What could make morality objective?

[Atla]

according to Kantian reasoning, philosophical realists who are also transcendental realists end up adopting a position that can be seen as indirectly solipsistic."

We have sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic that everything intuited in space or in time, hence all objects of an experience possible for us, are nothing but appearances, i.e., mere representations, which, as they are represented, as extended beings or series of alterations, have outside our thoughts no existence grounded in itself. This doctrine I call transcendental idealism. The realist, in the transcendental signification, makes these modifications of our sensibility into things subsisting in themselves, and hence makes mere representations into things in themselves. (A491/B519)

Same two basic errors:
- the whole argument is based on direct perception, but fails to investigate indirect perception
- he got space and time wrong, there are likely two kinds of space and time (Kantian and Einsteinian)

The correct view (imo) would be somewhere between INDIRECT Kantian transcendental realism and indirect realism, a kind of synthesis of the two.

I don't think I've ever met anyone who qualifies as a "direct" Kantian transcendental realist however. They may as well be indirectly solipsistic. But VA says that all philosophical realists are "direct" Kantian transcendental realists.

[Iwannaplato]

according to Kantian reasoning, philosophical realists who are also transcendental realists end up adopting a position that can be seen as indirectly solipsistic."

We have sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic that everything intuited in space or in time, hence all objects of an experience possible for us, are nothing but appearances, i.e., mere representations, which, as they are represented, as extended beings or series of alterations, have outside our thoughts no existence grounded in itself. This doctrine I call transcendental idealism. The realist, in the transcendental signification, makes these modifications of our sensibility into things subsisting in themselves, and hence makes mere representations into things in themselves. (A491/B519)

Same two basic errors:
- the whole argument is based on direct perception, but fails to investigate indirect perception
- he got space and time wrong, there are likely two kinds of space and time (Kantian and Einsteinian)

The correct view (imo) would be somewhere between INDIRECT Kantian transcendental realism and indirect realism, a kind of synthesis of the two.

I don't think I've ever met anyone who qualifies as a "direct" Kantian transcendental realist however. They may as well be indirectly solipsistic. But VA says that all philosophical realists are "direct" Kantian transcendental realists.

and let's look at what the "counterevidence" is
'according to Kantian reasoning' - so, if we assume Kantian reasoning is correct
'can be seen as' - IOW not saying it is solipsitic
as determined by Chapgpt - which will say, itself, that it doesn't actually know what it is talking about and has trouble with subtlties about philosophical issues.

So, I asked Chatgpt if Kant was indrectly solipsistic and, LOL, here's what Chatgpt said....

No, Immanuel Kant, the renowned German philosopher, is not indirectly solipsistic. In fact, Kant is well-known for his critical philosophy, which emphasizes the existence of an external reality beyond the mind.

Chatgpt is, right now, Pandora's box. Anyone can get it to support their position. If evidence is going to be put forth by Chatgpt, well, it will be regretted in minutes.

[Atla]

Let's see what ChatGPT has to say without prior discussion

Q: According to Kantian reasoning, can transcendental realists end up adopting a position that can be seen as indirectly solipsistic?

A :In Kantian philosophy, transcendental realism refers to the view that objects exist independently of our perception or knowledge of them, and they have an existence beyond our mental representations. On the other hand, solipsism is the philosophical position that only the self (or one's mind) can be known to exist, and the external world and other minds are uncertain or even illusory.

Kant himself was a transcendental idealist, not a realist. He argued that while we can never know things as they are in themselves (noumena), we can understand the world through the structure of our own minds (phenomena). Thus, he did not think we could claim to know whether things exist independently of our mental representations.

However, it is conceivable that a philosopher might adopt a position that could be seen as indirectly solipsistic while adhering to some aspects of transcendental realism. For example, someone might argue that the external world exists, but our knowledge of it is limited to our mental representations or perceptions. They might suggest that the external world is only indirectly accessible through our minds, and we can never know it as it truly is.

This perspective would not be straightforwardly solipsistic because it acknowledges the existence of an external world. However, it might still be considered indirectly solipsistic because it posits that our knowledge of the external world is ultimately limited to our own subjective experiences and mental representations.

It's important to note that this hypothetical position would not be a standard interpretation of Kantian reasoning, but rather a speculative extension or adaptation of some Kantian ideas. In any case, philosophers often interpret and adapt existing theories in various ways, and such debates are an essential part of the ongoing development of philosophical thought.

[Iwannaplato]

Let's see what ChatGPT has to say without prior discussion

Q: According to Kantian reasoning, can transcendental realists end up adopting a position that can be seen as indirectly solipsistic?

