Frege-Geach Problem Destroyed NonCognitivism

[FlashDangerpants]

Note I qualified;

How can PH deny he is not a non-cognitivist, when his claims in relation to Morality conform to the following [if not all, then the main ones];

You polluted your list with stuff with a bunch of congitivist things that Pete agrees with, and then challenge him to deny his non-cognitivism against your failed list.

It's lazy, it's stupid and it shows that you do not have a basic grasp of the subject matter. You are incompetent after a decade of this shit to even do the day one stuff without fucking it up.

[Atla]

900000 folders

I was wondering, can you tell me, does my stance on ethics have a name? Is there even such a category?

- I'm a subjectivist (no sign of objective morality in the known world)
- "cognitivist" obviously
- However, I think that we need to put our minds together, and come up with a good ethics that could be used universally. And then update it sometimes, when necessary. We need to treat this consensus ethics as it was sort-of objective. This is more or less what many societies are doing already anyway.

So I'd say I'm something like a pseudo-objectivist. I think this is the best we can make out of ethics. Of course I also think that humanity will never be smart enough to implement this. But it's my stance nevertheless.

[FlashDangerpants]

900000 folders

I was wondering, can you tell me, does my stance on ethics have a name? Is there even such a category?

- I'm a subjectivist (no sign of objective morality in the known world)
- "cognitivist" obviously
- However, I think that we need to put our minds together, and come up with a good ethics that could be used universally. And then update it sometimes, when necessary. We need to treat this consensus ethics as it was sort-of objective. This is more or less what many societies are doing already anyway.

So I'd say I'm something like a pseudo-objectivist. I think this is the best we can make out of ethics. Of course I also think that humanity will never be smart enough to implement this. But it's my stance nevertheless.

So far you are in line with JL Mackie in the forgotten second half of his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. After doing his entirely cognitive error theory thing to establish that moral properties are imaginary in the first half, which lines him up with your starting position, he follows up by attempting to define a sort of morality that you can persuade everyone to assent to, which seems a lot like your ambition.

This is usually referred to as revolutionary fictionalism. The idea there being that after discovering - against the standard expectation - that moral facts don't exist unless we construct them, revolutionary fictionalists look at how we have been constructing these fictions thus far and look for what is the most prudent way to go about improving that sort of thing.

My own brand is hermeneutic rather than revolutionary, on the extremely slender basis that I have never agreed with Mackie that our moral language assumes universal moral fact and aims to uncover them, I see that sort of thing as inherently an as-if sort of deal. So if you never really felt that the whole concept of universal moral facts ever made any sense, then you might be a hermeneutic fictionalist.

Either way you get to the same outcome in the end, which is that we will never have ultimate moral authority to overrule those who dispute your claim, but there is internal rationale to the human practices of morality (if you want freedoms you get concomitant responsiblities etc) so the notion that withoud God to back the currency of moral exchange, it's all bankrupt is nonsense. All that happens is you have to work within the system to reform the system.

[promethean75]

certainly there is a corresponding 'mental' state for every feeling we have when we express a value, so the expression of the value is as objective as the 'mental' states corresponding to it. so 'that person is a shmuck!' is a fact becuz it's only a collection of objective 'mental' states observable to the third person... there is no u outside and beyond the brain producing the mental state that has the 'mental' state, so it couldn't possibly be a subjective possession of some sort.

what i claim, as a garage non congnitivist, is that the objective facticity of the valuating (above) describes nothing of the actual properties of the object of value. that's to say it's impossible for a person to be a shmuck. that utterance expresses nothing but a degree of revolt, disagreement, offense, etc., none of which are actual properties of the person (the shmuck). what you're actually experiencing when u call joe a shmuck is your own body's reaction to a stimulus, not the stimulus itself, so none of the qualities of your experience pertain to the actual nature of the objective stimulus. 

the proposition is therefore emotive and not descriptive. you're not telling me anything about Joe, only how u feel about em. not to mention somebody else might think that schmuck is an angel.

moral realists are really overt prescriptivists. Btw that summary of non cognitivism by F.D. Pants wuz outstanding. It's like bro how could u know so much about non cognitivism and still choose not to be one.

[Atla]

900000 folders

I was wondering, can you tell me, does my stance on ethics have a name? Is there even such a category?

