Morality: To Wittgenstein Pure Realism is Solipsism

[Skepdick]

In other words, Wittgenstein believed that if we take a purely realistic stance, disregarding the importance of our linguistic and social practices, we risk falling into solipsism, where we isolate ourselves within our own minds and deny the existence of anything beyond our subjective experiences.

Anyone can argue ChatGPT is wrong with the above?

Sure, that's easy. It's easy to point out the silliness of Chatgpt's argument. Look at that sentence above. Then remember that Realism asssumes or asserts a mind independent reality. Right???????

That's what you, VA, are always saying is absurd about Realism.

Well, if realists think there is a mind-independent reality and we can know about it, then they cannot possibly be solipsists. Because solipsists believe there is only their mind.

It is utterly contradictory and silly what Chatgpt wrote.

Solipsism is a kind of antirealism, in part because it denies the existence of a mind-independent reality including other minds. It's not the same anti realism that VA asserts, but it is an antirealism.

Does there ever come a point in your philosophical understanding where you comprehend how logical equivalence works?

If a mind has direct access to reality, and there are no restrictions or limits on this directness of access, then threre is no difference between a mind accessing itself; or a mind accessing reality.

This trivially implies that the two ontologies are equivalent. That mind = reality.

Direct realism is isomorphic to solipsism.

[Veritas Aequitas]

3. mind-independence of the presumed outside world in the non-absolute sense, that there is a shared objective reality "out there" and every human perceives it in a different way, while the mind is also part of this world: this form of mind-independence is probably correct, using science we could build an accurate model, mapping of this objective reality, and this model is a thousands times better and bigger than anything else, yet can be made to account for everything.

That 'objective reality' i.e. claimed as the positive noumenon is an illusion.

As Kant had warned;

• There will therefore be Syllogisms which contain no Empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude from something which we know* to something else of which we have no Concept,
  and to which, owing to an inevitable Illusion, we yet ascribe Objective Reality.
  
  They {conclusion of illusions} are sophistications not of men but of Pure Reason [primal]itself.
  Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them {the illusions}.
  After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. CPR-B397

Philosophical Realism is;

• Philosophical realism – is the view that a certain kind of thing [reality] has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.
  -WIKI

There are those who held both realists and non-realists views in their various perspectives but they ultimately are grounded on either philosophical realism or ANTI-PhilosophicaRealism.
For example, Kant was both a realist [empirical] and non-realist but his ultimate grounded view is ANTI-PhilosophicaRealism.
The majority of so-claimed 'realists' but mixed with non-realism are fundamentally hardcore Philosophical Realists [as defined above].

In the above case, his view is fundamentally ultimately that of Philosophical realism.

Why??
As Kant warned;
"After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him."

Why?
because the evolutionary default of external_ness instinct is so primal, primitive, proto- thus very strong in driving him to adopt that external-ness as an ideology in the form of Philosophical Realism [which is potentially dangerous].

Why?
because the idea of nothingness [something from nothing] is so painful from cognitive dissonance driven by an existential crisis that the philosophical realist must grab on to 'something' in this case, the positive noumenon.

In a similar vein, but stronger, the theist [fundamentally a philosophical realist] must grab onto a mind-independent God which is illusory to soothe the pains of cognitive dissonances.

[Veritas Aequitas]

While skeptics deny we can have knowledge of reality, they still fall back on either being a realist or non-realist.

Even pragmatists do the same;

A general view from ChatGPT [with reservations];

"While pragmatism as a philosophical tradition does not have a unified stance on realism, there have been pragmatist thinkers who have expressed realist inclinations in their work. Here are a few pragmatist philosophers who have been associated with a realist perspective:

Charles S. Peirce: Peirce, considered one of the founders of pragmatism, developed a pragmatic realism. He argued that beliefs are "constrained" by the world and that our theories should align with reality. Peirce emphasized the importance of truth and the objective nature of inquiry.

William James: James, another key figure in pragmatism, had a nuanced view on realism. While he is often associated with pragmatism's anti-realist tendencies, he also recognized the significance of the external world. James acknowledged the existence of a mind-independent reality and highlighted the importance of our experiences and interactions with it.

Hilary Putnam: Putnam, a contemporary philosopher, has been associated with both pragmatism and realism. He argued for a pragmatic realism that emphasizes the practical success and correspondence of our beliefs to the world. Putnam's work explores the relationship between language, meaning, and reality.

Susan Haack: Haack is a contemporary philosopher who has been influenced by pragmatism and defends a form of scientific realism. She argues that scientific theories are tools for understanding the world and that our beliefs should be grounded in evidence and experience.

It's important to note that these philosophers may have nuanced and multifaceted perspectives, and their views on realism may vary within their own works.
Pragmatism encompasses a wide range of thinkers and interpretations, so there may be other pragmatists who have expressed realist inclinations as well.
Further exploration of the writings and works of these philosophers will provide a more comprehensive understanding of their views on realism within the context of pragmatism."