A :In Kantian philosophy, transcendental realism refers to the view that objects exist independently of our perception or knowledge of them, and they have an existence beyond our mental representations. On the other hand, solipsism is the philosophical position that only the self (or one's mind) can be known to exist, and the external world and other minds are uncertain or even illusory.

Kant himself was a transcendental idealist, not a realist. He argued that while we can never know things as they are in themselves (noumena), we can understand the world through the structure of our own minds (phenomena). Thus, he did not think we could claim to know whether things exist independently of our mental representations.

However, it is conceivable that a philosopher might adopt a position that could be seen as indirectly solipsistic while adhering to some aspects of transcendental realism. For example, someone might argue that the external world exists, but our knowledge of it is limited to our mental representations or perceptions. They might suggest that the external world is only indirectly accessible through our minds, and we can never know it as it truly is.

This perspective would not be straightforwardly solipsistic because it acknowledges the existence of an external world. However, it might still be considered indirectly solipsistic because it posits that our knowledge of the external world is ultimately limited to our own subjective experiences and mental representations.

It's important to note that this hypothetical position would not be a standard interpretation of Kantian reasoning, but rather a speculative extension or adaptation of some Kantian ideas. In any case, philosophers often interpret and adapt existing theories in various ways, and such debates are an essential part of the ongoing development of philosophical thought.

I think it's really telling that to get to one of VA's arguments we often have to go through the middle person of Kant. This just clutters up everyone's minds. First we need to check to see if his interpretation of Kant is correct, so there's this whole circus around that. Now he's added another layer. Implicit in his posts is that Chapgpt is an authority (ya, ya, with provisos) despite Chatgpt warning us it is not. But now we have to interpret Kant via Chapgpt.

So what happens: VA's argument is now behind two veils: first Chapgpt, then Kant.

In one OP he said that if you disagree with his argument then you have to read Kant's CPR and show that it is wrong and/or his interpretation of it is wrong.

[Peter Holmes]

The myth of the mind cuts us off from our bodies, other people and reality - the so-called 'external world' whose existence we're supposed to need - and are supposedly unable - to prove.

When we abandon the myth, the so-called mind-body or mind-world problems - that have muddied philosophical waters that Kant muddied even more - dissipate. 'Mental representations'? 'Transcendental idealism'? - Fictions we've taken seriously for so long that freeing ourselves can be hard - as can be abandoning supernatural religion.

[Skepdick]

The myth of the mind cuts us off from our bodies, other people and reality - the so-called 'external world' whose existence we're supposed to need - and are supposedly unable - to prove.

When we abandon the myth, the so-called mind-body or mind-world problems - that have muddied philosophical waters that Kant muddied even more - dissipate. 'Mental representations'? 'Transcendental idealism'? - Fictions we've taken seriously for so long that freeing ourselves can be hard - as can be abandoning supernatural religion.

Problems? What problems?

Can you prove any problems exist?

[Veritas Aequitas]

We have sufficiently proved in the Transcendental Aesthetic that everything intuited in space or in time, hence all objects of an experience possible for us, are nothing but appearances, i.e., mere representations, which, as they are represented, as extended beings or series of alterations, have outside our thoughts no existence grounded in itself. This doctrine I call transcendental idealism. The realist, in the transcendental signification, makes these modifications of our sensibility into things subsisting in themselves, and hence makes mere representations into things in themselves. (A491/B519)

Same two basic errors:
- the whole argument is based on direct perception, but fails to investigate indirect perception
- he got space and time wrong, there are likely two kinds of space and time (Kantian and Einsteinian)

The correct view (imo) would be somewhere between INDIRECT Kantian transcendental realism and indirect realism, a kind of synthesis of the two.

I don't think I've ever met anyone who qualifies as a "direct" Kantian transcendental realist however. They may as well be indirectly solipsistic. But VA says that all philosophical realists are "direct" Kantian transcendental realists.

and let's look at what the "counterevidence" is
'according to Kantian reasoning' - so, if we assume Kantian reasoning is correct
'can be seen as' - IOW not saying it is solipsitic
as determined by Chapgpt - which will say, itself, that it doesn't actually know what it is talking about and has trouble with subtlties about philosophical issues.

So, I asked Chatgpt if Kant was indrectly solipsistic and, LOL, here's what Chatgpt said....

No, Immanuel Kant, the renowned German philosopher, is not indirectly solipsistic. In fact, Kant is well-known for his critical philosophy, which emphasizes the existence of an external reality beyond the mind.