- I'm a subjectivist (no sign of objective morality in the known world)
- "cognitivist" obviously
- However, I think that we need to put our minds together, and come up with a good ethics that could be used universally. And then update it sometimes, when necessary. We need to treat this consensus ethics as it was sort-of objective. This is more or less what many societies are doing already anyway.

So I'd say I'm something like a pseudo-objectivist. I think this is the best we can make out of ethics. Of course I also think that humanity will never be smart enough to implement this. But it's my stance nevertheless.

So far you are in line with JL Mackie in the forgotten second half of his Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. After doing his entirely cognitive error theory thing to establish that moral properties are imaginary in the first half, which lines him up with your starting position, he follows up by attempting to define a sort of morality that you can persuade everyone to assent to, which seems a lot like your ambition.

This is usually referred to as revolutionary fictionalism. The idea there being that after discovering - against the standard expectation - that moral facts don't exist unless we construct them, revolutionary fictionalists look at how we have been constructing these fictions thus far and look for what is the most prudent way to go about improving that sort of thing.

My own brand is hermeneutic rather than revolutionary, on the extremely slender basis that I have never agreed with Mackie that our moral language assumes universal moral fact and aims to uncover them, I see that sort of thing as inherently an as-if sort of deal. So if you never really felt that the whole concept of universal moral facts ever made any sense, then you might be a hermeneutic fictionalist.

Either way you get to the same outcome in the end, which is that we will never have ultimate moral authority to overrule those who dispute your claim, but there is internal rationale to the human practices of morality (if you want freedoms you get concomitant responsiblities etc) so the notion that withoud God to back the currency of moral exchange, it's all bankrupt is nonsense. All that happens is you have to work within the system to reform the system.

Of course take everything I say with a truckload of salt because I've little to no idea about established ethical philosophy and I don't know what I'm talking about. But I don't think I can wholeheartedly agree with the error theory.

It strikes me as correct in the absolute, objective sense, but incorrect in the subjective sense. To me, morality as in the tribal morality, as in rudimentary conscience, is not nothing at all. Morality on that level is roughly the same for everyone, I think it involves roughly the same feelings/sensations of moral rightness/wrongness for everyone (everyone except people without morality/conscience).

It's when we move away from what morality originally evolved for, and start using morality for other things, when we start developing higher and broader forms of conscience, is when we get more and more diverging, often opposing moral stances.

Saying things like:
1. There are no moral features in this world.
2. No moral judgments are true.
3. Our moral judgments fail to describe the moral properties of things.
4. There is no moral knowledge.

are true in the absolute, objective sense. But I'd say, we can say that there can be degrees of truth (in the subjective sense) to moral features/judgments/properties/knowledge, based on how they relate to some features of the original tribal morality/rudimentary conscience. Some features have to be thrown out of course as tribalism only partially works anymore.

The point is that throughout history, moral systems were never entirely fictional at all, they were always partially based on the original morality/conscience. And when we try to build a morality for the unified humanity, that too will of course have to partially be based on some features of the original morality/conscience. Otherwise it couldn't even work.

[FlashDangerpants]

Of course take everything I say with a truckload of salt because I've little to no idea about established ethical philosophy and I don't know what I'm talking about. But I don't think I can wholeheartedly agree with the error theory.

It strikes me as correct in the absolute, objective sense, but incorrect in the subjective sense. To me, morality as in the tribal morality, as in rudimentary conscience, is not nothing at all. Morality on that level is roughly the same for everyone, I think it involves roughly the same feelings/sensations of moral rightness/wrongness for everyone (everyone except people without morality/conscience).

Most people would agree with you there, all people hold certain desires and many of those desires are largely universal, we all want autonomy and we want cooperation, we seek to enjoy the fruits of our own labours but we also want a nice atmosphere of sharing and so on. A lot of these require the striking of some sort of balance, which is a frequent source of controversy, and those little controversies are what drives the question of objectivity, it's the (futile) search for the sword sharp enough to cut through all the bullshit.

It's when we move away from what morality originally evolved for, and start using morality for other things, when we start developing higher and broader forms of conscience, is when we get more and more diverging, often opposing moral stances.

