Anti-realism(s)

[Iwannaplato]

I'd like to discuss Anti-realisms. In another thread I asked Atla for one of his stances that is anti-realist. Below is my first response.

I think the main problem here is that mind-independence means at least 3-4 different things. Taking 3-4 different things and mixing them together into one amorphous blob doesn't lead anywhere, an example is VA who has been hopelessly chasing his own tail for many years. Those 3-4 different things need to be evaluated individually, for example:

1. mind-independence as in the God's-eye-view: probably this view was, and to a degree still is a major collective hallucination, shared by countless people. Such independence was the 19th century scientist's dream. We are "looking into" a perfectly objective, independent world (reality), we are watching it as it happen, but we never disturb it in any way. We somehow have this God's-eye-view that looks into the world from an outside perspective. But when we try to find ourselves, the looker, this outside point, we don't find anything, can't find anything, but this doesn't seem to bother people.
This form of mind-independence is indeed probably crazy. In this sense, reality probably isn't mind-independent. But one also can't say that reality is mind-dependent, only that it's not-independent, that's the correct opposite. There's no outside perspective, instead there's an inside perspective that feels like an outside perspective.
(anti-realism vs realism 1-0)

I think many realists would agree with this. IOW while there is this sense of mind independent reality out there, I don't think this is necessarily an antirealism. I think one could agree with you and still be a realist. It sounds like naive realism...

In philosophy of perception and epistemology, naïve realism (also known as direct realism, perceptual realism, or common sense realism) is the idea that the senses provide us with direct awareness of objects as they really are.[1] When referred to as direct realism, naïve realism is often contrasted with indirect realism.[2]

2. mind-independence as in absolute independence from the rest of the world: the human mind is probably a part of the head, so as VA would say "part and parcel of reality". In this sense the world again isn't mind-independent, but it's also not mind-dependent, just non-independent.
(2-0)

Is this the idea that the mind is not in reality? and outsider view? I'm not sure that's realist or at least not necessarily realist. It sounds rather dualist and a bit archaic. Neither of which excludes it from realism, but not so common in modern realisms, I think.

3. mind-independence of the presumed outside world in the non-absolute sense, that there is a shared objective reality "out there" and every human perceives it in a different way, while the mind is also part of this world: this form of mind-independence is probably correct, using science we could build an accurate model, mapping of this objective relity, and this model is a thousands times better and bigger than anything else, yet can be made to account for everything
(2-1)

This sounds more like a modern common realism, especially if one presumes that while there is a common realism not dependent on minds, but affecting what minds perceive when there are minds around, what gets perceived is severely interpreted, guessed at, and affect by the specific senses and nervous system of animals, that then the psychology and cultures and individual peculiarities of the individual human perceiver.

4. mind-independence in a more Kantian sense: yes everything we ever experience is our own mind, it's not possible to get outside of it, there are only the appearances. Within our own mind, using its features, faculties, we construct the idea, the experience of the outside world. We live a representation within our own heads, and the representation works pretty well (unless one is schizophrenic etc.)
Which however totally doesn't mean that our mind can't have an outside, nor does it mean that such an outside would be mind-dependent in some absolute or relative sense.
(2.5-1.5)

I'm not sure how to categorize this one.

5. mind-independence in quantum mechanics yeah yeah.. I think the mind would have to be fairly separate, independent, something "other" than mere stuff, in order to be responsible for quantum weirdness. Here mind-dependence kinda shoots itself in the foot.
Personally I believe that human thinking is linear, but reality as a whole is of course inherently circular because every other idea is incoherent. And our human minds may be smaller circular things within the bigger circular reality, which may have to do with quantum weirdness.
Still it would be more of a "consistency of the outer reality with mental phenomena, in some rather technical way(s)" than mind-dependence in a very literal sense.

If you take observation to be this separate act that is performed on matter, then you end up with something like what you say above.

