Is morality objective or subjective?

[Veritas Aequitas]

I don't think you have read the whole book to grasp Bloom's main view re Empathy.

Do you know what a "thesis" is? It's the cardinal statement of the entire book, the summary of the author's intended point, in his own words. You can't find anything in the book more central and definitive than the thesis. That's how books work.

I've given you what Bloom identifies as his thesis. And I've read the whole book (unlike you, as you admit), so I can say for sure that that is the thesis he plays out.

But I've made the point in a way that should be very clear. And if you can't grasp it, I can't help you further. So it's time to move on. I'm beginning to feel that I'm wasting the effort.

The point is don't throw "Against Empathy" at anyone whenever you see any mention of empathy with morality.

Regardless, Bloom's thesis "Against Empathy" is wrong and you still a lot of effort to understand that.

[Immanuel Can]

I don't think you have read the whole book to grasp Bloom's main view re Empathy.

Do you know what a "thesis" is? It's the cardinal statement of the entire book, the summary of the author's intended point, in his own words. You can't find anything in the book more central and definitive than the thesis. That's how books work.

I've given you what Bloom identifies as his thesis. And I've read the whole book (unlike you, as you admit), so I can say for sure that that is the thesis he plays out.

But I've made the point in a way that should be very clear. And if you can't grasp it, I can't help you further. So it's time to move on. I'm beginning to feel that I'm wasting the effort.

The point is don't throw "Against Empathy" at anyone whenever you see any mention of empathy with morality.

In future, I'll only "throw" it at somebody who can read.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Do you know what a "thesis" is? It's the cardinal statement of the entire book, the summary of the author's intended point, in his own words. You can't find anything in the book more central and definitive than the thesis. That's how books work.

I've given you what Bloom identifies as his thesis. And I've read the whole book (unlike you, as you admit), so I can say for sure that that is the thesis he plays out.

But I've made the point in a way that should be very clear. And if you can't grasp it, I can't help you further. So it's time to move on. I'm beginning to feel that I'm wasting the effort.

The point is don't throw "Against Empathy" at anyone whenever you see any mention of empathy with morality.

In future, I'll only "throw" it at somebody who can read.

That's a cheap shot any kid can do.

[Will Bouwman]

...I am not assuming there is no evidence for faith or hope in your God, nor any other for that matter. If your hypothesis is that a supreme being created the world, then the fact that there is a world is evidence that supports your hypothesis.

Like all evidence, the evidence can be recognized as evidence, or dismissed as irrelevant. That's as true, whether we're talking about a hair or fibre at a crime scene, or an entire universe.

So recognizing evidence is always an act of faith and hope. But not groundless, evidenceless, faith or hope. That's all I was saying.

I'm trying to work out what you are on about. Even reminding myself that to someone who uses the Bible as a dictionary, faith and hope mean calculation and belief, I can't see the equivalence you apparently do. If I find a hair or fibre at a crime scene, or an entire universe, without getting into silly metaphysics, what faith, hope, calculation or belief that they are really there do I need?
If it is your contention that any faith I might have in forensic science, which matches a hair or fibre to a sample, is equivalent to your faith that the universe as revealed to us is exactly what a supreme being would create, I can only say that from my point of view, no it isn't. There are thousands of religious portrayals of the universe, all of them based on what you might see without a telescope, much less a god's eye view, and none of them, not even the one in the Bible, is anything like the universe we see.
There is more in your response that we might get back to, but since I use language in debased ways, I thought it best to clear things up a bit at a time so that we understand each other.

[Immanuel Can]

...I am not assuming there is no evidence for faith or hope in your God, nor any other for that matter. If your hypothesis is that a supreme being created the world, then the fact that there is a world is evidence that supports your hypothesis.

Like all evidence, the evidence can be recognized as evidence, or dismissed as irrelevant. That's as true, whether we're talking about a hair or fibre at a crime scene, or an entire universe.

So recognizing evidence is always an act of faith and hope. But not groundless, evidenceless, faith or hope. That's all I was saying.

I'm trying to work out what you are on about.