Note this thread;
All Philosophies are Reducible to ‘Realism’ vs ‘ANTI-Realism’
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=28643

[Iwannaplato]

I still don't see how we can have other minds with a no-noumena philosophy.

I think there is a problem for the individual antirealist. IOW one argument the antirealist can make is that each mind is not noumenon. It experiences, it exists. But this is, I think, a bird's eye view argument. Really, the antirealist gets out of bed and does not have access to these other minds. They have access to behaviors and facial expressions and in mirrors they look like these other people, however they have no direct experience of the subjective aspects of the other people's experiencing. I saw it once described - in relation antirealism and other minds - as no accesss to the other's sensing. There's a lot there to infer that there is another mind. But once the door is opened for inferring the existence of things not directly experienced, it seems like other noumena should also be allowed to be inferred.

Another approach would be to say that experiencing the words, voice, facial expressions, body language, etc of the other person is experiencing another mind. I don't think this holds, given that we don't (seem to) experience the actual subjectivity. They could be zombies. We could be said to experience some of the cognitive type processes, but not the conscious awareness facet. I suppose one could argue there that these two must always be present and then the realist can counter with this being another inferring.

Knowledge of other minds seems to be a prime
example of inferential knowledge. However, McDowell argues that construing knowledge of
other minds as indirect, inferential, leads to skepticism and fails to give a plausible account of
our use of mental concepts. We must, he suggests, make a radical break with the traditional
picture of the mind as ‘inner’ and hidden behind the ‘outer’, mere behaviour, and this
requires saying that the fact that another person is in a certain mental state is open to direct observation: “On a suitable occasion, the circumstance that someone else is in some ‘inner’
state can itself be an object of one’s experience.”

From...
https://www2.philosophy.su.se/wikforss/ ... 0minds.pdf
He seems to end up having a mixed conclusion about McDowell's argument.
To me it seems something like the Turing test. We can have a functional criterion for when we classify something as a mind. We get fooled into thinking it is a person. And we black box the issue of 'are we dealing with an experiencer, something that is conscious'.
Mind is ambiguous. It can be functions and cognitive skills. It can also mean something that experiences. I think inference is necessary, at least for most people who do not allow for what would be paranormal perception of others when one actually experiences the experiencing of another mind. I dream your dream with you for example and directly feel your experiencing.

And the realist is not saying inferring is bad, the antirealist infers here so they are wrong.
It's the realist noting that the antirealist is anti-inference, so how does the anti-realist reach the conclusion there are other minds.

[Skepdick]

But once the door is opened for inferring the existence of things not directly experienced, it seems like other noumena should also be allowed to be inferred.

What's the difference between a thing "directly" experienced and a thing "indirectly" experienced?

What is that which differentiates between the different types of experiences?

[Atla]

I think there is a problem for the individual antirealist. IOW one argument the antirealist can make is that each mind is not noumenon. It experiences, it exists. But this is, I think, a bird's eye view argument. Really, the antirealist gets out of bed and does not have access to these other minds. They have access to behaviors and facial expressions and in mirrors they look like these other people, however they have no direct experience of the subjective aspects of the other people's experiencing. I saw it once described - in relation antirealism and other minds - as no accesss to the other's sensing. There's a lot there to infer that there is another mind. But once the door is opened for inferring the existence of things not directly experienced, it seems like other noumena should also be allowed to be inferred.

Imo if we say that "well yeah, there could be other minds, but I won't infer them because they are noumenal", then that's solipsism in practice.

[Veritas Aequitas]

...

Denying even the possibility of noumena = only "my" appearances exist in this very moment, and there's nothing else. Not only is that solipsism, but it's a solipsism where even "my" past and future don't exist, and nothing can make any sense anyway.
It's a completely nonsensical philosophy.

Strawman!!
I had posted this a '1000' times.
Reality: Emergence & Realization Prior to Perceiving [appearances], Knowing & Describing
viewtopic.php?f=8&t=40145

I have never claimed "only "my" appearances exist in this very moment".

Before anything is an 'appearance' that thing has to emerge and realized before it is cognized as 'appearances' 'perceived', known and described. [see above thread]
That emerged, realized and real thing is conditioned upon a human-based Framework and System of Realization [FSR] before it is known via the FSK.
Because it is human-based it cannot be the logical object 'noumenon' which is a thing-by-itself or thing-in-itself.

This thing [or other minds] that emerged and realized can be mind-independent as conditioned within a human-based FSR-FSK.
As such, this sense of mind-independence [Empirical Realism] is a subset of ANTI-PhilosophicalRealism.

