henry quirk wrote: ↑Sun Jul 30, 2023 1:06 pm
Yeah, I wanted to explore this when I asked
what is a person? but you weren't interested.
You use terms in ways that I don't, so I didn't at the time even know what you meant by that question. I'd thought you meant "person" in some sort of legalistic sense, which seemed to me to be the wrong way to approach the issue.
henry quirk wrote: ↑Sun Jul 30, 2023 1:06 pm
Now, I don't have the time (or the interest).
I'll have to piece it together myself then. It seems that your position is that "being a person", "having a mind", and "having (or being a) free will" all mutually entail one another (and entail "being a moral agent", "being subject to moral judgement", and "having natural rights").
I surmise that this is because you start with the premise that any being with a mind
necessarily has the capacity to use that mind freely to make free choices, and thus has free will - and, of course, the converse applies too: that any being with free will necessarily has a mind. Then, you define a "person" as a being with a mind (and thus with free will).
Presumably, that's why when I present to you a thought experiment premised on the existence of a human being with a mind but
without free will, you implicitly reject that premise:
henry quirk wrote: ↑Sun Jul 30, 2023 1:06 pm
Harry Baird wrote: ↑Sun Jul 30, 2023 9:59 amSam is, then, capable of experiencing both joy and suffering.
No, he doesn't suffer or have joy. He has no mind, is not a mind, is not a free will, is not a person.
I can work with your premise that minds are necessarily free willing, and we presumably (hopefully?) otherwise share definitions of those terms, at least in context.
I can work with your definition of a person as a being with a mind (and thus with free will).
I can work with your premise that having a mind (and
only having a mind) entails being a moral agent subject to moral judgement and having natural rights.
I
can't work with your definitions of "feeling", "experience", "awareness", "sentience", and "consciousness", which are too broad, and include beings without minds.
Tentatively, it seems that we share definitions of "joy" and "suffering", and, given the above quote, it seems that just as you hold that "having a mind" entails "having free will", and vice versa, you also hold that both of those entail "capable of suffering and joy", and vice versa.
The crux of things can, then, I think, be phrased in terms we seem to share as:
You believe that non-human living beings (with perhaps some exceptions) do not have minds (and thus are incapable of either suffering or joy), and are mere automatons, and that is why you hold that they do not have natural rights. If you came to believe that non-human living beings actually do have minds, then you would hold that they do have natural rights. This would be the same as coming to believe that non-human living beings are capable of joy and suffering, since (it seems) you hold that only beings capable of joy and suffering have minds, and vice versa.
In
an earlier post, I pointed out that non-human beings behave in ways that are explicable in one of only two ways: firstly, that they are capable of joy and suffering, or, secondly, that as robots they have been deliberately designed by your deist God - presumably as some sort of perverse trick - to
mimic beings who are capable of joy and suffering.
On the first explanation, you are bound to accept that non-human living beings have natural rights, and that you are violating them by consuming their slaughtered bodies and the products otherwise stolen from them while they were deprived of their liberty and bodily integrity.
On the second explanation, you require some strong warrant to hold the belief that this is what God has done, especially given that if you are wrong about it, you are violating the natural rights of others. You haven't as yet explained what that warrant is.
Take your pick...