compatibilism

[phyllo]

It comes down to this :

I don't see free-will Mary making any different decisions than determined Mary.

Which according to Iambiguous is preposterous because free-will Mary gives birth and determined Mary aborts. QED

[iambiguous]

Huh?

Hell, you and I are discussing it here, aren't we?

You don't want to discuss the bifurcated brain with FJ.

Again -- click -- that's bullshit. I have discussed how I construe "being of two minds" here with him. It's just that my assessment is deemed inadmissible because it is not in sync with his own "serious philosopher" assessment of compatibilism. I won't go up into the intellectual clouds with him to be straightened out before discussing it in regard to this:

[Compatibilists] believe what they do only because they were never able not to believe it. So, compatibilists reconcile an inevitable, wholly determined abortion with moral responsibility but only because every single component of their brain, in sync with the laws of matter, compels them to? Is that what they are concluding? Not that moral responsibility actually is reconcilable with determinism, but that the compatibilists thinking that it is is?

It simply makes no sense to me "here and now" that if Mary was unable not to abort her unborn baby, that she can still be held morally responsible for doing so. Unless, when someone does hold her morally responsible, they do so, in turn, only because they were never able not to...in a world where all of our brains are entirely in sync with the laws of matter. And thus everything that we think and feel and say and do is but an inherent, necessary manifestation of the only possible reality.

Then "the gap" and "Rummy's Rule" in regard to grasping how the human condition fits into the ontological -- teleological? -- understanding of the existence of existence itself.

As for what you're doing with me ...

It's the usual. You're just repeating your ideas about determinism, compatibilism and free-will. Free-will Mary has some sort of magic "volition" which lets her do things which determined Mary can't do. You don't explain it in any rational way.

Uh, define "rational". Though, from my own frame of mind, it's the "usual" alright.

But how about this:

We make it unusual. You explain to me how you do connect the dots between God and religion and morality and free will.

Given my argument that, with God, discussions of both are very, very different from discussions without them.

I give you opportunities to make it clear and I get this in response:

Why?!

Yo, Jane! You explain it to him!!

Exactly! Since my whole point revolves around the fact that there is no possibility at all of Jane even being around if her mother is compelled by her brain to both want to abort her and to want to want to abort her.

Just imagine your own mother not only wanting to abort you but not being able to not want to.

[Flannel Jesus]

It comes down to this :

I don't see free-will Mary making any different decisions than determined Mary.

Which according to Iambiguous is preposterous because free-will Mary gives birth and determined Mary aborts. QED

I think it's definitely puzzling that, in a thread titled "compatibilism", the op takes it for granted that free will mary has a type of free will that is not a compatibilist type. I can't really make sense of it, other than to point out once again that it seems iambiguous has not yet even tried to understand what compatibilism is. I'd like him to try, that would be nice to see.

[iambiguous]

ME:

On the other hand, if, say, you believe in God and God installed free will in your soul the very moment you were conceived, then you'd have the capacity to freely listen to your friend's argument and decide that no, now you don't want to abort the baby/clump of cells in your womb.

Unless, perhaps, this God of yours is omniscient? Then you'd have to figure how to reconcile free will with an all-knowing God. Call it a miracle?

God can be left out of it for the time being.

On the contrary, for someone -- anyone -- who does believe in God, either his or her God did impart free will in them at the point of conception or He did not. As with morality, the existence of God changes everything.

And maybe, just maybe one day, in regard to both, you will be willing to encompass your own convictions here.

Given particular contexts, of course.

That's because given the manner in which I understand determinism, if Mary is talked out of it in a wholly determined universe where the human brain is itself, like all other matter, in thrall to the laws of matter, her friend was no less compelled to talk her out of it. The unborn baby joins the rest of us out of the womb. But in a free will world where the friend was able of her own volition to think up the argument, and the argument failed to convince Mary, the baby is aborted.

Okay, so you now agree that Mary could have an abortion in a free-will world and Mary could avoid an abortion in a determined world.
That's progress.

