What could make morality objective?

[Skepdick]

By contrast, his sidekick, dick-for-brains, tries to subvert the distinction between facts and opinions, with the aim of establishing that there are moral facts. (Face palm.)

I am not subverting it.

I am merely pointing out you are utterly confused about where the dividing line between facts and opinions lies leading you to commit repetitive category errors.

In fact, you are so confused about the entire thing you are committing 2nd order category errors.

What you call a category error is NOT a category error; and what you don't call a category error is a category error.

You are categorically wrong about your category error claims.

Does anyone have a more rational argument for moral objectivity? (Theistic moral objectivists need not bother.)

Yes, I gave you one. And you rejected its soundness. Given the argument below you don't think the premises are true. Crazy!

P1. Murder is wrong.
P2. Murder is wrong.
C. Murder is wrong.

[Harbal]

VA's premise is moral: we should avoid evil by promoting its related good. But VA then claims this is a factual conclusion, from factual premises - so that morality is objective. (Face palm.)

By contrast, his sidekick, dick-for-brains, tries to subvert the distinction between facts and opinions, with the aim of establishing that there are moral facts. (Face palm.)

Does anyone have a more rational argument for moral objectivity? (Theistic moral objectivists need not bother.)

We feel things to be morally right or wrong, which also means it feels like these things are objectively right or wrong; otherwise our moral sense would have significantly less motivational power. It is necessary that we feel there are objective moral truths when we are out in the real world, interacting with other human beings. But this is a philosophy site, and philosophical thinking is supposed to be different to every day, just-going-about-my-life thinking. I don't know where some people think moral truths come from, or where they might be stored for us to reference them.

[Peter Holmes]

VA's premise is moral: we should avoid evil by promoting its related good. But VA then claims this is a factual conclusion, from factual premises - so that morality is objective. (Face palm.)

By contrast, his sidekick, dick-for-brains, tries to subvert the distinction between facts and opinions, with the aim of establishing that there are moral facts. (Face palm.)

Does anyone have a more rational argument for moral objectivity? (Theistic moral objectivists need not bother.)

We feel things to be morally right or wrong, which also means it feels like these things are objectively right or wrong; otherwise our moral sense would have significantly less motivational power. It is necessary that we feel there are objective moral truths when we are out in the real world, interacting with other human beings. But this is a philosophy site, and philosophical thinking is supposed to be different to every day, just-going-about-my-life thinking. I don't know where some people think moral truths come from, or where they might be stored for us to reference them.

I think you're right. We think our moral opinions are facts, because we usually care about them deeply, and we apply them universally. So if we think slavery is morally wrong (as I do), then we think it always was and will be morally wrong, everywhere. It would be morally inconsistent to think otherwise. (Btw, this is one reason why I think the buybull - OT and NT - is morally disgusting.)

Thinking there are moral facts - that morality is objective - is an understandable misunderstanding. Moral objectivism is a delusion that its faithful have to rationalise - as do some of our colleagues here.

[Harbal]

VA's premise is moral: we should avoid evil by promoting its related good. But VA then claims this is a factual conclusion, from factual premises - so that morality is objective. (Face palm.)

By contrast, his sidekick, dick-for-brains, tries to subvert the distinction between facts and opinions, with the aim of establishing that there are moral facts. (Face palm.)

Does anyone have a more rational argument for moral objectivity? (Theistic moral objectivists need not bother.)

We feel things to be morally right or wrong, which also means it feels like these things are objectively right or wrong; otherwise our moral sense would have significantly less motivational power. It is necessary that we feel there are objective moral truths when we are out in the real world, interacting with other human beings. But this is a philosophy site, and philosophical thinking is supposed to be different to every day, just-going-about-my-life thinking. I don't know where some people think moral truths come from, or where they might be stored for us to reference them.

I think you're right. We think our moral opinions are facts, because we usually care about them deeply, and we apply them universally. So if we think slavery is morally wrong (as I do), then we think it always was and will be morally wrong, everywhere. It would be morally inconsistent to think otherwise. (Btw, this is one reason why I think the buybull - OT and NT - is morally disgusting.)

Thinking there are moral facts - that morality is objective - is an understandable misunderstanding. Moral objectivism is a delusion that its faithful have to rationalise - as do some of our colleagues here.

And the thing is; knowing there are no facts out in the world that our moral sense references does not lessen its influence on our conduct, or at least I find it so. Just as knowing music is no more than organised noise doesn't prevent me from loving some of it and loathing some of it. And there being no such thing as objective funniness does not make me less inclined to laugh at some things. In fact, I find it makes them seem funnier.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Why?
What wrong with comparing 'absolute to relative' in the context I am using?
As usual, you will do your handwaving drills.

It's incoherent because, since there's no non-physical mind, talk of mind-dependence or 'not-mind-independence' makes no sense. And meanwhile, the claim that reality is not independent from human brains is ridiculous.

Strawman again, a "100 million" times.
Note this thread I raised,
"Not Mind-Independent" is not equal to "Mind-Dependent"
viewtopic.php?t=40562
Meaning, reality is somehow related, connected and entangled with the human conditions [mind, brain and body].
I have explained this on the basis of Empirical Realism as subsumed within Transcendental Idealism.

