What could make morality objective?

[Peter Holmes]

Elsewhere, people have been discussing the nature and importance for morality of what we call empathy, sympathy and compassion. I'd add kindness, gentleness, forgiveness, justice, fairness, and probably other things I can't remember at the moment - things that many or most of us think of as good.

If asked to explain our moral beliefs, judgements or opinions, many or most of us would probably appeal to one or more of these qualities or values. But such explanations come to an end - and moral objectivists want that 'end' to be factual - not a matter of belief, judgement or opinion - which it can never be. And that's our moral predicament.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Elsewhere, people have been discussing the nature and importance for morality of what we call empathy, sympathy and compassion. I'd add kindness, gentleness, forgiveness, justice, fairness, and probably other things I can't remember at the moment - things that many or most of us think of as good.

If asked to explain our moral beliefs, judgements or opinions, many or most of us would probably appeal to one or more of these qualities or values. But such explanations come to an end - and moral objectivists want that 'end' to be factual - not a matter of belief, judgement or opinion - which it can never be. And that's our moral predicament.

Exposing your ignorance, shallow, narrow and dogmatic thinking again, again and again.

What are empathic, sympathetic, and compassionate feelings in relation to morality CANNOT be Objective moral facts within a human based moral FSR-FSK.

BUT there is no denial the physical neural mechanisms that generate empathic, sympathetic, and compassionate feelings in relation to morality are Objective which can be verified via the science-biology-neuroscientific FSR-FSK; [can you deny this??]
when these facts are inputted and processed through the human-based moral FSR-FSK, they are objective moral facts.

[Iwannaplato]

Elsewhere, people have been discussing the nature and importance for morality of what we call empathy, sympathy and compassion. I'd add kindness, gentleness, forgiveness, justice, fairness, and probably other things I can't remember at the moment - things that many or most of us think of as good.

If asked to explain our moral beliefs, judgements or opinions, many or most of us would probably appeal to one or more of these qualities or values. But such explanations come to an end - and moral objectivists want that 'end' to be factual - not a matter of belief, judgement or opinion - which it can never be. And that's our moral predicament.

Exposing your ignorance, shallow, narrow and dogmatic thinking again, again and again.

What are empathic, sympathetic, and compassionate feelings in relation to morality CANNOT be Objective moral facts within a human based moral FSR-FSK.

BUT there is no denial the physical neural mechanisms that generate empathic, sympathetic, and compassionate feelings in relation to morality are Objective which can be verified via the science-biology-neuroscientific FSR-FSK; [can you deny this??]
when these facts are inputted and processed through the human-based moral FSR-FSK, they are objective moral facts.

Well, then aggression is also objective and found within....(all you say above)...and yes, you have acknowledged this in the past but given that both aggression (and the acts that go with aggression) and empathy (and the acts that go with it) are both objectively present in neuronal patterns, we have no grounds to favor one over the other. However you have always prioritized empathy.

The exact ratio of aggression to empathy present in human brains now is objective, if you are correct. But you keep saying we need to increase things like the oughtness not to kill.

This means, that you look at the objective presence of neuronal patterns in the brain and do NOT feel compelled to respect their objectiveness. You are hoping to increase, by various means, the amount of oughtness not to kill and rape, etc.

So, your value must be coming from somewhere else.

You write AS IF objective moral facts come from brains, but your values, rooted not in brains but in something else, allow you to judge

what should be enhanced in brains
and what should unenhanced in brains.

To this date you have never explained the real source of your moral values.

The real source, whatever it is, from which you judge the current ratio of aggressive to empathetic neuronal patterns in the brain and choose to hope for, root for and work towards changing.

Until you actually take responsibility for the actual source of your morality, every time you mount this argument you undermine it by OBVIOUSLY getting your moral values somewhere else.

If you can explain on what grounds you decide that we should change brains and change the ratio/strength of these two patterns in human brains, they a real discussion can take place.

Until then there is a gaping hole/contradiction.