Just responding to your inquiries. And here, the point is simply that faith and hope aren't some kind of strange, religious activity. In fact, they're intrinsic to ordinary science.

If it is your contention that any faith I might have in forensic science, which matches a hair or fibre to a sample, is equivalent to your faith that the universe as revealed to us is exactly what a supreme being would create, I can only say that from my point of view, no it isn't.

You have less reason to be trusting of forensic science than you do of the existence of God. For the existence of God is manifest to you in the Creation and in your own nature; but forensic science is a specialization that few have the privilege of actually performing. Our faith in forensic science is mostly second-hand trusting.

Not that it's irrational, either; but it's less rational than belief in the evidence before your own eyes.

I use language in debased ways...

I did not say you did. I said that there was a debased understanding of "faith" and "hope," in which the assumption is that they stand on nothing, or are some kind of exercise of mere wish fulfillment. And there is. If you want an example of that, look no farther than, say, Dawkins.

But if you're not a proponent of that debased view or somebody fooled by it, why pillory yourself with that? I haven't.

[Will Bouwman]

...recognizing evidence is always an act of faith and hope.

Not in science it isn't. If the hypothesis is that a supreme being created a universe, the fact that there is a universe can be recognised as evidence without any faith or hope by people such as myself. It is your faith and hope, not that evidence exists, but that the hypothesis is true.

...the point is simply that faith and hope aren't some kind of strange, religious activity. In fact, they're intrinsic to ordinary science.

I think we can agree that hope is something that probably every human experiences. Faith is different, despite your rudeness:

I personally wouldn't call my attitude to aeroplanes or gravity faith.

That's maybe because you've hitherto had the mistaken idea that what detractors of religion want to call "faith" was an honest representation of the truth about what Biblical faith is. But they lied to you, and you can see that for yourself if you were to read the Bible. What they said it says is not what it says.

Religious Education is compulsory in the UK to this day. I went to a Church of England primary school, sang in the choir and at grammar school was taught RE by the local vicar. Far from being lied to, I was taught about faith by sincere Christians. Having also read the Bible, I know it is no coincidence that what those good people taught chimes with the passage you chose:

That's why the Bible says, "...without faith it is impossible to please Him, for the one who comes to God must believe that He exists, and that He proves to be One who rewards those who seek Him." (Hebrews 11:6)

That sort of faith has no place in science; perhaps you think it does because you have been lied to by detractors of science.

[Immanuel Can]

...recognizing evidence is always an act of faith and hope.

Not in science it isn't.

Actually, it is. Would you say that a scientist had no "faith" in his procedures and tests? Then if he didn't, why would he do them, since he would not have any conviction that they would even work? And do you think he never "hopes" that his results will be definitive and clear? I assure you, that's what every one of them fervently "hopes" when he performs the trial or experiment.

If the hypothesis is that a supreme being created a universe, the fact that there is a universe can be recognised as evidence without any faith or hope by people such as myself.

Apparently not. Because that's not how evidence works. Evidence is empirical, which means it's always capable of being doubted. Some doubts are reasonable, and some are unreasonable; but every evidentiary situation is capable of doubt.

So a person who does not believe in God can do so by defying what the evidence would say to a reasonable person, just as a religious enthusiast could accept as evidence that which was not. The difference between which one is right will not be settled by which one feels the strongest; it will be settled by which one has the best evidence...and which conclusion is the best accounting for the available evidence.

...the point is simply that faith and hope aren't some kind of strange, religious activity. In fact, they're intrinsic to ordinary science.

I think we can agree that hope is something that probably every human experiences. Faith is different,

Not really. It only looks "different" when somebody has been indoctrinated to think of "faith" as meaning something gratuitious. But ordinary people use faith the right way when they use a sentence like, "Have a little faith in me," or "I have faith that we can get this done." They're not saying, "I believe contrary to the evidence," or "Believe in things you know ain't true." They're saying, "You have enough evidence; now show some confidence."

Religious Education is compulsory in the UK to this day. I went to a Church of England primary school, sang in the choir and at grammar school was taught RE by the local vicar.