As a description of how we got to where we are today, I think this sounds fair enough. Our apelike ancestors about 100,000 years ago had a comparatively simple society, they probably resolved a lot of conflicts with tests of strength, nonetheless all the stuff about sharing and autonomy above applied to them too.I feel fairly safe in speculating that all of our univeralisable social desires that we still hold today are directly inherited with probably little if any change.

Saying things like:
1. There are no moral features in this world.
2. No moral judgments are true.
3. Our moral judgments fail to describe the moral properties of things.
4. There is no moral knowledge.

are true in the absolute, objective sense. But I'd say, we can say that there can be degrees of truth (in the subjective sense) to moral features/judgments/properties/knowledge, based on how they relate to some features of the original tribal morality/rudimentary conscience. Some features have to be thrown out of course as tribalism only partially works anymore.

We may have an issue of definitions and semantics here to distinguish between beliefs and subjective truths but let's say there are big truths and little truths. If you hold a belief that is in conflict with a Big True, your belief is just incorrect and thus if we can gain knowedge of a Big True then we can resolve any controversies that arise by comparing them to a Big True and we don't need to argue about that thing any more.

The little truths are something less than that, I'm going to guess they are the product of widespread agreement and that within some society or or social grouping they are assumed true for all practical purposes? Those sorts of trues are very useful day to day, but ultimately if somebody holds a belief that conflicts with them, the question is probably moot. Manners, traditions, customs, fashions and so on are things that might well fall under this umbrella. Or at least I think something like that is your intent? I'm going to use the term social truths in case I am in conflict with the intended meaning of subjective truth.

Social truths, which are negotiated and renegotiated on a daily basis, and are conditional on acceptance of certain common assumptions that can't be justified as Big Trues (but are very hard to doubt given that are totally baked into many of our language games), can be considered contingent but not arbitrary or random. These are the whole of the ball game here. What to do with them is the majority of what moral philosophy does as far as I know.

The point is that throughout history, moral systems were never entirely fictional at all, they were always partially based on the original morality/conscience. And when we try to build a morality for the unified humanity, that too will of course have to partially be based on some features of the original morality/conscience. Otherwise it couldn't even work.

So here we must deal with the misleading implications of the names we apply in philosophy. Fictionalism doesn't assert that the whole things is made up in that sense. It takes the same inputs as any other moral theory - the autonomy, sharing and whatnot. But what is considered fictional is the role of the assertions we make about morality.

Consider the case that hypothetically, I might say it is morally wrong for some people on philosophy forums to inaccurately accuse others of ad hominem fallacies when the person making the accusations knows perfectly well how that fallacy works and is capable of defending himself against similar accusations on grounds of dishonesty.

• A moral realist of the normal variety such as Immanuel Can would probably consider my statement about some hypothetical other person as a statement intended to convey a moral fact of the matter. A realist should assume that. Quite what VA would assume is just too weird to think about so I CBA

• A moral Error Theorist would concur that the intent was to state a moral fact. His theory being that I am mistaken in the attempt.

• A non-cognitive philosopher will say that I am just expressing a preference of some sort and not really asserting something that it makes any sense to think of as true or false.

• A Revolutionary Fictionalist might say that having discovered we are in error to talk about this thing as a presumed fact, we should construct an agreement to consider it fact anyway.

• But a Hermeneutic Fictionalist says that the way our language works isn't as simple as most of those other guys think, and we have many ways of discussing things on an as-if basis, so we use a the form of a truth apt statement bit we are doing so for conveninence and what is being discussed are beliefs not truth claim (or litte trues that just look a bit like Big Trues).

[Atla]

Most people would agree with you there, all people hold certain desires and many of those desires are largely universal, we all want autonomy and we want cooperation, we seek to enjoy the fruits of our own labours but we also want a nice atmosphere of sharing and so on. A lot of these require the striking of some sort of balance, which is a frequent source of controversy, and those little controversies are what drives the question of objectivity, it's the (futile) search for the sword sharp enough to cut through all the bullshit.

As a description of how we got to where we are today, I think this sounds fair enough. Our apelike ancestors about 100,000 years ago had a comparatively simple society, they probably resolved a lot of conflicts with tests of strength, nonetheless all the stuff about sharing and autonomy above applied to them too.I feel fairly safe in speculating that all of our univeralisable social desires that we still hold today are directly inherited with probably little if any change.