[Veritas Aequitas]

The above is very short-sighted;

Note this!
Well, then aggression (anger) and other emotions [happiness, sadness, disgust, fear, surprise, ] are also objective and found within....(all you say above)...and yes, you have acknowledged this in the past but given that both aggression (and the acts that go with aggression) [all other emotions] and empathy (and the acts that go with it) are both /all objectively present in neuronal patterns, we have no grounds to favor one over the other.

The emotion of aggression is not exclusive to morality.
Aggression as with other emotions are involved in other non-moral functions.
Attention must be given to other emotions and their related impulses.

However you have always prioritized empathy.
Empathy is also not exclusive to morality.

Whilst empathy is not exclusive to morality, where it is applicable to morality, it is a significant element and thus given greater attention [not prioritized] because a highly active or more strong state of empathy will thwart & modulate all other emotions [aggression (anger) and other emotions aggression, happiness, sadness, disgust, fear, surprise, to ensure they do not lead to evil acts, thus enable the related good of morality.

[Peter Holmes]

Elsewhere, people have been discussing the nature and importance for morality of what we call empathy, sympathy and compassion. I'd add kindness, gentleness, forgiveness, justice, fairness, and probably other things I can't remember at the moment - things that many or most of us think of as good.

If asked to explain our moral beliefs, judgements or opinions, many or most of us would probably appeal to one or more of these qualities or values. But such explanations come to an end - and moral objectivists want that 'end' to be factual - not a matter of belief, judgement or opinion - which it can never be. And that's our moral predicament.

Exposing your ignorance, shallow, narrow and dogmatic thinking again, again and again.

What are empathic, sympathetic, and compassionate feelings in relation to morality CANNOT be Objective moral facts within a human based moral FSR-FSK.

BUT there is no denial the physical neural mechanisms that generate empathic, sympathetic, and compassionate feelings in relation to morality are Objective which can be verified via the science-biology-neuroscientific FSR-FSK; [can you deny this??]
when these facts are inputted and processed through the human-based moral FSR-FSK, they are objective moral facts.

Well, then aggression is also objective and found within....(all you say above)...and yes, you have acknowledged this in the past but given that both aggression (and the acts that go with aggression) and empathy (and the acts that go with it) are both objectively present in neuronal patterns, we have no grounds to favor one over the other. However you have always prioritized empathy.

The exact ratio of aggression to empathy present in human brains now is objective, if you are correct. But you keep saying we need to increase things like the oughtness not to kill.

This means, that you look at the objective presence of neuronal patterns in the brain and do NOT feel compelled to respect their objectiveness. You are hoping to increase, by various means, the amount of oughtness not to kill and rape, etc.

So, your value must be coming from somewhere else.

You write AS IF objective moral facts come from brains, but your values, rooted not in brains but in something else, allows you to judge

what should be enhanced in brains
and what should unenhanced in brains.

To this date you have never explained the real source of your moral values.

The real source, whatever it is, from which you judge the current ration of aggressive to empathetic neuronal patterns in the brain and choose to hope for, root for and work towards changing.

Until you actually take responsibility for the actual source of your morality, every time you mount this argument you undermine it by OBVIOUSLY getting your moral values somewhere else.

If you can explain one what grounds you decide that we should change brains and change the ratio/strength of these two patterns in human brains, they a real discussion can take place.

Until then there is a gaping hole/contradiction.

Agreed. You've explained this clearly to VA innumerable times - without effect. There's a block he just can't get over.

Why should we enhance some neurological features of the human brain, and not others? And is there a factual answer to that question? Or is the answer a matter of moral opinion?

We can predict that VA won't or can't see the significance of those questions. All we'll get is blather about morality-proper being about the reduction of evil - net detriment to the individual and society - and the promotion of good.

That we should reduce evil and promote good is, well, just a fact - and not a matter of opinion at all.

It's hopeless. The penny won't drop.

[Iwannaplato]

Agreed. You've explained this clearly to VA innumerable times - without effect. There's a block he just can't get over.

It's hopeless. The penny won't drop.

Yes, innumerable. Though I think I got the wording best this time. LOL.

That we should reduce evil and promote good is, well, just a fact - and not a matter of opinion at all.

And, obviously, what constitutes good vs. evil.
The Spartans would likely want a very different ratio of aggressive to empathetic neurons.
So, what do we show from neurological research to show that that the Spartans are wrong.