What is real to the ANTI-PhilosophicalRealism are all things internal and external [incl. other minds].
The ANTI-PhilosophicalRealism do not adopt this belief of external-ness and mind-independence as an ideology.
Thus, ANTI-PhilosophicalRealism cannot be a solipsist [only one's mind exists].

The Philosophical realist insist reality and things are mind-independent.
But reality and things as mind-independent is illusory.
In this case, other minds are independent of the p-realist mind.
Thus, the only real thing is the p-realists mind.
Solipsism is believing only one's mind is real.
Therefore the philosophical realist is a solipsist.

Before any one critique the above, it would be advisable the present their understanding to the above in their own words to avoid strawmaning.

[Veritas Aequitas]

..

It's also an antirealism (pardon my repetition in-thread) because there is no mind independent reality.
For a year VA has been harping on the 'absurd realist belief' in a mind independent reality.
Suddenly realism, for VA, is solipsism, despite the fact that solipsism denies not only a mind independent reality but also other minds. Neither of which realism denies.
Solipsism is one form of antirealism, not his, but certainly falls into the metaphysics of an antirealism. By definition. By VA's definition. According to VA's dozens of threads on realism, it cannot possibly be solipsistic.
And that also is nonsense.

Philosophical Realism claims reality and things are mind-independent.
But a mind-independent reality [including other minds] are illusory, thus do not exists as real.
A solipsist also claim a mind independent reality [including other minds] are illusory, thus do not exists as real.
Therefore a philosophical realist is solipsistic.

[Iwannaplato]

I think there is a problem for the individual antirealist. IOW one argument the antirealist can make is that each mind is not noumenon. It experiences, it exists. But this is, I think, a bird's eye view argument. Really, the antirealist gets out of bed and does not have access to these other minds. They have access to behaviors and facial expressions and in mirrors they look like these other people, however they have no direct experience of the subjective aspects of the other people's experiencing. I saw it once described - in relation antirealism and other minds - as no accesss to the other's sensing. There's a lot there to infer that there is another mind. But once the door is opened for inferring the existence of things not directly experienced, it seems like other noumena should also be allowed to be inferred.

Imo if we say that "well yeah, there could be other minds, but I won't infer them because they are noumenal", then that's solipsism in practice.

Of course. Yes, that would be solipsistic.
I know that VA does not do that. IOW VA does not assert that his is the only mind. I believe he believes in other minds.
I am interested in how he justifies the belief in other minds and how this can be done without an process of inference that he does not allow in other cases. How does his belief in his physics FSK NOT lead to him no longer believing in other minds, given it's argument against inferring causes to experienced phenomena.

Unfortunately he avoids the issue by referring to other FSKs. When talking about external reality or reality in general, the physics FSK holds. And in that FSK what is not directly experienced does not exist. That should hold for everything. But when challenged regarding other minds, he no longer applies the physics FSK - which should be the base reality FSK under all other FSKs.

Some might argue that other minds exist and create their own realities. Sure, but he doesn't know, as an individual non-realist, that they have minds. Or so it seems to me. He is simply assuming that from common sense. But according to his physics FSK actually he has no access to anything beyond his experience. And his individual experience does not contain other minds. He has to infer them. Why is he allowed to infer but not realists?

Realists infer ding an sich or neoumena as the source of experienced phenomena.
This is bad and barbaric and primitive.
But it seems VA infers the existence of other minds based on behavior and so on. He infers a source for what he can experience of other humans. why does he get to do this?

[Iwannaplato]

1) Philosophical Realism claims reality and things are mind-independent.
2) But a mind-independent reality [including other minds] are illusory, thus do not exists as real.
3) A solipsist also claim a mind independent reality [including other minds] are illusory, thus do not exists as real.
4) Therefore a philosophical realist is solipsistic.

You need to take that argument to someone you know in real life who you respect. Go to a local university and show it to a professor whose course you've audited or some other mentor or professional you respect. Seriously, that argument makes no sense.

2 and 3: 2 is a non-realist position, 3 is a solipsist position.
You just demonstrated kinship between non-realism/antirealism and solipsism.
Which makes sense: solipsism is a kind of antirealism. It's not your anti-realism, but it is a kind of anti-realism.

The mistake in your argument is glaring.

I know that you will nto believe me. I have seen that you did not believe Flannel Jesus when he showed you this, despite him being much more patient than I am.

I don't see you changing you mind here in the context of Philosophy Now.

But for yourself, for you own sake, find some person you respect who has knowledge of rational argument or better a philosophy professor and ask them for feedback on that argument.

I believe you have said before that you have audited and taken quite a number of college courses. You must have respected some of these people or you would have considered the education worthless and clearly that was not the case.

Run the above by a few of those professors. Get some feedback from people who you have never had longstanding arguments or disagreements with. People who you can be sure have no ax to grind with you.

