Is morality objective or subjective?

[FlashDangerpants]

Somehow, non-cognitivists need to describe whatever it is they want to say the phenomenon "morality" actually is.

Other than people's emotional response to events, what phenomena relate to morality?

Wants, needs, beliefs, desires, expectations, bargains, deals and contracts. All of which are congnisable, and that's why there aren't any actual non-congitivists for IC to argue with. If he understood the Frege part of Frege-Geach, this information would be enough for him to casually drop that line of attack that he's overinvested into.

[Immanuel Can]

Maybe I'm not doing morality properly, but I don't tend to think in syllogisms.

That's okay if you don't, of course.

But if the question is, "Is there any logic behind account X of morality," then the Frege-Geach is a tool to expose that logic for our consideration. That's all. If there's none, no logic, and morality is just an illusion, then we have no need of the Frege-Geach -- or of morality itself. It doesn't refer to anything real.

Morality isn't about logic, just like love isn't about logic.

Well, some might say that the thing that keeps love going is that it's fun. But is that enough to keep morality going? It's certainly not enough to justify it in any way.

You surely can't deny that love can be an incredibly powerful motivator, and I find that so can morality, even though neither depend on logic and rationality.

Yes, but not for a subjectivist. For a subjectivist, something that motivates but gives impressions that are untrue is just a delusion.

While I have your attention, IC, can I just remind you of my request from an earlier post, just in case you missed it.

Sure.

Let’s imagine you got your way, and society went back to being run on religious morality; what would the implications be for people like homosexuals and pregnant women who don’t want to have children?

Well, for a subjectivist, neither would be right or wrong. And since I don't believe society ought to be run by a "religious morality," I guess you'd have to ask somebody who wants that...depending on which "religious morality" they were advocating.

Free conscience is sacred...and Divine Judgment is personal. The latter fact justifies the former. That's what John Locke knew.

[Immanuel Can]

Somehow, non-cognitivists need to describe whatever it is they want to say the phenomenon "morality" actually is.

Other than people's emotional response to events, what phenomena relate to morality?

Wants, needs, beliefs, desires, expectations, bargains, deals and contracts. All of which are congnisable, and that's why there aren't any actual non-congitivists for IC to argue with. If he understood the Frege part of Frege-Geach, this information would be enough for him to casually drop that line of attack that he's overinvested into.

You'd like me to drop it, because, it seems, it's unanswerable from such a position. No other reason.

[Will Bouwman]

Somehow, non-cognitivists need to describe whatever it is they want to say the phenomenon "morality" actually is.

Other than people's emotional response to events, what phenomena relate to morality?

Well, here's what we know: human beings seem to practice a thing they call "morality." That makes it a phenomenon, meaning no more than "a thing that happens."

What do human beings do that makes them seem to practice a thing they call "morality" beyond expressing an emotional response to events?

So moral deliberation "happens."

Certainly people rationalise their emotional responses.

What we don't know is if that "happening" is legit or not. It could be like the phenomenon of children imagining human faces in the curtains in their windows at night...a thing they do, but not related to any objective realities at all...an assemblage of imaginations. So it could be nothing.

But we don't think it's nothing. Still, that doesn't mean it isn't nothing. And if it's not nothing, then what is this "phenomenon"? Every worldview needs to be able to give some explanation for what it is -- if only to say, "It's a delusion." But if an account is going to say that morality is a something, then it owes us to be able to say what that worldview account holds it to be.

If a worldview is that the something which is morality is an emotional response, what more does it owe you?

[Skepdick]

But agreement about how to calibrate an instrument is arrived at with reference to facts about the physical world.

Really? Which particular facts about the physical world determined that a meter is that particular length and not any other length?

A meter isn't a measuring instrument -unless it's a gas meter, or something like that, but that isn't the sort of meter you are referring to- so it can't be calibrated; thus your question is senseless. No wonder they wouldn't let you be a real policeman.

I didn't say it's an instrument? Any measurement instrument which measures distance needs to calibrated in order to measure 1 meter distance.

Calibrated against what?

If two instruments disagree about the length of an object which instrument is closer to being right? Which instrument is definitely wrong?