Spartans, at least with boys, but would want to enhance modern Western babies aggression.
VA would like to enhance empathy.

The Spartans would likely appeal to what they consider objectively good character traits.
VA would appeal to....and that's the question.

Given that he has never explained on what grounds he chooses to engance empathy and the oughtness not to kill (while he does in fact acknowledge that there is a oughtness to kill also)

one is left with the impression that it is just obvious. Of course we want people to be nicer and not harm others. Well, there's the root of his morality. It's not in brains. But perhaps he does have some other source for his objective determination of what should be enhanced in brains.

But as yet...crickets.

And at times objecting to his argument has been taken as objecting to empathy or giving up on moving the world to place where we are less violent, etc.

Which obviously need not be nor is it the case, speaking for myself.

[Iwannaplato]

Let me present it in a thought experiment format, see if VA bites.

Thought experiment

We have two philosophers: Veritas Aequitas & Aggressio Fautor.
From here on out VA & AF

VA focuses on mirror neurons as part of neuronal patterns that lead to an oughtness not to kill. He calls the oughtness not to kill an objective moral fact.

AF focuses on neuronal patterns in the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex that lead to aggression and an oughtness to dominate and assert (and sometimes kill). He calls the oughtness to be aggressive and assert oneself an objective moral fact.

Each see problems with the current stage of human brains.
VA wants to find ways to increase empathy.
AF wants to find ways to increase aggression.

How do we decide which one is right. And how do VA and AF demonstrate that the other one is wrong.

However VA demonstrates that AF is wrong will be the ACTUAL SOURCE of his morality. It will show how he chose the part of the brain and the type of behavior/attitude he prefers. It's not in brains, it comes from his values. Perhaps he will make the case that his choice is objective, but it will not be because X is in brains.

[Peter Holmes]

Let me present it in a thought experiment format, see if VA bites.

Thought experiment

We have two philosophers: Veritas Aequitas & Aggressio Fautor.
From here on out VA & AF

VA focuses on mirror neurons as part of neuronal patterns that lead to an oughtness not to kill. He calls the oughtness not to kill an objective moral fact.

AF focuses on neuronal patterns in the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex that lead to aggression and an oughtness to dominate and assert (and sometimes kill). He calls the oughtness to be aggressive and assert oneself an objective moral fact.

Each see problems with the current stage of human brains.
VA wants to find ways to increase empathy.
AF wants to find ways to increase aggression.

How do we decide which one is right. And how do VA and AF demonstrate that the other one is wrong.

However VA demonstrates that AF is wrong will be the ACTUAL SOURCE of his morality. It will show how he chose the part of the brain and the type of behavior/attitude he prefers. It's not in brains, it comes from his values. Perhaps he will make the case that his choice is objective, but it will not be because X is in brains.

Yep. Sadly, thought-experiments require thought. I've tried the following related one with VA, to no avail.

Premise: Humans are programmed with ought-to-kill-humans.
Conclusion: Therefore, humans ought to kill humans.

I asked VA to consider this argument: does the conclusion follow from the premise? If not - and of course it doesn't - then consider the following argument.

Premise: Humans are programmed with ought-not-to-kill-humans.
Conclusion: Therefore, humans ought not to kill humans.

If the first argument is a non sequitur, then so is the second. (And there's no mention of rightness and wrongness.)

VA can't process this.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Let me present it in a thought experiment format, see if VA bites.

Thought experiment

We have two philosophers: Veritas Aequitas & Aggressio Fautor.
From here on out VA & AF

VA focuses on mirror neurons as part of neuronal patterns that lead to an oughtness not to kill. He calls the oughtness not to kill an objective moral fact.

AF focuses on neuronal patterns in the amygdala and orbitofrontal cortex that lead to aggression and an oughtness to dominate and assert (and sometimes kill). He calls the oughtness to be aggressive and assert oneself an objective moral fact.

Each see problems with the current stage of human brains.
VA wants to find ways to increase empathy.
AF wants to find ways to increase aggression.