I know the C of E. Its renderings are quite mixed, I'm afraid: some good, some not so much. Likewise, Anglicans come in different grades of conviction and knowledge. I can't speak to what yours were like.

That's why the Bible says, "...without faith it is impossible to please Him, for the one who comes to God must believe that He exists, and that He proves to be One who rewards those who seek Him." (Hebrews 11:6)

That sort of faith has no place in science;

On the contrary; as I pointed out above, science is suffused with faith. And if you don't believe me, maybe you'd believe the great Michael Polanyi, distinguished chemist and physicist, who held a chair in Manchester. Take a look at his book "Personal Knowlege." I'm certain it will change your view on this.

[Will Bouwman]

...recognizing evidence is always an act of faith and hope.

Not in science it isn't.

Actually, it is. Would you say that a scientist had no "faith" in his procedures and tests?

I would say that few scientists have the same emotional attachment to their procedures and tests that you have to your God. Would you say your faith is equivalent to a scientist's hope that their experiment works?

...do you think he never "hopes" that his results will be definitive and clear?

No, which is why I said I think we can agree that hope is something that probably every human experiences.

If the hypothesis is that a supreme being created a universe, the fact that there is a universe can be recognised as evidence without any faith or hope by people such as myself.

Apparently not. Because that's not how evidence works. Evidence is empirical, which means it's always capable of being doubted. Some doubts are reasonable, and some are unreasonable; but every evidentiary situation is capable of doubt.

You don't distinguish between evidence and hypothesis. You can get into some outré metaphysics and doubt that there is a universe, but you cannot doubt the evidence for it. That is Descartes' point and anyone who even pretends to understand philosophy needs to understand at least that.

So a person who does not believe in God can do so by defying what the evidence would say to a reasonable person, just as a religious enthusiast could accept as evidence that which was not. The difference between which one is right will not be settled by which one feels the strongest; it will be settled by which one has the best evidence...and which conclusion is the best accounting for the available evidence.

Nonsense; this is you still failing to understand underdetermination; something you can only do by defying what a reasonable person would appreciate. It's also contradictory: at first you say that a person who doesn't believe in God is defying the evidence. Then you say the disagreement "will be settled by which one has the best evidence". You can't defy evidence you don't have. On top of that it is quite clear that if you read Polanyi, you did so very selectively, ironically demonstrating one of the points he was making. According to "the great Michael Polanyi, distinguished chemist and physicist" who wasn't a physicist, "which one is right" isn't settled at all, instead people believe what they feel strongest about. When Polanyi talks about faith, he doesn't mean it as some sort of calculation as you claim it is, he means feeling.

Take a look at his book "Personal Knowlege." I'm certain it will change your view on this.

Take another look yourself, if you understand it this time you will understand why my view will not change.

[Immanuel Can]

Not in science it isn't.

Actually, it is. Would you say that a scientist had no "faith" in his procedures and tests?

I would say that few scientists have the same emotional attachment to their procedures and tests that you have to your God. Would you say your faith is equivalent to a scientist's hope that their experiment works?

My faith, like theirs is premised on evidence. But I think my evidence is a good deal better than what they usually have to go on, when they set out to design a truly new experiment. After all, when they set out on that, they've seen nothing; the test has never been run, and they have only hypotheses drawn from whatever similar cases they may perceive on which to go. But of the actual experiment, they have zero data.

That's a lot of faith for a person to have, I'd say.

If the hypothesis is that a supreme being created a universe, the fact that there is a universe can be recognised as evidence without any faith or hope by people such as myself.

Apparently not. Because that's not how evidence works. Evidence is empirical, which means it's always capable of being doubted. Some doubts are reasonable, and some are unreasonable; but every evidentiary situation is capable of doubt.

You don't distinguish between evidence and hypothesis.

I do, actually. You're mistaken.

You can get into some outré metaphysics and doubt that there is a universe, but you cannot doubt the evidence for it. That is Descartes' point

Oooh. I see! You haven't read Descartes.

If you do, you'll find that Descartes says the exact opposite, actually. Surprise, suprise. He points out that it's possible to doubt all kinds of things...not just the external world, but your own physical body as well. Meditations 1 and 2 cover this in detail, you'll find.

