What could make morality objective?

[Veritas Aequitas]

• Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework.[3]
  WIKI

Notice how high flow the uncritical metaphorical tides. What is 'the external world', and to what is it external? The expression assumes there is an 'internal world' - but what exactly is an internal world, and why is it a 'world'? This crap has passed intellectual muster for so long that we're numb to it. It's a residual faith, left over from religious belief in the soul.

The subject/object dichotomy itself is simply a way of talking in certain contexts. Yet Kant constructed a whole convoluted philosophy on 'reversing the polarity' of the invented metaphysical distinction - recycling the myth.

And wtf is a conceptual framework, that's also a lens? Why does it mean we can't experience the external world as it really is? Why say the external world must be different from what we experience? Who knows what the external world is really like? Do a dog and a hamster have conceptual frameworks through the lenses of which they also can't experience the external world as it really is? And so on.

Just poke in a pin, and the whole farrago pops.

Note your definition of 'what is fact',
what is fact is a feature of reality that is just-is, being so, that the case, states of affair that is independent of human perception, knowledge, opinions, beliefs, judgment and whatever human conditions [mind, brain, body].
I have argued; PH's What is Fact is Illusory
\viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

As per your definition, your fact or feature of reality exists as absolutely* independent of human conditions [mind, brain, body] -i.e. "mind-independent" - which is supposedly in the external world; example is the moon pre-existing humans and will exists independently even after humans are extinct.
* Why the term absolutely?

Why 'external'? it is because;
"Philosophical Realism" is an Evolutionary Default.
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39975


The internal world - as a matter of contrast - is your inner perception, knowledge, opinions, beliefs, judgment, imaginations, dreams.
This is precisely the fundamental principle of mind-independence within philosophical realism.
You cannot deny the above?

Your absolutely mind-independent is mutually exclusive with there are objective FSK-ed moral facts.

The expression assumes there is an 'internal world' - but what exactly is an internal world, and why is it a 'world'?

My point of "perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework" is to highlight there is such thing as a concept of 'framework' in relation to reality.
In my case, it is a more details representation of reality, i.e. terms of a 'Framework and System of Realization [FSR] and Knowledge [FSR].
This is merely a more complex and encompassing 'model' with emphasis on 'system' and its Framework.

This is the critical basis to the FSR-FSK.
Reality: Emergence & Realization Prior to Perceiving, Knowing & Describing
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=40145

Obviously a dog, cat and a bat has its own Framework and System of Realization of reality but since they are not humans, they do not have a knowledge [JTB] framework and system.

This is why Nagel Thomas raised the philosophical question,
What Is It Like to Be a Bat?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/What_Is_I ... e_a_Bat%3F

[Peter Holmes]

Kant's self-proclaimed Copernican revolution rested on a supposed distinction between phenomena (things-as-they-appear) and noumena (things-as-they-really-are). His argument was that we can never perceive or know noumena, because we have to perceive and know things through our necessarily limited senses and cognitive equipment. In other words, we can have no access to 'the object' or 'reality', but only ever to its appearance for us.

And I think this supposed distinction has haunted western philosophy ever since - to the point where challenging its basis seems grossly heretical. For example, the defensive distinction between so-called indirect realism and direct or naive realism is partly a reaction to the belief that reality-in-itself - the noumenon - must be inaccessible to us.

But wait. If we can never know what reality is really like, we can never know if it's different from the way it appears to us. It could well not be. And I think t's rational to believe that it isn't. For example, the evidence we have for quantum mechanical events is strong evidence for the quantum mechanical nature of reality. More macro descriptions - relativistic and Newtonian - are only trivially descriptions of 'appearances'.

How can we know that reality-in-itself is something we can never know? Or, as VA claims - arguably misunderstanding Kant - that it's an illusion?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Kant's self-proclaimed Copernican revolution rested on a supposed distinction between phenomena (things-as-they-appear) and noumena (things-as-they-really-are). His argument was that we can never perceive or know noumena, because we have to perceive and know things through our necessarily limited senses and cognitive equipment. In other words, we can have no access to 'the object' or 'reality', but only ever to its appearance for us.

And I think this supposed distinction has haunted western philosophy ever since - to the point where challenging its basis seems grossly heretical. For example, the defensive distinction between so-called indirect realism and direct or naive realism is partly a reaction to the belief that reality-in-itself - the noumenon - must be inaccessible to us.

You got is wrong.