How do we decide which one is right. And how do VA and AF demonstrate that the other one is wrong.

However VA demonstrates that AF is wrong will be the ACTUAL SOURCE of his morality. It will show how he chose the part of the brain and the type of behavior/attitude he prefers. It's not in brains, it comes from his values. Perhaps he will make the case that his choice is objective, but it will not be because X is in brains.

Yep. Sadly, thought-experiments require thought. I've tried the following related one with VA, to no avail.

Premise: Humans are programmed with ought-to-kill-humans.
Conclusion: Therefore, humans ought to kill humans.

I asked VA to consider this argument: does the conclusion follow from the premise? If not - and of course it doesn't - then consider the following argument.

Premise: Humans are programmed with ought-not-to-kill-humans.
Conclusion: Therefore, humans ought not to kill humans.

If the first argument is a non sequitur, then so is the second. (And there's no mention of rightness and wrongness.)

VA can't process this.

Strawman as usual a 'million' times.
I have also corrected and presented a valid argument which you ignore because it is too complex for you to grasp.
Your sort of perverted thinking is because you as a philosophical realist is grounding your views on morality based on an illusion.

PH's Philosophical Realism is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39992

PH's What is Fact is Illusory
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=39577

Here is my argument proper:
Premise 1: Humans are programmed with an ought-not-ness-to-kill-humans. [science-biology-FSK]
Premise 2: The ought-not-ness-to-kill-humans is a critical moral principle as guide within a human-based moral FSK.
Conclusion: Therefore, within the conditions of a human-based moral FSK, ought-not-ness to kill humans is to be used a guide only.

Each see problems with the current stage of human brains.
VA wants to find ways to increase empathy.
AF wants to find ways to increase aggression.

How do we decide which one is right. And how do VA and AF demonstrate that the other one is wrong.

If one were to have reflective thinking and has advanced knowledge of human nature,
it is obvious improving increasing empathy in relation to morality, good will definitely prevails over aggression.

To increase aggression, AF will have to create lesions in all humans and turned all of them into psychopaths.
This is perversion and abhorrent for any ordinary humans.

[Peter Holmes]

I have...corrected and presented a valid argument which you ignore because it is too complex for you...

Here is my argument proper:
Premise 1: Humans are programmed with an ought-not-ness-to-kill-humans. [science-biology-FSK]
Premise 2: The ought-not-ness-to-kill-humans is a critical moral principle as guide within a human-based moral FSK.
Conclusion: Therefore, within the conditions of a human-based moral FSK, ought-not-ness to kill humans is to be used a guide only.

As IWP keeps pointing out, humans are also programmed with oughtness-to kill-humans. So why not go for oughtness-to-kill-humans as a moral principle? Try to think very hard.

If one were to have reflective thinking and has advanced knowledge of human nature,
it is obvious improving increasing empathy in relation to morality, good will definitely prevails over aggression.

Why is it so hard for you to concentrate on and have a go at answering a question? Try again.

Why SHOULD we increase human empathy?

Why SHOULD good prevail over aggression?

And anyway, why is aggression NOT GOOD?

[Iwannaplato]

First you respond to PH, but you do not do so completely. You simply restate your position.

Here is my argument proper:
Premise 1: Humans are programmed with an ought-not-ness-to-kill-humans. [science-biology-FSK]
Premise 2: The ought-not-ness-to-kill-humans is a critical moral principle as guide within a human-based moral FSK.
Conclusion: Therefore, within the conditions of a human-based moral FSK, ought-not-ness to kill humans is to be used a guide only.

You did not explain what is wrong with the first Premise->Conclusion in PH's post....

Premise: Humans are programmed with ought-to-kill-humans.
Conclusion: Therefore, humans ought to kill humans.

I asked VA to consider this argument: does the conclusion follow from the premise? If not - and of course it doesn't - then consider the following argument.

Premise: Humans are programmed with ought-not-to-kill-humans.
Conclusion: Therefore, humans ought not to kill humans.

Here you respond to my question.....

Each see problems with the current stage of human brains.
VA wants to find ways to increase empathy.
AF wants to find ways to increase aggression.