I think what you say is correct on some level, but I also have to disagree here. From where I'm standing, morality at its core isn't desire. Morality is morality, and roughly the same rudimentary morality led to, leads to roughly the same social desires.

We may have an issue of definitions and semantics here to distinguish between beliefs and subjective truths but let's say there are big truths and little truths. If you hold a belief that is in conflict with a Big True, your belief is just incorrect and thus if we can gain knowedge of a Big True then we can resolve any controversies that arise by comparing them to a Big True and we don't need to argue about that thing any more.

The little truths are something less than that, I'm going to guess they are the product of widespread agreement and that within some society or or social grouping they are assumed true for all practical purposes? Those sorts of trues are very useful day to day, but ultimately if somebody holds a belief that conflicts with them, the question is probably moot. Manners, traditions, customs, fashions and so on are things that might well fall under this umbrella. Or at least I think something like that is your intent? I'm going to use the term social truths in case I am in conflict with the intended meaning of subjective truth.

Social truths, which are negotiated and renegotiated on a daily basis, and are conditional on acceptance of certain common assumptions that can't be justified as Big Trues (but are very hard to doubt given that are totally baked into many of our language games), can be considered contingent but not arbitrary or random. These are the whole of the ball game here. What to do with them is the majority of what moral philosophy does as far as I know.

There are some Big Trues that can make everyday life more or less unlivable. Like constantly keeping in mind the illusory nature of the "I", or constantly keeping in mind that we are just experiencing a representation of the outside world, or constantly keeping in mind the relativistic nature of spacetime, or that we may be infinitely stretched across dimensions, or constantly keeping in mind the Even Bigger True that we aren't omniscient and could always be wrong about everything etc.

So there may be the need to split philosophy into the absolute and the relative philosophies, at least when it comes to some issues. The Little Trues don't have to be entirely correct, but are needed to keep life livable. So subjective moralites, and a pseudo-objective morality, could be something like this too. Somewhat true, somewhat social convention, somewhat personal subjective stuff.

I mean, I guess we all know what morality is, and that we'll continue to need it in our lives.

[Veritas Aequitas]

My earlier list was a quickie job, here is the revised listing;

As gleaned from my research, Moral NonCognitivism has the following features:

Moral Sentences - moral judgments

• Non-Cognitivism in General
  1. Cannot be Propositions
  2. Cannot be True nor False
  3. Not truth apt
  4. Not fact, not state-of-affairs
  4i .......
  5. Not objectively true
  6. Prescriptive not descriptive
  7. Non-Declarative Speech Acts
  8. ..........
  9. Moral knowledge impossible
  10. Not state of mind of Beliefs
  11. Express desires, emotions, dis/approval
  12. Do not predicate properties of subjects
  13. ..........
  14. are Mind Dependent + not true or false

Non-Cognitivism re logical Positivist
8. Meaningless and nonsense
[Queer Theory]
13. Are Queer - mythical

How can PH and his sidekick [FDP] deny they are not a non-cognitivist, when their claims in relation to Morality conform to the above listing as Non-Cognitivism-in-General.

According to the Philosophy Vibe video linked
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Wg1l7_ldf4
"If no solution is found then it seems the only option for moral logical reasoning is a cognitive approach."

So, PH and his sidekick [FDP] are either non-cognitivist [not truth apt] or cognitivist [truth apt].
The other option is Ethical Nihilist which they are not.

[FlashDangerpants]

My earlier list was a quickie job, here is the revised listing;

FFS, what is it with you and posting all the same shit over and over again?

Nice try, but still a fail.

13. Are Queer - mythical <--- complete bullshit. That's not what queer means at all, and the argument from queerness is not non-congitive, Mackie rejected non-cognitivism earlier in the book before getting to the argument from queerness, and that argument is about what form moral propoerties would take if they did exist (they would be unlike any other natural property - which is what queer means in this context)

You are unable to distinguish between the important elements of non-cognitivism that make it non-cog and the side effects that just make it one among many types of moral antirealism. In your weird structure free listicle...