Hell, you could even email some well known antirealists. Well known people don't always respond, but actually in my experience a lot of professionals, even famous ones will respond. I have done quite a bit of this.

Show your argument to an antirealist, someone who has no motivation to find fault.

Because you're argument is really quite obviously unsound and you are a smart person, so I think it's important you find out that it's unsound so you can figure out how you could have missed such an obvious error.

[Veritas Aequitas]

2 and 3: 2 is a non-realist position, 3 is a solipsist position.
You just demonstrated kinship between non-realism/antirealism and solipsism.
Which makes sense: solipsism is a kind of antirealism. It's not your anti-realism, but it is a kind of anti-realism.

Personally, I believe solipsism is an incoherent idea.
The Incoherence of Solipsism
https://iep.utm.edu/solipsis/#H7

But for the sake of this dispute;
I believe there is some missing premises which I had not been able to present clearly YET.

Solipsism is a kind of anti-realism only from the perspective of philosophical realism.
But philosophical realism itself is groundless and illusory, for philosophical realism to claim solipsism is anti-realism is meaningless in terms of reality.

From another perspective, philosophical realism is also a type of anti-realism i.e. anti-EmpiricalRealism within certain perspectives.
A Realist is also an anti-realist [Idealist].
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=32913

Since solipsism is anti-realism and
Philosophical realism is also anti-realism,
therefore philosophical realism is solipsistic.

Philosophical realists do not claim to be solipsistic,
but when they insist others are solipsistic,
they are kicking their own arse in not realizing from deeper reflective thinking, philosophical realists themselves are somehow solipsistic.

[Iwannaplato]

1) Philosophical Realism claims reality and things are mind-independent.
2) But a mind-independent reality [including other minds] are illusory, thus do not exists as real.
3) A solipsist also claim a mind independent reality [including other minds] are illusory, thus do not exists as real.
4) Therefore a philosophical realist is solipsistic.

5) An antirealist also claims a mind independent reality is illusory, thus does not exist as real.
6) Therefore an antirealist is a solipsist.

I mean, 5 and 6 make much more sense. Even if 6 does not follow.

3) is just plain fast in that 'also'. The realist does not claim mind-independent reality is illusory. So, the also is a hallucination. Number 2 is an antirealist belief.

There are other reasons the above does not work.
REalism allows us to infer things we do not directly experience. Other minds fit in that category.
Using number 2 would mean that EVERYONE is a solipsist. If they believe there is mind-independent reality, then they are like solipsists because they believe in an illusion. If they believe there is no mind independent reality, well, that's what solipsists believe, so those people are also solipsists. It is ludicrous sophistry.

Take it to someone you respect who ran a course you respected, whose mind you respect. Show them that argument.

Google some prominant antirealists, find their bios and where they teach. It's usually easy to get email addresses of university professors. Again you might as well pick antirealists. IOW people who would be happy to have a short, neat argument demonstrating that realism is solipsism.

You're not open to feedback here. So, pick someone whose opinion you respect and whose bias, if any, would be for your argument not against it.

Cause this is just silly.

[FlashDangerpants]

Since solipsism is anti-realism and
Philosophical realism is also anti-realism,
therefore philosophical realism is solipsistic.

Since wome are humans with tits and
VA is also human
Therefore VA has tits


Tune in next week for news about VA's vagina.

[Iwannaplato]

Since solipsism is anti-realism and
Philosophical realism is also anti-realism,
therefore philosophical realism is solipsistic.

Since wome are humans with tits and
VA is also human
Therefore VA has tits


Tune in next week for news about VA's vagina.

I think you're not looking on the bright side of VA's logic for atheists.

1) Theism claims there is a God.
2) But God is illusory, thus does not exists as real.
3) An atheist also claims God is illusory, thus does not exist as real.
4) Therefore theists are atheists.

Everyone is an atheist.

Problem solved.

It's not that realists and theists are wrong. No, they don't exist.
There are only anti-realists and atheists.

It's like the mirror image of Immanuel Cant.

[Iwannaplato]

and then, of course, there is the very short argument....
Anti-philosophical_realists believe there is no mind-independent reality.
Solipsists believe there is no mind-independent reality.
Therefore anti-philosophical_realists are solipsists.

(obviously I don't believe this is correct, but it should highlight for VA one of the problems, and there are a few, in his argument above.)

Let's call it a fallacy of false equivalence. Because some quality is the same two things are the same.

Now the truly remarkable thing about VA's argument is that realists and solipsists DON'T share the quality in question - belief in a mind independent reality.

I have never before seen someone argue that A and B do not share the same trait, so they are the same.

And VA does not seem to understand how adding an antirealist position in step two does not make realists and solipsists come closer together, not that his argument works vastly better with antirealists and solipsists being the same.

Strangest thing I've seen in a long time.