Harry Baird wrote: ↑Sat Jul 15, 2023 1:47 amI led with the term "natural rights", which is, unless I'm misunderstanding, one of your preferred terms.
Ah, my mistake then: when you said you challenged me on my terms I assumed you meant on
my terms, not my
terms.
What I want to know is what it is (on your view) about a person that qualifies him/her for natural rights, and why you think non-human sentient beings lack it (and, if applicable, which non-human sentient beings you do think possess it.
For the purposes of this conversation, I'm interested in personhood only insofar as it pertains to those attributes of a being which qualify that being for moral consideration
*sigh*
Fine.
("natural rights" in your terms, if I understand correctly).
Same page check: what do you think I mean when I talk about
natural rights?
My working answer (open to revision), then, to the question as to what those attributes are is:
Sentience, especially the capacity to feel, and most especially the capacity to suffer. This confers on that being the right not to be harmed where that harm can be avoided or minimized.
So, someone afflicted with congenital insensitivity to pain has no such right?
The holding of preferences, wants, and desires. This confers on that being the right to have its preferences, wants, and desires respected where they don't interfere with those of other beings.
This (preferences, wants, and desires) seems to call for sumthin' more than just sentience (being able to perceive or feel).
My working answer:
a person is a being naturally and normally capable of and subject to moral judgement. Sorry, I can't just lay out a laundry list of
attributes, not without some examination of each. For example, I say
only free wills are capable of and subject to moral judgement. What, then, is a free will? From there we go into agent causality vs event causality, the coherence and persistence of identity, the nature of morality, and on and on. But you wanna work backwards...*shrug*...okay, we'll work backwards.