Again, you have your distinction here and I have been. I'd just love to be around when you explain to Jane that had her mother been compelled to abort her, well, what's the difference?

Also, I am willing to admit that your own distinction here may well be more reasonable than mine...going back to how the human condition itself fits into the definitive explanation for why anything exists at all. Are you willing to say the same regarding my own distinction.

Flannel Jesus and iwannaplato: same question.

No, I think that whatever is said to Mary, if it is said to her because there was no possibility of it not being said to her then that is in sync with a world where there was never the possibility of her not having the abortion.

What??
So you don't agree with the above??

No, again, I make a different distinction between Jane in a world where her mother's brain compels her to abort her and Jane in a world where her mother's friend, of her own volition, was successful in convincing Mary to, of her own volition, not abort Jane.

Again, under determinism as some understand it, she does what she wants but she could not want what she wanted. Her brain was wholly in command there.

You repeat this again.

Yeah, and that's because "here and now" -- click -- it still makes sense to me.

You repeat it as if someone is disagreeing with it. As if it's something remarkable.

Again, let's discuss this with Jane. Her mother wanted to abort her in a world where her mother was never able not to want to abort her. But here she is. Why? Because in a free will world her mother of her own volition was convinced to give birth to her.

Note to others:

Again, all I can say is that his argument here is to me nothing short of preposterous. But maybe not. So, in your own words, in regard to Mary and Jane, try to explain his point in another way.

In a free will world as I understand it, Mary can of her own volition come into a forum like this and explore all of the different -- and ofttimes conflicting -- assessments of human autonomy. Like me, she might end up changing her mind about it. In a determined world as I understand it, however, from the cradle to the grave everything that we think, feel say or do in regard to this "going-back-to-the-pre-Socratics" philosophical quandary unfolds in the only possible reality.

That's not a dichotomy.

In a determined world, Mary might come into a forum and read something that makes her change her mind.

In a free-will world, once something happens it becomes the "only possible reality". There are no do-overs.

Back to the "stuck" part again. In a determined world as i understand it [perhaps incorrectly], there is no "might" here. Mary is either wholly determined to come here or she is wholly determined not to come here. Whereas in a free will world as I understand it [perhaps incorrectly], Mary might opt to come here having opted up until that point to abort Jane. But then she comes upon an argument from another member who opted of her own free will to come here that convinces Mary not to abort Jane. Jane comes of age and discovers philosophy. She thinks, "hmm, only in a free will world am I even around at all!"

Unless, of course, I'm wrong. So, going back to the manner in which ontologically -- and teleologically? -- the human condition does fit into a definitive understanding of the existence of existence itself, how do we go about pinning that down? How about you, Mr. Objectivist? How about you, Mr. Serious Philosopher?

From my frame of mind there is an enormous difference between having and not having free will. Between wanting the things we do because we opted to want them and our brains compelling us to want only what we are ever able to want.

So how does someone with free-will "opt to want" something if they have the same experiences as someone who has no libertarian free-will?

My point is that in a wholly determined universe where human brains compel human beings -- all of them -- to think, feel, say and do only that which they were ever able to think, feel, say and do, their experiences will become just so many dominoes in thrall to the laws of matter. Whereas in a free will universe those personal experiences are, instead, rooted existentially in ever evolving historical and cultural and experiential contexts in a world awash in contingency, chance and change. And factoring in the profoundly problematic implications of the Benjamin Button Syndrome.

Surely to opt for something different than the non-free person, they would have to have some extra knowledge or experience. They would need another reason for picking a different want. Otherwise they would have the same wants.

The wholly determined individuals may appear to be opting to those aliens hovering above Earth in the free will sector of the universe, but they know that what they "opt" for they were never able not to opt for. All of their knowledge and experiences are but inherent, necessary components of the only possible reality.

The autonomous individuals....? Well, their options are the real deal. I merely make a distinction between opting in the either/or world and opting in the is/ought world. The role that dasein plays here.