One thing about many antirealist positions is that they question either the existence of unobservables or at least the possibility of confirming them. IOW models may be adequate, in the sense that they produce math that has predictive value, but this does not mean they reflect the reality of things in the model that are not observered. The reality that they exist. The qualities those things have that lead to our perceptions. So, there's no particle or wave, no eigenstates 'waiting' to move from potentialities to actuality. So, there is always simply moments of perception which include a unity of perceived/perceiving. The whole model of observation collapsing some unobserved potentiality is just a ways of explaining something we cannot know anything about or does not exist. Epistemological antirealism or metaphysicsal antirealism.

In any case one big bone of contention between the realists has been around observables.
Realists have countered that the distinction is not meaningful. We can get into that more below, just trying to get things rolling.

I will say that I am, myself, mainly interested in metaphysical antirealism and one that takes an actual stance, a positive stance, instead of primarily saying that realism is wrong or speculative.

[Iwannaplato]

double

[Impenitent]

to begin:

1. I appear to be a perceiving being (according to my perceptions and the collection thereof) -
2. the perceptions (and the linguistic labels thereof) are the only things to which that my mind has access ...

existence outside of the perceptions can never be perceived...

what are some assumptions about that which is perceived?

-Imp

[Iwannaplato]

to begin:

1. I appear to be a perceiving being (according to my perceptions and the collection thereof) -
2. the perceptions (and the linguistic labels thereof) are the only things to which that my mind has access ...

existence outside of the perceptions can never be perceived...

what are some assumptions about that which is perceived?

-Imp

Is this a presentation of an antirealism? Pardon my crass request for an overview.

existence outside of the perceptions can never be perceived...

This seems like an analytic truth. In some instances I would stress 'seems' but let's take it as given now.

what are some assumptions about that which is perceived?

Realists might assume that one can infer things about that which instigates the perception. Which gets into the observable/inobservables issue, I mentioned in my previous post?
Antirealists of the epistemological persuasion might say that we should not make any assumptions about that which is perceived ( a phrase they might consider unjustified).
Metaphysical antirealists might say that there is nothing which is perceived, we just have perceptions. (I sometimes wonder if this leads to a regress. Do we perceive our perseptions? Or does it lead to a loss of self? if all there is are perceptions, what is the self? There is no self ---> perceiving stuff, but rather just this ongoing shfting perception without perceiver. Some critiques of the cogito look like this.

One thing antirealists need to address, I think, is what we are allowed to infer, if anything. If we can infer the existence of X, then why not Y. If we can infer the qualities of X, why not the qualities of Y? Is inference to best explanation available to your version of antirealism or not?

[Flannel Jesus]

Anti realism framed as doubt, or as a fundamental limitation of what we can know, makes a lot of sense. It's not the statement "reality doesn't exist", instead it's the statement "we don't have access to the kind of information we would need to to be certain reality exists".

Which is true. As others have stated in this thread, we have access to what we think and what we experience, perceptually and otherwise. We can use those experiences to try to figure out what's causing those experiences, but inherently those attempts to figure it out can ALWAYS be met with brain-in-a-vat flavour doubts.

I don't deny that.

Those type of doubts are intellectually valid and worth considering. I, personally, tend to have a moment of having the doubt and then I move past it when I realise it's a dead end.

[Iwannaplato]

Anti realism framed as doubt, or as a fundamental limitation of what we can know, makes a lot of sense. It's not the statement "reality doesn't exist", instead it's the statement "we don't have access to the kind of information we would need to to be certain reality exists".

Which is true. As others have stated in this thread, we have access to what we think and what we experience, perceptually and otherwise. We can use those experiences to try to figure out what's causing those experiences, but inherently those attempts to figure it out can ALWAYS be met with brain-in-a-vat flavour doubts.

I don't deny that.

Those type of doubts are intellectually valid and worth considering. I, personally, tend to have a moment of having the doubt and then I move past it when I realise it's a dead end.

Can't a realist have this attitude? IOW acknowledge that knowledge of what is beyond is potentially false, but given we are more and more effective in prediction and creating solutions based on our models, they present a to some degree correct model of reality and also that there is one beyond our perceptions. Must a realist be able to prove to themselves at least that they are not in a brain in a vat situation to be a real realist? Is certainty a must for any ism? Are the objections of antirealism certain? IOW words can the realist be certain they are making sense? That their objections hold? for what perception is or must be? about what is possible (to know)? It seems like even skeptical objections are subject to radical doubt.