Where Descartes is trying to get to is something (he thinks) we cannot doubt. And this is where his "cogito" comes in: "I think, therefore, I am." He thinks the only thing we can know for sure is that we are "a thinking thing." And not even that there's a "we," but only that "I", the speaker, the doubter, exists.

So the world, the universe, is one of the very first things he points out we cannot know at all for certain...not if radical doubt is the standard.

But that's a big discussion.

...at first you say that a person who doesn't believe in God is defying the evidence. Then you say the disagreement "will be settled by which one has the best evidence". You can't defy evidence you don't have.

You've missed what I said about evidence.

There's a difference between having evidence, and treating it as evidence.

A simple example: right now, in America, they have Hunter Biden's laptop. It is full of evidence of criminal activities, implicating many people, and plausibly Joe Biden himself. But the authorities had it for a long time before that became known. Why? Because the authorities had the evidence, but refused to treat it or regard it AS evidence. Now, perhaps, they will treat the evidence they already had as evidence. But nobody's holding their breath, because against all obvious conclusions and justice, they seem not to want to.

All men have the evidence of Creation all around them, and in their own beings as well. They can look at the orderliness of nature, the laws by which it operates, the miracle of their own existence, the miracle of consciousness...none of which should mathematically ever have been expected to happen in an allegedly "random" universe...or they can look at their own DNA, and read the divine code of meaning placed therein...or they can say, "Fiddle-faddle: none of that counts."

That there are people who choose each approach is obvious. But both have all the evidence they need.

When Polanyi talks about faith, he doesn't mean it as some sort of calculation as you claim it is, he means feeling.

No, not feeling. He says that knowledge is "personal," (his actual term) that it never happens without some investment of personal faith in what one is doing, and one that comes prior to all possibility of knowing. It happens within a sort of faith community, taking the rules of that faith community for granted, and drawing upon assumptions believed because of our estimate of the credibility of the previous tradition. And here, he's describing not religion, but science itself. But it's a good and complicated argument, and one that deserves a reading, if you have time.

And if you don't like him, how about John Polkinghorn (the theoretical physicist /Anglican priest), or John Lennox (the Oxford mathematician and Christian apologist), or Francis Collins (leading geneticist and editor of the compendium "Belief" or Francis Bacon (the father of the scientific method itself) ...there are lots of voices that will point out the same thing. Science is a faith-based operation: always has been and always will be...so long as one understands "faith" in a non-debased way, that shouldn't even be controversial.

[Veritas Aequitas]

This is going off topic, nevertheless,

When Polanyi talks about faith, he doesn't mean it as some sort of calculation as you claim it is, he means feeling.

No, not feeling. He says that knowledge is "personal," (his actual term) that it never happens without some investment of personal faith in what one is doing, and one that comes prior to all possibility of knowing. It happens within a sort of faith community, taking the rules of that faith community for granted, and drawing upon assumptions believed because of our estimate of the credibility of the previous tradition.
And here, he's describing not religion, but science itself.
But it's a good and complicated argument, and one that deserves a reading, if you have time.

And if you don't like him, how about John Polkinghorn (the theoretical physicist /Anglican priest), or John Lennox (the Oxford mathematician and Christian apologist), or Francis Collins (leading geneticist and editor of the compendium "Belief" or Francis Bacon (the father of the scientific method itself) ...there are lots of voices that will point out the same thing. Science is a faith-based operation: always has been and always will be...so long as one understands "faith" in a non-debased way, that shouldn't even be controversial.

Polanyi's main theme is personal, i.e. his personal desperation to soothe the terrible cognitive dissonance exuding from an inherent existential crisis, he wrote;

Such an interpretation of society would seem to call for an extension in the direction towards God.
If the intellectual and moral tasks of society rest in the last resort on the free consciences of every generation, and these are continually making essentially new additions to our spiritual heritage, we may well assume that they are in continuous communication with the same source which first gave men their society-forming knowledge of abiding things.
How near that source is to God I shall not try to conjecture.
But I would express my belief that modern man will eventually return to God through the clarification of his cultural and social purposes.
Knowledge of reality and the acceptance of obligations which guide our consciences, once firmly realized, will reveal to us God in man and society.
-Polanyi

Scientists do rely on faith to some insignificant degrees but this is polished off during the process of intersubjective consensus within the scientific framework.