Do you know anybody with a mind who could explain it to you?

I guess you've ruled yourself out...

But it usually does when travelling across very large concepts.

Au contraire. The man-made vehicle which has traveled furthest (Voyager 1) used gravity assists to get up to its current speed.

Does it mean a lot to you to be 1.8 meters tall?

Not particularly. But it sure would mean something to you if it were true and not false.

[Will Bouwman]

Somehow, non-cognitivists need to describe whatever it is they want to say the phenomenon "morality" actually is.

Other than people's emotional response to events, what phenomena relate to morality?

Wants, needs, beliefs, desires, expectations, bargains, deals and contracts. All of which are congnisable...

Yes, but which is not, nor based on an emotional response?

...and that's why there aren't any actual non-congitivists for IC to argue with. If he understood the Frege part of Frege-Geach, this information would be enough for him to casually drop that line of attack that he's overinvested into.

I only learnt the term this morning, but it seems perfectly defensible. As someone whose opinion I respect, why shouldn't I be a non-cognitivist?

[Atla]

Morality, at its core, is a certain kind of feelings/sensations of rightness and wrongness, that permeates many of our experiences if we have a conscience/empathy. To the point where such feelings/sensations of rightness and wrongness can appear to be inherently part of the reality/world we live in, and usually goes unnoticed and always inherently assumed.

Morality, in the broader sense, is what is built around the above feelings/sensations.

A person with conscience can only truly see the above, when he/she has dealt with people without consciences more deeply. Then, the illusion of morality permeating things is completely shattered. We don't truly notice how much it was there all along, until suddenly we see it completely missing in some another person. Most people with conscience cannot believe or imagine that there are people without conscience (which explains half of history).

People without conscience can never experience or even imagine this certain kind of feelings/sensations of rightness and wrongness. Some of them do work out that there is this *something* called conscience that most people have, some of them think everyone is faking it, some of them don't notice it at all. They generally consider it a crippling weakness waiting to be exploited.

Morality is of course inherently subjective unless shown otherwise.

Well I think that's about it

[Harbal]

That's okay if you don't, of course.

But if the question is, "Is there any logic behind account X of morality," then the Frege-Geach is a tool to expose that logic for our consideration. That's all. If there's none, no logic, and morality is just an illusion, then we have no need of the Frege-Geach -- or of morality itself. It doesn't refer to anything real.

Morality isn't about logic, just like love isn't about logic.

Well, some might say that the thing that keeps love going is that it's fun. But is that enough to keep morality going? It's certainly not enough to justify it in any way.

That's a cheap trick, IC.

People commit murder for love; people risk their lives for love; A king of the land that I am privileged to be a citizen of gave up his throne for love. But why? Well, love is fun, isn't it?

You surely can't deny that love can be an incredibly powerful motivator, and I find that so can morality, even though neither depend on logic and rationality.

Yes, but not for a subjectivist. For a subjectivist, something that motivates but gives impressions that are untrue is just a delusion.

Actually, I believe it is true for everybody, whether they acknowledge it or not.

Let’s imagine you got your way, and society went back to being run on religious morality; what would the implications be for people like homosexuals and pregnant women who don’t want to have children?

Well, for a subjectivist, neither would be right or wrong. And since I don't believe society ought to be run by a "religious morality," I guess you'd have to ask somebody who wants that...depending on which "religious morality" they were advocating.

So what sort of morality do you think society ought to be run on, and what ought that society's attitude towards homosexuality and abortion be, would you say? Or maybe you don't know.

Free conscience is sacred...and Divine Judgment is personal. The latter fact justifies the former. That's what John Locke knew.

I think I know what "Divine Judgment is, but what do you mean when you say it is personal?

[Dontaskme]

if two instruments disagree about the length of an object which instrument is closer to being right? Which instrument is definitely wrong?

Two measuring instruments are neither wrong or right about length because two tape measures do not know they are measuring devices.

[Harbal]

If two instruments disagree about the length of an object which instrument is closer to being right? Which instrument is definitely wrong?

When two instuments disagree, they should be referred to arbitration, where an adjudicator instrument will make a final and binding measurement.

But it usually does when travelling across very large concepts.

