abandon their skepticism; but it would require them to be at least, in principle, open to having been wrong. For some reason, they find that a step too far, in most cases. Not all, of course: it was not too far for many former Atheists, from Lewis to Flew; but they find it difficult, it seems.

The "finding of neuroscience" you indicate does not singularly conduce to the conclusion that God is a product of neurology.

No indeed. What it does mean is that there are at least two explanations for your belief in God.

More, I think.

You can't prove the one that you wish to be true,

Oh, I can...but not to you, perhaps. I don't mean merely because of your a priori commitments (although that could indeed be a sticking point), but because much of the really important evidence has to be had experientially. For God is not interested, you see, in convincing skeptics to concede His existence against their wills; He's concerned with producing real and dynamic relationships with the creatures He loves. One does not merely "rationalize" one's way to God; one has to commit. He does not ask much, but He requires at least those things spoken of in Hebrews -- the willingness to believe He might exist, and that He might reward somebody who sought Him. The true skeptic will have neither: he will not believe that God exists, no matter what; and he will not believe that God is good and intends good to Him. In such a case, no relationship can be established, and the evidence is not available.

You see, if God were supplying mere theoretical demonstrationsto outright cynics of His existence, these former "evidences" would actually obviate any felt need for the latter, namely for any personal commitment of attitude toward God; and God wants even skeptics to be saved.

The thesis is not underdetermined. The Atheist is "overdetermined" not to entertain the thesis.

[Skepdick]

If necessitarianism were true; what other choice do we have but to live exactly the way we live?

None.

As I say: if necessitarianism is true, and some of us are compelled to believe we're free wills and are compelled to live as though we were free wills, then some of us would be compelled not only to believe in necessitarianism but would also be compelled to live as necessitarians. None do.

...and...

Each and every necessitarian, no matter where, no matter when, lives his life as a libertarian free will. Not a one naturally, or intentionally, lives as though he were not a libertarian free will.

I haven’t a clue what “living as though…” entails.

I live as though I am alive. I could say stuff about free wills and necessitarianism but those abstractions, words and concepts don’t map onto the living part any differently.

You can justify your decision-making in both languages.

Same sentiment - different words.

[henry quirk]

You can justify your decision-making in both languages.

Same sentiment - different words.

[Skepdick]

You can justify your decision-making in both languages.

Same sentiment - different words.

Both necessitarian and libertarians make choices.

They simply tell different stories/justifications about them.

[Iwannaplato]

Anyway, the point of Nullius in verba is not don't believe anyone, rather it is don't believe anyone who can't back up their claims with experimental evidence.

Well, it would have been nice if you had interacted with my original objection, instead of making a more nuanced claim without interacting at all with it. I didn't claim what you are counterclaiming here. I didn't argue that they must be saying don't believe anyone. Which can been seen in my orginal response to

Take nobody's word for it' the motto of the Royal Society and fundamental to the practise of science.

As for Socrates, you are not the first person to not like him. At his trial, more people thought he should be executed than found him guilty.

I didn't say I didn't like him. I said that there was something that irritates me on this (the claim to know issue). And then explained on what grounds I didn't like this given...well, what I wrote there. So you managed to (pejoratively, I'm not sure) connected me to the people who wished him dead without actually responding to what I wrote as to why I found his statement irritating.

I guess, I'll ignore you and read stuff from people who manage to interact in some way with what I write.

But kudos for reasserting your positions.

[Age]

I have done just that, in my OP. I'm not going to compromise my explanation to suit your laziness or short attention span. I don't do philosophy for the intellectually challenged. We're done here.

You don't do philosophy for the intellectually challenged.
You do philosophy because you are intellectually challenged.

Objective evaluation is just another way to allude to computation.

Which does nothing to address the problem of there existing two (or more) objective evaluators which disagree on the value of the evaluation.

Is the value of "x=x" true; or false?

Some objective evaluators say it's true.
Some objective evaluators say it's false.

LOL 'Some objective evaluators' IS a 'self-contradiction' and 'oxymoron'.

I'd explain the computer science to you, but philosophers are intellectually challenged.

And what are 'you', "skepdick", if NOT a "philosopher"?

Code: Select all

In [1]: class A: pass
In [2]: class B:
   ...:     def __eq__(self, other): return False
   
In [3]: x = A()
In [4]: eval('x == x')
Out[4]: True

In [5]: x = B()
In [6]: eval('x == x')
Out[6]: False

[Age]

If ANY one here would like to define the word 'morality', then I could SHOW and REVEAL HOW and WHY 'morality', itself, can be objective AND subjective.

HOWEVER, for 'those' who BELIEVE that 'morality' can be ONLY 'one' OR 'the other', then 'you' WILL NOT BE ABLE TO LEARN, SEE, and UNDERSTAND this IRREFUTABLE Fact.

[henry quirk]

Both necessitarian and libertarians make choices.

If necessitarianism is true then no one chooses. If necessitarianism is true, why is there the persistent, universal illusion of bein' a free will?

[Skepdick]

If necessitarianism is true then no one chooses.

That's not true. Everybody chooses.

The clash between necessitarianism and libertarianism (and all the other isms) is in the "why?" question.
The clash is in the justification of choices. Why did you do X?

Necessitarianism says: Nature made me do X.
Libertarians say: I made me do it X.

Either way they both did X.

If necessitarianism is true, why is there the persistent, universal illusion of bein' a free will?

Q.E.D. When you ask "Why?" you are asking for justification.

But in the exact same spirit one could ask "If libertarianism is true then why are there necessitarians?"

Because we tell different stories about why we make the choices we make.

You say you are a libertarian and you have free will? I'll come over to your house and threaten your life. Take your stuff. Slap you around even.

Can you choose to do nothing about it? Bet you can't.