What you're saying is that a non-free person has experiences A,B and C. As a result, his brain makes him want X.

And a free-will person has experiences A,B and C. But he wants Z.

Why would that happen?

(These people are identical except one has free-will and the other doesn't, for the sake of argument.)

Why?!

Yo, Jane! You explain it to him!!

HIM:

It comes down to this :

I don't see free-will Mary making any different decisions than determined Mary.

Which according to Iambiguous is preposterous because free-will Mary gives birth and determined Mary aborts. QED

QED? You tell me.

[phyllo]

It comes down to this :

I don't see free-will Mary making any different decisions than determined Mary.

Which according to Iambiguous is preposterous because free-will Mary gives birth and determined Mary aborts. QED

I think it's definitely puzzling that, in a thread titled "compatibilism", the op takes it for granted that free will mary has a type of free will that is not a compatibilist type. I can't really make sense of it, other than to point out once again that it seems iambiguous has not yet even tried to understand what compatibilism is. I'd like him to try, that would be nice to see.

He has only one concept of free-will. It's free of the "laws of nature".

That's why he has to bifurcate the brain.

[Iwannaplato]

It comes down to this :

I don't see free-will Mary making any different decisions than determined Mary.

Which according to Iambiguous is preposterous because free-will Mary gives birth and determined Mary aborts. QED

I think it's definitely puzzling that, in a thread titled "compatibilism", the op takes it for granted that free will mary has a type of free will that is not a compatibilist type. I can't really make sense of it, other than to point out once again that it seems iambiguous has not yet even tried to understand what compatibilism is. I'd like him to try, that would be nice to see.

He has only one concept of free-will. It's free of the "laws of nature".

That's why he has to bifurcate the brain.

It's an odd reference since this usually refers to the two hemispheres of the brain and certainly no compatibilst thinks that, say, the left hemisphere has free will and the right one is determined.

[iambiguous]

It comes down to this :

I don't see free-will Mary making any different decisions than determined Mary.

Which according to Iambiguous is preposterous because free-will Mary gives birth and determined Mary aborts. QED

I think it's definitely puzzling that, in a thread titled "compatibilism", the op takes it for granted that free will mary has a type of free will that is not a compatibilist type. I can't really make sense of it, other than to point out once again that it seems iambiguous has not yet even tried to understand what compatibilism is. I'd like him to try, that would be nice to see.

No, the OP is no less embedded in the philosophical quandary here going all the back to the pre-Socratics in the West.

If my brain does wholly compel me to post the OP then how, Mr. Compatibilist, would you go about demonstrating that I am still responsible for posting it? Unless of course in demonstrating it, you are no less compelled by your brain to do that as well.

You know, given the gap between what any of us think "here and now" about all of this and what we do not fully understand about this:

All of this going back to how the matter we call the human brain was "somehow" able to acquire autonomy when non-living matter "somehow" became living matter "somehow" became conscious matter "somehow" became self-conscious matter.

Then this part:

I concede that flannel jesus -- Mr. Wiggle -- has a greater philosophical understanding of compatibilism than I do. I invite him therefore to take this far more sophisticated understanding down out of the technical clouds and intertwine it into his reaction to this:

[Compatibilists] believe what they do only because they were never able not to believe it. So, compatibilists reconcile an inevitable, wholly determined abortion with moral responsibility but only because every single component of their brain, in sync with the laws of matter, compels them to? Is that what they are concluding? Not that moral responsibility actually is reconcilable with determinism, but that the compatibilists thinking that it is is?

It simply makes no sense to me "here and now" that if Mary was unable not to abort her unborn baby, that she can still be held morally responsible for doing so. Unless, when someone does hold her morally responsible, they do so, in turn, only because they were never able not to...in a world where all of our brains are entirely in sync with the laws of matter. And thus everything that we think and feel and say and do is but an inherent, necessary manifestation of the only possible reality.