Chatgpt is, right now, Pandora's box. Anyone can get it to support their position. If evidence is going to be put forth by Chatgpt, well, it will be regretted in minutes.

I am very confident of my philosophy.
It is unlikely you will find any flaws in my philosophical views.
The only issues are the typical presentation and communication issues.

ChatGPT is right.

It would be more accurate to restate ChatGPT statement as;
In fact, Kant is well-known for his critical philosophy, which on his basis of Empirical Realism, emphasizes the existence of an external reality beyond the mind.
This Empirical realism is subsumed within Transcendental Idealism.

Take the analogy of 'freedom' to mind-independence.

A prisoner is relatively "free" [sense 1] to do what he likes in his cell within the rules, but he is not absolutely free [sense 2] like an ordinary person outside that prison.
There are two senses of 'freedom' in this case.

It is the same that are two senses of 'mind-independence' within Kantianism, i.e. in the Empirical Realist sense [relative] and the Transcendental Idealist sense [absolute].
As such the empirical realists has a relative mind-independence but do not have absolute mind-independence as a Transcendental Idealist.

What is advocated in Kant's CPR is not indirectly solipsistic.

Based on Kant's CPR it is philosophical realism who are indirectly solipsistic as per the argument I provided as the claim that the premises are true.
Anyone can counter the premises in that argument are false.

[Atla]

It is the same that are two senses of 'mind-independence' within Kantianism, i.e. in the Empirical Realist sense [relative] and the Transcendental Idealist sense [absolute].
As such the empirical realists has a relative mind-independence but do not have absolute mind-independence as a Transcendental Idealist.

Two can play this game

No, Kantian transcendental idealism does not claim absolute mind-independence. Instead, it asserts that the external world, as we perceive it, is a product of both the mind and the external things-in-themselves.

In Immanuel Kant's philosophy, he distinguishes between two realms: the noumenal realm and the phenomenal realm. The noumenal realm consists of things-in-themselves, which exist independently of human perception and cognition. These things-in-themselves are beyond our ability to know them directly because they are not accessible to our senses or intellectual faculties.

On the other hand, the phenomenal realm is the world of appearances as it appears to us through our senses and mental structures. Kant argues that the mind plays an active role in shaping our perceptions and organizing sensory data into meaningful experiences. He posits that space, time, and certain categories of understanding are inherent in the structure of the human mind and are necessary for us to make sense of the external world.

Transcendental idealism, therefore, suggests that our experience of the external world is a combination of both the external things-in-themselves and the mind's structuring activity. The mind imposes its conceptual framework on the raw data received through the senses, and thus, the external world that we perceive is not the world as it exists independently of us but rather a product of the interaction between the mind and the external things.

In summary, Kantian transcendental idealism does not claim absolute mind-independence. It acknowledges that our perceptions are shaped by the mind's cognitive structures and that the external world, as we perceive it, is a result of this interaction between the mind and things-in-themselves.

[Atla]

Bit curious though, why someone would name his position "transcendental idealism" when it's neither really transcendental nor really idealism.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Thanks. Of course, validity deals with the consistency of assertions, which is a linguistic matter. But soundness - which deals with the truth of premises - is what really matters.

So if, as I argue, there's no such thing as mind-as-a-separate-non-physical-thing, then the whole distinction between mind-dependence and mind-independence - and arguments that assume them - collapse.

IWP claimed ChatGPT concluded my argument is invalid but he missed out critical information and the qualification 'based on Kant's reasoning' thus distorting the original argument.
I rechecked with ChatGPT and it confirm the original argument as valid subject to the soundness which we have to make further Kant's CPR.

"there's no such thing as mind-as-a-separate-non-physical-thing"
You are so ignorant that you are actually banking on a "mind-as-a-separate-non-physical-thing" which is your 'what is fact' a feature of reality that is just is, being so, that is the case, or states of affairs that is independent of the human conditions [mind and body]
I have challenged you to prove your mind-independent 'what is fact' is really real as above, but you have failed to do so, but ran off whenever I remind you.

Until you prove that the non-physical mind exists, the distinction you make between mind-dependence and mind-independence is incoherent - as is your charge that I believe in a mind-independent reality. A mind-independent reality is as stupid an idea as a noumenon - which is Kant's version of the fiction.

But you won't understand what I've just written, because you can't grasp very simple arguments.

What??
I have been charging you for being narrow, shallow and dogmatic minded as supported with evidence.