Both indirect realism and direct or naive realism believe the absolutely mind-independent reality-in-itself -the noumenon is inaccessible to us.
The difference is, naive realism believe what is perceived in the brain/mind is 100% exactly what the mind-independent reality-in-itself is.
Indirect realism believe in the mind-independent reality-in-itself really exists out there but what is perceived is a corrupted version of it due to the necessary intermediaries between the perception and that-which-is-perceived.
The fundamental principle of an absolutely mind-independent reality-in-itself [noumenon or thing-in-itself] is grounded within philosophical realism [with various subs of p-realism].

On the other hand, ANTI-Philosophical_Realism do not believe there is an absolutely mind-independent reality-in-itself [noumenon or thing-in-itself]; there are many types of ANTI-Philosophical_Realism.
The Kantian ANTI-Philosophical_Realism adopts Empirical Realism as subsumed within Transcendental Idealism; this is relative mind-independence.

This Philosophical Realism versus ANTI-Philosophical_Realism dichotomy or camps had already existed > thousand of years before Western Philosophy, i.e. within Hinduism, Buddhism and others.

In ancient times, philosophical realism [mind-independence] grounds theism where God is held to be absolutely mind-independent to soothe the inherent cognitive dissonances by the majority; this was and is still a critical necessarily psychological undertaking by the majority at present.

However, there was already a minority of enlightened people [e.g. Buddha, and others] who realized the absolute mind-independence of philosophical realism has serious philosophical flaws and cons amidst its pros. But because, they are a minority, they could not influenced the hard core psychological desperate philosophical realists as theists, etc.

The real problem amplified was when Analytic Philosophy adopted Philosophical Realism [mind-independence] aggressively as an ideology and like a fundamentalist religion, where challenging it is grossly heretical, which is still going at present in academia and in this forum.
You cannot deny this.

What Kant did was what the Buddhists and other anti-philosophical realists [>2000 years ago] tried to do, i.e. an attempt to bring greater enlightenments to the masses. But again during Kant's time and even now, the majority are still in the primordial psychological state with the inability to understand and accept Kant's ideas.

I have an Eastern philosophy background grounded on a preference for Buddhist's philosophies which align very well with Kantian philosophical to a great extent.
When I present Buddhist-Kantian ANTI-Philosophical_Realism, I am faced with aggressive hostility [conscious and subliminal] from the grossly heretical philosophical realists in this forum and elsewhere.

But wait. If we can never know what reality is really like, we can never know if it's different from the way it appears to us. It could well not be. And I think t's rational to believe that it isn't. For example, the evidence we have for quantum mechanical events is strong evidence for the quantum mechanical nature of reality. More macro descriptions - relativistic and Newtonian - are only trivially descriptions of 'appearances'.

How can we know that reality-in-itself is something we can never know? Or, as VA claims - arguably misunderstanding Kant - that it's an illusion?

Note I mentioned the BOTTOM-UP versus the TOP-DOWN approach.

Yours is the BOTTOM-UP where you ASSUMEs there is a pre-existing absolutely mind-independent reality of facts out there based on faith.
In this case your bottom-up reality will appear [manifest] upward differently from different conditions to the consciousness.
Thus, what appears must be grounded on THAT-which-appears under different conditions.

My TOP-DOWN approach is based on what-is-experienced [empirical] coupled with high critical thinking and rationality; this avoid empiricism [purely empirical] and rationalism [purely on reason].
Thus what is real is based on a human-based FSK without any ASSUMPTION there is an absolutely mind-independent reality out there.

For the Kantian ANTI-Philosophical Realists, they don't a F... with any absolutely mind-independently out there which is useless except as a psychological crutch to deal with theistic and other philosophical realists' [PH, et. al] cognitive dissonances.
What is TOP-DOWN approach to reality is based on as far as the empirical-rational evidence can go without any damn F... for what is down there at the BOTTOM.

Kantian ANTI-Philosophical Realists can survive comfortably with merely what is empirical-rational evidence without concern they are above a bottomless state.

Ask yourself, what is so critical that there must be an absolutely mind-independent reality out there.
Your concern is seemingly theists imposing their moral oughts of 'no abortion' etc. on you and others.
Rationally, the theists claims of God is groundless, so why the concern for what they are imposing on you and others.
The point is this;
It is Impossible for God to be Real based on ANTI-Philosophical_Realism.
viewtopic.php?t=40229
But you are unable to accept the above, so you are caught in a conundrum because you are stuck with the same philosophical realism as the theists.