Your claim that theism [God exists] is based on evidence is very misleading with intent to be deceptive.

When science proves that X exists it is based on direct empirical evidence X as verified and justified within a human-based scientific Framework.
When science speculates based on existing empirical evidence, it will qualify such speculation with various degrees of uncertainty.

When theism insists God exists as absolutely real [without qualifications], it does not rely on the direct evidence of an empirical God as science does.
Rather theists make a intelligible leap to an intelligible entity [supersensible] that has no empirical possibility to be verified and justified empirically as real within a credible Framework and System of Knowledge.

• It is impossible, Kant argues, to extend knowledge to the supersensible realm of speculative metaphysics. The reason that knowledge has these constraints, Kant argues, is that the mind plays an active role in constituting the features of experience and limiting the mind’s access only to the empirical realm of space and time.
  https://iep.utm.edu/kantmeta/

It is Impossible for God to be Real
viewtopic.php?t=40229

[Will Bouwman]

Would you say your faith is equivalent to a scientist's hope that their experiment works?

My faith, like theirs is premised on evidence.

Then it isn't the sort of "personal faith" Polanyi is talking about.

But I think my evidence is a good deal better than what they usually have to go on, when they set out to design a truly new experiment.

That is personal faith.

Apparently not. Because that's not how evidence works. Evidence is empirical, which means it's always capable of being doubted. Some doubts are reasonable, and some are unreasonable; but every evidentiary situation is capable of doubt.

You don't distinguish between evidence and hypothesis.

I do, actually. You're mistaken.

No you don't. Every time you open your eyes you see evidence that suggests there is an external universe.

You can get into some outré metaphysics and doubt that there is a universe, but you cannot doubt the evidence for it. That is Descartes' point

Oooh. I see! You haven't read Descartes.

Of course I have, the difference is that I have understood him.

If you do, you'll find that Descartes says the exact opposite, actually. Surprise, suprise. He points out that it's possible to doubt all kinds of things...not just the external world, but your own physical body as well. Meditations 1 and 2 cover this in detail, you'll find.

This is where you fail to distinguish between evidence and hypothesis and simultaneously misunderstand Descartes: you can certainly doubt any hypothesis you draw from the evidence, perhaps because you are hallucinating, mad, dreaming or being deceived by an evil demon, as Descartes suggested, but what you cannot doubt is that the evidence exists, if only in your own mind.

Where Descartes is trying to get to is something (he thinks) we cannot doubt. And this is where his "cogito" comes in: "I think, therefore, I am." He thinks the only thing we can know for sure is that we are "a thinking thing."

Descartes' point is not that we think about the evidence, it is that we perceive it; you are taking 'I think' too literally.

...at first you say that a person who doesn't believe in God is defying the evidence. Then you say the disagreement "will be settled by which one has the best evidence". You can't defy evidence you don't have.

You've missed what I said about evidence.

There's a difference between having evidence, and treating it as evidence.

Indeed, and the difference is personal faith.

All men have the evidence of Creation all around them, and in their own beings as well.

That is your personal faith. Even allowing for faith to mean calculation, it is your personal calculation.

They can look at the orderliness of nature, the laws by which it operates, the miracle of their own existence, the miracle of consciousness...none of which should mathematically ever have been expected to happen in an allegedly "random" universe...or they can look at their own DNA, and read the divine code of meaning placed therein...or they can say, "Fiddle-faddle: none of that counts."

That there are people who choose each approach is obvious. But both have all the evidence they need.

Again, the difference is personal faith.

When Polanyi talks about faith, he doesn't mean it as some sort of calculation as you claim it is, he means feeling.

No, not feeling. He says that knowledge is "personal," (his actual term) that it never happens without some investment of personal faith in what one is doing, and one that comes prior to all possibility of knowing.

Which is a feeling.