Your philosophy in this case is grounded on an illusion, i.e. what is fact is illusory.
PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577
PH's Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39992

What is fact to you is illusory.
For example as a philosophical realist you insist there is a real physical and absolutely mind-independent apple out there; this based on an illusion, thus illusory.
Based on this illusory grounding, you insist if a 'mind' exists, then, a mind must be like an absolutely mind independent physical apple out there.
This is an absurd kind of thinking.

I have argued,
There are Two Senses of Reality
viewtopic.php?t=40265
i.e.
1. FSK-ed based reality, fact [relative mind-independence] - realistic
2. Philosophical Realism - absolute mind-independence - illusory

In the case of the FSK-ed concept of mind, it is this;

• The mind (adjective form: mental) is that which thinks, imagines, remembers, wills, and senses, or is the set of faculties responsible for such phenomena.[2][3][4] The mind is also associated with experiencing perception, pleasure and pain, belief, desire, intention, and emotion. The mind can include conscious and non-conscious states as well as sensory and non-sensory experiences.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind

It is obvious that the mind above would not be like a physical apple like what you are expecting within your philosophical realism's absolute mind-independence.
It is very stupid to reject the physical empirical mind as defined above because it cannot conform to your ideology which is illusory in the first place.

However, what is needed to be rejected is the claim of an absolutely independent mind re dualism which is the soul and can survive physical death.

Within the FSK-ed factual mind, the mind is empirical and physical as supported by its physical neural correlates within the brain and body.

It is like a symphony orchestra which is empirically physical is represented by physical musicians or a team which is empirically physical and is represented by physical humans.

If you are not an intellectual coward, counter my above line by line.

[Atla]

Bit curious though, why someone would name his position "transcendental idealism" when it's neither really transcendental nor really idealism.

Might have been German humour

[Peter Holmes]

IWP claimed ChatGPT concluded my argument is invalid but he missed out critical information and the qualification 'based on Kant's reasoning' thus distorting the original argument.
I rechecked with ChatGPT and it confirm the original argument as valid subject to the soundness which we have to make further Kant's CPR.

"there's no such thing as mind-as-a-separate-non-physical-thing"
You are so ignorant that you are actually banking on a "mind-as-a-separate-non-physical-thing" which is your 'what is fact' a feature of reality that is just is, being so, that is the case, or states of affairs that is independent of the human conditions [mind and body]
I have challenged you to prove your mind-independent 'what is fact' is really real as above, but you have failed to do so, but ran off whenever I remind you.

Until you prove that the non-physical mind exists, the distinction you make between mind-dependence and mind-independence is incoherent - as is your charge that I believe in a mind-independent reality. A mind-independent reality is as stupid an idea as a noumenon - which is Kant's version of the fiction.

But you won't understand what I've just written, because you can't grasp very simple arguments.

What??
I have been charging you for being narrow, shallow and dogmatic minded as supported with evidence.

Your philosophy in this case is grounded on an illusion, i.e. what is fact is illusory.
PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577
PH's Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39992

What is fact to you is illusory.
For example as a philosophical realist you insist there is a real physical and absolutely mind-independent apple out there; this based on an illusion, thus illusory.
Based on this illusory grounding, you insist if a 'mind' exists, then, a mind must be like an absolutely mind independent physical apple out there.
This is an absurd kind of thinking.

I have argued,
There are Two Senses of Reality
viewtopic.php?t=40265
i.e.
1. FSK-ed based reality, fact [relative mind-independence] - realistic
2. Philosophical Realism - absolute mind-independence - illusory

In the case of the FSK-ed concept of mind, it is this;

• The mind (adjective form: mental) is that which thinks, imagines, remembers, wills, and senses, or is the set of faculties responsible for such phenomena.[2][3][4] The mind is also associated with experiencing perception, pleasure and pain, belief, desire, intention, and emotion. The mind can include conscious and non-conscious states as well as sensory and non-sensory experiences.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind

It is obvious that the mind above would not be like a physical apple like what you are expecting within your philosophical realism's absolute mind-independence.
It is very stupid to reject the physical empirical mind as defined above because it cannot conform to your ideology which is illusory in the first place.

However, what is needed to be rejected is the claim of an absolutely independent mind re dualism which is the soul and can survive physical death.

Within the FSK-ed factual mind, the mind is empirical and physical as supported by its physical neural correlates within the brain and body.

It is like a symphony orchestra which is empirically physical is represented by physical musicians or a team which is empirically physical and is represented by physical humans.

If you are not an intellectual coward, counter my above line by line.

Prove that the non-physical mind - and therefore non-physical, 'mental' things and events - exist. Quoting a description that assumes it and they do proves nothing.