One argument some realists raise is one based on plausability. It's often referred to as the no miracles argument. Realism seems to lead to all sorts of repeatedly functional solutions and also can predict further findings with regularitly. It would be a miracle if these models of 'reality out there' were not correct, yet so effective.

The No Miracles Argument (NMA) is perhaps the most prominent argument in the debate about scientific realism. It contends that the truth of our best scientific theories is the only hypothesis that does not make the astonishing predictive and explanatory success of science a mystery.

There are antirealist counterarguments (of course )

[Flannel Jesus]

Anti realism framed as doubt, or as a fundamental limitation of what we can know, makes a lot of sense. It's not the statement "reality doesn't exist", instead it's the statement "we don't have access to the kind of information we would need to to be certain reality exists".

Which is true. As others have stated in this thread, we have access to what we think and what we experience, perceptually and otherwise. We can use those experiences to try to figure out what's causing those experiences, but inherently those attempts to figure it out can ALWAYS be met with brain-in-a-vat flavour doubts.

I don't deny that.

Those type of doubts are intellectually valid and worth considering. I, personally, tend to have a moment of having the doubt and then I move past it when I realise it's a dead end.

Can't a realist have this attitude? IOW acknowledge that knowledge of what is beyond is potentially false, but given we are more and more effective in prediction and creating solutions based on our models, they present a to some degree correct model of reality and also that there is one beyond our perceptions. Must a realist be able to prove to themselves at least that they are not in a brain in a vat situation to be a real realist?

That's me. That's what I'm doing

[Iwannaplato]

Anti realism framed as doubt, or as a fundamental limitation of what we can know, makes a lot of sense. It's not the statement "reality doesn't exist", instead it's the statement "we don't have access to the kind of information we would need to to be certain reality exists".

Which is true. As others have stated in this thread, we have access to what we think and what we experience, perceptually and otherwise. We can use those experiences to try to figure out what's causing those experiences, but inherently those attempts to figure it out can ALWAYS be met with brain-in-a-vat flavour doubts.

I don't deny that.

Those type of doubts are intellectually valid and worth considering. I, personally, tend to have a moment of having the doubt and then I move past it when I realise it's a dead end.

Can't a realist have this attitude? IOW acknowledge that knowledge of what is beyond is potentially false, but given we are more and more effective in prediction and creating solutions based on our models, they present a to some degree correct model of reality and also that there is one beyond our perceptions. Must a realist be able to prove to themselves at least that they are not in a brain in a vat situation to be a real realist?

That's me. That's what I'm doing

I added a bit to the post you're responding to.

That said: it seems implicit, given you're saying 'makes a lot of sense' in the first sentence above' that in a way you see antirealism, at least in part, as a useful tool in realism. IOW it's good if we question the conclusions (in even radical ways) even if we are realists. Antirealism as a kind of internal heuristic check inside realism. Or?

[Flannel Jesus]

One argument some realists raise is one based on plausability. It's often referred to as the no miracles argument. Realism seems to lead to all sorts of repeatedly functional solutions and also can predict further findings with regularitly. It would be a miracle if these models of 'reality out there' were not correct, yet so effective.

The No Miracles Argument (NMA) is perhaps the most prominent argument in the debate about scientific realism. It contends that the truth of our best scientific theories is the only hypothesis that does not make the astonishing predictive and explanatory success of science a mystery.

There are antirealist counterarguments (of course )

I suppose one could argue that, if I'm a brain in a vat, scientific facts and consistency aren't a miracle or mystery : they aren't a miracle or mystery, because they are what this brain's controller wants this brain to experience.

They want me to experience living in a world with these properties. Gravity, electro magnetism, whatever. These are all part of the system designed for me to experience.

It's basically a form of theism at that point isn't it? Solipsistic theism. I am alone in this world, which is being created for me by a being outside of and in control of this world...