How do we decide which one is right. And how do VA and AF demonstrate that the other one is wrong.

If one were to have reflective thinking and has advanced knowledge of human nature,
it is obvious improving increasing empathy in relation to morality, good will definitely prevails over aggression.

All you are doing here is saying 1) it's obvious and 2) if anyone disagrees they are not smart.

There's no argument, no justification. And this is the exact spot we have been trying to get you to 1) own as where your individual moral values come in. They are not coming from brains, they are coming from your preferences.

To increase aggression, AF will have to create lesions in all humans and turned all of them into psychopaths.
This is perversion and abhorrent for any ordinary humans.

This is an appeal to popularity (sentence 2) after some kind of slippery slope argument.

And remember, those are not the only two possible postions. Another postion could be that there are aggressive neuronal tendencies and empathetic neuronal tendencies and we take the current ratio to be just fine.

So we seek to neither increase empathy nor to increase aggression. And whatever solutions we have for current problems are not aimed at changing the strengths or rations of neuronal patterns. We cannot tell Spartans not people with this third reaction that they are not being objective. Adn if brain patterns show objectivity, well, leaving the current ratio is objective.

There are cultures, like the Spartans, who think that humans do better with more aggression than the average person in the West has. They can, just like you, look in the brain and find neuronal patterns for aggression and argue that aggression is thus an objective moral fact.

So, you cannot appeal to the brain to sort this out.
You have to appeal to values. You value is to keep as many people alive and reduce violence. Fine, I share this value, this preference. But it's not objective.
The Spartan might feel that aggression, which is a part of asserting oneself and not worrying so much about what others might think, will lead to greatness: great achievements, strong leadership, daring artists and inventors, and yes, brave soldiers and more violence.

For them that trade off is good.
For you (and for me) that trade off is not what we want.

But we have no objective source to prove the Spartans (and their modern counterparts) are wrong.

We cannot demonstrate it by pointing to the brain.

We can't demonstate this by ad populum arguments: most people in the world think atheism is perversion and abhorrent for any ordinary humans

You can't slippery slope it either. The Spartans were not psychopaths, though they probably had more psychopaths or people who acted like them, just as CEOs of companies have a higher incidence of psychopathy.

They just want more aggression than the average modern shows. Not complete aggression. I am sure they showed some empathy to people in group and brave enemies and so on.

Your argument is, more or less, it's obvious. And it's abhorrant.

But those are subjective arguments.

I too have no interest in living in a Spartan society. I'd rather be in Athens back then, though I'm pretty sure they would have felt more aggressive, on average, also.

All this time we have been dealing with this
it's in the brain, so it's objective moral fact.

PH and I are trying to show that all sorts of moralities can be justified using 'it's in the brain.' We don't get an objective moral position looking at brains.

Your personal taste then comes in and chooses one part of the brain to 'make' your position objective. But it doesn't, precisely because some Spartan can come in and use another part of the brain to 'make' his position objective.

The real agent in your position is all the stuff you put here:

To increase aggression, AF will have to create lesions in all humans and turned all of them into psychopaths.
This is perversion and abhorrent for any ordinary humans.

That is the part you need to show is objective. And it's not. Because there are people whose preference is more social darwinist. They are happy to have natural and human selection weed out the weed and increase the greatness of the great. The loss of the weak is not something they prioritize.
I don't like them. But I cannot turn to some authority to prove they are objectively wrong.

And given the argument, really a reaction, you present, I don't think you can either. Your reaction is 'that's horrible'. I have empathy for that reaction, but it's not a justification for your position.

Yes, objectively there are parts of the brain that give us a tendency to be empathetic.
We also have other parts of the brain.

We cannot point to one part and claim our choice of that part to enhance is objective.

It depends on our goals and values and humans have a myriad.

[Peter Holmes]

Premise: My team's god thinks/says X is morally wrong - or didn't create humans to do or endorse X.
Conclusion: Therefore, X is morally wrong.

This argument is invalid, for any value of X. And its unsoundness is obvious.

And an argument from undesirable consequences, actual or perceived - such as the absence of moral objectivity - is an informal fallacy.