Then "the gap" and "Rummy's Rule" in regard to grasping how the human condition fits into the ontological -- teleological? -- understanding of the existence of existence itself.

[iambiguous]

It comes down to this :

I don't see free-will Mary making any different decisions than determined Mary.

Which according to Iambiguous is preposterous because free-will Mary gives birth and determined Mary aborts. QED

I think it's definitely puzzling that, in a thread titled "compatibilism", the op takes it for granted that free will mary has a type of free will that is not a compatibilist type. I can't really make sense of it, other than to point out once again that it seems iambiguous has not yet even tried to understand what compatibilism is. I'd like him to try, that would be nice to see.

He has only one concept of free-will. It's free of the "laws of nature".

That's why he has to bifurcate the brain.

Of course, in both the philosophical and the scientific communities, the quandary [going back now thousands of years] revolves precisely around the fact that we have a brain that is matter but matter like no other matter. So, in being like no other matter, is it matter that "somehow" acquired free will?

Maybe.

But if "somehow" it did, it makes all the difference in the world to Jane. Why? Because in a world where the human brain is such that it wholly compelled her mother to both want to abort her and want to want to abort her, she's in sync now only with oblivion.

But here she is among us.

Okay, Mr. Serious Philosopher, Mr. Compatibilist, what do you make if that? Deduce the most rational explanation.

Next up: Mr. Theologian. Phyllo, perhaps? How does God and religion factor into all of this for him?

[Flannel Jesus]

I concede that flannel jesus -- Mr. Wiggle -- has a greater philosophical understanding of compatibilism than I do.

As gracious as this concession is, it's not what I'm looking for. I'd much prefer you to leave this conversation understanding that compatibilism is not about making exceptions for determinism inside human brains.

I invite him therefore to take this far more sophisticated understanding down out of the technical clouds and intertwine it into his reaction to this:

[Compatibilists] believe what they do only because they were never able not to believe it. So, compatibilists reconcile an inevitable, wholly determined abortion with moral responsibility but only because every single component of their brain, in sync with the laws of matter, compels them to? Is that what they are concluding? Not that moral responsibility actually is reconcilable with determinism, but that the compatibilists thinking that it is is?

It simply makes no sense to me "here and now" that if Mary was unable not to abort her unborn baby, that she can still be held morally responsible for doing so. Unless, when someone does hold her morally responsible, they do so, in turn, only because they were never able not to...in a world where all of our brains are entirely in sync with the laws of matter. And thus everything that we think and feel and say and do is but an inherent, necessary manifestation of the only possible reality.

Then "the gap" and "Rummy's Rule" in regard to grasping how the human condition fits into the ontological -- teleological? -- understanding of the existence of existence itself.

You've said quite a lot there, and I really don't know how to reply to all of that - I'm much better at replying to very focused posts and questions. In that vein, I'll pick out the most highlighted part of the above text and just imagine that this is the question you want me to focus on:

Is that what they are concluding? Not that moral responsibility actually is reconcilable with determinism, but that the compatibilists thinking that it is is?

You're asking, are compatibilists concluding that compatibilists think that responsibility is reconcilable with determinism, but compatibilists are not concluding that moral responsibility actually is reconcilable with determinism?

If so, I don't really understand that question. Surely if compatibilists conclude that they think it's reconciliable with determinism, then compatibilists have also concluded that it actually is reconcilable with determinism.

Can you explain what the difference is here? What's the difference between a compatibilist who says "I conclude that I think that responsibility is reconcilable with determinism" vs a compatibilist who says "I conclude that responsibility is actually compatible with determinism"? To me, both of those compatibilists are saying the same thing, I'm having a hard time understanding why there's a difference here for you, one that you think is worth highlighting and focusing on.