1. Is indeed specific to non cogintivism, but Pete presents moral propositions and so do I. For instance... your answer to CIN about torturing dogs not being imoral is an absurd conclusion, I hold that torturing animals is quite obviously a moral wrong.
2. isn't specific enough as written to be specific at all, it applies equally to many theories, most of them perfectly cognitive. It applies to fictionalism for instance which is not non-cog.
3. is not specific enough, also applies to cognitive theories such as fictionalism.
4. word salad
5. not specific enough at all, applies to error theory, fictionalism and even quasi-realism
6. your morality-proper theory is prescriptive, don't be just openly stupid
7. well done, this does at least reference actual non-cognitivism. I've never seen Pete endorse this though, and I certainly don't so this shows neither he nor I am a non-cognitivist, keep up the good work you fucking idiot.
8 .... describes Logical Positivism and its attitude to metaphysics, not to ethics. Does not describe me or Pete at all.
9 again, fictionalism, error theory are examples of cognitive theories that assert the same thing.
10. I hold moral beliefs, Pete holdws moral beliefs, you have no record of either of us saying there are no such things as moral beliefgs, you are incompetent.
11. See 7 because this is the same point in other words.
12. See 7 because this is the same point in other words... again


Your "quickie" was shit. Your further research is inept.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I was reminded of the Frege-Geach Problem somewhere;

Frege-Geach Problem Hindered Non-Cognitivists Condemnation of Cognitivism

Comments from ChatGpt [with reservations].

The Frege-Geach Problem poses a challenge primarily to non-cognitivist theories of ethics.
Non-cognitivism, in a simplified form, asserts that moral statements do not express propositions or convey factual information but are instead expressions of emotions, attitudes, or preferences.
The problem arises when these non-cognitive attitudes appear to be embedded within larger sentences in a way that seems to preserve some semblance of truth conditions.
The challenge is to explain how non-cognitive attitudes can function coherently when combined in complex statements.

Here are some ways the Frege-Geach Problem can be used to raise questions about non-cognitivism:

Preservation of Meaning:
Argument: The problem highlights difficulties in explaining how the meaning or content of non-cognitive attitudes is preserved when embedded in complex sentences.
Implication: If non-cognitive attitudes lose their meaning or fail to combine coherently in embedded contexts, it challenges the consistency and plausibility of non-cognitivism.

Logical Connectives:
Argument: Non-cognitivism often struggles to account for the logical behavior of moral statements under connectives like "if," "and," or "not."
Implication: If non-cognitivism cannot adequately explain how these connectives operate on moral statements, it raises questions about the theory's ability to capture the logical structure of moral language.

Problem with Disagreement:
Argument: The Frege-Geach Problem also points to challenges non-cognitivism faces in explaining how moral disagreements can occur.
Implication: If non-cognitivism has difficulty accounting for the nature of moral disagreement, it raises concerns about its ability to provide a comprehensive account of moral discourse.

Complex Moral Reasoning:
Argument: Non-cognitivism may struggle to explain how individuals engage in complex moral reasoning involving conditional statements or moral principles.
Implication: If non-cognitivism cannot provide a satisfactory account of complex moral reasoning, it may seem incomplete as a theory of ethics.

Challenges to Universalizability:
Argument: Non-cognitivism may find it challenging to explain the universalizability of moral statements across different contexts.
Implication: If non-cognitivism struggles to address the issue of how moral statements apply universally, it may face difficulties in providing a comprehensive ethical framework.

.. the Frege-Geach Problem .. highlights certain difficulties and invites non-cognitivists to refine and elaborate on their theories to address these challenges.

Personally I cannot see how the doomed fundamentalistic non-cognitivists can improve on their counter against the cognitivists based on their insistence upon moral relativism and moral nihilism.

[Age]

While non-cognitivists attempt to discredit the cognitivists' claims [which I believe are justifiable with empirical evidence and philosophical reasoning], the non-cognitivists' claims are full of holes.

Outside of any model, story, FSK, what about any ethical claim makes it justifiable?

The EXACT SAME 'thing' which MAKES ALL 'justifiable' 'claims' JUSTIFIABLE.

Now, if ANY of 'you', here, are NOT YET AWARE of what 'this' IS, EXACTLY, and ARE INTERESTED IN FINDING OUT, then, hopefully, 'you' ALREADY NOW KNOW WHAT TO DO.

[FlashDangerpants]

Personally I cannot see how the doomed fundamentalistic non-cognitivists can improve on their counter against the cognitivists based on their insistence upon moral relativism and moral nihilism.

Are there any non-cognitivists in the forum with us now?