It makes no sense and is ridiculous to you because you [its pathetic] don't have the capacity for deeper reflective thinking to grasp its principle, thus limiting your use of its potential for humanity's progress.

So you resort to the claim that, since everything in the universe is physical, humans are 'part and parcel of', and not independent from, the universe - from reality - as though that's a profound and meaningful insight. It isn't.

It is isn't to you because you don't have the capacity for deeper reflective thinking to grasp its principle, thus limiting your use of its potential for humanity's progress.

You want, and claim to have, empirical evidence for your moral theory. But the main evidence you cite is from neuroscience, which investigates neuronal physiology and says exactly nothing about morality.

To solve this problem, you've invented a 'morality-proper framework and system of knowledge', which is laughable. Its premise is that we should avoid evil and promote good - suitably defined - which is an unexceptional moral opinion, and therefore subjective.

The basis is your 'what is fact' in this case is that of Philosophical Realism which is grounded on an illusion.
You are ignorant of it, but your Philosophical Realism is indirectly Solipsistic.
viewtopic.php?t=40509

Note my arguments why Philosophical Realism is illusory.

• Why Philosophical Realism is Illusory
  viewtopic.php?t=40167
  PH's Philosophical Realism is Illusory
  viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39992

Then I argued 'what is fact' is and must be conditioned to a human based FSK; there are no other alternative, else it is illusory.

• What is a Fact?
  viewtopic.php?f=8&t=29486

From the above one will note there can be any FSK as long as there are sufficient people to recognize it BUT there is a continuum of objectivity within all FSKs.
Prove this point is false.

As such, there are moral FSKs [deontological, consequentialism, utilateranism, etc.] of various degrees of objectivity.

The scientific FSK is the most credible, reliable and objective.

My proposed human based moral FSK will have near equivalent objectivity to the scientific FSK because the majority of inputs into my moral FSK are scientific facts from the scientific FSK, not only from the neurosciences FSKs but from other scientific sub-FSKs as well.

As such, my proposed human based moral FSK [near objectivity with the scientific FSK] will enable objective moral facts. In this case, morality is objective just as science if objective.

Two Senses of 'Objective'
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39326
Scientific Objectivity
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39286

Counter the above point by point to get to the bottom of the issue.

Problem. Solution: claim that there are features of the human brain that lead to behaviour that avoids evil - ignoring the fact that other features of the human brain lead to behaviour that promotes evil - but that the choice of which features to enhance is 'obvious' or a matter of fact. It isn't. It's a choice, which is subjective.

Untangling the mess of your ideas and arguments can be hard work.

If I define morality as moderating and managing evil to enable its related goods, how can I ignore the evil elements within the human conditions [mind, brain and body] in my Moral FSK [Model].

Note my principle is;

• Whatever is fact must be conditioned upon a human-based FSK.
  Evil elements are conditioned within a human-based moral FSK.
  Therefore evil elements are moral facts.

Point was IWP is in my 'ignored list'. He raised the question about evil elements within the brain and I did not bother to answer it. Then he brewed is own answer to his own question and imaging that is what I agree with. NO!

I have take into account evil elements in the brain are moral facts long ago albeit I did not focus directly on it.

Whatever your skepticism to my proposed human-based moral FSK, the test is whether my model will produce produce results at least theoretically and are there such similar [not exactly] model. The answer is YES; I have not discussed this in detail; it is in my pocket and I don't intend to.

[Peter Holmes]

If I define morality as moderating and managing evil to enable its related goods, how can I ignore the evil elements within the human conditions [mind, brain and body] in my Moral FSK [Model].

Try to think very hard.

What makes an action evil or good?

If evil is 'to the net detriment of the individual and society', then why should we resist or oppose it?
If good is 'to the net benefit of the individual and society', then why should we promote it?

My point is that your answer to the second and third questions seems to be: well, it just is - it's obvious - it's common sense. And in turn, you think that indirectly answers the first question.

Your appeal to neurological 'elements within the human conditions' [sic] doesn't explain why we should enhance one element and not another.

And your appeal to a morality-proper framework and system of knowledge to provide the reason doesn't work, because its main premise is that we should oppose evil and enhance its related good. Back to my questions above.

You have no way out. You begin with a moral premise - which is fine: we should oppose evil and enhance goodness - suitably defined. But your theory doesn't explain why it's a fact that we should.

[Veritas Aequitas]

If I define morality as moderating and managing evil to enable its related goods, how can I ignore the evil elements within the human conditions [mind, brain and body] in my Moral FSK [Model].

Try to think very hard.

What makes an action evil or good?

If evil is 'to the net detriment of the individual and society', then why should we resist or oppose it?
If good is 'to the net benefit of the individual and society', then why should we promote it?

My point is that your answer to the second and third questions seems to be: well, it just is - it's obvious - it's common sense. And in turn, you think that indirectly answers the first question.

Your appeal to neurological 'elements within the human conditions' [sic] doesn't explain why we should enhance one element and not another.