'The mind exists, because it's where thinking goes on.' (Face palm.)

When we abandon the myth of the mind, the stupidity of talking about mind-dependence and mind-independence becomes obvious. For example, it's ridiculous to believe that reality depends on human brains, bodies or 'conditions'?

[Skepdick]

Prove that the non-physical mind - and therefore non-physical, 'mental' things and events - exist. Quoting a description that assumes it and they do proves nothing.

'The mind exists, because it's where thinking goes on.' (Face palm.)

When we abandon the myth of the mind, the stupidity of talking about mind-dependence and mind-independence becomes obvious. For example, it's ridiculous to believe that reality depends on human brains, bodies or 'conditions'?

Prove that reality exists instead of merely assiming so.

Follow the rules of the game you claim to be playing and produce a valid and sound argument which concludes that reality exists.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Until you prove that the non-physical mind exists, the distinction you make between mind-dependence and mind-independence is incoherent - as is your charge that I believe in a mind-independent reality. A mind-independent reality is as stupid an idea as a noumenon - which is Kant's version of the fiction.

But you won't understand what I've just written, because you can't grasp very simple arguments.

What??
I have been charging you for being narrow, shallow and dogmatic minded as supported with evidence.

Your philosophy in this case is grounded on an illusion, i.e. what is fact is illusory.
PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577
PH's Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39992

What is fact to you is illusory.
For example as a philosophical realist you insist there is a real physical and absolutely mind-independent apple out there; this based on an illusion, thus illusory.
Based on this illusory grounding, you insist if a 'mind' exists, then, a mind must be like an absolutely mind independent physical apple out there.
This is an absurd kind of thinking.

I have argued,
There are Two Senses of Reality
viewtopic.php?t=40265
i.e.
1. FSK-ed based reality, fact [relative mind-independence] - realistic
2. Philosophical Realism - absolute mind-independence - illusory

In the case of the FSK-ed concept of mind, it is this;

• The mind (adjective form: mental) is that which thinks, imagines, remembers, wills, and senses, or is the set of faculties responsible for such phenomena.[2][3][4] The mind is also associated with experiencing perception, pleasure and pain, belief, desire, intention, and emotion. The mind can include conscious and non-conscious states as well as sensory and non-sensory experiences.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind

It is obvious that the mind above would not be like a physical apple like what you are expecting within your philosophical realism's absolute mind-independence.
It is very stupid to reject the physical empirical mind as defined above because it cannot conform to your ideology which is illusory in the first place.

However, what is needed to be rejected is the claim of an absolutely independent mind re dualism which is the soul and can survive physical death.

Within the FSK-ed factual mind, the mind is empirical and physical as supported by its physical neural correlates within the brain and body.

It is like a symphony orchestra which is empirically physical is represented by physical musicians or a team which is empirically physical and is represented by physical humans.

If you are not an intellectual coward, counter my above line by line.

Prove that the non-physical mind - and therefore non-physical, 'mental' things and events - exist. Quoting a description that assumes it and they do proves nothing.

'The mind exists, because it's where thinking goes on.' (Face palm.)

When we abandon the myth of the mind, the stupidity of talking about mind-dependence and mind-independence becomes obvious. For example, it's ridiculous to believe that reality depends on human brains, bodies or 'conditions'?

Strawman, where did I claim there is a non-physical mind?
How can you be so ignorant and delusional??

I claimed there is an objective physical mind that is conditioned upon the science-biology-psychology FSK; the mind is supported by its physical neural correlates.

I have defined what is the FSK-ed mind as this;

• The mind (adjective form: mental) is that which thinks, imagines, remembers, wills, and senses, or is the set of faculties responsible for such phenomena.[2][3][4]
  The mind is also associated with experiencing perception, pleasure and pain, belief, desire, intention, and emotion.
  The mind can include conscious and non-conscious states as well as sensory and non-sensory experiences.
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind

The above has nothing to do with Descartes' dualism.

How can you be so ignorant that there are loads of scientific studies to confirm the structure, features, structures, processes, resulting effects of the mind as defined above?
These are proofs that the objective FSK-ed physical mind exists as empirically real.

Can you justify why such a FSK-ed physical mind do not exists as real?

[Peter Holmes]

So, we all agree there's no non-physical mind. But does anyone have any empirical evidence for the existence of a physical mind - maybe something like evidence for the existence of brains?

While we wait for ever for that, let's draw the obvious conclusion: the idea that reality is or could be 'mind-dependent' - that the existence of the universe depends on humans/human brains - is utterly incoherent.