It happens within a sort of faith community, taking the rules of that faith community for granted, and drawing upon assumptions believed because of our estimate of the credibility of the previous tradition.

Yes, it's what Ludwik Fleck called a 'thought collective'. As Max Planck said: “a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.” Everyone in science knows that there are different approaches to the same questions, and there are different research groups working on those problems. But underdetermination being what it is, different research groups using different approaches can produce equally efficacious strategies.

And here, he's describing not religion, but science itself. But it's a good and complicated argument, and one that deserves a reading, if you have time.

I had time when I was doing MSc history and philosophy of science.

And if you don't like him, how about John Polkinghorn (the theoretical physicist /Anglican priest)

Well at least there's one Anglican you approve of.

[Immanuel Can]

You don't distinguish between evidence and hypothesis.

I do, actually. You're mistaken.

No you don't. Every time you open your eyes you see evidence that suggests there is an external universe.

As Descartes argued, it is quite possible to doubt that what one sees when one opens one's eyes is real. One has to begin with a faith step: one has to assume, without having the means to prove it for certain, that one is not being deceived by some agency. But if you read Descartes first two meditations, you'll get this argument without me.

If you do, you'll find that Descartes says the exact opposite, actually. Surprise, suprise. He points out that it's possible to doubt all kinds of things...not just the external world, but your own physical body as well. Meditations 1 and 2 cover this in detail, you'll find.

This is where you fail to distinguish between evidence and hypothesis and simultaneously misunderstand Descartes: you can certainly doubt any hypothesis you draw from the evidence, perhaps because you are hallucinating, mad, dreaming or being deceived by an evil demon, as Descartes suggested, but what you cannot doubt is that the evidence exists, if only in your own mind.

The problem with that rejoinder is that it drops the meaning of "exists" to such a low level that unicorns, pixies and flat earths can also meet it. They, too, are things that can "exist, if only in [one's] mind."

So no, that won't give one the confidence that what is before one's eyes is "evidence." It will only take one so far as that necessary leap of faith, where one takes one's eyes for reliable. Yet we do still know one's eyes can deceive, and there are so many ways to demonstrate this that it cannot be doubted, really. For example, even watching a movie depends on a thing called "the persistence of vision," an effect by which the mind is tricked into interpreting a series of still photos, moved in succession, for fluid motion. If our eyes could not be fooled, we could not even enjoy...or even "see" a movie as we do.

Or which one of us has not thought we saw a friend at a distance, and we waved...only to realize, as he/she came closer, that our imagination had fooled us, and the one we "saw" as our friend was a stranger. That happens to everybody. And if eyes are perfect certifiers of truth, it simply could not happen. Our friend, then, only "existed in our own mind." But what "existed," in that sense, was not our friend.

Where Descartes is trying to get to is something (he thinks) we cannot doubt. And this is where his "cogito" comes in: "I think, therefore, I am." He thinks the only thing we can know for sure is that we are "a thinking thing."

Descartes' point is not that we think about the evidence, it is that we perceive it; you are taking 'I think' too literally.

Not at all. It's Descartes point. He's indicating that if we use radical doubt as an heuristic method, then there is nothing we know with absolute certainty, except that "I" exist...not that you, or anybody else does, since they could be false imaginings or deceptions foisted on one...and that the way one knows oneself to exist is because something has to be experiencing the doubt. That's all one really knows.

So Descartes "cogito" has been alternately translated as the argument, "I doubt, therefore I am." And that's exactly his point.

...at first you say that a person who doesn't believe in God is defying the evidence. Then you say the disagreement "will be settled by which one has the best evidence". You can't defy evidence you don't have.

You've missed what I said about evidence.

There's a difference between having evidence, and treating it as evidence.

Indeed, and the difference is personal faith.

Quite right!

The detective who assembles the evidence at a crime scene could see the broken glass on the victim's table either as incidental damage, or as part of the causes implicated in the death of the victim. Before he is going to discover that the liquid in the glass was poisoned, and that the victim squeezed the glass in his dying convulsion, he has to make the faith-step to say, "Possibly this glass could be part of the story here: I'd best consider that possibility." If he doesn't have any faith that the glass could be, if he simply dismisses it as relevant to the case, then for him, it forms no part of the evidence he employs in assembling the case against the murderer.