Any, as a hardcore Philosophical Realist, it would be better for you to stick with it, for to consider the alternative will trigger severe cold turkey sufferings.

[Wizard22]

Wizard22.

I think it's ironic that you obviously lack the intelligence and self-awareness that you proclaim are necessary for an elite access to moral objectivity. I have no interest in your maunderings about liberalism. In my opinion, you don't know what you're talking about, and I don't want to continue this conversation. But thanks, anyway.

So it seems you don't care about what could make morality objective then, after all.

Kant's self-proclaimed Copernican revolution rested on a supposed distinction between phenomena (things-as-they-appear) and noumena (things-as-they-really-are). His argument was that we can never perceive or know noumena, because we have to perceive and know things through our necessarily limited senses and cognitive equipment. In other words, we can have no access to 'the object' or 'reality', but only ever to its appearance for us.

And I think this supposed distinction has haunted western philosophy ever since - to the point where challenging its basis seems grossly heretical. For example, the defensive distinction between so-called indirect realism and direct or naive realism is partly a reaction to the belief that reality-in-itself - the noumenon - must be inaccessible to us.

But wait. If we can never know what reality is really like, we can never know if it's different from the way it appears to us. It could well not be. And I think t's rational to believe that it isn't. For example, the evidence we have for quantum mechanical events is strong evidence for the quantum mechanical nature of reality. More macro descriptions - relativistic and Newtonian - are only trivially descriptions of 'appearances'.

How can we know that reality-in-itself is something we can never know? Or, as VA claims - arguably misunderstanding Kant - that it's an illusion?

Since you won't listen to me, you should listen to VA.

[Peter Holmes]

Wizard22.

I think it's ironic that you obviously lack the intelligence and self-awareness that you proclaim are necessary for an elite access to moral objectivity. I have no interest in your maunderings about liberalism. In my opinion, you don't know what you're talking about, and I don't want to continue this conversation. But thanks, anyway.

So it seems you don't care about what could make morality objective then, after all.

Kant's self-proclaimed Copernican revolution rested on a supposed distinction between phenomena (things-as-they-appear) and noumena (things-as-they-really-are). His argument was that we can never perceive or know noumena, because we have to perceive and know things through our necessarily limited senses and cognitive equipment. In other words, we can have no access to 'the object' or 'reality', but only ever to its appearance for us.

And I think this supposed distinction has haunted western philosophy ever since - to the point where challenging its basis seems grossly heretical. For example, the defensive distinction between so-called indirect realism and direct or naive realism is partly a reaction to the belief that reality-in-itself - the noumenon - must be inaccessible to us.

But wait. If we can never know what reality is really like, we can never know if it's different from the way it appears to us. It could well not be. And I think t's rational to believe that it isn't. For example, the evidence we have for quantum mechanical events is strong evidence for the quantum mechanical nature of reality. More macro descriptions - relativistic and Newtonian - are only trivially descriptions of 'appearances'.

How can we know that reality-in-itself is something we can never know? Or, as VA claims - arguably misunderstanding Kant - that it's an illusion?

Since you won't listen to me, you should listen to VA.

I do care about what could make morality objective, hence the OP. And your offer makes no sense.

[Wizard22]

I do care about what could make morality objective, hence the OP. And your offer makes no sense.

If you cared, then you wouldn't ignore what could make morality objective.

[Peter Holmes]

I do care about what could make morality objective, hence the OP. And your offer makes no sense.

If you cared, then you wouldn't ignore what could make morality objective.

I won't ignore a rational suggestion. Make one - preferably as simply and clearly as you can. Boil down your waffle to sharp premises and a conclusion that you think follows. Then we can talk about it.

[Wizard22]

Examine the lifestyle of a Master, and his or her Slave.

What is wrong about it? What is wrong about being Superior, Lording over an Inferior? Do humans have moral quandaries of a human housing and owning a domesticated Canine or Feline? Do you have a problem with being Master over a dog or cat? How about children? Is a parent, not a Master over his or her own children? So what's the difference, of the Master-Slave dynamic, than or compared to, owning a pet or "having" a child? Let's begin with the obvious, there is a difference of status and reputation. A Slave is a Servant. The Servant is supposed to put the Master's desires and needs, before his/her own.

And I think this is where the real 'moral' dilemma begins.

[Peter Holmes]

Examine the lifestyle of a Master, and his or her Slave.