[Skepdick]

Can't a realist have this attitude? IOW acknowledge that knowledge of what is beyond is potentially false, but given we are more and more effective in prediction and creating solutions based on our models, they present a to some degree correct model of reality and also that there is one beyond our perceptions.

Model efficacy is epistemically insufficient to demonstrate reality. There are such things as models of equivalent efficacy which mutually contradict each other's internal assumptions.

That is to say they are observationally equivalent but mutually conflicting.

The simplest examples of two such models are:

1. The color of this sentence is red.
2. The color of this sentence is blue, not red.

[Flannel Jesus]

Antirealism as a kind of internal heuristic check inside realism. Or?

It doesn't really do much as a check, I think. What does it check for?

It's just an unavoidable doubt. No matter what model of the world you have, there's always some pathway along which you have to admit, "my model might be wrong". This is what that pathway of doubt looks like for realism.

[Iwannaplato]

One argument some realists raise is one based on plausability. It's often referred to as the no miracles argument. Realism seems to lead to all sorts of repeatedly functional solutions and also can predict further findings with regularitly. It would be a miracle if these models of 'reality out there' were not correct, yet so effective.

The No Miracles Argument (NMA) is perhaps the most prominent argument in the debate about scientific realism. It contends that the truth of our best scientific theories is the only hypothesis that does not make the astonishing predictive and explanatory success of science a mystery.

There are antirealist counterarguments (of course )

I suppose one could argue that, if I'm a brain in a vat, scientific facts and consistency aren't a miracle or mystery : they aren't a miracle or mystery, because they are what this brain's controller wants this brain to experience.

They want me to experience living in a world with these properties. Gravity, electro magnetism, whatever. These are all part of the system designed for me to experience.

It's basically a form of theism at that point isn't it? Solipsistic theism. I am alone in this world, which is being created for me by a being outside of and in control of this world...

If you are actually suggesting 'this is a brain in a vat situation' then yes. If you are saying 'we don't know if is a simulation or brain in a vat or some other situation with similar features, including scenarios I cannot and/or haven't imagined, then.....

It's less like that.

There are some responses that are different here:

Some antirealists have (tried to show) shown that for all we know reality can have plural models that work. So, if you can have several models that work, reality isn't a single thing, but rather ontologically plural. Antirealists can then make the positive assertion that there is no mind indepdant reality but actually as many realities as perceivers. Or that reality isn't ontological singular, but actually some sort of infinitely pliable non-thing or set of non-things.

[Iwannaplato]

Antirealism as a kind of internal heuristic check inside realism. Or?

It doesn't really do much as a check, I think. What does it check for?

It's just an unavoidable doubt. No matter what model of the world you have, there's always some pathway along which you have to admit, "my model might be wrong". This is what that pathway of doubt looks like for realism.

I guess it would always be getting us to look at assumptions: could it be possible that other models for this external reality would also work? Are we inferring in this situation in ways we would not allow theist to infer? for example. The anti-realist, it seems to me, is averse to inferring around ontology/metaphysics. So, they get realists to look at their processes of inference. The realist might realise in such a process that they are allowing themselves a freedom to infer around ontology they do not allow people with other paradigms. (so that was two ways the check might function)

[Flannel Jesus]

I guess it would always be getting us to look at assumptions: could it be possible that other models for this external reality would also work? Are we inferring in this situation in ways we would not allow theist to infer? for example.

That's definitely a useful function, sure. I see it.

[Skepdick]

I guess it would always be getting us to look at assumptions: could it be possible that other models for this external reality would also work? Are we inferring in this situation in ways we would not allow theist to infer? for example. The anti-realist, it seems to me, is averse to inferring around ontology/metaphysics. So, they get realists to look at their processes of inference. The realist might realise in such a process that they are allowing themselves a freedom to infer around ontology they do not allow people with other paradigms. (so that was two ways the check might function)

This is a distinction without a difference.

Ontological arguments (be they realist, anti-realist or solipsistic) support any and all inferences. Including the God inference. Hence - Anselm and Godel's ontological arguments.

Restrictions imposed upon inference are always self-imposed inhibitions, and if they aren't self-imposed then we are back at the moral table discussing social norms about the ways other people aren't allowed to think.