He has the evidence, but he fails to recognize it as the evidence it is. And that's his fault -- for being closed-minded on some alternate theory, perhaps.

All men have the evidence of Creation all around them, and in their own beings as well.

That is your personal faith.

Polanyi's point: all knowing involves personal faith.

They can look at the orderliness of nature, the laws by which it operates, the miracle of their own existence, the miracle of consciousness...none of which should mathematically ever have been expected to happen in an allegedly "random" universe...or they can look at their own DNA, and read the divine code of meaning placed therein...or they can say, "Fiddle-faddle: none of that counts."

That there are people who choose each approach is obvious. But both have all the evidence they need.

Again, the difference is personal faith.

Yes.

If one closes one's mind to all the above evidence, then one is exercising a faith that there is no God. One does not know it; but one is refusing to accept any evidence as evidence, because one has already closed one's mind on the alternate theory.
The evidence remains, but ceases to look like evidence to the observer, because of his pre-set faith.

When Polanyi talks about faith, he doesn't mean it as some sort of calculation as you claim it is, he means feeling.

No, not feeling. He says that knowledge is "personal," (his actual term) that it never happens without some investment of personal faith in what one is doing, and one that comes prior to all possibility of knowing.

Which is a feeling.

No, actually, it's distinct from mere feelings. What Polanyi's talking about is the investment of self that allows one to be willing to be convinced. That's why he doesn't simply call it "feeling" or "emotion." It's not that, and far more than that. It's the kind of faith step one takes when one walks onto an airplane: one doesn't know that the plane won't crash. Lots of people fear that it will, and yet many still fly. Sometimes, planes actually crash. Everybody knows that. And still, we fly every day.

Boarding any plane takes personal faith. That's what Polanyi's talking about: that knowing anything is inextricably tied with an investment of oneself in that proposition. The scientist who has no personal faith in a particular experiment will never perform that experiment. He'll perform another, in which he has more faith. And when he does, he will have to invest himself -- his time, his energies, his hopes, his resources, his expectations, his career -- in the exercise of practicing out that faith in reality. That's what's "personal" about "personal knowledge." It's not just some feeling; it's a conviction sufficient to warrant the commitment of self to an enterprise or a hypothesis.

And here, he's describing not religion, but science itself. But it's a good and complicated argument, and one that deserves a reading, if you have time.

I had time when I was doing MSc history and philosophy of science.

Then you'd enjoy Polanyi.

And if you don't like him, how about John Polkinghorn (the theoretical physicist /Anglican priest)

Well at least there's one Anglican you approve of.

All I said about Anglicans is that they're a mixed bag. That means that some are better, and some are worse. But you don't need to take my word for it. Take theirs. The Anglican Church, as you must surely know, is currently riven by controversies so serious as to rupture the entire structure, over basic moral and theological issues. Without even trying to take any sides on those, you know that one side or the other has gotten off the proper track. So Anglicans themselves are making the case that they're a mixed bag.

And yes, there are plenty of Anglicans of whom I approve; but not because they're Anglican...because some of them are decent folks and good Christians, with reasonable views.

[Will Bouwman]

As Descartes argued, it is quite possible to doubt that what one sees when one opens one's eyes is real.

Well of course he did, you can't invent a method of scepticism without a bit of scepticism. You really don't understand Descartes. The whole point of the cogito is that while you can doubt how you interpret what perceptions, or thoughts, you are having, you cannot doubt that you are having those thoughts. If you are having any perception, thought or doubt as you say, you necessarily exist; hence I think, therefore I am. There is no faith involved, which is precisely what Descartes was trying to achieve.
Polanyi was critical of any approach to science that denied the personal intuition of scientists, such as Descartes' and yes, he used the word faith, but it is your personal faith that he used it in the way you intend.

[Immanuel Can]

As Descartes argued, it is quite possible to doubt that what one sees when one opens one's eyes is real.

You really don't understand Descartes.

Meditations is right here on my desk, if you want to debate him.