And your appeal to a morality-proper framework and system of knowledge to provide the reason doesn't work, because its main premise is that we should oppose evil and enhance its related good. Back to my questions above.

You have no way out. You begin with a moral premise - which is fine: we should oppose evil and enhance goodness - suitably defined. But your theory doesn't explain why it's a fact that we should.

You got it wrong.
I never explicitly state 'I should' 'we should' 'you should' 'they should,' 'he should' xyz should, etc. from a third party perspective as a command or prescription.
This is what Hume 'No Ought From Is' "NOFI" is about, i.e. enforcing 'ought' from a third party to individual[s] as in theism or political laws.

Rather, we need to recognize there are moral oughts [which are physical, factual [FSK-ed] and objective] which are fundamentally biology which we must recognize as real [evidently] and allow such ought[s] to express spontaneously and naturally within the individual[s].
To do this we need a proper moral framework i.e. a human based moral FSK that would be necessarily very extensive and complex to meet the moral purposes.

[FlashDangerpants]

This is what Hume 'No Is from Ought' is about, i.e. enforcing 'ought' from a third party to individual[s] as in theism or political laws.

No it isn't. You should read it again, and concentrate on the copulation of propositions until you get it.

[Veritas Aequitas]

This is what Hume 'No Ought From IS' is about, i.e. enforcing 'ought' from a third party to individual[s] as in theism or political laws.

No it isn't. You should read it again, and concentrate on the copulation of propositions until you get it.

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.

The context of enforcement referred to is correct,
"This is what Hume 'No Ought From IS' is about, i.e. enforcing 'ought' from a third party to individual[s] as in theism or political laws."
Hume is highlighting the commanding and prescriptive 'ought' and 'ought-not' that is enforced from a third party to individuals is not based on facts.

The context here is about 'enforcement' not on the why and copulation related to "No Is From Ought" which Hume explained below but that is not relevant to my context or point;

This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it's necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.

[FlashDangerpants]

Did you ever work out what Pete means those thousand times he's told you that a factual premise cannot entail a moral conclusion?
It's a restatement of Hume.

[Skepdick]

Did you ever work out what Pete means those thousand times he's told you that a factual premise cannot entail a moral conclusion?
It's a restatement of Hume.

It's not a re-statement of Hume. It's a presumption and acceptance of Hume's prescriptive claim.

Here's a factual premise which entails a moral conclusion: Today is Friday therefore murder is wrong.

Hume's prescription (if accepted) implies that I wasn't allowed to do what I just did.

[FlashDangerpants]

Did you ever work out what Pete means those thousand times he's told you that a factual premise cannot entail a moral conclusion?
It's a restatement of Hume.

It's not a re-statement of Hume. It's a presumption and acceptance of Hume's prescriptive claim.

Here's a factual premise which entails a moral conclusion: Today is Friday therefore murder is wrong.

Hume's prescription (if accepted) implies that I wasn't allowed to do what I just did.

Common sense and the basic precepts of sanity agree with Hume. Nobody cares what you think.

[Skepdick]

Did you ever work out what Pete means those thousand times he's told you that a factual premise cannot entail a moral conclusion?
It's a restatement of Hume.

It's not a re-statement of Hume. It's a presumption and acceptance of Hume's prescriptive claim.

Here's a factual premise which entails a moral conclusion: Today is Friday therefore murder is wrong.

Hume's prescription (if accepted) implies that I wasn't allowed to do what I just did.

Common sense and the basic precepts of sanity agree with Hume. Nobody cares what you think.

So agree with him - who's stopping you?

That doesn't preclude his claim (and your acceptence thereof) from being prescriptive.

Nobody gives a shit about your anger issues and dismissive attitude either, so lets return to our regular programming and get back to the OP by pointing out that:

1. Common sense and basic percepts of sanity accept it as true, a matter of fact, that factual premises can't entail moral conclusions.
2. No.1 is a moral claim with truth value; as well as a fact.
3. Morality is not objective.

I am so dumb I just can't understand how that works. Please explain it to me.

[FlashDangerpants]

You misread me. Common sense and basic precepts of sanity all agree that murder being wrong is not an entailment of today not being Wednesday. If you credit Hume with being the source of that information, then common sense agrees with Hume.

You'll have to get by with that for now, you can have new attention in September perhaps.

[Skepdick]

You misread me. Common sense and basic precepts of sanity all agree that murder being wrong is not an entailment of today not being Wednesday.

You misread me. My use of "therefore" in "Today is Wednesday therefore Murder is wrong" makes it an entailment.

I've made the inference and drawn the conclusion whether you like it or not. This is a basic descriptive statement of fact abiout my reasoning process.

This empirical act of rebelion demonstrates that I can, in fact, do what Hume says cannot be done thus affirming that his claim is normative, not descriptive.

The rest is nothing other than your moral outrage - an attempt to enforce Hume's normative.

You'll have to get by with that for now, you can have new attention in September perhaps.

Lets not pretend I am the one seeking attention here. I told you to ignore me permanently, yet you keep coming back.

Typical addict behavior.