Au contraire.

Any communication in a language other than English will be ignored.

Does it mean a lot to you to be 1.8 meters tall?

Not particularly. But it sure would mean something to you if it were true and not false.

I don't know what you mean by that. Do you know what you mean by it?

[Skepdick]

When two instuments disagree, they should be referred to arbitration, where an adjudicator instrument will make a final and binding measurement.

That's a pretty stupid process.

Should the adjudication instrument be manufactured according to the specifications of the first; or the second disagreeing instrument?

What if the "adjudication instrument" produces a third unique answer that doesn't agree with either of the other two?

I don't know what you mean by that. Do you know what you mean by it?

Do you know what I mean when I say I am 1.8 meters tall?

Do you know what I mean when I say I am 1.8 meters tall, but I am not using the standard definition for a meter?

[FlashDangerpants]

Other than people's emotional response to events, what phenomena relate to morality?

Wants, needs, beliefs, desires, expectations, bargains, deals and contracts. All of which are congnisable...

Yes, but which is not, nor based on an emotional response?

In the same sense that Reason is the Slave to the Passions, I would say that yeah, sure, we are motivated by emotional responses to engage in moral forms of life that give us equity and reciprocity and the other basic desiderata of the whole shebang and caboodle. But what I don't recommend is attempting an ineliminative reduction to emotions, moods, or attitudes.

...and that's why there aren't any actual non-congitivists for IC to argue with. If he understood the Frege part of Frege-Geach, this information would be enough for him to casually drop that line of attack that he's overinvested into.

I only learnt the term this morning, but it seems perfectly defensible. As someone whose opinion I respect, why shouldn't I be a non-cognitivist?

Honestly Frege-Geach isn't a terrible reason not to be non-cognitivist. To get out of it you would need to take Frege to task on the matter of intensional content (sadly that's not one of my legion of typos, so the the s in intensional is there for real). You can take a lead from Fodor or Kripke and get it done, but I would consider that a bit of a headfuck.

For my preference though, I just don't find this notion that moral claims express nothing at all except a certain form of approval or disapproval at all compelling, certainly not enough to try and explain Kripke/Rigid Designators to IC.

Off the top of my head, one other thing that I don't remember is any actual good arguments that were ever made for this non-cog thing. It was all a marriage of convenience that sidestepped a couple of doodoos that Ayer and Carnap didn't want to tread in, but they really never made a compelling argument in favour of it.

We have to give up a lot of stuff that makes sense to us to support this move and I don't like the trade. We don't need to have God to tell us how to to do moral rationales we just need to have competing needs and desires to fulfil and then application of rationales - whether they make ultimate sense or not - is just human nature. Alice bakes a pie, Bob and Carrol want a slice, Alice wants something in return, Bob and Carrol say it's nicer to just share, that's all a universe needs to contain for a cognisable moral logic to arise.. two or more available desires and three or more hairless apes to argue about it.

My personal belief is that the best version of all this stuff out there is Hermeneutic Moral Fictionalism. But I can be just a straight up moral error theorist and leave it at that quite happily. My real take is that we try to make a working logical singular system of morality out of disparate parts that aren't really compatible to form a singular harmonious system out of.

[Skepdick]

I only learnt the term this morning, but it seems perfectly defensible. As someone whose opinion I respect, why shouldn't I be a non-cognitivist?

Because it's incoherent. Here's the gist of it:

A noncognitivist denies the cognitivist claim that "moral judgments are capable of being objectively true, because they describe some feature of the world.

Lets suppose that moral claims do describe emotional responses. OK.

So the objective feature of the world being described; or expressed by moral claims (and therefore being objectively true) is my emotional state.

[Harbal]

Do you know what I mean when I say I am 1.8 meters tall, but I am not using the standard definition for a meter?

Yes, you mean you are 1.8 meters tall, but you are not using the standard definition for a meter?

[Skepdick]

Do you know what I mean when I say I am 1.8 meters tall, but I am not using the standard definition for a meter?

Yes, you mean you are 1.8 meters tall, but you are not using the standard definition for a meter?

So what does 1 non-standard meter mean to you? Can you convert it to a standard meter for me.