The whole point of the cogito is that while you can doubt how you interpret what perceptions, or thoughts, you are having, you cannot doubt that you are having those thoughts. If you are having any perception, thought or doubt as you say, you necessarily exist; hence I think, therefore I am. There is no faith involved, which is precisely what Descartes was trying to achieve.

I'm not arguing against that reading, so far. But what happened to Descartes after that is famous: he aimed to build up certain knowledge from that foundation of absolute doubt. In particular, he aimed at eventually proving the existence of God, (His original title was, "Meditations on First Philosophy, in which the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are demonstrated": you can look that up, if you wish) but on the way, he also hoped to reconstruct the existence of all the things earlier denied in his heuristic exercise of absolute skepticism, this time on solid, undoubtable ground.

Subsequent philosophical consensus is that at this reclamation project, he utterly fails.

What most philosophers today would say about the strategy of radical doubt Descartes used is that itcan get us to something like certain knowledge that the "I" exists, at least inasmuch as we can say "a doubting thing" exists, whenever "doubting" is taking place. But dominant critical opinion is that once we get to that point, we can't crawl out of the epistemological hole we've dug, without once again returning to exercising some willingness to believe in things Descartes has already shown we can systematically doubt. So to "build back better" what Descartes tore down, we end up having to abandon his "radical doubt" methodology, and start believing in things we can't absolutely prove, or which at least we cannot manage not to see radical doubt call back into doubt.

What does this mean? It means that without some exercise of personal faith, we don't know what we are, we don't know we have a body, we don't know if we can trust our senses, and we don't know at all if an external world even exists, or just a realm of illusion presided over by some kind of malevolent deceiver.

To return from the "cogito" exercise requires faith, in other words. Yes, you can get to certain knowledge of the bare existence of a "doubter." But just one, and only yourself, whatever that "you" is. And you can't get anything more than that without using the method of personally committing to some kind of belief you have to admit you cannot absolutely prove...and which the skeptical method could still debunk.

[Will Bouwman]

You really don't understand Descartes.

Meditations is right here on my desk, if you want to debate him.

Fire away.

The whole point of the cogito is that while you can doubt how you interpret what perceptions, or thoughts, you are having, you cannot doubt that you are having those thoughts. If you are having any perception, thought or doubt as you say, you necessarily exist; hence I think, therefore I am. There is no faith involved, which is precisely what Descartes was trying to achieve.

I'm not arguing against that reading, so far.

Perhaps it is finally sinking in that I'm right and you're wrong.

But what happened to Descartes after that is famous: he aimed to build up certain knowledge from that foundation of absolute doubt.

Well, Descartes developed analytic geometry and the Cartesian coordinate system that bears his name. As a gifted mathematician, he hoped to apply the same axiomatic reasoning to philosophy.

In particular, he aimed at eventually proving the existence of God, (His original title was, "Meditations on First Philosophy, in which the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are demonstrated": you can look that up, if you wish)

Well there's the evidence and your interpretation of it. Alternative hypotheses include that he hoped to appease the Catholic church who were suspicious of Descartes and still had Galileo under house arrest when the Meditations was published in Latin. This was in contrast to the earlier Discourse on Method, which was first published in French and contains the cogito itself, Je pense, donc je suis. So anyone who translates that into I doubt, therefore I am, as you suggest, doesn't speak French. Another option is that it was simply marketing. 'Meditations on First Philosophy' isn't going to fly off the shelves, but demonstrating God and immortality is going to peak the interest.
So there you have three different explanations for exactly the same evidence: yours, that Descartes wished to prove God; another that he was cowed by church authorities and a third that he was in it for the money. This neatly brings us back to underdetermination and onto Polanyi's point that the only thing that can persuade you of a particular option is your personal faith and not some epistemological accounting you have been straining to show.

What does this mean? It means that without some exercise of personal faith, we don't know what we are, we don't know we have a body, we don't know if we can trust our senses, and we don't know at all if an external world even exists, or just a realm of illusion presided over by some kind of malevolent deceiver.

Yep, and you can live with that or apply your personal faith to any number of philosophies or religions.