[FlashDangerpants]

Premise: My team's god thinks/says X is morally wrong - or didn't create humans to do or endorse X.
Conclusion: Therefore, X is morally wrong.

This argument is invalid, for any value of X. And its unsoundness is obvious.

And an argument from undesirable consequences, actual or perceived - such as the absence of moral objectivity - is an informal fallacy.

There's epistemic warrant and then there's ontological claim. God saying that X is epistemically viable as a reason to believe that X, but it doesn't answer any ontological question about what makes the thing right/wrong. We know that IC cares deeply about this divide, he invokes it frequently to criticise others. So technically the above should be redone with whatever is the ontological aspect that makes the goodness/wrongness/badness a property of the event/decision/outcome/whatever rather than the mere epistemic claim that we should believe X because it is endorsed by a big frightening sky beast. That would only be fair.

[Peter Holmes]

Premise: My team's god thinks/says X is morally wrong - or didn't create humans to do or endorse X.
Conclusion: Therefore, X is morally wrong.

This argument is invalid, for any value of X. And its unsoundness is obvious.

And an argument from undesirable consequences, actual or perceived - such as the absence of moral objectivity - is an informal fallacy.

There's epistemic warrant and then there's ontological claim. God saying that X is epistemically viable as a reason to believe that X, but it doesn't answer any ontological question about what makes the thing right/wrong. We know that IC cares deeply about this divide, he invokes it frequently to criticise others. So technically the above should be redone with whatever is the ontological aspect that makes the goodness/wrongness/badness a property of the event/decision/outcome/whatever rather than the mere epistemic claim that we should believe X because it is endorsed by a big frightening sky beast. That would only be fair.

I don't follow what you mean by 'epistemic warrant' and 'epistemically viable'. Is this your claim?:

My team's god saying X is morally wrong is a sufficient reason to believe that X is morally wrong.

If so, why? Put it like this. I agree the following is valid:

P1 What A says is true.
P2 A says X is morally wrong.
C Therefore, (it's true that) X is morally wrong.

But the issue is the supposed truth-value of a moral assertion. So assuming it does or can have a truth-value doesn't work.

[FlashDangerpants]

Premise: My team's god thinks/says X is morally wrong - or didn't create humans to do or endorse X.
Conclusion: Therefore, X is morally wrong.

This argument is invalid, for any value of X. And its unsoundness is obvious.

And an argument from undesirable consequences, actual or perceived - such as the absence of moral objectivity - is an informal fallacy.

There's epistemic warrant and then there's ontological claim. God saying that X is epistemically viable as a reason to believe that X, but it doesn't answer any ontological question about what makes the thing right/wrong. We know that IC cares deeply about this divide, he invokes it frequently to criticise others. So technically the above should be redone with whatever is the ontological aspect that makes the goodness/wrongness/badness a property of the event/decision/outcome/whatever rather than the mere epistemic claim that we should believe X because it is endorsed by a big frightening sky beast. That would only be fair.

I don't follow what you mean by 'epistemic warrant' and 'epistemically viable'. Is this your claim?:

My team's god saying X is morally wrong is a sufficient reason to believe that X is morally wrong.

If so, why? Put it like this. I agree the following is valid:

P1 What A says is true.
P2 A says X is morally wrong.
C Therefore, (it's true that) X is morally wrong.

But the issue is the supposed truth-value of a moral assertion. So assuming it does or can have a truth-value doesn't work.

I'm just saying that IC doesn't like it when you portray his argument that way, and he also tends to make a big deal about the difference between the epistemological calim that we can know that X is wrong becvuase God says X is wrong and the ontological claim that X is a wrong thing. But I can't fix the syllogism because I don't know what the thing is that makes X wrong in IC's terms. All I know is that any attempt to get to the bottom of that question seems to go in a different direction when you aren't looking, as any conversation with IC tends to do.

His P1 is something along the lines of God does know what properties make X right or wrong. After that, I don't know if you are supposed to ever know about that or if you are required to accept stuff on faith. I don't think you as a mortal are supposed to have the capacity of moral reasoning without God's intervention, but the details are obscure because they are hidden behind a man who has nothing to gain by speaking the truth plainly.