[popeye1945]

Does not the lack of free will in the evolutionary sense register? Knowing all organisms are adapted through mutation, death, and the physical world as cause to all reactionary organisms, makes this a no-brainer? All subjects, all organisms are reactionary to the physical world as cause, the organism's reaction in turn is cause to the physical world in affecting its change. It simply has to be human arrogance that would lead him/her to believe they can act, and act independently of the other half of reality. The relation of subject and object, the physical world and the organism. Relation/relativity makes you one with your apparent reality, only half of your brain is encased in your skull the other half is the physical world as object. One can never be independent from the other, and you react to the greater reality of the physical world, it is the fuel of the mind. There is no such thing as human action, there is but human reaction and this is true of all organisms. You can affect cause on the physical world but only through your reactions to her/mother earth. You are part of something larger than yourself, that larger something governs your entire being as you evolve with it. You have at best a choice of reactions in the moment, if you fail to react, to not respond through intent, that to is a reaction to your environment. There is one thing you cannot do in this life, and that is, you cannot, not react, that is what being is. So, logically, being is determined to be a thing of change and in sink with the physical world. If your reactions are totally at odds with the nature of the world in the here and now, you will perish, and from the gene pool be removed. You're not in charge, the cosmos rules.

[phyllo]

You're asking, are compatibilists concluding that compatibilists think that responsibility is reconcilable with determinism, but compatibilists are not concluding that moral responsibility actually is reconcilable with determinism?

If so, I don't really understand that question. Surely if compatibilists conclude that they think it's reconciliable with determinism, then compatibilists have also concluded that it actually is reconcilable with determinism.

Can you explain what the difference is here? What's the difference between a compatibilist who says "I conclude that I think that responsibility is reconcilable with determinism" vs a compatibilist who says "I conclude that responsibility is actually compatible with determinism"? To me, both of those compatibilists are saying the same thing, I'm having a hard time understanding why there's a difference here for you, one that you think is worth highlighting and focusing on.

It's his basic idea that the brain and "laws of nature" compel everything that determinists and compatibilists think.

And therefore, all thoughts and ideas are equivalent and meaningless. True and false mean nothing. Reasoning is no different than non-reasoning.

Because there is no control over it.

[Iwannaplato]

It's his basic idea that the brain and "laws of nature" compel everything that determinists and compatibilists think.

And therefore, all thoughts and ideas are equivalent and meaningless. True and false mean nothing. Reasoning is no different than non-reasoning.

Because there is no control over it.

It's not a ridiculous 'criticism' but it undermines itself. But you know someone is committed to this when they pee in the kitchen and cook in the toilet.

[phyllo]

It terminates a discussion, since there is no true/false evaluation to anything that is said. All is babble.

[iambiguous]

I concede that flannel jesus -- Mr. Wiggle -- has a greater philosophical understanding of compatibilism than I do.

As gracious as this concession is, it's not what I'm looking for. I'd much prefer you to leave this conversation understanding that compatibilism is not about making exceptions for determinism inside human brains.

On the other hand, some determinists will insist, they would rather have you leave the conversation understanding that what you tell them compatibilism is all about is but an inherent and necessary manifestation of your brain compelling you to tell them that. Just as my brain compels me to post this.

I invite him therefore to take this far more sophisticated understanding down out of the technical clouds and intertwine it into his reaction to this:

[Compatibilists] believe what they do only because they were never able not to believe it. So, compatibilists reconcile an inevitable, wholly determined abortion with moral responsibility but only because every single component of their brain, in sync with the laws of matter, compels them to? Is that what they are concluding? Not that moral responsibility actually is reconcilable with determinism, but that the compatibilists thinking that it is is?

It simply makes no sense to me "here and now" that if Mary was unable not to abort her unborn baby, that she can still be held morally responsible for doing so. Unless, when someone does hold her morally responsible, they do so, in turn, only because they were never able not to...in a world where all of our brains are entirely in sync with the laws of matter. And thus everything that we think and feel and say and do is but an inherent, necessary manifestation of the only possible reality.

Then "the gap" and "Rummy's Rule" in regard to grasping how the human condition fits into the ontological -- teleological? -- understanding of the existence of existence itself.