What is wrong about it? What is wrong about being Superior, Lording over an Inferior? Do humans have moral quandaries of a human housing and owning a domesticated Canine or Feline? Do you have a problem with being Master over a dog or cat? How about children? Is a parent, not a Master over his or her own children? So what's the difference, of the Master-Slave dynamic, than or compared to, owning a pet or "having" a child? Let's begin with the obvious, there is a difference of status and reputation. A Slave is a Servant. The Servant is supposed to put the Master's desires and needs, before his/her own.

And I think this is where the real 'moral' dilemma begins.

That's not an argument, with premises and a conclusion. It's a list of questions, followed by a banal factual assertion: there are differences of status and reputation between people. But so what? What moral point are you making? Perhaps you're saying it's obvious that this inequality is morally wrong. But if so, that's just a moral opinion, which is subjective - like all moral opinions.

If I try to extract an argument from this, I may well straw man you. So let's save time. Work out what you're asserting - your premises - and produce your conclusion.

[Wizard22]

That's not an argument, with premises and a conclusion. It's a list of questions, followed by a banal factual assertion: there are differences of status and reputation between people. But so what? What moral point are you making? Perhaps you're saying it's obvious that this inequality is morally wrong. But if so, that's just a moral opinion, which is subjective - like all moral opinions.

If I try to extract an argument from this, I may well straw man you. So let's save time. Work out what you're asserting - your premises - and produce your conclusion.

But this assumes that there is indeed something to be known: an object of some kind that verifies the assertion slavery is wrong and falsifies the assertion slavery is right - or, perhaps, vice versa. But what is the object that makes moral judgements objective - matters of fact - and therefore true or false?

It can't be slavery itself, because that would also be the object of the assertion slavery is right - so we're back to square one. And it can't be the wrongness of slavery. To say the assertion slavery is wrong is justified (shown to be true) by the objective wrongness of slavery is circular, and so no justification at all.

It seems you've forgotten your OP by now, can't say I blame you, seeing as you made this thread 5 years ago?

Yet you haven't learned anything about objective morality??

[Wizard22]

At least, in your OP, you seem to understand a simple point:

Objects, are "Facts", while
Subjects, are merely opinions.

Yet people do not treat subjects with Authority, like your Prime Minister, or the President of the United States, as-if their dictates were mere opinion. Authority and political power change the context. They make opinions real. They make opinions...factual. Because executive decisions, are made on behalf of those "opinions". Hence this is how morality moves between "objective fact" and "subjective opinion".

...from executive, authoritative, decisions.

[Peter Holmes]

That's not an argument, with premises and a conclusion. It's a list of questions, followed by a banal factual assertion: there are differences of status and reputation between people. But so what? What moral point are you making? Perhaps you're saying it's obvious that this inequality is morally wrong. But if so, that's just a moral opinion, which is subjective - like all moral opinions.

If I try to extract an argument from this, I may well straw man you. So let's save time. Work out what you're asserting - your premises - and produce your conclusion.

But this assumes that there is indeed something to be known: an object of some kind that verifies the assertion slavery is wrong and falsifies the assertion slavery is right - or, perhaps, vice versa. But what is the object that makes moral judgements objective - matters of fact - and therefore true or false?

It can't be slavery itself, because that would also be the object of the assertion slavery is right - so we're back to square one. And it can't be the wrongness of slavery. To say the assertion slavery is wrong is justified (shown to be true) by the objective wrongness of slavery is circular, and so no justification at all.

It seems you've forgotten your OP by now, can't say I blame you, seeing as you made this thread 5 years ago?

Yet you haven't learned anything about objective morality??

Don't flirt. produce your valid and sound argument for objective morality - the existence of moral facts - with premises and a conclusion. Until you do, we can't have a discussion.

[Wizard22]

If you're going to ignore everything written to you, and not read responses to your own thread, then there's not much to be done.

I fear you'll waste another 5 years in this thread. You have to...you know, actually open your mind, and at least listen to what others tell you, right?

[Peter Holmes]

If you're going to ignore everything written to you, and not read responses to your own thread, then there's not much to be done.

I fear you'll waste another 5 years in this thread. You have to...you know, actually open your mind, and at least listen to what others tell you, right?

Waste of time.

[Wizard22]

Waste of time.

Agreed.

Your conclusion is already formed, and nobody else will ever change that.

You are not here to learn. You are here to instruct.