You've said quite a lot there, and I really don't know how to reply to all of that - I'm much better at replying to very focused posts and questions. In that vein, I'll pick out the most highlighted part of the above text and just imagine that this is the question you want me to focus on:

Is that what they are concluding? Not that moral responsibility actually is reconcilable with determinism, but that the compatibilists thinking that it is is?

You're asking, are compatibilists concluding that compatibilists think that responsibility is reconcilable with determinism, but compatibilists are not concluding that moral responsibility actually is reconcilable with determinism?

Click. I'm asking them to tell me if the voters here -- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7gY20_InCKs -- are compelled by their brains to vote only as they must vote? And if they are so compelled by their brains "beyond their control" and the outcome is what it turns out to be -- because there was never any possibility of it turning out otherwise -- can those on the other side hold them responsible for voting as they did even though they were not ble to vote any other way? And, if they do hold them responsible, is that too only because their brains compelled them to hold the other side responsible?

If so, I don't really understand that question. Surely if compatibilists conclude that they think it's reconciliable with determinism, then compatibilists have also concluded that it actually is reconcilable with determinism.

Again, from my frame of mind "here and now", if the compatibilists conclude that moral responsibility is reconcilable with determinism not only because they want to conclude this but because they were never able to not want to conclude this, then what they conclude becomes an inherent manifestation of the only possible reality. They may say it's reconcilable but that is only because they were never able not to say otherwise. Thus everything that we think, feel, say and do is but an intrinsic component of the laws of matter. That includes all of the voters in Ohio. The whole voting process itself reflects merely the psychological illusion of autonomous votes because human psychology itself is an inherent and necessary component of the laws of matter.

Depending of course on whether or not -- God or No God -- human brain matter "somehow" acquired free will when non-biological matter itself "somehow" evolved into biological matter on Earth evolved into conscious biological matter evolved into us.

Can you explain what the difference is here? What's the difference between a compatibilist who says "I conclude that I think that responsibility is reconcilable with determinism" vs a compatibilist who says "I conclude that responsibility is actually compatible with determinism"? To me, both of those compatibilists are saying the same thing, I'm having a hard time understanding why there's a difference here for you, one that you think is worth highlighting and focusing on.

if the compatibilists' brains are compelling them to think as they must what difference does it make what they think? There was no possibility of them thinking other than how they must think.

It's just that mere mortals do not possess the capacity -- philosophically, scientifically or theologically -- to pin this down such that we know what the objective truth is here. That would involve the brain itself explaining itself 13 to 14 billion years after matter supposedly came into existence in the first place if you believe in the Big Bang.

Unless, of course, I'm wrong. But what on Earth does it mean to be either eight or wrong here given both The Gap and Rummy's Rule?

[iambiguous]

It's his basic idea that the brain and "laws of nature" compel everything that determinists and compatibilists think.

And therefore, all thoughts and ideas are equivalent and meaningless. True and false mean nothing. Reasoning is no different than non-reasoning.

Because there is no control over it.

Yes, essentially, in a No God world where nature itself is wholly responsible for everything we think and feel and say and do here on planet Earth, well, doesn't everything unfold in the only possible reality?

Then back to those aliens in the hypothetical free will sector of the universe observing us interacting down here in such a way that we really do think that we have at least some measure of control over what we think and feel and say and do. Only the autonomous aliens know that this reflects but the psychological illusion of free will because "somehow" human psychology itself is but an inherent manifestation of the only possible world.

It's like in our dreams when we think that we are behaving autonomously only to wake up and realize that everything we "thought", "felt" "said" and "did" in the dream was entirely concocted by the brain.

Or when we watch a movie and the characters up on the screen seem to think and feel and say and do things of their own volition...only it's all entirely in sync with what the screenwriter and the director are telling them to think and feel and say and do.

It terminates a discussion, since there is no true/false evaluation to anything that is said. All is babble.

No, our discussions continue. And they are hardly construed by us to be babble. Same with the discussions I have with others in my dreams. They are by and large entirely coherent.